Certified Questions and Disputed Facts:
Stafford Glenn Poff v. Wayne County Commission and the Jurisdictional Limits of the West Virginia Supreme Court

I. Introduction

The memorandum decision in Stafford Glenn Poff v. Wayne County Commission, No. 24‑105 (W. Va. Nov. 10, 2025), arises from a dispute between a group of Wayne County deputy sheriffs and the Wayne County Commission over retiree health insurance benefits. The deputies contend that the Commission’s longstanding policy of paying a large portion of retiree health insurance premiums created enforceable contractual and vested rights; the Commission maintains it merely adopted a policy it could later change and, in any event, suggests the benefits were unlawfully promised (ultra vires).

At the procedural level, the case reached the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia not as a direct appeal, but through certified questions from the Circuit Court of Wayne County under West Virginia Code § 58‑5‑2. The circuit court, viewing the matter as one of first impression with no clear precedent on retiree health insurance “vesting,” certified two questions:

Whether the Commission’s former written policy of paying 90% of retiree health premiums for certain deputy sheriffs created a vested right to retiree health benefits.
Whether the deputies could proceed on alternative theories such as detrimental reliance, false and misleading statements, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and breach of contract.

The Supreme Court did not answer these questions. Instead, it held that because the certified questions were permeated with unresolved factual disputes and turned on issues that are inherently factual (such as the existence of a contract), the Court lacked jurisdiction under the certification statute and would not issue what would effectively be an advisory opinion. The decision thus sits squarely in a developing line of West Virginia cases sharply limiting the use of certified questions where factual issues remain unsettled.

The true significance of Poff is not in any new rule about retiree health insurance benefits—those questions remain entirely open—but in the Court’s clear reaffirmation (and extension) of doctrinal limits on:

What may be certified as a “question of law” under West Virginia Code § 58‑5‑2; and
When the Supreme Court will refuse to answer certified questions that require fact-finding or would amount to advisory opinions.

II. Summary of the Memorandum Decision

The Supreme Court’s disposition can be summarized as follows:

Standard of Review: Certified questions of law are reviewed de novo, per syllabus point 1 of Gallapoo v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 197 W. Va. 172, 475 S.E.2d 172 (1996).
Jurisdictional Inquiry: Even though neither party challenged jurisdiction, the Court independently examined whether it had authority to answer the certified questions, invoking syllabus point 1 of State v. Lewis, 188 W. Va. 85, 422 S.E.2d 807 (1992).
Statutory Constraint: Under West Virginia Code § 58‑5‑2, the Court may answer only a “question of law” certified from a circuit court. Because the certification procedure is “in derogation of the common law,” it is strictly construed (syllabus point 1 of State v. Brown, 159 W. Va. 438, 223 S.E.2d 193 (1976)).
Need for Undisputed Facts: The Court reiterated that certified questions require a “sufficiently precise and undisputed factual record” and that it lacks jurisdiction to determine questions of fact by certification (citing State v. Stout, Bass v. Coltelli, Sage v. Boyd, and Toler v. Shelton).
Application to Question 1:
- Whether the deputies had a contractual or property right in retiree health benefits is itself an unresolved factual question.
- The existence of a contract is “generally” a question of fact for the jury (syllabus point 4 of Cook v. Heck’s Inc., 176 W. Va. 368, 342 S.E.2d 453 (1986)).
- The record showed conflicting evidence regarding what, if anything, the deputies had been promised about retiree health benefits and when.
- Without resolving these factual disputes, the Court could not decide whether any right had “vested” under the 2011 policy.
Application to Question 2:
- Determining whether the deputies “may proceed” on their equitable and reliance-based theories (unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, detrimental reliance, false and misleading statements) would require resolving individualized factual disputes.
- Answering this question would “preempt the tried and true process of civil litigation” and effectively produce an advisory opinion, contrary to syllabus point 3 of City of Huntington v. AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., 251 W. Va. 637, 915 S.E.2d 828 (2025), and syllabus point 2 of Harshbarger v. Gainer, 184 W. Va. 656, 403 S.E.2d 399 (1991).
Outcome: The Court declined to answer both certified questions and remanded the matter to proceed in the circuit court, effectively telling the parties: resolve the factual disputes in the trial court first, then seek appellate review in the usual way.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Parties and the Policy

The petitioners are a group of deputy sheriffs employed by the Wayne County Sheriff’s Department. They allege that, as early as 1988, the Wayne County Commission (the respondent) provided retiree health insurance coverage for deputy sheriffs, including:

Coverage for deputy sheriffs who retired at age 50 after 20–24 years of service; and
A county-paid share of 90% of their health insurance premiums.

Though the practice purportedly existed informally for decades, the Commission formally adopted a written policy in 2011 covering deputy sheriffs hired before that year. The deputies contend this policy was part of their overall compensation package, one they relied upon when choosing and continuing employment.

B. The 2017 Policy Change

In 2017, the Commission amended its policy in two critical ways:

Raising the minimum retirement age for eligibility from 50 to 60 for deputies with 20–24 years of service; and
Reducing the employer-paid portion of premiums from 90% to 50%.

These changes were applied to deputies hired before 2011—the same group that the original policy purportedly favored. The Commission’s defense emphasizes fiscal constraints, noting in the circuit court’s order that:

Retiree health insurance was funded annually from current-year budgets;
Future costs were increasing; and
The Commission concluded it could no longer afford prior benefit levels.

C. The Deputies’ Claims

In response to the 2017 change, the deputies filed multiple lawsuits (five separate civil actions) in the Circuit Court of Wayne County, each alleging various theories:

Breach of Contract: The deputies argued that the retiree health policy—especially as formalized in 2011—formed a binding contract. Their “continued employment” constituted acceptance and consideration, and the Commission’s attempt to reduce benefits in 2017 constituted breach.
Vested Property Interest: They contended that the Commission’s policy created a vested property right in lifetime retiree health benefits (90% premiums, retirement at 50 after 20–24 years), such that altering the policy impaired their rights.
Equitable/Quasi‑Contract Claims:
- Unjust enrichment and quantum meruit: They accepted “artificially low wages” and forewent other, higher-paying positions or pay raises, in reliance on the promised retiree benefits. This, they argued, conferred a benefit on the Commission that would be unjust for the County to retain without fulfilling its promise.
- Detrimental reliance and false and misleading statements: The deputies alleged they had been explicitly told they would receive retiree health coverage under the earlier terms and had structured their careers around this expectation.

In short, the deputies portrayed retiree health insurance not as a discretionary fringe benefit, but as a core component of earned compensation, akin to a pension, and argued that altering it after the fact violated both contract and equitable principles.

D. The Commission’s Defenses

The Commission responded on several fronts:

No Contract: It characterized the retiree health provision as a unilateral policy that could be changed prospectively, not a binding contract guaranteeing benefits in perpetuity.
Ultra Vires Argument: Even if a contract existed, the Commission argued it was void or unenforceable because:
- West Virginia Code § 11‑8‑26 forbids a county from incurring obligations exceeding funds available for current expenses; and
- West Virginia Code § 7‑5‑20 provides that when a public officer or employee retires, they may remain on the group plan only if they pay the “entire premium.”
The Commission suggested that promising to pay future retiree premiums violated these statutes and exceeded its lawful authority, rendering any such contract ultra vires.
No Vested Rights: It argued that retiree health insurance, funded “year-to-year” from annually approved budgets, could not create vested rights, particularly where employees had not contributed funds to a dedicated plan.

The Supreme Court carefully stated that, because it lacked jurisdiction to answer the certified questions, it expressed no opinion on these ultra vires arguments or their merits.

E. Procedural History and Certification

The cases progressed in the circuit court to the summary judgment stage, and mediation resolved some unrelated issues. The parties then:

Jointly moved to stay proceedings; and
Jointly sought certification of the two legal questions to the Supreme Court.

In granting the certification motion, the circuit court acknowledged:

There were significant factual disputes about:
- Whether and when each deputy was told about retiree benefits;
- Whether they relied on those promises when accepting or remaining in their positions; and
- Whether the nature of the benefits could be considered “vested.”
The issues were “of first impression” in West Virginia and lacked clear controlling precedent.

The Supreme Court docketed the certified questions, received briefing, and heard oral argument. It then issued a memorandum decision under Rule 21 of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure, declining to answer the questions while providing a detailed explanation of the jurisdictional limitations on certified questions.

IV. Legal Framework and Precedents

A. Statutory Framework: Certification from Circuit Courts

The key statute is West Virginia Code § 58‑5‑2, which permits circuit courts to certify “any question of law” to the Supreme Court. Several principles follow:

The statute authorizing certification is “in derogation of the common law” because it interrupts the usual path of litigation (trial → final order → appeal). Therefore, it is strictly construed (syllabus point 1, State v. Brown).
Certification is limited to questions of law; questions of fact cannot be certified.
The question of whether a certified question is proper—certifiability—is a matter of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction (syllabus point 2, Brown).

In Poff, the Court holds itself to this statutory boundary and emphasizes that it must decline certified questions that:

Require resolution of factual disputes; or
Ask the Court, in effect, to decide mixed questions of law and fact where the factual predicates remain contested and undeveloped.

B. Older Precedents on Certified Questions and Facts

The decision situates itself in a longstanding doctrinal line:

State v. Stout, 142 W. Va. 182, 95 S.E.2d 639 (1956) (syllabus point 1):
“Under [West Virginia] Code [§] 58-5-2, this Court has no jurisdiction to determine a certified question of fact.”
This is the core foundational rule: certification cannot be a vehicle for fact-finding.
Sage v. Boyd, 145 W. Va. 197, 113 S.E.2d 836 (1960) (syllabus point 3):
Under § 58‑5‑2, the Court has no jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of a pleading on certification where proof is required.
Here the Court drew a line between abstract legal sufficiency (certifiable) and questions turning on evidence (not certifiable).
Toler v. Shelton, 159 W. Va. 476, 223 S.E.2d 429 (1976): The Court reiterated that it lacks jurisdiction on certified questions where factual establishment is necessary.
Bass v. Coltelli, 192 W. Va. 516, 453 S.E.2d 350 (1994) (syllabus point 5, in part):
“Certification will not be accepted unless there is a sufficiently precise and undisputed factual record on which the legal issues can be determined. Moreover, such legal issues must substantially control the case.”
This blends the jurisdictional requirement (no fact questions) with prudential concerns—certification should only be used where the legal question is central and factually anchored.

Poff explicitly invokes this line of authority and applies it rigorously, stressing the need for a “sufficiently precise and undisputed factual record” before a legal question can be certified.

C. Recent Trilogy of Cases Tightening Certification Practice

The Court also relies heavily on a recent trio of decisions that collectively underscore the same theme: certified questions cannot be decided on unsettled facts.

1. SWN Production Co., LLC v. Kellam, 247 W. Va. 78, 875 S.E.2d 216 (2022)

In Kellam, the Court received certified questions from a federal court regarding an oil and gas lease and the calculation of deductions. It reformulated three questions into one but ultimately:

Declined to answer because determining whether the lease contained a method of calculating deductions required examination and interpretation of contract language and factual development.
Held that such tasks were for “the court and the fact-finder, as appropriate,” not for the Supreme Court on certification.

Poff parallels Kellam: in both, the Court refuses to interpret contractual arrangements or implications without a fully developed factual record and first-level interpretation by the trial court.

2. Clark v. W. Va. Consol. Public Retirement Bd. (Clark II), 252 W. Va. 143, 919 S.E.2d 46 (2025)

In Clark II, one certified question asked whether, under the facts of that case, the petitioner was entitled to recover attorney’s fees. The Court declined to answer, reasoning:

“The question of whether or not a litigant has a viable claim for attorney's fees in a particular matter is necessarily dependent upon facts as well as the law. Here, this Court does not have before it any factual findings of the lower court or its application of the law to those facts…. To do so would preempt the tried and true process of civil litigation. Thus, because this question does not present an issue of law, we must decline to answer it.”

Poff directly borrows this rationale, especially in declining to answer whether the deputies “may proceed” on their equitable and reliance-based claims. Like attorney’s fees, entitlement to relief on unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, or detrimental reliance is fact-intensive and unsuited to abstract resolution by certification.

3. City of Huntington v. AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., 251 W. Va. 637, 915 S.E.2d 828 (2025)

In City of Huntington, arising from opioid epidemic litigation, the Supreme Court refused to answer a certified question from the Fourth Circuit where the answer required resolving numerous disputed facts. It held:

Under the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act (West Virginia Code §§ 51‑1A‑1 to ‑13), it may only answer questions of law;
The factual record must be “sufficiently precise and undisputed,” and the Court will assume the certifying court’s findings of fact are correct; and
Any answer given in the face of unsettled facts would be advisory.

Poff extends the same logic to certifications from state circuit courts under § 58‑5‑2. The Court explicitly notes that, despite different enabling statutes, the principle is the same: where unsettled facts and unreviewed legal conclusions underlie the certified question, any answer would effectively be advisory, and thus impermissible.

D. Advisory Opinions and the Harshbarger Line

The Court reinforces the prohibition on advisory opinions by citing:

Harshbarger v. Gainer, 184 W. Va. 656, 403 S.E.2d 399 (1991) (syllabus point 2, in part):
“Courts are not constituted for the purpose of making advisory decrees or resolving academic disputes.”
City of Huntington (syllabus point 3): Restates the advisory-opinion prohibition in the certification context.

Advisory opinions are decisions rendered in the absence of a concrete dispute suitable for judicial resolution, often hypothetical in nature. Poff treats certifications based on contested facts as dangerously close to advisory opinions, because the Court would be opining on legal principles untethered to a settled factual scenario.

E. Other Substantive Precedents in the Background

While the Court explicitly avoids deciding substantive issues about retiree health benefits, it does reference several cases that frame the legal context:

Citynet, LLC v. Toney, 235 W. Va. 79, 772 S.E.2d 36 (2015): The deputies relied on this case to argue that an employer’s written promise can form a unilateral contract accepted by continued employment:
“[A]n employer's written promise to its employees constitutes an offer for a unilateral contract that can be accepted by an employee continuing to work while under no obligation to do so. . . .”
This supports their theory that the Commission’s 2011 written policy was a binding offer, accepted by their continued service.
Boggess v. City of Charleston, 234 W. Va. 366, 765 S.E.2d 255 (2014) (syllabus point 4):
“In the absence of a contractual obligation providing otherwise, a public employer is permitted to unilaterally modify a longstanding policy affecting the rights of employees where notice is provided to such employees and where the modification of the policy does not retroactively impair previously earned and vested rights, such as pension benefits.”
The Commission effectively stands on Boggess, claiming the retiree health policy was just that—a policy, modifiable at will absent a contract and absent vested rights.
Cook v. Heck’s Inc., 176 W. Va. 368, 342 S.E.2d 453 (1986) (syllabus point 4):
“Generally, the existence of a contract is a question of fact for the jury.”
This is critical to the Court’s jurisdictional ruling: because the existence of a contract is fact-based, it is not an appropriate subject for a certified “question of law.”

The Court also notes, but expressly does not decide, statutory issues potentially bearing on the substantive merits:

West Virginia Code § 11‑8‑26: Prohibits counties from incurring obligations beyond funds available for current expenses.
West Virginia Code § 7‑5‑20: States that when a public officer or employee retires, they may remain in the group plan if they elect and “pay the entire premium.”

These statutes form the backbone of the Commission’s ultra vires argument but remain unresolved at this stage.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Sua Sponte Jurisdictional Review

Even though neither party questioned the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to answer the certified questions, the Court invoked syllabus point 1 of State v. Lewis:

“This Court will make an independent determination of whether the matters brought before it lie within its jurisdiction.”

The Court thus undertakes its own jurisdictional inquiry whenever a certification is presented, and it will not simply accept the parties’ acquiescence. In Poff, this leads the Court to conclude that:

The statutory grant of authority under § 58‑5‑2 is limited; and
The current certification does not satisfy its prerequisites.

B. Requirement that Certified Questions Be Pure Questions of Law

Section 58‑5‑2 authorizes certification of “any question of law.” The Court underscores the phrase “question of law” and reads it narrowly:

Questions that require the Court to resolve disputed facts are not questions of law.
Questions that are so entangled with factual disputes that any legal ruling would be hypothetical or contingent are effectively non-certifiable.

The Court couples this statutory reading with the older cases (Stout, Sage, Bass) and its more recent decisions (Kellam, Clark II, City of Huntington). Together, they establish a firm rule:

Certification will not be accepted unless there is a sufficiently precise and undisputed factual record on which the legal issues can be determined, and the issues must substantially control the case.

This is not a mere prudential preference; it is treated as a jurisdictional limitation.

C. Application to Certified Question 1: Vested Right to Retiree Health Insurance

Certified Question 1 asks whether the Commission’s former written policy of paying 90% of premiums for deputies who retire at age 50 after 20–24 years of service:

“created a vested right to retiree health insurance benefits for [the deputies].”

The circuit court answered “No.” The Supreme Court refuses to answer at all, for several reasons.

1. Contract Existence is a Factual Question

Determining whether any “vested right” exists first requires determining the legal source of such a right:

Is it grounded in a contract between the Commission and the deputies?
Is it merely a discretionary policy without contractual force?

The deputies argue that:

The 2011 written policy constituted a contractual offer under Citynet;
Their continued employment and decision to forego other opportunities constituted acceptance and consideration; and
Thus, the Commission is contractually bound to provide the promised benefits.

The Commission insists that:

The policy was just that—a policy, not a contract;
Under Boggess, it could be unilaterally modified prospectively absent an express contractual obligation; and
In any event, any supposed contract was ultra vires.

The Supreme Court notes that the parties do not even agree on the core facts:

What precisely each deputy was told about retiree benefits;
When they were told;
Whether their decisions to accept or remain employed were actually based on those representations.

The Court highlights specific examples:

Petitioner Stafford Glen Poff claims he accepted employment based on a promise of retiree health coverage after 20 years at age 50; the Commission points to contrary evidence that no such promise was made at his hiring.
Petitioner Sheria Maynard claims she remained employed because of the retiree health policy; the Commission offers evidence that no one promised her future benefits and that she does not recall when or how she even received a copy of the policy.

Given this, and citing syllabus point 4 of Cook, the Court emphasizes:

“Generally, the existence of a contract is a question of fact for the jury.”

Thus, whether a contract existed is not properly certifiable as a pure question of law under § 58‑5‑2.

2. “Vesting” Cannot Be Decided in the Abstract

The question of whether benefits have “vested” cannot be resolved without first:

Determining whether there is a contract (or other legal basis) at all; and
Defining the terms of any such contract.

The Court puts this succinctly:

“As a practical matter, we cannot begin to address whether rights have ‘vested’ under something without knowing the nature of the purported rights or what that ‘something’ is legally.”

Without a concrete, undisputed set of facts about what was promised and how, the Court cannot answer whether rights vested. To do so would fall outside its certification jurisdiction and drift into advisory-opinion territory.

3. Ultra Vires and Additional Factual Questions

The Court further notes that the circuit court has not yet resolved whether the Commission’s adoption of the retiree health benefits was an ultra vires act. That determination itself requires factual findings:

What commitments were made relative to available funds and statutory constraints;
How the benefits were structured and funded.

If the policy was ultra vires, then even a facially “contractual” promise might be unenforceable—another reason the Court cannot meaningfully answer the certified question in its current posture.

D. Application to Certified Question 2: May the Deputies Proceed on Equitable/Alternative Theories?

Certified Question 2 asks whether the deputies:

“may proceed with claims sounding in detrimental reliance, false and misleading statements, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit and breach of contract to enforce [the Commission’s] former written policy….”

The circuit court answered “Yes.” The Supreme Court declines to answer this question as well, because:

Deciding whether plaintiffs “may proceed” is essentially deciding a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment on fact‑intensive causes of action.
Each of the equitable claims—unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, detrimental reliance—turns on what representations were made to each plaintiff, what they actually relied upon, and what benefit they conferred on the Commission.

As in Clark II, where the Court refused to decide entitlement to attorney’s fees, the Court here holds that answering whether the deputies can proceed on these theories would:

Require it to “preempt the tried and true process of civil litigation”; and
Involve resolving individualized factual disputes that must first be addressed in the circuit court.

The Court further emphasizes that taking up this question would risk issuing an impermissible advisory opinion, forbidden by Harshbarger and reaffirmed in City of Huntington.

E. Unified Rule from State and Federal Certification Statutes

The Court acknowledges that the statutes governing certification from circuit courts (§ 58‑5‑2) and from federal courts (the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, §§ 51‑1A‑1 to ‑13) are distinct in form. However, it stresses that the underlying principle is the same:

“Although we recognize that the enabling statutes for certification are different in questions certified from circuit courts and from federal courts, the principle remains the same – this Court cannot answer certified questions that require it to conjure the facts necessary to respond to the question.”

Thus, regardless of the source of the certification (state or federal), the Supreme Court requires an undisputed factual predicate and will decline questions where the factual record is unsettled or imprecise.

VI. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

1. Certified Question

A certified question is a mechanism by which a trial court (state or federal) may ask the state’s highest court to decide a specific question of law that is:

Determinative or substantially controlling in the case; and
Unclear or unsettled in that jurisdiction.

The idea is to obtain authoritative guidance on state law before proceeding with the case. But the appellate court can only answer if the question is a pure question of law resting on a clear and undisputed set of facts.

2. Advisory Opinion

An advisory opinion is a judicial statement on the law that:

Is not tied to resolving an actual, concrete dispute between parties;
Addresses hypothetical or academic questions; or
Is rendered where the necessary facts are not sufficiently developed.

West Virginia courts, like federal courts, have long held (e.g., Harshbarger) that they are not constituted to render such opinions. The prohibition protects separation of powers and ensures courts resolve real disputes rather than general policy questions.

3. Ultra Vires

An ultra vires act is one taken “beyond the powers” of a governmental entity or officer. In this context:

If a county commission promises benefits that state law forbids it from funding (e.g., obligations beyond current revenue limits or contrary to statutory insurance frameworks), those promises may be ultra vires.
Ultra vires commitments are often void or unenforceable, even if the parties agreed to them.

Here, the Commission argues the retiree health commitments violated §§ 11‑8‑26 and 7‑5‑20. The Supreme Court does not decide this, leaving the ultra vires question for the circuit court.

4. Unilateral Contract and Consideration

A unilateral contract is a contract where one party makes a promise and the other accepts by performing, rather than by making a counter‑promise. Applied to employment:

An employer may issue an offer (e.g., “If you work 20 years, we will provide lifetime retiree health benefits.”).
Employees accept the offer by working under those terms, providing the consideration (their labor, forgoing other opportunities).

Under Citynet, an employer’s written promise can form such a unilateral contract if the employee continues to work while free to leave. The deputies rely on this doctrine to argue that the 2011 policy created contractual rights.

5. Vested Rights / Property Interest

A vested right is a right that has become so fully and legally established that it is not subject to being taken away without due process or breach of contract. In public employment:

Pensions are classic examples of vested rights once certain conditions (years of service, contributions) are met.
In Boggess, the Court held that in the absence of a contract, a public employer may change its policies prospectively, so long as it does not retroactively impair vested rights.

A property interest in constitutional terms similarly refers to a legitimate claim of entitlement, often based on law, contract, or established practice. The deputies claim that the retiree health benefit became a vested property interest once they met—or relied on meeting—the policy’s conditions.

6. Equitable and Quasi‑Contract Theories

Unjust enrichment: Arises when one party receives a benefit unjustly at another’s expense, and equity requires restitution. The deputies say the Commission benefited from years of service at lower wages, induced by promised retiree benefits; the Commission would be unjustly enriched if it could now deny those benefits.
Quantum meruit: Literally “as much as he has deserved.” It allows a party to recover the reasonable value of services rendered where no enforceable contract exists, but services were provided with an expectation of payment and accepted by the other party.
Detrimental reliance / promissory estoppel: Applies where:
- A promise is made;
- The promisee reasonably relies on it to their detriment; and
- Injustice can be avoided only by enforcing the promise or providing some remedy.
The deputies argue they relied on the retiree health policy when choosing long-term service and lower pay.
False and misleading statements: This can overlap with misrepresentation or fraud theories, depending on proof of falsity, knowledge, reliance, and damages.

All these claims are fact-intensive; they cannot be resolved (nor even meaningfully evaluated) without a full factual record.

VII. Impact and Implications

A. Immediate Procedural Impact on the Poff Litigation

For the parties in Poff, the immediate effect of the memorandum decision is:

The case returns to the Circuit Court of Wayne County without any Supreme Court guidance on whether the deputies’ retiree health benefits vested or whether the Commission’s 2017 changes were lawful.
The circuit court must now:
- Develop a complete factual record (through further discovery, evidentiary hearings, or trial);
- Decide, in the first instance, core questions such as:
  - Did a contract exist?
  - Were any rights vested?
  - Was the policy ultra vires?
  - Are the equitable claims viable on the facts?
- Issue final or appealable orders.
Only then can an appeal be taken in the usual manner, at which point the Supreme Court can address both facts (under deferential standards) and law.

B. Broader Impact on Certification Practice in West Virginia

Poff significantly tightens the practical availability of certification from circuit courts:

Circuit Judges Must Resolve More First: Circuit courts can no longer treat certification as a convenient way to outsource difficult mixed questions early in the case. Instead, they must:
- Make findings on key fact questions (e.g., contract existence);
- Clarify the factual predicate for any certified question; and
- Ensure the question is truly legal and not fact-bound.
Parties Cannot Use Joint Certification to Bypass Fact-Finding: The parties’ joint certification request in Poff did not persuade the Court to relax its jurisdictional constraints. The opinion makes clear that:
- Parties’ agreement cannot create jurisdiction where it does not exist;
- The Court will independently scrutinize whether the questions are certifiable.
Stronger Uniformity Between State and Federal Certification: By harmonizing the § 58‑5‑2 framework with the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act (§§ 51‑1A‑1 to ‑13), the Court signals that:
- Whether the question comes from a state circuit court or a federal court, the prerequisite of an undisputed factual record is the same;
- Cases like Kellam, Clark II, and City of Huntington are part of a unified approach limiting certification to genuine questions of law.

C. Implications for Public Employment and Retiree Health Litigation

Substantively, Poff does not decide whether retiree health insurance policies can create vested rights or enforceable contract claims. However, it has important practical consequences for future litigants:

Fact Development is Critical: Employees and public employers must recognize that disputes over benefit “vesting” will turn heavily on:
- What explicit promises were made (in writing or orally);
- How those promises were communicated;
- What policies or ordinances were actually adopted; and
- How employees relied on them.
Merely labeling something a “policy” or a “benefit” will not answer whether there is a vested right.
Unilateral Contract Theories Require Individual Proof: Those invoking Citynet to claim an employer’s policy created a unilateral contract must be prepared to provide detailed, individualized evidence of:
- Receipt of the policy;
- Understanding of its terms;
- Continued employment in reliance on those terms.
Public Employers and Policy Flexibility: Public employers looking to maintain flexibility for future policy changes may:
- Draft policies with explicit disclaimers (e.g., reserving the right to modify or terminate benefits);
- Be transparent about the absence of contractual guarantees; and
- Ensure compliance with budgetary and statutory constraints to avoid ultra vires issues.

Ultimately, Poff signals that any major doctrinal development in this area (e.g., clarifying when retiree health benefits can “vest” like pensions) will arise only after fully developed trial court records, not on thin or disputed factual certifications.

D. Separation of Powers and Judicial Role

The decision reinforces a core separation-of-powers principle:

Courts resolve cases—disputes between parties on concrete facts—not abstract policy questions.
Certification is a narrow exception to the usual appellate path and cannot be turned into a mechanism for general legal advice or premature appellate review.
By refusing to issue advisory opinions, the Court:
- Respects the legislature’s statutory limits in § 58‑5‑2;
- Respects the trial courts’ role in fact-finding; and
- Preserves the appellate court’s role as reviewer of final decisions, not co-adjudicator of ongoing factual disputes.

VIII. Conclusion

Stafford Glenn Poff v. Wayne County Commission does not answer the substantive question the parties most care about—whether Wayne County’s former retiree health policy created vested rights that the Commission could not later diminish. Instead, the decision’s significance lies in its robust reaffirmation of the limits on the Supreme Court’s ability to answer certified questions.

Drawing on a substantial body of precedent—Stout, Sage, Toler, Bass, Brown, Kellam, Clark II, and City of Huntington—the Court holds that:

Only pure questions of law may be certified under West Virginia Code § 58‑5‑2;
A sufficiently precise and undisputed factual record is an indispensable prerequisite to certification; and
The Court will not, and cannot, answer certified questions whose resolution requires fact-finding or would amount to an advisory opinion.

For litigants and lower courts, the case is a clear directive: before asking the Supreme Court to resolve novel legal issues, particularly in complex areas like public employment benefits, they must first do the hard work of establishing and resolving the relevant facts at the trial level. Only then can the Supreme Court fulfill its proper appellate role—deciding concrete legal questions on a settled factual foundation, rather than speculating on incomplete or disputed records.

Certified Questions and Disputed Facts: Stafford Glenn Poff v. Wayne County Commission and the Jurisdictional Limits of the West Virginia Supreme Court