Certification Is Not a Vehicle to Revisit Settled Law: Michigan Supreme Court Declines to Answer Federal Certified Question on the Medical-Malpractice Damages Cap

Certification Is Not a Vehicle to Revisit Settled Law: Michigan Supreme Court Declines to Answer Federal Certified Question on the Medical-Malpractice Damages Cap

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Michigan Supreme Court’s July 3, 2025 order in In re Certified Question (Beaubien v. Trivedi, et al.), declining to answer a question certified by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The federal court had asked whether Michigan’s medical-malpractice noneconomic damages cap, MCL 600.1483, violates the state constitution’s jury-trial right, equal-protection guarantees, or separation-of-powers doctrine.

The Michigan Supreme Court, by order, declined the request. Chief Justice Cavanagh issued a separate concurrence explaining why certification under MCR 7.308(A)(2)(a) was improper in this instance: the questions posed are already controlled by binding Michigan precedent, most centrally the Court’s decision in Phillips v. Mirac, Inc., 470 Mich 415 (2004), and the Michigan Court of Appeals’ line of cases upholding the constitutionality of damages caps, including Zdrojewski v. Murphy, 254 Mich App 50 (2002). Justice Bernstein would have granted the request to hear argument and answer the question.

Parties and posture:

  • Plaintiff: Whitney Beaubien, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Craig A. Beaubien.
  • Defendants: Dr. Charu Trivedi and Toledo Clinic, Inc., doing business as Toledo Clinic Cancer Centers.
  • Procedural posture: Federal district court certified a state-law constitutional question concerning MCL 600.1483; the Michigan Supreme Court declined to answer, leaving the federal court to apply existing Michigan law.

Summary of the Opinion

The Michigan Supreme Court’s order simply “respectfully declines” the request to answer the certified question. The Court did not reach or resolve the constitutional merits. However, Chief Justice Cavanagh’s concurrence explains the basis for declining certification:

  • Certification under MCR 7.308(A)(2)(a) is reserved for questions “not controlled by Michigan Supreme Court precedent.”
  • The constitutionality of legislative damages caps—in particular the interaction with jury-trial, equal-protection, due-process, and separation-of-powers principles—has already been addressed by binding precedent, notably Phillips v. Mirac, Inc. (upholding an analogous damages cap) and Court of Appeals decisions that specifically uphold MCL 600.1483, including Zdrojewski v. Murphy and its progeny.
  • Because these authorities provide a “reasonably clear and principled course” for the federal court to follow, the question is not “unsettled,” and certification is unwarranted.

The concurrence underscores that if Michigan law on damages caps is to be revisited, it should occur through the normal state appellate process rather than by stretching the certified-question procedure beyond its intended scope. Justice Bernstein would have granted certification to hear argument and answer the question.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1) The certification framework

  • Bagg v. Detroit, 5 Mich 66, 70 (1858), and Reichert v. Metro Trust Co., 262 Mich 123, 135 (1933), reflect a longstanding principle: certification is for questions where the law is new or unsettled and of public importance.
  • MCR 7.308(A)(2)(a) allows certification to the Michigan Supreme Court only when the question “is not controlled by Michigan Supreme Court precedent.” If the standard is satisfied, the Court may answer by order or opinion; it may also deny the request. MCR 7.308(A)(5).
  • Federal analogs reinforce this limitation:
    • ED Mich LR 83.40 permits certification only for “unsettled” questions of state law.
    • In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litigation, 82 F.4th 455, 461 (6th Cir. 2023), notes that certification is discretionary and suited to “novel or unsettled” issues.
    • Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Duro Bag Mfg. Co., 50 F.3d 370, 372 (6th Cir. 1995), declined certification where state law principles already provided guidance, even absent an exact on-point state decision.
    • Pennington v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 553 F.3d 447, 450 (6th Cir. 2009), emphasizes the federal court’s task is to chart “a reasonably clear and principled course” under existing state law.
    • Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), and West v. AT&T, 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940), require federal courts sitting in diversity to apply state substantive law, including intermediate appellate decisions absent persuasive reasons to think the state’s highest court would decide differently.
  • MCR 7.215(C)(2) grants published Michigan Court of Appeals opinions precedential authority in state courts, reinforcing their importance to the Erie analysis in federal court.

2) Substantive damages-cap precedent

  • Phillips v. Mirac, Inc., 470 Mich 415 (2004):
    • Upheld an analogous statutory cap (MCL 257.401(3)) against challenges under the Michigan Constitution’s jury-trial right, equal protection, and due process.
    • On the jury-trial right, framed the question as whether a legislative cap that limits recoverable damages—after a jury has made its findings—violates the constitutional guarantee. The Court answered no, indicating the cap does not impermissibly intrude on the jury’s fact-finding function.
    • On equal protection, identified the asserted right more precisely as a claimed right to have a jury’s damages assessment be unmodifiable as a matter of law. The Court held this is not a fundamental right and does not involve a suspect classification, so rational-basis review applies; cost reduction is a legitimate legislative purpose satisfied by a cap.
    • Phillips thus supplies the controlling framework for damages-cap constitutional analysis in Michigan.
  • Andary v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 512 Mich 207, 268, 270 (2023):
    • While addressing different statutory issues, Andary reaffirmed the equal-protection framework relevant to Phillips (i.e., application of rational-basis review when neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class is implicated).
  • Zdrojewski v. Murphy, 254 Mich App 50 (2002), and Wiley v. Henry Ford Cottage Hosp., 257 Mich App 488 (2003):
    • Directly addressed the constitutionality of Michigan’s medical-malpractice cap, MCL 600.1483, rejecting challenges under the jury-trial right, equal protection, and separation of powers (with Wiley ultimately recognizing Zdrojewski as controlling after internal Court of Appeals procedures).
  • Jenkins v. Patel (On Remand), 263 Mich App 508 (2004):
    • After Phillips, the Court of Appeals held that Phillips and Zdrojewski foreclose arguments that MCL 600.1483 violates the jury-trial right, separation of powers, or equal protection.
  • Wessels v. Garden Way, Inc., 263 Mich App 642, 646 (2004):
    • Relied on Phillips and Zdrojewski to uphold a noneconomic damages cap in the products-liability context against similar constitutional claims.
  • Smith v. Botsford General Hospital, 419 F.3d 513, 519–520 (6th Cir. 2005):
    • The Sixth Circuit itself has cited Phillips and Zdrojewski in rejecting constitutional challenges to MCL 600.1483, reinforcing the Erie-based expectation that federal courts will follow these state precedents.
  • Earlier Michigan cases concerning the jury’s role in assessing damages:
    • Cases like Weil v. Longyear, 263 Mich 22 (1933); Leary v. Fisher, 248 Mich 574 (1929); Aho v. Conda, 347 Mich 450 (1956); and Precopio v. Detroit, 415 Mich 457 (1982), recognize the jury’s traditional role in determining damages but did not address statutory damages caps or establish that a jury’s award is categorically unalterable. Chief Justice Cavanagh’s concurrence explains why these authorities do not undercut Phillips or render the issue “unsettled.”

Legal Reasoning

A. The procedural threshold: what counts as a proper certified question?

The core of Chief Justice Cavanagh’s concurrence is procedural: MCR 7.308(A)(2)(a) reserves the Michigan Supreme Court’s certified-question jurisdiction for unsettled issues “not controlled by Michigan Supreme Court precedent.” The concurrence surveys both Michigan and federal certification practices to emphasize:

  • Certification is not a path to relitigate settled questions or to invite the Supreme Court to reconsider existing precedent in a federal case.
  • Where prior decisions supply a “reasonably clear and principled course,” federal courts should apply that body of law rather than seek certification.
  • Published Michigan Court of Appeals decisions upholding MCL 600.1483, especially when in harmony with Phillips, further reinforce that the question is settled for Erie purposes.

B. Substantive guidance already provided by Phillips and the Court of Appeals

  • Jury-trial right:
    • Phillips framed the question as whether a cap that limits recoverable damages—after a jury has performed its fact-finding—violates the constitutional right to jury trial. It concluded that it does not, because the cap does not prevent the jury from finding facts or assessing damages; rather, it sets a legal limit on the amount that may be awarded in judgment.
    • This framing directly parallels the challenge in Beaubien and supplies a controlling answer against a jury-trial violation claim.
  • Equal protection:
    • Phillips characterized the asserted right as the right to have a jury’s damages assessment remain unmodified as a matter of law. Because that is neither a fundamental right nor does it involve a suspect or quasi-suspect class, rational-basis review applies.
    • Michigan precedent recognizes cost containment as a legitimate legislative purpose, and a damages cap rationally advances that purpose. Andary recently reaffirmed the relevant equal-protection framework.
    • Applying the same logic, MCL 600.1483 survives equal-protection scrutiny, as held in Zdrojewski and reaffirmed in Jenkins.
  • Separation of powers:
    • Michigan appellate decisions have consistently held that the Legislature may define substantive remedies, including damages limits, without improperly encroaching on the judicial function. Courts retain the adjudicatory role; caps set policy limits on remedies.
  • Due process:
    • Although due process was part of Phillips, it was not among the questions certified here. Phillips upheld the cap against due-process challenges as well, further buttressing the settled nature of Michigan law in this area.

Taken together, these strands of precedent led the concurrence to conclude that the federal court already has ample guidance: Michigan law upholds statutory damages caps against the cited constitutional challenges. The certified question therefore does not meet the threshold requirement, and the Court appropriately declined to answer it.

Impact

Immediate implications for the federal case

  • The Eastern District of Michigan must now apply Michigan law as it stands. Under Erie and West, that means following Michigan Supreme Court precedent (Phillips) and published Michigan Court of Appeals decisions (Zdrojewski, Jenkins, Wiley, and related cases).
  • Given those authorities, the federal court is likely to uphold MCL 600.1483 against the plaintiff’s Michigan-constitutional challenges.

Broader effects on certification practice

  • This order, and especially the concurrence, signals a disciplined approach to certified questions: the Michigan Supreme Court will not use certification to revisit existing precedent. Litigants seeking a change in state law should bring cases through the Michigan appellate system, presenting grounds for reconsideration consistent with stare decisis principles.
  • Federal courts may be more reluctant to certify questions when a reasonably clear path exists in existing Michigan Supreme Court or Court of Appeals decisions, even if those decisions are not perfectly on point to every fact pattern.

Substantive landscape of damages caps in Michigan

  • The constitutionality of damages caps under the Michigan Constitution remains, for now, governed by Phillips and the Court of Appeals’ medical-malpractice cases. The concurrence repeats that this is “rightly or wrongly decided,” implying the Court has not foreclosed future reexamination in an appropriate direct case.
  • The medical-malpractice noneconomic damages cap remains on firm precedential footing under current Michigan law, subject to legislative amendment or a future, properly presented request to revisit precedent through state appellate channels.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Certified question: A procedure allowing a court (often a federal or sister-state court) to ask a state supreme court to decide an unsettled question of that state’s law. In Michigan, MCR 7.308(A)(2)(a) limits certification to questions not controlled by Michigan Supreme Court precedent.
  • Noneconomic damages cap (MCL 600.1483): A statutory limit on the amount of compensation for intangible harms (e.g., pain and suffering) recoverable in medical-malpractice cases.
  • Right to jury trial: A constitutional guarantee that a jury decides factual disputes. Michigan precedent holds that a post-verdict statutory damages cap does not prevent the jury’s fact-finding; it limits the legal remedy available.
  • Equal protection: A constitutional command that similarly situated persons be treated alike. Where no suspect classification or fundamental right is implicated, courts use “rational-basis” review and uphold the law if it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest (e.g., cost containment).
  • Separation of powers: The allocation of governmental powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Defining the scope of remedies is typically viewed as a legislative function; courts adjudicate cases within those substantive limits.
  • Controlling precedent: Binding authority from a higher court (here, the Michigan Supreme Court). If such authority squarely governs an issue, lower courts and certification requests must follow it.
  • Erie doctrine: In diversity cases, federal courts apply state substantive law, including the decisions of the state’s highest court and, absent contrary indications, published intermediate appellate decisions.

Conclusion

The Michigan Supreme Court’s refusal to answer the certified question in Beaubien v. Trivedi reinforces a critical procedural principle: certification is for unsettled questions of state law, not to re-open settled doctrine. Chief Justice Cavanagh’s concurrence identifies the governing authorities—Phillips v. Mirac, Inc. and the Court of Appeals’ decisions in Zdrojewski, Jenkins, and related cases—which together control the constitutional challenges to Michigan’s medical-malpractice noneconomic damages cap, MCL 600.1483.

Practically, the federal district court must apply these precedents, which strongly support the cap’s constitutionality under the Michigan Constitution’s jury-trial, equal-protection, and separation-of-powers provisions. Institutionally, the order underscores the Court’s commitment to the intended bounds of certification under MCR 7.308(A)(2)(a), reserving that mechanism for genuinely unsettled questions. If Michigan’s damages-cap jurisprudence is to evolve, it will do so through the ordinary appellate process in the state courts, not by means of certified questions seeking reconsideration of settled law. Justice Bernstein’s separate view—favoring full briefing and an answer—highlights that the issue remains contested in policy terms, even if presently settled as a matter of Michigan law.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Michigan

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