I. Introduction

This commentary examines the Kentucky Supreme Court’s unpublished memorandum opinion in Isaiah Parris Bentley v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, rendered December 18, 2025 (No. 2024‑SC‑0495‑MR). Although designated “Not to Be Published” under RAP 40(D) and therefore not binding precedent, the opinion provides meaningful guidance on several recurring criminal law and procedure issues:

• When evidence of shooting at police officers supports attempted murder or attempted first-degree assault, rather than mere wanton endangerment.
• The high threshold for ordering a second, mid‑trial competency evaluation.
• The limits of the right to present a defense when the defendant seeks to introduce her own out‑of‑court statements through police testimony.
• The evidentiary standard for a voluntary intoxication instruction in methamphetamine‑use cases.
• The proper use of highly emotional “context” evidence—in this case, the devastating Mayfield tornado.
• The procedural path for challenging parole eligibility under KRS 532.046 (Safer Kentucky Act/HB 5): such challenges must be brought against the Department of Corrections (DOC) in Franklin Circuit Court, not on direct appeal.

The parties were:

• Appellant: Isaiah Parris Bentley (a transgender woman, referred to by feminine pronouns at trial and in the opinion).
• Appellee: Commonwealth of Kentucky.

Bentley was convicted in Graves Circuit Court of a violent robbery of a Cash Express in Mayfield, followed by a multi‑agency, multi‑jurisdictional police chase during which she fired repeatedly at pursuing officers. The trial court imposed a total sentence of 70 years’ imprisonment. On direct appeal as a matter of right, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed.

While the opinion is unpublished, under RAP 40(D) it may be cited when no published case adequately addresses the issue, making its reasoning practically important despite its non‑precedential status.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Robbery and Police Chase

In late December 2021, Bentley lived with three roommates (including co‑defendant James Hawks and girlfriend Allison Dillow) in Lone Oak. The household was behind on rent and utilities. On the night of December 30–31, 2021, Hawks returned drunk from a bar, was driven home by Dillow, and a discussion occurred about obtaining money from Cash Express. Hawks initially characterized this as talk of a loan with joking references to robbery, but under cross‑examination (and reminder of his plea agreement obligations), he admitted he left the apartment knowing a robbery was intended.

The next morning:

• Bentley first visited a Cash Express in Paducah, ostensibly to seek a loan, wearing distinctive clothing (grey sweats, Calvin Klein sweatshirt, cap, mask).
• They then proceeded to the Mayfield Cash Express, after efforts to obscure the truck’s license plate and Hawks’s logo sweatshirt.

In Mayfield:

• Bentley initially asked about a loan but then drew a black handgun, pointed it at the manager, and demanded cash.
• She moved behind the counter, directed the manager not to call police, and had her open the drawer.
• A customer entered, observed the robbery, and fled, calling police.
• Bentley left with a bag of money, dropping some bills on her way out.

B. The Mayfield Tornado Context and Multi‑Agency Response

Three weeks prior, a catastrophic tornado had devastated Mayfield, killing 24 people and severely disrupting infrastructure, including police facilities. As a result:

• Officers from other departments (e.g., Glasgow Police, KSP Post 1, Graves County Sheriff) were patrolling Mayfield.
• Debris was piled along roadways.
• Police camera systems and docking stations were disrupted or unavailable.

This context explains why:

• Multiple outside agencies rapidly converged on the suspects.
• There was no body‑camera or dash‑camera footage in evidence.
• Finding shell casings from Bentley’s shots was difficult.

C. Gunfire at Officers

After the robbery, Hawks and Bentley fled in Hawks’s white S‑10 pickup. Accounts diverged slightly, but the Commonwealth’s evidence showed:

• Glasgow Officer Vance initiated a traffic stop after observing a truck matching dispatch descriptions; Hawks accelerated away, starting the chase.
• Bentley partially climbed out of the passenger window, sitting on the window frame, and pointed a handgun directly at pursuing officers at various points.
• Glasgow Officer Garrison, local resident Jason Fitzgerald, KSP Trooper Propes, KSP Detective Moore, and Chief Deputy Prince all testified they saw Bentley aiming and firing toward the police vehicles.
• Officers swerved, ducked, and used medians and lawns for cover. Eventually, Trooper Propes fired 11 rifle rounds through his own windshield at Bentley when he had a clear backdrop.
• The handgun was ultimately seen tumbling down US 45; Hawks pulled over; Bentley was lightly wounded.

Though no law enforcement vehicle or officer was struck by gunfire, the testimony depicted deliberate targeting of the officers over an extended pursuit.

D. Post‑Arrest Statements

At the scene and later at the jail:

• Bentley falsely claimed to be a runaway juvenile from Illinois.
• She told KSP Sergeant Hamby that Hawks did not know she would commit the robbery or shoot at police.
• She told KSP Captain Green the handgun belonged to her (ex‑)girlfriend, admitted pointing it at police, but claimed she fired into the air as a “scare tactic.” She admitted throwing the gun from the truck.
• In a later interview, she also claimed (in statements excluded at trial) to have been on a multi‑day methamphetamine binge, including an ounce of meth the morning of the offense.

E. Trial, Convictions, and Sentence

A Graves County jury convicted Bentley of:

• Two counts of attempted murder (Trooper Propes and Officer Vance).
• Attempted first‑degree assault (Detective Moore).
• First‑degree wanton endangerment (Chief Deputy Prince).
• First‑degree robbery (Cash Express).
• Complicity to first‑degree fleeing or evading police.

In the penalty phase, based on a prior second‑degree robbery conviction, the jury also found her guilty of:

• Possession of a handgun by a convicted felon.

The jury recommended, and the court imposed, maximum and consecutive sentences totaling 70 years’ imprisonment.

Bentley’s appeal challenged: (1) denial of directed verdicts on the attempt charges; (2) denial of a second competency evaluation mid‑trial; (3) exclusion of her jailhouse drug‑use statements as hearsay; (4) refusal to give a voluntary intoxication instruction; (5) admission of evidence about the Mayfield tornado; and (6) the alleged ex post facto application of KRS 532.046 (parole ineligibility for certain firearm‑using felons).

III. Summary of the Opinion

The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed Bentley’s convictions and sentence in all respects. In brief:

1. Directed verdicts on criminal attempt offenses: Denied. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, a rational juror could find specific intent to kill or cause serious physical injury where officers described Bentley repeatedly pointing and firing a handgun directly at them. The trial court correctly allowed the charges of attempted murder and attempted first‑degree assault to go to the jury.
2. Second competency evaluation: Properly denied. A pretrial KCPC evaluation (with malingering findings) supported competency; mid‑trial counsel’s generalized report of “hearing voices” did not provide “reasonable grounds” or “substantial evidence” requiring a new evaluation or hearing.
3. Exclusion of defendant’s own drug‑use statements: Upheld. Bentley’s self‑described methamphetamine binge was classic hearsay—self‑serving, unsworn, and not subject to cross‑examination. Her choice not to testify did not entitle her to introduce those statements through Captain Green.
4. No voluntary intoxication instruction: Affirmed. Vague evidence that Bentley used methamphetamine daily, without any testimony that she appeared impaired or unable to appreciate her actions at the time of the offenses, did not justify the instruction.
5. Tornado evidence: Properly admitted. The tornadic devastation was relevant contextual evidence under KRE 401 and 403, explaining the multi‑agency response, lack of camera recordings, and debris conditions; it was not prohibited character or “other bad acts” evidence under KRE 404(b).
6. Parole eligibility and KRS 532.046: Issue not properly before the Court. Challenges to parole eligibility classifications and application of KRS 532.046 must be brought against the Department of Corrections (DOC), typically in Franklin Circuit Court, after exhausting administrative remedies under KRS 454.415. DOC was not a party; thus, the Kentucky Supreme Court declined to adjudicate the ex post facto claim in this direct appeal.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Directed Verdicts on Attempted Murder and Attempted First-Degree Assault

1. Standards and Statutory Framework

The Court applied the familiar directed verdict standard from Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1991), and Commonwealth v. Woods, 657 S.W.3d 902 (Ky. 2022):

On appeal, the question is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. (Woods, quoting Potts.)

Substantively, the Court focused on:

• Murder – intent “to cause the death of another person,” KRS 507.020.
• First-degree assault – intent “to cause serious physical injury,” KRS 508.010.
• Criminal attempt, KRS 506.010:
  • The defendant must act with the culpability required for the completed offense.
  • She must take a “substantial step” that under the circumstances as she believed them to be “leaves no reasonable doubt as to [her] intention to commit the crime.”

Thus, for attempted murder or attempted first‑degree assault, the Commonwealth had to produce evidence from which a jury could infer Bentley intended to kill or seriously injure the officers and took substantial steps toward that end by firing at them.

2. Distinguishing Wanton Endangerment from Intentional Attempts

Bentley argued that her conduct supported at most wanton endangerment—recklessly creating a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury—citing Swan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 77, 102 (Ky. 2012), which associates wantonness with shooting into crowds, occupied buildings, or vehicles. She asserted she fired into the air as a “scare tactic,” pointing to Hawks’s testimony that her arm was angled up and that he did not hear shots.

The Court rejected that characterization as a basis for a directed verdict, emphasizing:

• The relevant question is not what defense‑favorable evidence exists, but whether the Commonwealth’s evidence, if believed, is sufficient. (Sutton v. Commonwealth, 627 S.W.3d 836, 848 (Ky. 2021)).
• Multiple witnesses (officers and a civilian) testified that Bentley:
  • Climbed or leaned out of the passenger window.
  • Pointed the handgun directly at their vehicles “with her arm nearly straight out.”
  • Fired multiple rounds in their direction, causing them to swerve, duck, and seek cover.

Applying Cox v. Commonwealth, 553 S.W.3d 808, 814 (Ky. 2018), and Anastasi v. Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Ky. 1988), the Court reaffirmed that:

Firing repeatedly directly at officers in close pursuit, in broad daylight, is a textbook scenario from which a jury may infer specific intent to kill or seriously injure. The Court thus held the evidence more than sufficient to go to the jury on attempted murder and attempted first-degree assault.

3. Practical Implications

Although unpublished, the opinion reinforces several practical points:

• Prosecutors can proceed with attempt charges (rather than only wanton endangerment) where officers can testify that a suspect clearly aimed and fired at them, even if no one is hit.
• Defense counsel should recognize that once there is testimony of direct aiming and firing at officers, conflicting evidence that shots were “into the air” typically goes to weight, not sufficiency. Directed verdict motions on lack of intent will be difficult.
• Trial courts are reminded that on directed verdicts, they must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and leave credibility conflicts to the jury.

B. Denial of a Second Competency Evaluation Mid‑Trial

1. Constitutional and Statutory Framework

The Court’s analysis is rooted in:

• U.S. Constitution, Due Process: It is unconstitutional to try an incompetent defendant (Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975)).
• KRS 504.100(1): If at any stage the court has “reasonable grounds” to believe the defendant is incompetent, it must order a competency evaluation.
• Definition of incompetence (KRS 504.060(5)): The defendant lacks the capacity, due to mental condition, to appreciate the nature and consequences of the proceedings or to participate rationally in her defense.

Kentucky case law further requires:

Appellate review asks whether “a reasonable judge” in the trial judge’s position should have experienced doubt about competency. (Woolfolk, quoting Turner).

2. Pretrial Evaluation and Malingering

Before trial, Bentley underwent a KCPC evaluation by Dr. Susan Brittain‑Seitz, covering both competency and criminal responsibility. Notable findings:

• Bentley displayed average estimated intelligence, based on vocabulary and testing.
• Formal testing showed malingering—deliberate feigning of symptoms and cognitive deficits.
• Her reported “voices” resembled an internal monologue or self‑talk and did not suggest psychosis; they were not distressing.
• No symptoms of psychosis, mania, or chronic thought disorder were observed.
• Dr. Brittain‑Seitz concluded Bentley was competent to stand trial.

Bentley stipulated to competency after the report.

3. Mid‑Trial Request and Denial

After the Commonwealth rested, defense counsel told the court Bentley was hearing voices that allegedly impaired her ability to participate and requested a renewed competency evaluation.

The trial judge:

• Paused the proceedings to review the prior evaluation report.
• Noted Bentley’s stipulated competence and the malingering findings.
• Observed Bentley’s courtroom demeanor and saw nothing to suggest a sudden decompensation.
• Found no “reasonable grounds” to question competency mid‑trial and denied the renewed evaluation request.

The Supreme Court affirmed, emphasizing:

• Generalized claims (e.g., “hearing voices”) without concrete, objective manifestations do not automatically mandate a second evaluation.
• Given the earlier malingering finding and non‑distressing nature of reported voices, the new report added little.
• The trial judge, who observed Bentley throughout, was in the best position to assess whether new concerns arose (Woolfolk; Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 S.W.3d 715 (Ky. 2007)).

4. Practical Impact

This portion underscores:

• Defense counsel must make an “affirmative showing” to justify a second evaluation, ideally with:
  • Specific behavioral observations (e.g., inability to communicate, disorganized speech, obvious confusion).
  • Sudden changes from prior functioning.
  • Corroboration from jail or medical staff, if available.
• Trial courts retain substantial discretion; they are not required to suspend trials on bare assertions, especially against a record of malingering.

C. Exclusion of Bentley’s Jailhouse Statements About Methamphetamine Use

1. Hearsay and the Right to Present a Defense

Bentley sought to introduce, through KSP Captain Green’s testimony, her own statements that she had been:

• Awake and using methamphetamine for twelve days before the offenses, and
• Had used an ounce of methamphetamine on the morning of the robbery.

The Commonwealth objected as hearsay. The trial court agreed and ruled:

• The statements could not be admitted through Captain Green for their truth.
• Bentley could, however, testify personally if she chose.

Bentley invoked her right to remain silent and did not testify. The proffered (avowal) testimony from Green preserved the issue for appeal.

2. Hearsay Analysis

Under KRE 801(c), hearsay is an out‑of‑court statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted and is generally inadmissible absent an exception. The Court emphasized:

• Hearsay is “inherently unreliable” because it is not subject to cross‑examination (Harrison v. Commonwealth, 858 S.W.2d 172 (Ky. 1993); Barnes v. Commonwealth, 794 S.W.2d 165 (Ky. 1990)).
• Cross‑examination under oath is the primary means for testing truth and credibility (Combs v. Commonwealth, 74 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Ky. 2002)).

The Court held Bentley’s own statements about drug use were:

• Self‑serving (tending to mitigate culpability).
• Made outside court and not under oath.
• Not subject to cross‑examination (since she chose not to testify).

Her constitutional right to remain silent did not entail a right to have her version of events placed before the jury in untested, hearsay form. Nor was there a specific hearsay exception invoked (e.g., statement against interest, medical diagnosis, etc.) that would fit these facts.

3. Right to Present a Defense

The opinion implicitly reaffirms a basic but crucial principle: the constitutional right to present a defense does not include a right to circumvent core evidentiary rules of reliability. The trial court had already:

• Allowed other defense avenues (cross‑examining witnesses, calling other witnesses such as Dillow or Hawks about drug use).
• Offered Bentley the option to testify personally about her intoxication.

Thus, her ability to present a defense was not unconstitutionally hindered; only a particular, unreliable piece of evidence was excluded.

4. Practical Takeaways

• Self‑serving defendant statements made to officers are almost always hearsay when offered by the defense for their truth.
• If a defendant wants the jury to consider her own narrative (e.g., extensive drug use, alternative intent), she typically must:
  • Testify and be subject to cross‑examination, or
  • Fit the statements within a narrow hearsay exception—which will rarely be available for this type of claim.

D. Voluntary Intoxication Instruction

1. Legal Test

Kentucky law on voluntary intoxication is anchored in:

• KRS 501.010(4): Voluntary intoxication is intoxication knowingly caused by substances whose intoxicating effects the defendant knows or should know.
• KRS 501.080(1): Voluntary intoxication is a defense if it “negatives” (negates) an element of the offense—here, the required intent for specific‑intent crimes.
• King v. Commonwealth, 513 S.W.3d 919, 923 (Ky. 2017): A defendant is entitled to such an instruction if the evidence indicates the degree of intoxication needed to prevent formation of the specific intent.
• Luna v. Commonwealth, 460 S.W.3d 851, 881–84 (Ky. 2015); Harris v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 40, 50 (Ky. 2010): There must be evidence reasonably sufficient to prove that the defendant was so intoxicated she “did not know what she was doing.”

2. Evidence Presented

Evidence offered to support intoxication was limited:

• Hawks testified that early that morning he saw Bentley and Dillow smoking something from a glass pipe, but he did not know what it was or observe further use.
• Dillow claimed she and Bentley used drugs daily around that time, but:
  • She did not specify the substance or amounts.
  • She did not recall Bentley using drugs immediately before the robbery or chase.
• Chief Deputy Prince and Sergeant Hamby, both experienced in recognizing drug impairment, interacted with Bentley after the chase and saw no signs of intoxication or impairment.
• Bentley’s more dramatic claims (twelve‑day meth binge; ounce of meth that morning) were never placed before the jury, only by avowal.

The Supreme Court correctly confined its review to the evidence actually presented to the jury (Luna), not the excluded proffer.

3. Application and Reliance on Brafman

The Court noted that even if Bentley’s excluded statements had been admitted, Brafman v. Commonwealth, 612 S.W.3d 850 (Ky. 2020), allowed a trial court to refuse a voluntary intoxication instruction where the only evidence is the defendant’s own self‑report of heavy substance use, unsupported by any corroboration.

Here, the actual trial record was even weaker:

• Only vague references to periodic drug use.
• No contemporaneous observations that Bentley appeared high, confused, or incapable of forming intent.
• Officer observations to the contrary.

Under Luna’s standard—demanding evidence that the defendant was so intoxicated she did not know what she was doing—the Court concluded no voluntary intoxication instruction was warranted and the trial court acted within its discretion.

4. Practical Lessons

• High threshold for intoxication defenses: Mere evidence of drug or alcohol consumption, even heavy use, is insufficient without proof of severe functional impairment.
• Corroboration is critical: To secure an intoxication instruction, defense counsel should seek:
  • Eyewitness testimony describing slurred speech, stumbling, confusion, or inability to follow events.
  • Expert testimony on likely cognitive effects at the doses described.
  • Objective indicators (e.g., toxicology, bizarre or disorganized behavior during or immediately after the offense).

E. Admission of Mayfield Tornado Evidence

1. Relevance and Prejudice

Defense counsel moved in limine to exclude all references to the December 2021 tornado as irrelevant and unduly prejudicial under KRE 401 and 403. The Commonwealth argued the tornado was necessary context:

• Explaining why out‑of‑jurisdiction officers (e.g., Glasgow Police) were patrolling Mayfield.
• Explaining why police video systems and docking stations were disabled or unavailable.
• Explaining the extensive roadside debris complicating both the pursuit and shell casing recovery.

The trial court:

• Allowed evidence of the tornado and its operational impact.
• Limited references to fatalities, to reduce emotional prejudice.

The Supreme Court, reviewing for abuse of discretion (Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999)), held this was proper:

• The tornado was relevant contextual evidence under KRE 401.
• Its probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under KRE 403, particularly given the trial court’s limitation on fatality references.

2. Not KRE 404(b) Bad‑Acts Evidence

Bentley argued on appeal that the Commonwealth used the tornado to create a prejudicial narrative, essentially invoking KRE 404(b). The Supreme Court flatly rejected this characterization:

• The tornado is not a “crime, wrong, or act” attributable to Bentley.
• It does not reflect on Bentley’s character or propensity to commit crime.
• It is purely environmental context—akin to mentioning a neighborhood’s high crime rate or a blackout during which a crime occurred, when relevant.

The Court also noted the Commonwealth’s closing argument—that Mayfield might appear an “easier target” post‑tornado—was supported by evidence:

• Bentley specifically suggested Mayfield, despite living elsewhere.
• She rejected a closer Paducah Cash Express that appeared busy and opted to travel to storm‑damaged Mayfield.

The inference that disaster conditions might make a business an easier target was thus grounded in the trial record.

3. Practical Significance

• Context evidence (disasters, community conditions, resource constraints) is generally admissible if it helps explain how and why events unfolded, so long as courts vigilantly apply KRE 403 to minimize unfair emotional impact.
• Limiting inflammatory details (e.g., numbers of deaths) is an effective way to strike the balance.

F. Parole Eligibility Under KRS 532.046 (Safer Kentucky Act) and Ex Post Facto Concerns

1. The New Statute

House Bill 5 (“Safer Kentucky Act”) added KRS 532.046(1), effective July 15, 2024. In short:

• It prohibits any form of early release (e.g., parole) for a person who:
  • Has a prior felony conviction, and
  • Uses a firearm in the commission of an offense and in furtherance of a crime.

Bentley’s crimes occurred in December 2021, well before KRS 532.046’s effective date, but she:

• Had a prior felony (second‑degree robbery), and
• Used a handgun in the robbery and subsequent police chase.

At the penalty phase, a DOC Probation and Parole officer testified that, under KRS 532.046, Bentley would be ineligible for parole or early release. The written judgment, however, did not mention KRS 532.046 or explicitly find her ineligible for parole.

2. The Court’s Procedural Holding

Bentley argued that application of KRS 532.046 to her 2021 conduct would violate the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws by retroactively increasing punishment severity.

Rather than reach the constitutional issue, the Supreme Court held the issue was not properly before it, based on:

• Hoskins v. Commonwealth, 158 S.W.3d 214 (Ky. App. 2005): A challenge to DOC’s classification of a defendant as a “violent offender” (affecting parole eligibility) must be brought as an original action against DOC in Franklin Circuit Court, not through a CR 60.02 motion in the sentencing case.
• Mason v. Commonwealth, 331 S.W.3d 610, 628–29 (Ky. 2011): The Supreme Court refused to reclassify a defendant as non‑violent for parole purposes where DOC was not a party to the appeal; the defendant’s remedy lay in a separate action (e.g., declaratory judgment) against DOC.
• KRS 454.415: Requires inmates challenging DOC’s calculation of parole or sentence credits to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit.

Consistent with Mason, the Court emphasized:

• DOC—not the sentencing court or the Supreme Court on direct appeal—is the agency that calculates parole eligibility and applies statutes such as KRS 532.046.
• DOC was not a party to Bentley’s criminal case or appeal and thus not before the Court to defend or adjust its classification decisions.

The Court also noted a DOC Division Director had publicly stated (in materials included in another case, Blakemore v. Commonwealth, 2024‑SC‑0370‑MR) that DOC is applying KRS 532.046 only to offenses committed on or after July 15, 2024. This suggested DOC itself is construing the statute prospectively, further undermining the need to decide the ex post facto question in Bentley’s criminal appeal.

3. Resulting Rule (Though in an Unpublished Opinion)

The key procedural principle can be summarized as:

The Bentley Court therefore declined to adjudicate the ex post facto challenge and left all questions regarding application of KRS 532.046 to DOC and the appropriate civil forum.

4. Practical Consequences

• Defense counsel should:
  • Anticipate that parole eligibility disputes, including ex post facto challenges under KRS 532.046, will not be resolved in the direct appeal of the conviction.
  • Advise clients that any such challenge will necessitate:
    • Exhausting DOC’s internal grievance or administrative review process, and
    • Filing an original action (e.g., declaratory judgment or similar) in Franklin Circuit Court, naming DOC as the defendant.
• Prosecutors should:
  • Be cautious about eliciting testimony in the penalty phase declaring an inmate “never eligible” for parole under statutes where there may be unresolved retroactivity or interpretive questions.
  • Recognize that ultimate parole determinations lie with DOC and the Parole Board, subject to court review in a separate, civil‑administrative context.

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

1. Directed Verdict

A directed verdict is a ruling by the judge that no reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty (or not guilty) based on the evidence presented. In criminal cases, a directed verdict for the defendant is appropriate only when, taking the Commonwealth’s evidence as true and giving it all reasonable inferences, a rational juror still could not find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is a very defendant‑friendly remedy and thus rarely granted.

2. Specific Intent Crimes vs. Wanton Conduct

• Specific intent crime: The prosecution must prove the defendant meant to bring about a particular result—e.g., intending to cause death (murder) or serious physical injury (first‑degree assault).
• Wanton conduct: The defendant is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a bad result will occur (e.g., someone may be shot if you fire randomly into a crowd), but does not necessarily aim to cause that result.

Shooting in someone’s direction, especially repeatedly and with clear aiming motions, strongly supports a jury inference of specific intent.

3. Criminal Attempt and “Substantial Step”

Under KRS 506.010, a person commits criminal attempt when they intend to commit a crime and take a substantial step toward it. The “substantial step”:

• Must strongly corroborate the criminal intent.
• Must leave “no reasonable doubt” as to the intention to commit the crime charged.

Pointing a loaded firearm at a person and firing multiple times is a classic “substantial step” toward homicide or serious assault.

4. Competency to Stand Trial

Competency focuses on the defendant’s present ability (at the time of trial), not on mental state when the crime occurred. The question is:

• Does the defendant understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings?
• Can she rationally assist her lawyer in her defense?

If reasonable grounds exist to doubt competence, the court must obtain an evaluation and, if substantial evidence appears, hold a hearing. But courts are not required to repeatedly order new evaluations absent concrete new concerns.

5. Voluntary Intoxication as a Defense

Voluntary intoxication can negate the mental state required for certain crimes if the intoxication is so extreme that the defendant cannot form the required intent. In practice:

• Evidence of having consumed substances is not enough.
• There must be evidence (often from witnesses or experts) that the defendant was so impaired that she “did not know what she was doing.”

6. Hearsay and Self‑Serving Statements

Hearsay is an out‑of‑court statement offered to prove the truth of whatever it asserts. Concerns include:

• The speaker is not under oath.
• The opposing party cannot cross‑examine the speaker in front of the jury.

When defendants try to get the jury to hear their own prior statements to police—especially those that help their case (like “I was high” or “I didn’t intend to hurt anyone”)—courts treat these as self‑serving hearsay and exclude them unless a hearsay exception clearly applies. The usual lawful route is to take the stand and testify.

7. Parole Eligibility and Administrative Law

In Kentucky, the Department of Corrections, not the trial court, calculates parole eligibility and classifies inmates (e.g., violent offender status, application of KRS 532.046). If the inmate believes DOC misapplied the law (for example, applied a statute retroactively), she must:

1. Use DOC’s internal complaint or grievance process (exhaust administrative remedies under KRS 454.415).
2. If unsatisfied, sue DOC—usually in Franklin Circuit Court—seeking judicial review or a declaratory judgment correcting the classification.

Direct criminal appeals, like Bentley’s, are not the venue for resolving those administrative classification disputes.

VI. Conclusion

Although unpublished and non‑precedential under RAP 40(D), Bentley v. Commonwealth offers clear, practically significant guidance in several areas of Kentucky criminal practice.

On the merits, the Court reaffirmed:

• The robust inferences of specific intent that a jury may draw when a defendant repeatedly aims and fires at pursuing officers, justifying attempted murder and attempted first‑degree assault charges rather than mere wanton endangerment.
• The high bar for obtaining a second competency evaluation mid‑trial, particularly when pretrial evaluation reveals malingering and mid‑trial concerns are unsupported by observable deterioration.
• The strict application of hearsay rules even to a defendant’s own statements proffered for intoxication or intent defenses, and the limited scope of the right to present a defense in the face of standard evidentiary constraints.
• The demanding evidentiary standard for a voluntary intoxication instruction: evidence must show intoxication so severe that the defendant could not form the required intent, not merely that she used drugs.
• The admissibility of disaster‑related context (e.g., the Mayfield tornado), when carefully cabined, to explain law enforcement deployment and evidentiary gaps without becoming unfairly prejudicial character evidence.

Most notably for future litigation, the Court underscored the procedural route for challenging Kentucky’s Safer Kentucky Act (KRS 532.046) as applied to parole eligibility: such challenges must be directed at DOC via an original action in Franklin Circuit Court, with administrative exhaustion under KRS 454.415, and cannot be resolved in a direct criminal appeal where DOC is not a party.

For trial judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel, the opinion collectively reinforces:

• The centrality of concrete, corroborated evidence when raising mental state and intoxication defenses.
• The need for procedural precision in attacking parole classifications and ex post facto issues tied to DOC application of sentencing statutes.
• The importance of balancing narrative context with fairness under the Kentucky Rules of Evidence.

Even as a memorandum opinion, Bentley thus serves as a detailed roadmap for navigating these issues in future Kentucky criminal cases where no published authority squarely addresses the point.