Centrality of Motive and the Reporting Requirement: The Tenth Circuit’s Published Clarification on Nexus, State Protection, and Internal Relocation in Mixed‑Motive Asylum Claims

Introduction

In Jimenez v. Bondi, a published decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (Oct. 7, 2025), a panel (Hartz, Tymkovich, Federico, JJ.; opinion by Judge Tymkovich) denied a Colombian family’s petition for review from a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ’s) denial of asylum and withholding of removal. The decision reaffirms and sharpens several doctrinal guideposts in asylum adjudication: (1) the requirement that a protected ground be “at least one central reason” for the harm in mixed‑motive cases; (2) the demanding evidentiary showing that a home government is “unable or unwilling” to protect, with particular emphasis on the applicant’s duty to report—or to prove futility or danger if reporting is not done; and (3) the role of internal relocation where threats appear localized.

The petitioners—Colombian nationals from Bogotá—had engaged in political campaigning and, critically, the lead petitioner (Jimenez) had a professional confrontation with a local narco‑trafficking figure (“Don Rafa”) while attempting to help a client in a property dispute. Threats escalated after that confrontation. The IJ found the family credible but denied relief on multiple grounds; the BIA affirmed; and the Tenth Circuit now publishes an opinion that consolidates and clarifies circuit law across the core elements of an asylum claim.

Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit denied the petition. Applying substantial‑evidence review, it held that:

• No past persecution: The cumulative harms—repeated threats (including at gunpoint), fear, and psychological distress—did not rise to the level of “persecution” as defined in circuit law, which requires more than restrictions or threats to life and liberty.
• No nexus to a protected ground: Even assuming mistreatment, substantial evidence supported the finding that the principal motive was retaliation for Jimenez’s interference with a criminal enterprise and perceived “snitching,” not his political opinion. Any political dimension was tangential and subordinate.
• Government not “unable or unwilling” to protect: Petitioners largely failed to report the threats through available channels. A single patrol officer’s discouraging remarks and generalized concerns about corruption did not establish systemic state failure, especially where authorities had attempted searches and seizures at the relevant property.
• Internal relocation feasible: The record showed the threats were localized, petitioners briefly and safely relocated within Colombia, and relatives remained unharmed. Thus, even if other elements had been met, safe relocation undermined future‑fear claims.
• Withholding of removal: Because petitioners failed to meet the lower asylum standard, they necessarily failed to satisfy the higher burden for withholding.

Background

The petitioners—Wilson Leonardo Canon Jimenez, his spouse Angelica Parada Duarte, and their two minor sons—are from Bogotá. They supported the Colombian Liberal Party and campaigned for Federico Gutiérrez in the 2022 presidential election, during which Jimenez received political threats. Concurrently, as a provisional lawyer and intern at the National Prosecutor’s office, Jimenez undertook a client’s property dispute only to discover the occupant was “Don Rafa,” a leader of narco‑trafficking guerrillas. After Jimenez’s involvement, threats escalated: armed men accused him of “snitching” for law enforcement; a factory employee was assaulted; and a menacing incident targeted their younger son near school. The family decamped briefly to the countryside, spoke with a patrol officer who offered no help, and then left for the United States.

The Department of Homeland Security served Notices to Appear. The IJ deemed petitioners credible but denied asylum, withholding, and CAT protection; the BIA affirmed and dismissed the appeal, also rejecting a due‑process claim (not pursued further). The petition for review to the Tenth Circuit challenged only the denial of asylum and withholding.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

• Singh v. Bondi, 130 F.4th 848 (10th Cir. 2025): Cited for jurisdictional posture and the scope of review, as well as the asylum framework and the “unable or unwilling” analysis. Singh emphasizes that two types of evidence “weigh heavily” in assessing state protection: whether the government attempted to stop the persecutors and whether it offered protection (protective custody, for example). The court applied Singh to highlight that petitioners’ minimal reporting, the existence of police search attempts, and the absence of systemic non‑response undermined the “unable or unwilling” showing.
• Rivera‑Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d 641 (10th Cir. 2012): Foundational for substantial‑evidence review and the three‑part test for past persecution (persecution; nexus; state action or inability/unwillingness), as well as internal relocation principles. The court’s central‑reason requirement for nexus flows through Rivera‑Barrientos.
• Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2005): Supplies the statutory definition of refugee and the protected‑ground framework. The court’s emphasis that “persecution” must exceed mere restrictions or threats aligns with Niang’s baseline.
• Wiransane v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 889 (10th Cir. 2004): Clarifies that persecution requires “offensive” harm beyond restrictions or threats. The court relied on this to hold that threats, even repeated or menacing, are generally insufficient standing alone.
• Ritonga v. Holder, 633 F.3d 971 (10th Cir. 2011): Directs adjudicators to consider incidents cumulatively. The court did so here yet found the aggregate still fell short of persecution.
• Karki v. Holder, 715 F.3d 792 (10th Cir. 2013): Key for the proposition that threats alone do not constitute persecution, while acknowledging physical injury is not strictly required. The court’s reasoning tracks Karki closely.
• Brandy v. Holder, 590 F. App’x 744 (10th Cir. 2014) (unpub.): Persuasive authority that threats and psychological distress—though serious—rarely suffice without more. The court used Brandy to emphasize the high threshold for persecution absent physical harm or comparable severity.
• Dallakoti v. Holder, 619 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2010): Defines “at least one central reason” for nexus, requiring a protected ground to be more than incidental or tangential. This is the lodestar of the opinion’s mixed‑motive analysis.
• O.C.V. v. Bondi, No. 23‑9609, 2025 WL 2447603 (10th Cir. Aug. 26, 2025): Confirms that mixed motives are permissible but a protected ground still must be a central reason. The court leverages O.C.V. to explain why criminal retaliation can dominate an actor’s motive even when political activity exists in the background.
• Yuk v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2004): Reminds reviewing courts not to reweigh the record; the question is whether substantial evidence supports the agency’s decision. The court invokes this to defer to the BIA/IJ’s motive findings.
• Aviles‑Gonzalez v. Garland, No. 23‑9547, 2024 WL 3066987 (10th Cir. June 20, 2024): Articulates that failure to report generally undercuts, but does not automatically defeat, an unable‑or‑unwilling claim; the applicant can still prevail by proving reporting would have been futile or dangerous. The court applied this framing and found the record did not establish futility or danger.
• Osorio‑Morales v. Garland, 72 F.4th 738 (7th Cir. 2023): Persuasive authority emphasizing the need for systemic, not merely individual, failures to establish a government’s inability or unwillingness; a single unhelpful officer does not suffice. The Tenth Circuit’s reliance signals cross‑circuit alignment on this point.
• Chhetri v. Rosen, 844 F. App’x 23 (10th Cir. 2021) (unpub.): Used for both persecution (insufficient threats) and state‑protection (failure to report) analyses; bolsters the opinion’s conclusions about the evidentiary burden.
• Uanreroro v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2006): Establishes reviewing posture (BIA decision, with ability to consult IJ’s fuller reasoning) and the doctrinal point that failing asylum necessarily defeats withholding, which has a higher burden.
• Carias‑Mejia v. Garland, 860 F. App’x 121 (10th Cir. 2021) (unpub.): Confirms the relative stringency of withholding standards; the court invokes it to dispose of withholding after denying asylum.
• Vicente‑Elias v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1086 (10th Cir. 2008): Cited for the proposition that past private persecution is a fact question under the substantial‑evidence standard.

Legal Reasoning

1) Past Persecution

The court recognized that “persecution” is not statutorily defined but, in circuit law, requires “offensive” harm exceeding mere restrictions or threats to life or liberty. While physical injury is not strictly necessary, the record showed no physical harm to the petitioners themselves. The alleged harms included:

• Repeated threats (including a late‑night, in‑person threat at gunpoint);
• Psychological and emotional distress (insomnia; panic attacks for the child);
• An assault on a factory employee, not a petitioner;
• A menacing incident involving the younger child outside school but no resulting injury.

Applying Ritonga’s cumulative approach, the court still found the aggregate did not cross the persecution threshold, emphasizing Karki and Brandy: threats and psychological distress, even when unsettling and serious, “rarely, if ever,” suffice, absent additional aggravating factors reaching the level of persecution.

2) Nexus to a Protected Ground (Political Opinion)

The dispositive insight is the court’s mixed‑motive analysis. While the family had engaged in political activity that prompted some threatening messages, the evidence showed that the most acute and dangerous mistreatment escalated only after Jimenez intervened in the property dispute with “Don Rafa.” Threateners expressly accused Jimenez of being a “snitch” for the prosecutor’s office and blamed him for law‑enforcement searches of the property. When they later threatened an employee, they said the order came from “Don Rafa.”

Under Rivera‑Barrientos and Dallakoti, a protected ground must be “at least one central reason” for the harm; it cannot be incidental, tangential, or subordinate. O.C.V. reaffirms that where multiple motives exist, the protected one must still be central. Here, the court concluded—deferring under Yuk—that the predominant motive was criminal retaliation for interference with a narcotics enterprise and perceived cooperation with law enforcement, not the petitioners’ political opinion. Their politics, even if part of the background, were tangential to the persecutors’ core purpose.

3) Government Unable or Unwilling to Protect

The court’s published discussion puts particular weight on the “reporting” prism. Singh instructs adjudicators to look at whether the government tried to stop the persecutors and whether it offered protection. Another threshold question is whether the government had notice and an opportunity to respond.

The record showed only minimal reporting: a conversation with a patrol officer who discouraged engagement. The court emphasized that a “one‑off” unhelpful encounter does not establish systemic inability or unwillingness (Osorio‑Morales). Countervailing evidence showed the Colombian government had attempted searches and seizures at the property “Don Rafa” used—undercutting the claim that authorities were aligned with him or would refuse to act.

Aviles‑Gonzalez recognizes that failure to report is not automatically fatal if reporting would be futile or dangerous. But the court found no substantial evidence that filing a report would have been futile or perilous; petitioners’ general belief that corruption existed, without more, did not meet the standard. In short, the government’s actions (search efforts) and petitioners’ minimal reporting together defeated the “unable or unwilling” element.

4) Internal Relocation

Although the court had already found petitioners failed to establish asylum eligibility, it addressed internal relocation briefly. The evidence suggested a localized threat: assailants told petitioners to leave the neighborhood, and the family safely stayed with Jimenez’s mother in the countryside for three weeks without incident. Family members remained in Colombia unharmed; Jimenez’s father continued to work in the criminal‑justice system. These facts supported the conclusion that petitioners could avoid future harm by reasonably relocating within the country.

Impact and Significance

As a published opinion, Jimenez v. Bondi will guide future asylum adjudications in the Tenth Circuit. Its principal contributions lie in three areas:

• Mixed‑motive nexus clarity: The decision underscores that when escalation is closely tied to interference with criminal activity or perceived cooperation with law enforcement, a petitioner’s political opinion is unlikely to be a “central reason.” Applicants must develop robust, specific proof that persecutors linked their harm to the applicant’s political beliefs or activities—e.g., statements by persecutors explicitly referencing politics as the motive—rather than to non‑protected motives like profit protection, retaliation, or personal vendettas.
• State protection requires more than “one‑off apathy”: The court foregrounds the evidentiary value of actually reporting threats or, if not reporting, substantiating why doing so would be futile or dangerous. Evidence such as formal complaints, protective‑order requests, escalations to internal‑affairs or human‑rights ombuds, or documentation of systemic corruption will be vital. Conversely, isolated discouraging comments by individual officers—without more—will rarely carry the day.
• Localized threats and internal relocation: The court treats threats limited to a neighborhood or locality as mitigable through internal relocation, especially where short‑term relocation was safe and family remains unharmed elsewhere. Applicants will need concrete evidence of a persecutor’s national reach or persistence despite relocation to rebut this inference.

For practitioners, Jimenez also serves as a cautionary tale on issue preservation: petitioners did not brief their particular‑social‑group theory on appeal, effectively narrowing the nexus inquiry to political opinion alone. Ensuring that all viable protected grounds are adequately developed and briefed will be crucial.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Persecution vs. harassment/threats: “Persecution” refers to serious harm that is more than mere threats or inconveniences. While physical injury is not required, the harm must be severe and offensive. Threats and anxiety, standing alone, usually do not suffice.
• Nexus (“one central reason”): An applicant must show the persecutor targeted them because of a protected ground (e.g., political opinion). If the persecutor was chiefly motivated by something else (like criminal retaliation), political opinion is not a central reason, and nexus fails.
• Government “unable or unwilling” to protect: Applicants generally strengthen this element by reporting threats and seeking help. If they do not report, they need credible evidence that reporting would have been dangerous or pointless due to systemic issues.
• Internal relocation: Even if there is danger in one area, asylum can be denied if a person can move to a different part of their home country safely and reasonably, considering practical factors and the persecutor’s reach.
• Substantial‑evidence review: On appeal, the court does not reweigh evidence; it asks only whether a reasonable adjudicator could have reached the agency’s conclusion based on the record. This highly deferential standard often favors the BIA/IJ’s findings.
• Withholding vs. asylum: Withholding of removal has a higher burden than asylum. If an applicant fails to meet asylum’s standard (well‑founded fear), withholding will almost always fail too (clear probability).
• Derivative beneficiaries: Family members may be attached to a principal applicant’s asylum claim. If the principal fails, derivatives typically cannot succeed independently unless they file their own claims with distinct grounds and evidence.

Conclusion

Jimenez v. Bondi reinforces, in a published and precedential format, three core propositions in asylum law within the Tenth Circuit:

• Threats and psychological harm, without more, rarely meet the past‑persecution threshold—even when considered cumulatively.
• In mixed‑motive settings, a petitioner’s political opinion must be a central reason for the harm; retaliation for interference with criminal enterprises or perceived “snitching” will generally defeat the nexus element.
• Establishing that a home government is unable or unwilling to protect typically requires either (a) proof of meaningful attempts to seek protection and systemic failure, or (b) credible, specific evidence that reporting would have been futile or dangerous. One‑off police apathy is insufficient.

The court’s internal‑relocation analysis also signals continued skepticism toward claims where threats appear localized and where petitioners demonstrate successful short‑term internal movement. For advocates, the opinion underscores the importance of building a meticulous record on motive (with persecutor statements and timing), on government response (with documented reporting or reliable futility/danger evidence), and on the nationwide reach (or lack thereof) of alleged persecutors. As a published decision, Jimenez will serve as a touchstone in the Tenth Circuit for evaluating mixed‑motive claims, state‑protection showings, and relocation feasibility in asylum and withholding cases.