Chavez-Suntaxi v. Bondi: Post-Loper Bright Continuity of the “One Central Reason” Standard and the Rigorous Abandonment Rule in Asylum Litigation

1. Introduction

On 30 July 2025 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a summary order in Chavez-Suntaxi v. Bondi, No. 23-7216, denying a petition for review brought by Carlos Enrique Chavez-Suntaxi, his wife Paola Clemencia Chiluisa-Vargas, and their minor child, all natives and citizens of Ecuador. The petitioners sought reversal of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) dismissal of their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).

Although the order is non-precedential under the Second Circuit’s local rules, it is one of the first appellate immigration decisions to address statutory interpretation after the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), which overruled Chevron deference. The court reaffirmed that the “one central reason” causation test continues to govern both asylum and withholding claims, and it underscored the stringent consequences of abandonment when counsel fails to brief dispositive issues. Practitioners and scholars therefore view the decision as an early roadmap on how federal courts may treat pre-existing immigration precedents in the post-Loper Bright era.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Petition denied. The court upheld the BIA’s determination that petitioners were ineligible for asylum, withholding, and CAT relief.
• Particular Social Group (PSG). Petitioners’ proposed group—“Ecuadorian men who take concrete steps to oppose gang authority”—was found neither “particular” nor “socially distinct,” and counsel failed to argue those requirements on appeal.
• Nexus. Even assuming a cognizable PSG, the record showed that the alleged harm arose from gangs’ economic motives (extortion) rather than a protected ground, failing the “one central reason” test under 8 U.S.C. §1158(b)(1)(B)(i).
• CAT. Petitioners did not challenge the agency’s finding that torture was not “more likely than not,” thereby forfeiting the claim.
• Abandonment. Because counsel devoted at most a sentence or no argument at all to several dispositive issues, those issues were deemed abandoned.
• Post-Loper Bright Note. The court held that overruling Chevron “does not call into question” earlier Second Circuit cases (e.g., Quituizaca v. Garland) that had relied on Chevron when establishing the “one central reason” standard.

3. Analytical Discussion

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Quituizaca v. Garland, 52 F.4th 103 (2d Cir. 2022). Re-affirmed that the “one central reason” requirement applies equally to asylum and withholding. The panel explicitly stated that Quituizaca remains good law post-Loper Bright.
2. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024). Cited for the proposition that elimination of Chevron deference does not automatically invalidate prior statutory precedents adopted under the Chevron framework—an important reassurance for stare decisis in immigration law.
3. Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2014) & BIA precedents Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I.&N. Dec. 227 (2014). Provide the modern three-part test for PSG cognizability (immutability, particularity, social distinction).
4. Garcia-Aranda v. Garland, 53 F.4th 752 (2d Cir. 2022) & Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2007). Clarify that criminal extortion for financial gain does not satisfy the nexus requirement.
5. Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013). Distinguished: unlike witnesses who publicly testify against gangs (socially visible), “people who oppose gangs” lack definable visibility.
6. Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676 (2d Cir. 2023) and Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540 (2d Cir. 2005). Provide the doctrinal basis for deeming ill-briefed issues abandoned.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

a. Standard of Review. Factual findings were assessed for “substantial evidence,” requiring the petitioner to show that “any reasonable adjudicator” would be compelled to reach the contrary conclusion. Questions of law were reviewed de novo.

b. Particular Social Group Analysis. The BIA concluded—and the Second Circuit agreed—that the proposed group failed two of the three PSG prongs:

• Particularity: Petitioners never explained clear boundaries of who “opposes” gangs, when the membership starts/ends, or how it can be objectively verified.
• Social Distinction: The record lacked evidence that Ecuadorian society recognizes such individuals as a distinct, identifiable group—unlike witnesses who testify in open court (Henriquez-Rivas).

Because counsel’s opening brief did not engage either prong, the issue was deemed abandoned.

c. Nexus (“One Central Reason”). Even if the PSG were cognizable, the evidence indicated that gang members targeted Chavez-Suntaxi primarily for extortion—a profit-driven motive insufficient under Garcia-Aranda. Petitioners’ brief contained only one conclusory sentence on nexus, again triggering abandonment.

d. CAT Claim. For CAT protection, an applicant must show it is “more likely than not” that torture will occur with government acquiescence. Petitioners mistakenly argued they needed to show only that the government was “unable or unwilling” to protect them—an asylum nexus standard, not the CAT standard. They failed to attack the agency’s dispositive finding that torture was not “more likely than not,” thereby forfeiting the claim.

e. Post-Loper Bright Statutory Interpretation. The panel reiterated the Supreme Court’s express assurance that overruling Chevron does not disturb precedents that interpreted statutes under that framework. Thus, Quituizaca (and, by extension, the “one central reason” requirement) remains binding in the Second Circuit unless and until the Supreme Court—or the Second Circuit sitting en banc—says otherwise.

3.3 Likely Impact of the Decision

1. Causation Standard Cemented Post-Loper Bright.
   Practitioners may no longer argue that the end of Chevron automatically calls earlier immigrant-friendly (or immigrant-unfriendly) interpretations into doubt. Courts will review each precedent under traditional stare decisis principles.
2. Heightened Briefing Obligations.
   The Second Circuit’s willingness to dispose of a case on abandonment grounds— and its notation that the same counsel has repeatedly committed similar errors—serves as a cautionary tale. Comprehensive, record-supported briefing is not optional.
3. Resisting Gangs ≠ Cognizable PSG (without more).
   Applicants who describe themselves broadly as “anti-gang” without demonstrating social visibility or precise boundaries will likely fail the PSG test.
4. Distinction between Economic Crime and Persecution.
   Where gangs pursue victims primarily for financial gain, courts will continue to deny asylum absent evidence that a protected ground plays a central role.
5. CAT Threshold Remains High.
   Merely showing government inability or unwillingness is insufficient; the applicant must show a probability of torture with government acquiescence.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Particular Social Group (PSG): A category of persons sharing an immutable trait, precisely defined, and socially recognized as distinct in the applicant’s country.
• One Central Reason Test: At least one primary (not incidental) reason for the harm must be a statutorily protected ground (race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or PSG).
• Abandonment on Appeal: If a party’s brief omits argument on a critical agency finding—or provides only perfunctory treatment—the court treats the issue as forfeited.
• Substantial Evidence Review: A deferential standard requiring reversal only when any reasonable fact-finder would necessarily reach the opposite conclusion.
• CAT “More Likely Than Not” Standard: An applicant must prove a probability exceeding 50% that torture will occur with official involvement or consent.

5. Conclusion

Chavez-Suntaxi v. Bondi signals three pivotal messages for the immigration bar and judiciary:

1. The demise of Chevron does not automatically unsettle prior statutory precedents such as the “one central reason” rule; courts will continue to apply them absent explicit overruling.
2. Failure to fully brief PSG criteria, nexus, or CAT probability is fatal; the Second Circuit will readily find abandonment.
3. Broad formulations like “people who oppose gangs” remain non-cognizable unless applicants produce country-specific evidence of social distinction and particularity. Purely economic extortion does not convert criminal activity into persecution.

While technically non-precedential, the order provides invaluable guidance on post-Loper Bright statutory interpretation, on counsel’s duties, and on the continued robustness of PSG and nexus doctrines. Future litigants would do well to heed the court’s admonition: precise group definitions, robust country evidence, and meticulously briefed arguments are prerequisites to appellate success.