Certified Uncertainties in Florida Proceedings Supplementary: Eleventh Circuit Sends Five Determinative Questions on § 56.29 Remedies, FUFTA Limitations, and Tolling to the Florida Supreme Court

Introduction

This appeal arises from a long-running collection effort following a 2009 defamation judgment. The plaintiff–judgment creditor, attorney Edward T. Saadi (pro se), alleges that defendant–judgment debtor Pierre A. Maroun fraudulently transferred funds to the co-defendant company Maroun’s International, LLC (MILLC) to avoid paying a $90,000 judgment. After the district court entered summary judgment for Maroun and MILLC—largely on limitations grounds—and denied Saadi’s request for discovery sanctions, Saadi appealed.

The Eleventh Circuit does not decide the merits. Instead, recognizing dispositive and unsettled issues of Florida law at the heart of both the limitations ruling and the available remedies for fraudulent transfers in proceedings supplementary, the court certifies five questions to the Florida Supreme Court. The questions traverse the remedial scope of Florida Statutes § 56.29(3), the reach of funds as “personal property,” retroactivity of the 2014 and 2016 amendments to § 56.29, and whether FUFTA’s repose periods may be tolled—including where the identity or whereabouts of the defendant are concealed.

Key Background Facts

• 2009: A federal jury found Maroun liable for defamation and awarded Saadi $90,000 in compensatory and punitive damages; judgment was entered.
• 2010–2018: No payments were made; Saadi’s enforcement efforts were unsuccessful. Saadi alleges Maroun became difficult to locate and transferred funds to MILLC.
• Transfers at issue: About $250,000 was transferred from Maroun’s personal account to MILLC in 2012, allegedly used to purchase a condominium titled to MILLC (but used as Maroun’s residence) and to pay Maroun’s personal expenses, including child support.
• 2019–2020: The district court allowed proceedings supplementary and impleaded MILLC. Saadi filed a second amended impleader complaint with three counts:
  • Count 1: “Fraudulent transfer” relief under § 56.29 (including voiding transfers under § 56.29(3)(b), execution on funds and the condominium, and a money judgment under § 56.29(6) and (8)).
  • Count 2: FUFTA—actual fraud under § 726.105(1)(a).
  • Count 3: FUFTA—constructive fraud under §§ 726.105(1)(b), 726.106(1), (2).
• Discovery dispute: Saadi noticed the deposition of Omar Qawasmi as a purported MILLC officer/agent. Qawasmi did not appear. The district court denied sanctions, finding insufficient evidence that Qawasmi was MILLC’s officer/director/managing agent.
• Summary judgment: The district court held the FUFTA counts time-barred under § 726.110 and treated Count 1 as subject to FUFTA’s limitation rules, rendering it time-barred as well. It concluded § 56.29(3)(b) is limited to voiding transfers of identifiable personal property and does not allow money judgments.

Summary of the Opinion

Judge Lagoa, writing for a unanimous panel (Rosenbaum, Lagoa, and Wilson, JJ.), certifies five decisive questions to the Florida Supreme Court because no controlling Florida Supreme Court precedent exists and Florida’s district courts of appeal are split on pivotal interpretive issues. The Eleventh Circuit identifies three groups of issues:

1. Remedies available under § 56.29(3), including:
   • Whether a money judgment is available under § 56.29(3)(b).
   • Whether fraudulently transferred funds can be reached and, if so, whether they must be “identifiable.”
   • Whether the 2014 and 2016 amendments to § 56.29 may be applied retroactively, potentially relocating money-judgment remedies into § 56.29(9) and thus subjecting them to FUFTA’s limitation periods.
2. Whether FUFTA’s time bars (§ 726.110) are subject to statutory tolling under § 95.051.
3. Whether concealment of the tortfeasor (as opposed to concealment of the tort itself) can toll under § 95.051(1)(c).

Finding these questions determinative of timeliness and available relief, the Eleventh Circuit certifies them and defers all merits rulings, including on the discovery-sanctions appeal, pending the Florida Supreme Court’s response.

The Five Certified Questions

• 1. Can a judgment creditor obtain a money judgment against a transferee in a claim under Fla. Stat. § 56.29(3)?
• 2. Can a judgment creditor seek fraudulently transferred funds under § 56.29(3)(b), and, if so, must those funds be identifiable; may a judgment creditor seek transfer of a judgment debtor’s property other than the fraudulently transferred property, and may he do so if the sought property is real property?
• 3. Given the 2014 and 2016 amendments to § 56.29, can a judgment creditor seek a money judgment under § 56.29(3)(b) for the life of the judgment, or have those amendments situated that remedy solely within § 56.29(9) such that FUFTA’s limitation periods (§ 726.110) apply?
• 4. Are claims brought under FUFTA subject to the statutory tolling provisions of § 95.051?
• 5. Does tolling under § 95.051(1)(c) apply only to concealment of the tort, or does it also apply to concealment of the tortfeasor?

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Proceedings supplementary and FUFTA context

• Rule 69(a)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P., requires federal courts to follow state procedures for executing judgments.
• Florida Statutes § 56.29 codifies “proceedings supplementary,” historically designed to let a judgment creditor “ferret out” a debtor’s assets or property held by others and reach assets transferred to defeat collection (Longo v. Associated Limousine Services, Inc., 236 So. 3d 1115, 1118 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018), quoting Young v. McKenzie, 46 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1950)).
• Section 56.29(3)(b) authorizes voiding fraudulent transfers of personal property and directing seizure by the sheriff; § 56.29(6) authorizes courts to “enter any orders, judgments, or writs” to carry out § 56.29, including money judgments; § 56.29(9) permits bringing FUFTA claims (chapter 726) within proceedings supplementary.
• FUFTA’s substantive provisions (§§ 726.105–.106) define actual and constructive fraudulent transfers; § 726.110 sets extinguishment periods (four years from transfer for most claims, with a one-year “discovery” savings clause for § 726.105(1)(a)). National Auto Service Centers, Inc. v. F/R 550, LLC, 192 So. 3d 498 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) clarifies the one-year period runs from discovery of the transfer, not discovery of its fraudulent nature.

The DCA split: McGregor vs. Rosenberg

• McGregor v. Fowler White Burnett, P.A., 332 So. 3d 481 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021):
  • Held § 56.29(3)(b) relief is limited to voiding transfers of “identifiable” personal property that can be seized; money judgments belong under § 56.29(9) as FUFTA remedies, thus subject to § 726.110.
  • Concluded funds were not “identifiable” and that claims seeking money damages should proceed under FUFTA, making them time-barred in that case.
  • Viewed post-2014 amendments as channeling money-judgment remedies into § 56.29(9), and approved retroactive application because the plaintiff had a reasonable time after discovery to sue.
• Rosenberg v. U.S. Bank, 360 So. 3d 795 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023), review dismissed (Jan. 31, 2024):
  • Rejected McGregor’s narrowing. Read § 56.29(6) to authorize money judgments “for this section,” meaning throughout § 56.29, including § 56.29(3); the Legislature’s distinction between “section” and “subsection” indicates no intent to confine money judgments to § 56.29(9).
  • Underscored longstanding practice permitting money judgments in proceedings supplementary, even before express references were added; amendments should not be read to make those remedies less available.
  • Held “personal property” includes intangible property like money; therefore, fraudulent transfers of funds are reachable under § 56.29(3). It disagreed with McGregor’s “identifiability” limitation for funds.
  • Reasoned it is not “absurd” to have different limitations for different remedies: the § 56.29(3) remedy can extend for the life of the judgment, while FUFTA claims under § 56.29(9) are subject to § 726.110.

Real property and equitable liens in proceedings supplementary

• First and Fifth DCAs have upheld equitable liens on real property in proceedings supplementary (Whigham v. Muehl, 511 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Zureikat v. Shaibani, 944 So. 2d 1019 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)).
• By contrast, the Second DCA has held § 56.29(3)(a) does not reach transfers of real property (Clampitt v. Wick, 320 So. 3d 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021)).

Retroactivity and due process principles

• The Florida Supreme Court has held retroactive abolition of vested substantive rights is prohibited (Metropolitan Dade County v. Chase Federal Housing Corp., 737 So. 2d 494, 503 (Fla. 1999)). A limitations amendment may be applied retroactively if clear legislative intent exists and a reasonable time to sue remains (Bauld v. J.A. Jones Construction Co., 357 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1978); Polk County BOCC v. Special Disability Trust Fund, 791 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)).
• McGregor found retroactive application of FUFTA’s extinguishment periods appropriate to claims pursued via § 56.29, while Rosenberg maintained that the § 56.29(3) remedy remains distinct and continues for the life of the judgment, making the retroactivity query unnecessary for that remedy.

Tolling vs. repose for FUFTA

• FUFTA’s § 726.110 is consistently characterized as a statute of repose in DCA decisions (National Auto Service Centers; see also discussion in Sabal Chase Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Walt Disney World Co., 726 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)).
• Whether § 95.051’s statutory tolling applies to statutes of repose remains unsettled in Florida Supreme Court precedent. Some DCAs have suggested tolling does not apply to repose (National Auto Service Centers; Sabal Chase). Others have indicated tolling provisions may apply to repose (Moore v. Winter Haven Hospital, 579 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), treating repose within “statute of limitations” for tolling; Brown v. MRS Manufacturing Co., 617 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)). The Florida Supreme Court in Musculoskeletal Institute Chartered v. Parham, 745 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 1999), applied a tolling provision to both a statute of limitations and a statute of repose in that context.

Concealment for tolling under § 95.051(1)(c)

• Fourth DCA cases have read § 95.051(1)(c) narrowly to exclude tolling based on concealment of a tortfeasor’s identity, limiting it to concealment of the tort itself (Putnam Berkley Group, Inc. v. Dinin, 734 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Lee v. Simon, 885 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)).
• By contrast, the Florida Supreme Court later observed in dictum that statutory tolling bases “include inter alia … concealment of the defendant” (Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So. 2d 1071, 1076 n.10 (Fla. 2001)), aligning with the plain text of § 95.051(1)(c), which tolls limitations when “[c]oncealment in the state of the person to be sued so that process cannot be served on him or her.” The high court, however, has not squarely resolved the identity-concealment issue.

Legal Reasoning: Why Certification Was Necessary

Under Article V, § 3(b)(6) of the Florida Constitution and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.150, the Florida Supreme Court may answer certified questions that are determinative of a cause and lack controlling precedent. The Eleventh Circuit identifies a direct conflict between Florida’s Third and Fourth DCAs on the scope of remedies in § 56.29 proceedings and on the interaction with FUFTA’s extinguishment periods after the 2014 and 2016 statutory amendments. These conflicts directly determine whether Saadi’s Count 1 is time-barred.

Similarly, for Counts 2 and 3, which were filed after the nominal repose periods but during the life of the judgment, whether statutory tolling under § 95.051 can suspend § 726.110’s time bars—and whether concealment of a tortfeasor can trigger tolling—will decide whether those counts may proceed. Given the likely case-dispositive nature of the issues and the lack of controlling Florida Supreme Court guidance, the court certifies all five questions and defers merits disposition.

Potential Impact

If the Florida Supreme Court aligns with Rosenberg (broader § 56.29 remedies):

• Money judgments would be available under § 56.29(3) as a remedy throughout the section via § 56.29(6), not confined to FUFTA claims under § 56.29(9).
• Funds would be treated as “personal property,” including intangible personal property, making fraudulent transfers of money reachable under § 56.29(3) without a strict “identifiability” barrier.
• The classic remedies of proceedings supplementary, including voiding transfers and imposing money judgments and equitable remedies, would remain available for the life of the judgment, not curtailed by FUFTA’s extinguishment periods—at least when proceeding under § 56.29(3).
• Judgment creditors could more flexibly unwind transfers and pursue transferees without the constraints of FUFTA’s tight repose periods, reshaping enforcement strategy and increasing exposure for transferees.

If the Florida Supreme Court aligns with McGregor (narrower § 56.29(3) and FUFTA time bars):

• Money judgments for fraudulent transfers within proceedings supplementary would be channeled to § 56.29(9) and thus be subject to FUFTA’s extinguishment provisions in § 726.110.
• Section 56.29(3)(b) would be limited to voiding and seizing “identifiable” personal property; cash transfers might be out of reach if not specifically traceable, limiting the utility of § 56.29(3) in cases involving fungible funds.
• Retroactive application of the post-2014 regime could constrain older claims, provided due process (clear legislative intent and reasonable window to sue) is satisfied.
• Judgment creditors would need to move quickly and carefully preserve FUFTA claims; transferees would have more repose-based certainty.

Tolling outcomes

• If § 95.051 tolling applies to FUFTA’s repose: Creditors may revive otherwise extinguished FUFTA claims where statutory tolling grounds exist (e.g., debtor’s concealment that prevents service), potentially harmonizing with the Florida Supreme Court’s broader remarks in Morsani and Parham.
• If tolling does not apply to FUFTA’s repose: The extinguishment periods remain hard deadlines, emphasizing the importance of prompt discovery and action; the “one-year discovery” savings clause would remain the principal escape valve for § 726.105(1)(a) actual fraud claims.
• If concealment of the tortfeasor suffices for tolling under § 95.051(1)(c): Cases involving evasive debtors who hide their identity or whereabouts to thwart service may remain viable longer, particularly important where debtors use layered entities.
• If only concealment of the tort tolls: Cases focused on hidden identities or whereabouts could be time-barred notwithstanding concealment tactics, tightening repose across debtor-creditor litigation.

Additional Notes on the Record and Deferred Issue

• FUFTA accrual mechanics: For § 726.105(1)(a), the one-year savings clause runs from when the transfer was or reasonably could have been discovered, not from discovery of fraud (National Auto Service Centers, 192 So. 3d at 503–09).
• Real property reach: If the Florida Supreme Court clarifies that equitable liens and other remedies remain available in proceedings supplementary against real property, it could resolve the intra-DCA tension (Whigham and Zureikat versus Clampitt).
• Discovery sanctions issue (deferred): The Eleventh Circuit declines to address Saadi’s Rule 37 sanctions appeal regarding nonappearance of Omar Qawasmi, because prejudice could be moot if claims are time-barred. The court will revisit only if necessary after the Florida Supreme Court’s answers.
• Initiation timing under § 56.29(9): The court notes FUFTA claims in proceedings supplementary must be initiated by supplemental complaint; it rejects using the date of the motion for proceedings supplementary to calculate timeliness (see Biel Reo, LLC v. Barefoot Cottages Dev. Co., 156 So. 3d 506 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)).

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Proceedings supplementary (§ 56.29): A post-judgment process enabling creditors to locate and reach a debtor’s assets, including assets transferred to others, to satisfy a judgment.
• FUFTA (Chapter 726): Florida’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, allowing a creditor to void certain transfers made to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors (actual fraud) or made without reasonably equivalent value when the debtor is insolvent (constructive fraud). FUFTA provides specific remedies and strict time bars.
• Statute of limitations vs. statute of repose: A statute of limitations bars a claim after a set time from accrual of the claim; a statute of repose extinguishes the claim after a fixed time from the defendant’s act (e.g., the transfer), regardless of accrual or discovery.
• Tolling: A statutory pause of the running of time under a limitations statute. Whether tolling applies to a statute of repose depends on statutory text and precedent.
• “Identifiable” funds: Under McGregor, § 56.29(3)(b) relief applies to personal property the sheriff can seize; fungible funds that cannot be traced or specifically identified may not qualify. Rosenberg rejects this narrow reading and treats money as intangible personal property within the reach of § 56.29(3).
• Retroactivity: Applying a new statute or amendment to events or claims that occurred before the change. In Florida, retroactive application of procedural changes is more permissible than retroactive changes that impair vested substantive rights, and even for limitations changes there must be clear intent and a reasonable time to sue.
• Money judgment vs. execution: A money judgment imposes personal liability on a transferee; execution is the process of seizing property to satisfy the judgment. Whether § 56.29(3) authorizes money judgments directly is central to this case.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion does not decide who wins. Instead, it identifies five dispositive and unresolved questions of Florida law that control whether Saadi’s claims are time-barred and what remedies remain available in proceedings supplementary. The court’s certification highlights a deep and consequential split between Florida’s Third and Fourth DCAs over the reach of § 56.29(3), the availability of money judgments and recovery of funds, and how the 2014 and 2016 amendments interact with FUFTA’s extinguishment periods.

The Florida Supreme Court’s answers will reverberate across Florida judgment enforcement practice. A Rosenberg-aligned resolution would preserve broad, life-of-the-judgment remedies under § 56.29(3), including money judgments and recovery of transferred funds as “personal property.” A McGregor-aligned resolution would constrain creditors to FUFTA’s extinguishment schedules for money damages and require stricter tracing of funds under § 56.29(3), effectively narrowing proceedings supplementary in fraudulent-transfer contexts. Clarification on whether § 95.051 tolling applies to FUFTA’s repose provisions—and whether concealment of the tortfeasor qualifies—will decide whether creditors can overcome late discovery of transfers where debtors have actively evaded service.

Until the Florida Supreme Court speaks, the outcome remains uncertain. But the Eleventh Circuit has ensured that the governing law will be authoritative and uniform statewide, providing much-needed clarity on the interplay between § 56.29 and FUFTA and on the tolling landscape for fraudulent transfer litigation in Florida.