I. Precedents Cited and Their Role

1. Liberal Construction of Pro Se Pleadings – Greer v. Moon

The court begins by acknowledging the well‑established principle that pleadings filed by pro se litigants are to be liberally construed:

“When a litigant proceeds pro se, we construe their pleadings liberally and hold the pleadings ‘to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” – citing Greer v. Moon, 83 F.4th 1283, 1292 (10th Cir. 2023).

In Greer, the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed that courts should overlook technical defects in pro se filings and attempt to read them to state any plausible claim. The Chan panel repeats that rule, but immediately tempers it:

“[W]e do not act as [the litigant’s] advocate, if we can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which [the litigant] could prevail, we do so despite the litigant’s failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of various legal theories, or unfamiliarity with pleading requirements.”

This sets the stage: leniency in interpretation does not mean the court will create arguments the litigant has not made or excuse a total failure to respond to court orders.

2. Standard of Review – Conkle v. Potter and United States v. Clay

The panel reviews the dismissals under an abuse‑of‑discretion standard:

• Conkle v. Potter, 352 F.3d 1333 (10th Cir. 2003) – establishes that dismissals for failure to follow court orders are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
• United States v. Clay, 148 F.4th 1181 (10th Cir. 2025) – as quoted, a court abuses its discretion if it bases its ruling on:
  • An error of law;
  • A clearly erroneous factual finding; or
  • A “clear error in judgment.”

The panel invokes these cases to underscore that the question on appeal is not what the panel might have done in the first instance, but whether the district courts’ choices fell outside the range of permissible options in managing their dockets and enforcing compliance.

3. Authority to Dismiss Sua Sponte – Davis v. Miller and Olson v. Mapes

The core procedural principle supporting the dismissals comes from:

• Davis v. Miller, 571 F.3d 1058 (10th Cir. 2009) – holds that a district court may dismiss an action sua sponte if the plaintiff fails to comply with a court order, tying this authority to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
• Olson v. Mapes, 333 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2003) – similarly observes that a court can dismiss an action for failure to prosecute or to comply with rules or orders.

The panel applies these precedents directly:

“A district court can dismiss an action sua sponte if the plaintiff fails to comply with a court order. … That’s precisely what happened here.”

Because Chan ignored show‑cause orders in two separate courts, the panel concludes that dismissal without prejudice was well within the courts’ authority.

4. In Forma Pauperis Standards – Watkins v. Leyba and Neitzke v. Williams

To proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal, a litigant must meet several requirements. The panel cites:

• Watkins v. Leyba, 543 F.3d 624 (10th Cir. 2008) – an IFP applicant must:
  • Comply with filing requirements;
  • Demonstrate financial inability to pay fees; and
  • Present a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on law and facts supporting the appeal.
• Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989) – a claim is “frivolous” when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact,” a standard incorporated into IFP analysis.

The panel uses these precedents to deny IFP status because:

• Chan’s briefs contained only minimal, conclusory arguments (two sentences in one appeal, one repeated sentence in the other); and
• Those arguments did not engage with the actual ground for dismissal (failure to respond to show‑cause orders) and displayed fundamental legal misunderstandings (conflating venue, jurisdiction, and merits).

5. Appellant’s Duty to Address the Grounds for Decision – Nixon v. City & County of Denver

The panel quotes:

“An appellant’s first task ‘is to explain … why the district court’s decision was wrong.’” – Nixon v. City & Cnty. of Denv., 784 F.3d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 2015).

This principle is central here. Chan’s appellate briefs focused on:

• Residency of some defendants in Denver; and
• Broad statements about § 1983 “not barring” federal court intervention.

But neither brief confronted the actual reason the district courts dismissed: Chan’s complete failure to respond to court orders. Under Nixon, that failure to engage with the real basis for the decisions is itself a reason to affirm, and also supports the finding that the appeals are frivolous for IFP purposes.

6. Jurisdiction, Venue, and Pleading Standards – Statutes and Supreme Court Cases

The panel corrects Chan’s misunderstanding of several basic, but easily conflated, concepts:

• Venue – 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1)
  • Venue lies in “a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located” (emphasis added).
  • Thus, the presence of some defendants in Denver does not automatically make the District of Colorado a proper venue if other defendants reside in other states.
• Subject‑Matter Jurisdiction – 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 42 U.S.C. § 1983
  • Federal courts have jurisdiction over “federal questions,” such as claims under § 1983.
  • But subject‑matter jurisdiction is distinct from venue and from the sufficiency of the complaint under Rule 8.
• Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303 (2006)
  • Cited for the basic point that subject‑matter jurisdiction is not the same as venue.
• Pleading Standards – Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); 12(b)(3), (6); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)
  • Rule 8(a)(2) requires a “short and plain statement” showing entitlement to relief.
  • Rule 12(b)(3) allows dismissal for improper venue; Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
  • Iqbal establishes the modern plausibility standard for federal pleading, requiring more than conclusory allegations.

By citing these authorities, the panel underscores that:

“Subject‑matter jurisdiction is not the same as venue. Nor is it the same as stating a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2).”

Chan’s reliance on “§ 1983 jurisdiction” to answer a venue challenge or a Rule 8 problem reflects exactly the confusion the panel disavows.

II. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Dismissal for Failure to Comply with Court Orders

The key factual premise is undisputed: Chan did not respond to either district court’s order to show cause, did not amend his complaints, and did not attempt to cure any identified defects.

Under Rule 41(b) and Davis v. Miller, a district court may dismiss when a plaintiff fails to comply with a court order. The panel identifies:

• The existence of valid court orders (the show‑cause orders);
• Clear noncompliance by the plaintiff (complete silence); and
• An appropriately tailored response: dismissal without prejudice.

Within an abuse‑of‑discretion framework, this easily falls within the district courts’ authority. The panel does not discuss—but implicitly relies upon—the common Tenth Circuit factors for dismissal (such as those from Ehrenhaus in other contexts), likely because the dismissals were:

• Without prejudice, which is less drastic than dismissal with prejudice; and
• Based on total nonresponsiveness to clear court instructions.

The panel therefore concludes succinctly:

“Dismissal was within the courts’ authority and appropriate under the circumstances. Thus, it was not an abuse of discretion.”

B. Limits of Pro Se Leniency

The opinion takes care to affirm that the court has liberally construed Chan’s pleadings, citing Greer. However, the court emphasizes two limits:

1. Court leniency in reading a complaint does not:
   • Relieve a litigant of the duty to respond to orders; or
   • Permit the court to build arguments not presented.
2. There are procedural rules every litigant, including a pro se litigant, must follow, such as:
   • Responding to show‑cause orders;
   • Using required forms when ordered to do so; and
   • Respecting venue and pleading requirements.

Chan’s total inaction after the show‑cause orders leaves the appellate court with nothing to “construe liberally.” There is simply no response to interpret.

C. Denial of In Forma Pauperis Status

The panel then turns to Chan’s requests to proceed IFP. Applying Watkins, the court looks at whether Chan has:

• Presented a reasoned argument; and
• Shown that the argument is at least nonfrivolous.

It concludes he has not, for two reasons:

1. Inadequate briefing:
   • The Colorado appeal brief: only two sentences of reasoning.
   • The New Mexico appeal brief: one sentence, repeated three times.
   • Neither addresses the failure to respond to the show‑cause orders.
2. Substantively flawed arguments:
   • Asserting Denver defendants’ residence as sufficient for venue, ignoring the “all defendants” requirement of § 1391(b)(1).
   • Invoking § 1983 “jurisdiction” to answer both venue and sufficiency problems, conflating distinct legal concepts.

Because the arguments “do not merit in forma pauperis status,” and given Neitzke’s definition of frivolousness, the court denies IFP. This is a gatekeeping function: the IFP regime is designed to prevent the judicial system from being overwhelmed by appeals that “lack an arguable basis in law or fact.”

D. Clarifying Jurisdiction, Venue, and Merits

A significant part of the opinion’s reasoning is devoted to correcting a common pro se misunderstanding: the idea that if a federal court has “jurisdiction” over a cause of action (e.g., § 1983), that answers all procedural objections.

The panel explains:

• Subject‑matter jurisdiction (e.g., federal question jurisdiction under § 1331 for § 1983 claims) is about whether the court has power to hear that kind of case at all.
• Venue is about whether the lawsuit is filed in the right geographical district, governed here by § 1391(b)(1).
• Pleading sufficiency is about whether the complaint gives fair notice and states a plausible claim (Rule 8(a)(2), Iqbal), and is distinct from both jurisdiction and venue.

The panel’s short but clear explanation has practical importance:

“Though Chan is correct that federal courts ordinarily have subject‑matter jurisdiction over 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, subject‑matter jurisdiction is not the same as venue … Nor is it the same as stating a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2).”

This is a reminder that satisfying one threshold requirement (jurisdiction) does not cure defects in others (venue or pleading).

III. Potential Impact of the Opinion

A. On Pro Se Litigation

Although non‑precedential, the decision carries persuasive weight in pro se cases. It conveys several messages:

• Silence is fatal – ignoring a show‑cause order will likely result in dismissal, even if the underlying claims are potentially serious (e.g., conspiracy to forge court records).
• Leniency is limited – courts will construe filings liberally, but will not:
  • Excuse failure to respond to orders; or
  • Build legal theories the plaintiff does not present.
• Appellate obligations apply equally – a pro se appellant must still:
  • Identify the actual ground for the lower court’s decision; and
  • Explain why that ground is legally or factually mistaken.

In practice, this opinion will likely be cited (for its persuasive force) when district courts and the Tenth Circuit face appeals from pro se litigants who have:

• Ignored show‑cause orders;
• Filed perfunctory or conclusory appellate briefs; or
• Confused jurisdiction, venue, and pleading standards.

B. On Docket Management and Sua Sponte Dismissals

The decision reinforces the judiciary’s ability to manage its docket:

• District courts may issue show‑cause orders pointing out defects and requiring a response.
• When a plaintiff does nothing, even after being alerted to the problems, courts may dismiss the case without prejudice under Rule 41(b).

This helps alleviate prolonged stagnation of cases and encourages litigants—even pro se ones—to engage with the process when the court gives them explicit opportunities to cure deficiencies.

C. On In Forma Pauperis Appeals

The decision also signals a relatively strict approach to IFP appeals:

• Courts will scrutinize whether an appeal contains a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument, not just whether the appellant is indigent.
• Minimal, repetitive, or conclusory briefs that do not address the true ground for the lower court’s decision are strong candidates for IFP denial.
• Neitzke’s standard (“no arguable basis in law or fact”) remains central to that assessment.

This approach protects judicial resources while still allowing serious, well‑reasoned appeals by indigent litigants to proceed.

D. On Understanding of Basic Federal Civil Procedure

Finally, the opinion serves as a concise teaching tool—especially for non‑lawyers—on:

• How venue differs from jurisdiction.
• Why citing a federal statute (like § 1983 or RICO) does not automatically:
  • Make venue proper; or
  • Guarantee a plausible claim under Rule 8.
• How Rule 8’s “short and plain statement” requirement, as interpreted by Iqbal, demands more than bare accusations of conspiracy or wrongdoing.

Lawyers and courts may use this decision persuasively in explaining these concepts to unrepresented litigants.