Introduction

This consolidated appeal arises from four related environmental suits between neighboring industrial landowners in South Charleston, West Virginia. The Courtland Company, Inc. alleged that Union Carbide Corporation’s historic disposal practices contaminated groundwater and surface waters affecting Courtland’s 13.8-acre parcel. Union Carbide, in turn, counterclaimed in one action for response costs and sought to allocate any recoverable costs to Courtland under CERCLA’s contribution provision.

The litigation was tried in two phases before the district court: Phase I on liability (18-day bench trial) and Phase II on remedies (3-day bench trial). The district court issued 495 pages of findings and conclusions across both phases. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed in full, substantially adopting the district court’s thorough fact-finding and legal analysis.

Although unpublished and therefore non-binding within the Fourth Circuit, the opinion offers practical clarifications on several recurring issues in environmental litigation:

• CERCLA cost recovery can be defeated by the § 107(b)(3) third-party/causation defense even when plaintiff’s expenses are “necessary” and consistent with the National Contingency Plan.
• “Necessary” private-party response costs must be tied to the contaminant pathway at issue; exploratory sampling far downstream may not qualify.
• Under the Clean Water Act, civil penalties accrue per unpermitted discharge, not per day a facility lacks a permit in the abstract.
• Citizen-suit standing under the Clean Water Act requires a concrete, site-specific injury; generalized interests or purely downstream discharges disconnected from the plaintiff’s property are insufficient.
• RCRA injunctive relief requires proof of irreparable harm; local restrictions on groundwater use can significantly undercut that showing.
• Equitable contribution under CERCLA § 113(f)(1) can reduce a plaintiff’s recovery where the plaintiff contributed to the contamination on its own property.
• Trial management matters: when liability and remedies are bifurcated, parties may not backfill liability proof during the remedies phase.

Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit affirmed across all four cases:

• Courtland I (Tech Park/CERCLA & RCRA): Although Courtland’s $36,916.25 preliminary investigation was “necessary” and NCP-consistent, Union Carbide prevailed on a § 107(b)(3) causation defense. The district court found, based on hydrogeology and credited expert testimony, that the Tech Park was not the source of Courtland’s groundwater contaminants. RCRA and parallel state-law claims failed on the same factual findings.
• Courtland II (Filmont/Massey/CERCLA, RCRA, and state claims): Courtland recovered $27,142.50 in CERCLA response costs for a preliminary groundwater investigation but not $7,802.50 for a downstream “kayak” sampling trip deemed unnecessary to the claim. Union Carbide was liable under RCRA for maintaining an “open dump,” but injunctive relief was denied for lack of irreparable harm. Public nuisance claims failed. On Union Carbide’s counterclaim, its own response costs were denied, but it received a 25% contribution allocation against Courtland’s recovery due to Courtland’s contribution to its property’s contamination.
• Courtland III (CWA—northern ditches): Dismissed for lack of standing. The alleged discharges occurred downstream from Courtland’s property, and Courtland failed to show a concrete injury or environmental interest in the affected area. The panel cited Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw and Gaston Copper for the standing standard.
• Courtland IV (CWA—boundary ditch): Courtland proved three unpermitted stormwater discharges; the district court imposed the statutory maximum penalty of $200,136. Claims premised on groundwater and surface water were rejected based on factual findings that Courtland likely polluted its own groundwater and was as likely as Union Carbide to have been the source of surface water pollutants. The court refused to let Courtland add new liability evidence during the remedies phase. The Fourth Circuit upheld both the per-discharge penalty approach and the case-management decision.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Westfarm Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, 66 F.3d 669, 681–82 (4th Cir. 1995): The panel invoked Westfarm in affirming the district court’s conclusion that Union Carbide carried its causation defense under CERCLA § 107(b)(3). Westfarm is frequently cited in this circuit for the causal nexus requirement in cost recovery and for recognizing defenses that negate the defendant’s facility as the source of the contamination giving rise to the plaintiff’s costs. Here, hydrogeologic evidence persuaded the district court that the Tech Park did not cause the contaminants detected in Courtland’s groundwater.
• Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183–84 (2000): Established that environmental plaintiffs may demonstrate injury-in-fact through specific recreational, aesthetic, or economic harms. The Fourth Circuit used Laidlaw to underscore that mere allegations of generalized environmental harm are not enough; plaintiffs must document how the discharges concretely affected their interests.
• Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 156–61 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc): Clarifies the evidentiary showing needed to connect a plaintiff’s interests to the affected waterbody. The panel noted Courtland offered no evidence of such a connection for the alleged northern-ditch discharges—no specific uses or activities curtailed and no concrete aesthetic or recreational harms.

Legal Reasoning

The appellate court’s affirmance rests on two pillars: deferential review of the district court’s exhaustive fact-finding after a lengthy bench trial, and straightforward applications of well-established statutory frameworks.

Standards of Review

• Factual findings from a bench trial are reviewed for clear error, with special deference to credibility determinations.
• Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.
• Equitable allocations (CERCLA contribution) and injunctive relief determinations are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
• Case-management decisions (e.g., confining Phase II to remedies) are reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Courtland I: CERCLA § 107(b)(3) Defense Defeats Otherwise Recoverable Costs

The district court recognized that Courtland’s $36,916.25 spent on a preliminary groundwater assessment met CERCLA’s “necessary” and NCP-consistency requirements. But Union Carbide carried its burden under § 107(b)(3)—the “third-party”/causation defense—by proving that the Tech Park was not the source of the constituents detected in Courtland’s groundwater. The court relied on hydrogeologic evidence: groundwater flow direction, bedrock structure, and expert testimony favored the defense. As a result, Union Carbide avoided liability for those costs. This same factual finding collapsed Courtland’s RCRA and parallel state claims tied to the Tech Park.

The lesson is two-fold. First, private-party response costs can be “necessary” and NCP-consistent yet still unrecoverable if the defendant proves the release from its facility did not cause the plaintiff’s incurrence of those costs. Second, in cross-boundary groundwater disputes, the quality of hydrogeologic proof—flow direction, gradients, formations, and fate-and-transport modeling—can decide the case.

Courtland II: Necessary Costs, Contribution Allocation, RCRA Injunction, and Nuisance

• CERCLA Cost Recovery: The district court awarded $27,142.50 for a preliminary groundwater investigation targeting migration from the Filmont/Massey property but denied $7,802.50 for a kayak-based sampling campaign conducted “significantly downstream” from the Courtland parcel. Those downstream activities were too attenuated from the groundwater migration concern animating the claim and were therefore not “necessary” costs under § 107(a). The appellate court found no clear error in that assessment.
• Contribution Allocation under § 113(f)(1): The court granted Union Carbide a 25% contribution against Courtland’s CERCLA recovery. The district court found both the historic use and ongoing operations at Courtland’s property contributed to its groundwater contamination. On that record, allocating 25% to Courtland was equitable. The Fourth Circuit found no abuse of discretion.
• RCRA “Open Dump” Liability but No Injunction: Although the Filmont site qualified as an open dump under RCRA, the district court denied injunctive relief due to lack of irreparable harm. The court emphasized four facts: absence of known groundwater wells within a mile; no evidence contaminated groundwater could reach residential areas; a local ordinance prohibiting use of untreated groundwater; and no current or planned groundwater use on either site. The Fourth Circuit affirmed that, on these facts, injunctive relief was properly denied.
• Public Nuisance Claims: The Filmont site was not a public nuisance per se, and Courtland failed to demonstrate public harm requiring abatement under West Virginia law. Dismissal affirmed.

Courtland III: Standing for Clean Water Act Citizen Suit

Courtland challenged alleged discharges into ditches at the northern edge of Filmont/Massey. Those ditches were downstream from Courtland’s property, and water does not flow uphill. Courtland also failed to establish a concrete environmental interest in the affected area—no curtailed use, recreational, aesthetic, or economic harm. Applying Laidlaw and Gaston Copper, the district court found no standing; the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

Courtland IV: CWA Stormwater Discharges, Penalty Calculation, and Bifurcation Discipline

• Surface Water and Groundwater Theories Rejected: The district court found Courtland likely polluted its own groundwater and was at least as likely as Union Carbide to have been the source of surface water pollutants. Those factual findings doomed the groundwater and surface water theories of CWA liability.
• Stormwater Discharges Proven: Courtland proved three discrete unpermitted stormwater discharges from Filmont/Massey into the boundary ditch during Phase I. The district court imposed the statutory maximum penalty totaling $200,136, which the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
• Penalties Accrue Per Discharge, Not Per Day Without a Permit: Courtland argued for penalties for every day Union Carbide lacked a stormwater permit. The court rejected that theory, holding the CWA penalizes unpermitted “discharges,” not the mere state of being unpermitted on non-discharge days. This reading closely tracks 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a) and 1342(a)(1) and is consistent with how “discharge of a pollutant” is defined and enforced.
• Trial Management/Bifurcation: Courtland tried to expand the violation count at the remedies phase using rain records. The district court refused, having set a two-phase structure where Phase I was for liability and Phase II for remedies. The Fourth Circuit found no abuse of discretion. The takeaway is clear: when liability is bifurcated, parties must present all liability evidence in Phase I.

Impact and Practical Implications

While unpublished and non-precedential, the decision offers persuasive guidance for environmental litigants within and beyond the Fourth Circuit.

• CERCLA Plaintiffs: Proving “necessary” and NCP-consistent costs is not enough. Anticipate and rebut § 107(b)(3) causation defenses with rigorous hydrogeologic evidence demonstrating that the defendant’s facility is the source of the release that prompted your response actions. Ensure each cost is tied to the specific contaminant pathway at issue; distant or downstream sampling untethered to the asserted threat may not qualify.
• CERCLA Defendants: A well-supported hydrogeologic case can prevail on § 107(b)(3). If the plaintiff’s property is also an industrial site, develop evidence of on-site sources to support either a complete defense or, at minimum, a favorable contribution allocation under § 113(f)(1).
• RCRA Injunctions: Courts will require a traditional showing of irreparable harm, even where statutory violations are established. Local ordinances restricting groundwater use and the absence of actual groundwater use can tip the scales against injunctive relief.
• CWA Citizen Suits: Standing is not presumed. Plaintiffs must demonstrate a concrete, particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the alleged discharge. Property ownership alone—especially upstream of the alleged discharge—will not suffice absent credible evidence of a direct impact on the plaintiff’s interests.
• CWA Penalties: Penalty exposure is calculated per unpermitted discharge event, not per day a permit is absent in the abstract. Plaintiffs should focus on proving actual discharge days; defendants should scrutinize whether rainfall data alone demonstrates a discharge.
• Trial Strategy: In bifurcated trials, lock down all liability evidence in Phase I. Courts are reluctant to reopen liability during remedies proceedings.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• CERCLA § 107(a) vs. § 107(b)(3) vs. § 113(f)(1): Section 107(a) allows private parties to recover “necessary” response costs consistent with the National Contingency Plan from PRPs. Section 107(b)(3) is a defense: a defendant can avoid liability by showing the release or threatened release was caused by a third party (among other statutory elements), thereby negating causation. Section 113(f)(1) allows equitable allocation (contribution) among PRPs, so a defendant can recoup a share even if plaintiff prevails on cost recovery.
• “Necessary” and NCP-Consistent Costs: “Necessary” means the cost addresses an actual or threatened release posing a danger that warrants a response action. For private parties, NCP consistency generally requires certain procedural and technical steps. Early investigative costs can qualify, but they must be reasonably tied to the threat being addressed.
• RCRA “Open Dump” and Injunctions: An “open dump” is a disposal site that does not meet the criteria for a sanitary landfill and violates federal minimum standards. Proving a violation does not automatically yield an injunction; courts apply equitable factors, including irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest.
• CWA “Discharge” and Penalties: The CWA prohibits the discharge of pollutants from point sources to navigable waters without a permit. A violation occurs when a discharge happens without a permit. Penalties are assessed per violation (often per discharge day), not per day a permit is absent if no discharge occurs.
• Standing in Environmental Citizen Suits: Plaintiffs must show an injury-in-fact (e.g., curtailed recreational use, aesthetic harm, or economic injury), traceable to the defendant’s conduct, and likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Affidavits detailing specific harms or foregone activities often carry the day; generalized concerns typically do not.
• Hydrogeologic Proof: In groundwater cases, courts rely on evidence such as groundwater gradient and flow direction, stratigraphy and bedrock structure, contaminant fate-and-transport, and expert testimony. Upgradient/down-gradient relationships and physical barriers can be dispositive on causation.

Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s unpublished affirmance in Courtland Co. v. Union Carbide delivers an integrated set of clarifications across CERCLA, RCRA, and the Clean Water Act. It underscores that:

• CERCLA cost recovery remains subject to a robust causation defense; even “necessary” and NCP-consistent costs are unrecoverable if the defendant shows its facility did not cause the contamination prompting those costs.
• Private-party response costs must be closely tied to the asserted risk; downstream reconnaissance untethered to the threatened pathway may fall outside CERCLA’s “necessary” ambit.
• Contribution allocations can meaningfully reduce plaintiffs’ recoveries when plaintiffs have contributed to their own contamination.
• RCRA injunctions require concrete proof of irreparable harm; local groundwater-use prohibitions and a lack of actual groundwater use can be pivotal.
• Clean Water Act penalties are per unpermitted discharge, not per day without a permit in the abstract, and standing requires a concrete, site-specific injury.
• Procedural discipline in bifurcated trials is enforced; liability evidence belongs in the liability phase.

For practitioners, the opinion is a reminder that environmental cases turn on tight causal links, credible expert hydrology, and disciplined proof sequencing. Even though non-precedential, the court’s reasoning provides a practical roadmap for litigating complex contamination disputes in the Fourth Circuit and beyond.