Chhim v. City of Houston: Pleading Employment Claims Requires Comparator Facts and Decisionmaker Knowledge; Five-Month Temporal Gap Insufficient for Retaliation, and Unbriefed Issues Are Forfeited

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Date: October 8, 2025

Panel: Judges Dennis, Graves, and Duncan (per curiam)

Docket No.: 24-20469

Disposition: Affirmed (unpublished; Fifth Cir. R. 47.5)

Introduction

In Chhim v. City of Houston, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of a pro se plaintiff’s employment discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII, the ADEA, and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA). The decision reiterates three interlocking principles that frequently decide early motions in employment cases:

Pleading a plausible disparate-treatment claim requires concrete facts about comparators—e.g., that similarly situated, non-protected applicants were hired over the plaintiff under nearly identical circumstances.
A retaliation claim must allege that an identifiable decisionmaker knew of the plaintiff’s protected activity and that there was a causal link; temporal proximity of five months, standing alone, is insufficient in the Fifth Circuit.
On appeal, even for pro se litigants, failure to address and explain how the district court erred constitutes forfeiture of the issues and warrants affirmance.

The case arises from the City of Houston’s refusal to interview or hire Joseph Chhim, a 79-year-old Asian man of Cambodian descent, for custodial and mechanical positions between July and September 2023. The district court dismissed his amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), and the Fifth Circuit affirmed—both because the pleadings lacked essential factual allegations and because Chhim did not challenge the district court’s analysis on appeal.

Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of:

Discrimination claims (Title VII/ADEA/TCHRA): Chhim did not plead facts supporting a plausible inference that the City rejected him because of race, national origin, or age. He conceded he did not know anything about the selected candidates, and he alleged no facts showing a less-qualified or similarly situated comparator outside his protected class was hired.
Retaliation claims (Title VII/ADEA/TCHRA): Chhim did not allege that any decisionmaker knew of his purported protected activity (a February 15, 2023 letter to the Supreme Court regarding prior litigation) or facts supporting causation. A five-month gap between that letter and the City’s July–September 2023 non-selection is not close enough to infer causation by temporal proximity alone.
Other defendants (EEOC and two of its employees): The district court held it lacked jurisdiction; Chhim did not contest that ruling on appeal and thereby forfeited any challenge.

Critically, the court held that, even construing Chhim’s briefs liberally, he failed to engage the district court’s reasoning on appeal. Under Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner, this failure is “the same as if he had not appealed that judgment.” The court therefore affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited and Their Influence

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972): Establishes that pro se pleadings are construed liberally. The Fifth Circuit invoked this baseline but emphasized that even pro se complaints must satisfy Rule 12(b)(6)’s plausibility requirement.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), via In re S. Scrap Material Co., 541 F.3d 584, 587 (5th Cir. 2008): Supplies the plausibility standard—complaints must contain enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face. The court applied this to require comparator and causation facts, not mere conclusions.
Meador v. Apple, Inc., 911 F.3d 260, 264 (5th Cir. 2018): Confirms de novo review of 12(b)(6) dismissals; facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. The panel accepted Chhim’s factual narrative but found it legally insufficient.
Chhim v. University of Texas at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 470–71 (5th Cir. 2016): A prior appeal by the same plaintiff. It underscores that a discrimination complaint must plead facts on the “ultimate elements” of disparate treatment to be plausible, and that comparator allegations matter. The court used it to show that, unlike in some prior filings, Chhim here alleged no comparator details at all.
Chhim v. University of Houston–Clear Lake, 129 F. Supp. 3d 507, 513 (S.D. Tex. 2015): Emphasizes that plaintiffs should allege that similarly situated individuals outside the protected class were treated more favorably under nearly identical circumstances. This district-court authority reinforces the comparator requirement the Fifth Circuit applied.
Mission Consolidated Independent School District v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 633–34 (Tex. 2012): The Texas Supreme Court instructs that TCHRA tracks Title VII; thus, federal Title VII/ADEA standards guide TCHRA analysis. The panel treated all three statutes as materially aligned for pleading purposes.
Munoz v. Seton Healthcare, Inc., 557 F. App’x 314, 321 (5th Cir. 2014): Sets out the elements of a prima facie retaliation claim (protected activity, adverse action, causal link), which inform what facts a complaint should allege to be plausible.
Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300, 305 n.4 (5th Cir. 1996): States that the “ultimate determination” in retaliation is whether protected activity was the but-for cause of the adverse decision. This frames the causation backdrop and the insufficiency of temporal proximity alone when the gap is substantial.
Medina, 238 F.3d at 684: Articulates that the causal link for retaliation requires employer knowledge—an employer cannot retaliate based on unknown protected activity. The court applied this to Chhim’s failure to allege that any decisionmaker knew of his February 2023 letter.
Normore v. Dallas Independent School District, 677 F. Supp. 3d 494, 531 (N.D. Tex. 2023): Reinforces the knowledge requirement; no retaliation where the decisionmaker lacked awareness of the protected activity at the time of the decision.
Lyons v. Katy Independent School District, 964 F.3d 298, 305 (5th Cir. 2020): A five-month lapse is not “close enough” to establish the causal-connection element by temporal proximity alone. This directly defeats Chhim’s reliance on timing.
Rollins v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021): Issues not adequately briefed on appeal are forfeited. Applied to the EEOC-related claims and foreshadows the broader forfeiture holding.
Grant v. Cuellar, 59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1995): Pro se briefs are read liberally; nonetheless, some substantive engagement with the district court’s analysis is required.
Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987): An appellant’s failure to address the district court’s reasoning is “the same as if he had not appealed.” This is the opinion’s capstone rationale for affirmance.

Legal Reasoning

1) Pleading standard applies fully to pro se employment complaints

Although the court accorded liberal construction to Chhim’s filings, it applied the ordinary Twombly plausibility threshold: the complaint must allege facts that make the claim plausible, not merely possible. The panel emphasized that, even at the pleading stage, a disparate-treatment claim must include facts addressing its “ultimate elements,” drawing from the Fifth Circuit’s prior decision in Chhim v. UT Austin.

2) Discrimination: comparator facts were missing

The court affirmed dismissal of race, national origin, and age discrimination claims because the complaint lacked critical comparator allegations:

Chhim conceded he did not know who was selected for the positions and therefore could not plausibly allege they were similarly situated or less qualified non-protected comparators.
Such allegations are central to supporting a reasonable inference of discriminatory motive at the pleading stage, especially where the plaintiff was not interviewed or hired and offers no other direct or circumstantial facts indicating bias.

The court contrasted this pleading with Chhim’s past cases, where at least some comparator allegations had been made—underscoring that even those fell short, and none were present here.

3) Retaliation: decisionmaker knowledge and temporal proximity

The retaliation claims failed for two independent reasons:

Decisionmaker knowledge: The complaint did not identify a decisionmaker or allege that such a person knew of the February 15, 2023 letter to the Supreme Court. Without knowledge, there can be no causal link.
Temporal proximity: Even assuming knowledge for argument’s sake, the five-month gap between the letter and the July 2023 non-selection was not “close enough” to plausibly suggest causation under Fifth Circuit precedent (Lyons).

The court reaffirmed that “ultimate” causation in retaliation is a but-for standard (Long), and that temporal proximity must be very tight to carry causation without more.

4) Appellate forfeiture controls the disposition

While the panel summarized the district court’s reasoning in detail, its operative basis for affirmance was that Chhim—despite liberal construction—did not engage the district court’s analysis or explain legal error in his appellate briefs. Under Brinkmann, that failure is equivalent to abandoning the appeal. The court also held that the claims against the EEOC and its employees were not contested on appeal under Rollins.

Impact

Although unpublished and nonprecedential under Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5, the decision is instructive in several practical respects:

Comparator pleading remains pivotal in the Fifth Circuit. Applicants alleging disparate treatment should marshal plausible facts showing that similarly situated individuals outside the protected class were hired instead, under comparable qualifications and circumstances.
Retaliation requires concrete knowledge and timing facts. Plaintiffs must identify (or plausibly describe) the decisionmaker and allege that person’s knowledge of protected activity. Temporal proximity of five months, standing alone, is not enough; additional causal indicia are necessary.
Pro se litigants must still meet plausibility standards. Liberal construction does not substitute for factual allegations on core elements. Courts will not infer comparator identity, decisionmaker knowledge, or causation from silence.
Appellate discipline matters. Failure to directly address the district court’s reasons is outcome-determinative. Even meritorious issues can be lost without targeted briefing.
TCHRA alignment. Texas state-law claims will rise or fall with their federal analogs; practitioners should plead them with the same factual specificity demanded by Title VII and the ADEA.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal: The court throws out a case at the outset because the complaint does not state a legally plausible claim, even assuming the facts are true.
Plausibility (Twombly): Plaintiffs must plead enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of liability—not mere labels, conclusions, or speculation.
Comparator allegations: In disparate-treatment cases, plaintiffs often need to allege that similarly situated, non-protected individuals were treated more favorably under nearly identical circumstances, supporting an inference of discriminatory motive.
Protected activity (retaliation): Actions like filing an EEOC charge, complaining internally about discrimination, or participating in discrimination proceedings.
Decisionmaker knowledge: To connect protected activity to an adverse action (e.g., non-hiring), the plaintiff must plausibly allege that the person who made or influenced the decision knew about the protected activity when acting.
Temporal proximity: The closeness in time between protected activity and adverse action. Very short intervals (days to a few weeks) may help infer causation; several months often are not enough without more.
But-for causation (retaliation): The protected activity must be the reason without which the adverse action would not have occurred; timing alone rarely proves this at later stages.
With prejudice: The dismissal is final on the merits; the same claims cannot be refiled.
Forfeiture on appeal: If an appellant does not address the district court’s reasoning or develop an argument, the issue is treated as abandoned and cannot be revived.
TCHRA–Title VII harmony: Texas’s TCHRA is interpreted in lockstep with federal Title VII; federal standards and cases are used to decide TCHRA claims.

Practical Guidance for Future Litigants

Gather comparator facts before filing: Use public records laws, job postings, municipal hiring logs, or discovery in related matters to identify who was hired, their qualifications, and how they compare to yours.
Name or plausibly describe the decisionmaker: If the specific individual is unknown, allege facts showing what office or committee made the decision and why knowledge of your protected activity can be inferred.
Strengthen causation beyond timing: Plead intervening facts such as statements referencing your protected activity, deviations from hiring procedures, or inconsistent explanations that connect the dots.
On appeal, pinpoint error: Identify each basis for the district court’s ruling and explain why it is incorrect, with citations. Liberal construction will not cure silence on dispositive issues.

Conclusion

The Fifth Circuit’s unpublished affirmance in Chhim v. City of Houston delivers a concise restatement of foundational pleading and appellate principles in employment cases. Disparate-treatment claims require comparator facts that plausibly suggest discriminatory motive; retaliation claims require allegations that the decisionmaker knew of the protected activity and that the adverse action followed closely enough—or was otherwise causally connected—to support a plausible inference of but-for causation. Most decisively here, the court underscores that even pro se appellants must confront the district court’s reasoning on appeal; failure to do so forfeits the issues and results in affirmance. The opinion thus serves as a practical roadmap for drafting viable employment complaints and for preserving issues on appeal under federal and Texas employment discrimination law.