Change in Law Alone Is Not an “Extraordinary Circumstance”:
The Post-Remand Rule 60(b)(6) Boundary in Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services

1. Introduction

Court – Date: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 1 August 2025
Procedural Setting: Decision on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court (Waetzig, 604 U.S. ___ (2025)).
Parties: Gary Waetzig (plaintiff–appellee)  |  Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. (defendant–appellant).
Core Question: After the Supreme Court clarified that a Rule 41(a)(1) voluntary dismissal “without prejudice” is a “final proceeding” eligible for Rule 60(b) reopening, could the district court still reopen Waetzig’s case under Rule 60(b) based on an intervening change in arbitration-jurisdiction law (Badgerow v. Walters)?

The panel’s answer is unequivocal: No. Although the Supreme Court removed the jurisdictional obstacle that the Tenth Circuit initially perceived (holding that a voluntary dismissal can be reopened), the remaining Rule 60(b) criteria were not met. The district court therefore abused its discretion when it treated the change in law as an “extraordinary circumstance” and reopened the action seventeen months after dismissal.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• The Supreme Court’s mandate resolved only step 1: a Rule 41(a)(1) voluntary dismissal is a “final proceeding” for Rule 60(b) purposes.
• On remand, the Tenth Circuit addressed step 2: whether any subdivision of Rule 60(b) was actually satisfied.
• The court held that:
  • Relief under Rule 60(b)(1) (mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect) was time-barred because the motion was filed more than one year after dismissal.
  • Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) (catch-all) was unavailable because (a) it cannot be used when the motion falls within b(1)–b(5) but is untimely, and (b) an intervening change in decisional law, standing alone, is not an “extraordinary circumstance.”
• Because Rule 60(b) relief failed, the panel reversed the district court without reaching subsequent jurisdictional or merits questions (steps 3 and 4).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Badgerow v. Walters, 596 U.S. 1 (2022)
  • Clarified that a standalone FAA §10/§11 petition must have an independent federal-question or diversity basis.
  • District court invoked Badgerow to find “extraordinary circumstances.” The Tenth Circuit held this was insufficient.
• Collins v. City of Wichita, 254 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1958)
  • Longstanding rule: change in law does not justify Rule 60(b)(6) relief.
  • Forms the doctrinal backbone for rejecting Waetzig’s argument.
• Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) & BLOM Bank v. Honickman, 605 U.S. ___ (2025)
  • Emphasise that Rule 60(b)(6) demands “extraordinary circumstances”; mere legal developments rarely suffice.
• Kemp v. United States, 596 U.S. 528 (2022)
  • Reiterates mutual exclusivity of 60(b)(1)–(5) and 60(b)(6).
• Elite IT Partners, Inc., 91 F.4th 1042 (10th Cir. 2024)
  • Recent Tenth Circuit application of the Collins rule—“change in case law” ≠ extraordinary.
• Rule 41(a)(1) and Rule 60(b)
  • The Supreme Court’s earlier holding in this same litigation—voluntary dismissal is a final proceeding—sets new national precedent on Rule 60(b)’s reach.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Time-bar under Rule 60(c)(1): A motion under Rule 60(b)(1) must be filed “no more than a year” after the judgment or proceeding. Waetzig waited seventeen months; the claim is untimely.
2. Mutual Exclusivity Principle: Because Waetzig’s ground (mistake/inadvertence) squarely fits b(1), he cannot bypass the one-year limit by relabeling under b(6). (Kemp; Pioneer).
3. “Extraordinary Circumstances” Test: Even if 60(b)(6) were open, intervening decisions—especially those that merely clarify an existing split—do not qualify. The court stressed:
• Finality interests would be “eviscerated” if every new Supreme Court decision reopened closed cases.
• Badgerow did not overrule controlling precedent within the Tenth Circuit; thus the “change” was modest.
4. Alternative Procedural Options: Waetzig could have sought a stay rather than dismissal, preserving jurisdiction. Litigants’ strategic choices, even if later regretted, rarely rise to “extraordinary circumstances.”

3.3 Likely Impact of the Judgment

• Clarifies Post-Supreme-Court Workflow: Even where SCOTUS holds that a voluntary dismissal is reopenable, lower courts must still police the substantive and temporal limits of Rule 60(b).
• Strengthens Finality: Reaffirms the Tenth Circuit line (now expressly relying on SCOTUS’s BLOM Bank) that mere intervening changes in law do not sustain Rule 60(b)(6) motions outside habeas or similarly exceptional settings.
• Guidance for Arbitration Strategy: Litigants who intend to challenge an eventual award should consider staying rather than dismissing. Otherwise, they risk being locked out by combined 1-year and statute-of-limitations constraints.
• Forum-selection in FAA Cases: After Badgerow, parties must plan for lack of federal jurisdiction at the enforcement/vacatur stage; Waetzig underscores that Rule 60(b) cannot be used as a backdoor to federal court when strategic mistakes are made.
• Uniformity Across Circuits: The decision aligns the Tenth Circuit with the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits which likewise treat changes in decisional law as non-extraordinary.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 41(a)(1) Voluntary Dismissal

A plaintiff’s unilateral right (before an answer or summary judgment motion) to dismiss the case “without prejudice,” meaning the merits are not decided and the plaintiff may refile.

Rule 60(b)

A rule allowing a federal court to undo (“relieve a party from”) a final judgment or proceeding for specific reasons (mistake, newly discovered evidence, fraud, etc.) or, under subsection (6), for “any other reason” deemed sufficiently extraordinary.

Rule 60(c)(1) Time Limits

While most 60(b) motions must be filed “within a reasonable time,” motions under subsections (1)-(3) have an absolute 1-year deadline.

Extraordinary Circumstances

Situations so rare and compelling that overriding the strong interest in finality is justified—usually where the integrity of the judicial process is at stake; not simply when the law later shifts.

Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) §10 / §11

Statutory grounds to vacate (set aside) or modify an arbitration award. Badgerow clarified that these provisions do not themselves confer federal jurisdiction.

5. Conclusion

Waetzig on remand establishes a two-part precedent:

1. The Supreme Court’s component: a Rule 41(a)(1) voluntary dismissal is a “final proceeding” open to Rule 60(b) review.
2. The Tenth Circuit’s component: that doorway remains narrow—motions must satisfy the substantive subdivision invoked and, for Rule 60(b)(1), comply with the one-year limit; changes in controlling law, by themselves, do not constitute “extraordinary circumstances” under Rule 60(b)(6).

Practitioners should take heed: strategic dismissals can have irrevocable consequences. Courts will not reopen cases simply because the legal landscape later shifts. Finality remains a bedrock principle, and Rule 60(b)(6) remains a reservoir to be tapped only in the truly exceptional case.