Causation Required for Juvenile Restitution: South Dakota Aligns Delinquency Restitution with Adult Standard in In re Interest of J.W. (2025 S.D. 38)

Introduction

In In the Interest of J.W., 2025 S.D. 38, the Supreme Court of South Dakota confronted a recurring question in juvenile law: must there be a causal connection between a juvenile’s adjudicated conduct and a victim’s loss before a court may impose restitution? Historically, South Dakota treated juvenile restitution differently from adult restitution, allowing courts to order restitution as a rehabilitative measure without requiring a direct causal link between the child’s adjudicated act and the victim’s loss. That approach stemmed from earlier cases interpreting pre-2016 statutes and permitted restitution where the juvenile had “some involvement,” even if the loss was not “as a result of” the adjudicated offense.

This decision marks a decisive shift. Interpreting the Legislature’s 2016 amendments to South Dakota’s juvenile statutes, the Court holds that juvenile restitution is now governed by the same causation principles that apply to adult restitution under SDCL 23A-28-2. As a result, courts must find that a victim suffered pecuniary damages “as a result of” the juvenile’s criminal activities before ordering restitution. Applying that rule, the Court vacated a restitution order against J.W., who admitted only to accessory-after-the-fact conduct (lying to police after the damage had occurred), because his criminal act did not cause the fire damage at issue.

The parties involved were:

J.W., a 14-year-old juvenile respondent who admitted to being an accessory after the fact by deceiving law enforcement.
The State of South Dakota, which sought restitution for substantial fire damage to a vacant trailer.
Two other juveniles: S.E. (who admitted he lit the mortar firework inside the trailer) and D.B. (who reached an agreement to pay $9,086.75, after which his case was dismissed).

The key issues on appeal were:

Whether juvenile restitution now requires a causal connection between the victim’s loss and the juvenile’s adjudicated conduct.
Whether the circuit court clearly erred in finding no “serious hardship” to J.W. from the restitution order (an issue rendered moot by the Court’s disposition).

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court reversed and vacated the restitution order imposed against J.W. The Court held:

Following the Legislature’s 2016 amendments, juvenile restitution under SDCL 26-8C-7(1) is “restitution, as defined in subdivision 23A-28-2(4),” which necessarily invokes related definitions in SDCL 23A-28-2 (including “victim” and “criminal activities”) and their “as a result of” causal language.
Earlier juvenile cases, In re M.D.D., 2009 S.D. 94, and People ex rel. K.K., 2010 S.D. 98—which had permitted juvenile restitution without a causal connection—were abrogated by these legislative changes.
The adult causation standard articulated in State v. Joyce, 2004 S.D. 73, now governs juvenile restitution determinations: there must be a causal connection between the adjudicated criminal act and the victim’s pecuniary damages.
Because J.W. admitted only to accessory-after-the-fact conduct (deception after the fire damage occurred), his criminal act did not cause the property damage; therefore, restitution could not be imposed on him for those losses.

Having resolved the appeal on the legal ground of causation, the Court did not reach J.W.’s alternative challenge regarding “serious hardship or injustice.”

Factual Background

On July 5, 2023, three juveniles—J.W. (14), S.E. (15), and D.B. (14)—entered a vacant trailer. S.E. kicked in the door and lit a mortar firework inside. A fire ensued, causing significant damage. Initially, J.W. falsely told law enforcement that two unknown boys had run from the trailer. Later, all three juveniles were interviewed; S.E. admitted to lighting the firework.

The State charged J.W. with second-degree burglary and aiding and abetting reckless burning. The State then amended the petition to allege one count of accessory to a crime (SDCL 22-3-5(4)), based on J.W.’s deception of law enforcement intended to hinder detection and prosecution of S.E. and D.B. J.W. admitted to the amended petition and was adjudicated delinquent.

At a later restitution hearing, the trailer owner and contractor testified to repair costs; the owner also claimed lost rental income. D.B. separately agreed to pay $9,086.75 and his case was dismissed. The circuit court:

Found repair costs of $24,700 but declined to award lost rent due to uncertainty;
Subtracted D.B.’s payment and ordered J.W. and S.E. jointly and severally liable for $15,613.25;
Relied on K.K. and M.D.D. to conclude no causal connection was required in juvenile cases, emphasizing rehabilitation and “best interests.”

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court’s reasoning pivots on reconciling prior case law with intervening statutory amendments.

State v. Joyce, 2004 S.D. 73, 681 N.W.2d 468. In Joyce, an adult defendant pleaded guilty to leaving the scene of an accident. The Court held that South Dakota’s restitution statutes (SDCL ch. 23A-28) require a causal connection between the criminal activity and the victim’s damages. The key textual source was the definition of “victim” in SDCL 23A-28-2(5): a person who has suffered pecuniary damages “as a result of the defendant’s criminal activities.” Because the damages were caused by the accident itself—not by leaving the scene—the restitution order was reversed. Joyce’s causation rule is the template the Court now applies to juveniles.
State v. Hofer, 2008 S.D. 109, 757 N.W.2d 790. Hofer confirmed that the causal requirement arises from the “as a result of” phrase in SDCL 23A-28-2(5), reinforcing Joyce’s textual approach.
In re M.D.D., 2009 S.D. 94, 774 N.W.2d 793. M.D.D. held that adult restitution statutes did not apply in juvenile proceedings under then-existing statutory language; juvenile restitution used broad, unqualified terms (“any damage done to property”) with a rehabilitation-centric emphasis.
People ex rel. K.K., 2010 S.D. 98, 793 N.W.2d 24. K.K. extended M.D.D., holding that juvenile restitution did not require a causal link to the adjudicated offense and could be imposed where the child had “some involvement.” K.K. distinguished Joyce as an adult case under a different statutory scheme and, alternatively, found a factual connection in that particular record.
State v. Dutton, 2023 S.D. 29, 993 N.W.2d 136. Dutton provided the definition and conceptual framework for “accessory after the fact”—a person who, knowing a felony has been committed, helps a principal by obstructing justice. This case underscores why J.W.’s criminal conduct occurred after the property damage had been inflicted.
Statutory interpretation authorities. The Court relied on core interpretive principles: start with text (In re Implicated Individual, 2021 S.D. 61); give primacy to clear language (Puffy’s, LLC v. Dep’t of Health, 2025 S.D. 10); apply statutory definitions provided by the Legislature (State v. Turner, 2025 S.D. 13; N. Border Pipeline Co. v. S.D. Dep’t of Rev., 2015 S.D. 69); and presume the Legislature acts with knowledge of judicial decisions and that it changes text for a reason (AEG Processing Ctr. No. 58, Inc. v. S.D. Dep’t of Rev., 2013 S.D. 75; State v. Schroeder, 2004 S.D. 21).
Constitutional provision. The Court noted that Marsy’s Law (S.D. Const. art. VI, § 29(14)) speaks of restitution for losses suffered “as a result of the criminal conduct” and “as a result of delinquent conduct,” harmonizing with the statutory causation requirement.

Collectively, Joyce and its statutory anchor (SDCL 23A-28-2) supplied the causation rule; M.D.D. and K.K. supplied the now-superseded juvenile-specific approach; and the interpretive authorities guided how the 2016 legislative amendments reoriented juvenile restitution toward the adult standard.

Statutory Framework and Legislative Amendments

Pre-2016, juvenile disposition statutes authorized courts to require a child to pay “for any damage done to property” (see former SDCL 26-8B-6(4)), language the Court understood as broad and rehabilitation-oriented, and distinct from adult restitution statutes. That textual difference underpinned M.D.D. and K.K.

The Legislature’s 2016 amendments changed course. SDCL 26-8C-7(1) (delinquency) now states: “The court may require the child to pay restitution, as defined in subdivision 23A-28-2(4) and under conditions set by the court, if payment can be enforced without serious hardship or injustice to the child.” The Legislature simultaneously amended the CHINS statute (SDCL 26-8B-6(4)) to use the same “restitution, as defined in subdivision 23A-28-2(4)” language, later revised in 2021 to reference “§ 23A-28-2” holistically. The Legislature also added the same definitional cross-reference to other juvenile statutes (SDCL 26-7A-129 and SDCL 26-7A-11).

The deliberate move from broad, unqualified language to an explicit cross-reference to adult restitution definitions—especially after M.D.D. and K.K.—is key. The Court presumes legislative awareness of judicial decisions and that it changes text intentionally. Accordingly, the Legislature’s adoption of SDCL 23A-28-2’s definitional framework into juvenile statutes signals alignment of juvenile restitution with adult restitution principles.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three steps.

Text controls; definitions travel with their terms. SDCL 26-8C-7(1) incorporates “restitution, as defined in subdivision 23A-28-2(4).” Restitution under that provision is “full or partial payment of pecuniary damages to a victim.” To apply that definition meaningfully, courts must also use the accompanying definitions of “victim,” “pecuniary damages,” and “criminal activities” located in the same definitional section (SDCL 23A-28-2), because the introductory clause “Terms used by this chapter mean” enshrines those definitions for the chapter as a whole. The circuit court had applied the “pecuniary damages” definition but declined to apply “victim,” producing an internally inconsistent reading the Supreme Court rejected as both illogical and contrary to statutory text.
The “as a result of” language reinstates causation. The definition of “victim” in SDCL 23A-28-2(5) (a person who suffered pecuniary damages “as a result of the defendant’s criminal activities”) imports a causation requirement. So too does the definition of “pecuniary damages” (damages recoverable in a civil action), which presupposes causation doctrines. Marsy’s Law uses the same “as a result of” language for both criminal and delinquent conduct. Together, these provisions reestablish the Joyce causation rule in the juvenile context.
M.D.D. and K.K. are abrogated by the 2016 amendments. Those decisions rested on the premise—no longer true—that adult restitution statutes did not apply in juvenile proceedings. The Legislature’s amendments intentionally referenced SDCL 23A-28-2, supplanting the prior broad juvenile language and aligning juvenile restitution with the adult framework.

Applying this rule to the record, the Court identified J.W.’s admitted crime as accessory after the fact (SDCL 22-3-5(4))—deception intended to hinder law enforcement after the fire damage occurred. As in Joyce, the criminal act occurred after the injury, so it did not cause the loss. The State expressly did not argue factual causation on appeal. With no causal connection, restitution could not be imposed on J.W. and the order was vacated.

Impact

The decision has immediate and far-reaching consequences for juvenile justice practice in South Dakota.

Causation is now mandatory in juvenile restitution. Prosecutors must prove that the victim’s pecuniary losses were suffered “as a result of” the juvenile’s adjudicated criminal conduct or another crime the juvenile admitted (whether or not prosecuted) as defined in SDCL 23A-28-2(2).
Rehabilitation cannot justify restitution untethered to causation. Courts may no longer impose restitution purely as a rehabilitative tool when the loss is not caused by the juvenile’s criminal activities. Other rehabilitative dispositions remain available, but restitution must be grounded in causation.
Charging and plea practices will adjust. If the State seeks restitution for a particular loss, the adjudication (or the juvenile’s admissions) should encompass the conduct that caused the loss (e.g., burglary, arson, aiding and abetting reckless burning). Accessory-after-the-fact or misprision dispositions, standing alone, will not support restitution for underlying offense losses unless the juvenile admits to criminal activities that caused the loss.
Record building becomes critical. Transcripts establishing the factual basis for adjudication, detailed findings on causation, and evidence tying losses to the adjudicated or admitted criminal activities will be essential to sustain restitution orders on appeal.
Joint and several liability narrows. Courts may still impose joint and several restitution among juveniles whose criminal activities caused the loss. But juveniles adjudicated only for after-the-fact conduct ordinarily cannot be held jointly and severally liable for losses caused by others’ earlier criminal acts.
Scope of recoverable losses remains civilly anchored. The definition of “pecuniary damages” (SDCL 23A-28-2(3)) incorporates the measure of damages recoverable in a civil action, excluding pain, suffering, and punitive damages. Lost rent may be recoverable if proven with sufficient certainty and causally connected; here the circuit court declined lost rent due to unclear proof.
The “serious hardship or injustice” limitation remains. SDCL 26-8C-7(1) still requires courts to consider whether payment can be enforced without serious hardship or injustice to the child. Although the Supreme Court did not reach that issue here, trial courts must continue to make supported findings on hardship when imposing restitution.
CHINS and delinquency are harmonized on restitution definitions. While the delinquency statute references SDCL 23A-28-2(4) and the CHINS statute references § 23A-28-2 as a whole, the Court’s analysis effectively aligns both with the adult restitution framework by requiring use of the necessary definitions (victim, pecuniary damages, criminal activities) to give coherent meaning to “restitution.”
Civil remedies and parental liability remain separate. The Court noted, and the parties accepted, that the civil parental liability cap in SDCL 25-5-15 does not govern juvenile restitution. Victims may still pursue civil remedies where appropriate, but juvenile restitution must follow the statutory causation and hardship constraints.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Restitution: A court-ordered payment from an offender to a victim to compensate for economic losses (money/property) caused by the offender’s criminal activities.
Pecuniary damages (SDCL 23A-28-2(3)): Economic losses that could be recovered in a civil lawsuit arising from the same event, excluding pain and suffering and punitive damages.
Victim (SDCL 23A-28-2(5)): Someone who suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant’s criminal activities. The “as a result of” phrase creates the causation requirement.
Criminal activities (SDCL 23A-28-2(2)): Crimes for which the defendant was found guilty or to which the defendant pleaded guilty, and any other crime admitted by the defendant (even if not prosecuted).
Causal connection: A link showing that the loss would not have occurred but for—and was proximately caused by—the criminal activity at issue. If the criminal act happens after the loss (e.g., leaving the scene; accessory-after-the-fact), it typically does not cause the existing loss.
Accessory after the fact (SDCL 22-3-5(4)): Helping someone avoid detection or punishment after a felony has been committed, often by deception or obstruction of law enforcement. It does not encompass committing the initial crime that caused the loss.
Joint and several liability: A form of liability in which multiple offenders can each be held responsible for the full amount of a victim’s loss. After In re J.W., this applies in juvenile cases only to those whose criminal activities caused the loss.
Serious hardship or injustice (SDCL 26-8C-7(1)): A statutory limit on juvenile restitution, requiring courts to ensure the child can pay without suffering serious hardship or injustice. Courts must make fact-based findings on this point.
CHINS vs. delinquency: CHINS addresses non-criminal misconduct by children; delinquency addresses criminal law violations by juveniles. Both now use restitution definitions aligned with adult law.

Application to the Case

The Court’s application was straightforward once the legal rule was set. J.W. admitted only to accessory-after-the-fact conduct—lying to police to hinder their investigation. The fire damage was already done when J.W. lied. Because his criminal activity did not cause the loss, restitution was legally impermissible. The Court therefore vacated the restitution portion of J.W.’s disposition and did not reach the separate question of serious hardship.

Conclusion

In the Interest of J.W. is a watershed decision in South Dakota juvenile law. It holds that, following the 2016 statutory amendments, juvenile restitution is defined by and operates under SDCL 23A-28-2’s adult framework, including the critical causation requirement. The decision abrogates the earlier juvenile-specific approach in M.D.D. and K.K., which had allowed restitution without a causal link as a rehabilitative measure.

Practically, prosecutors must now prove that a victim’s pecuniary damages were suffered “as a result of” the juvenile’s adjudicated or admitted criminal activities to secure restitution. Courts must make findings that tie losses to the conduct and ensure that payment can be enforced without serious hardship to the child. Defense counsel should pay careful attention to the scope of admissions and the evidentiary basis for causation. Victims and courts should expect a more tightly tethered restitution process, aligned with civil damages principles and constitutional text.

The immediate effect is clear for J.W.: no restitution for damages caused by a fire that his admitted criminal conduct did not cause. The broader effect is to recalibrate juvenile restitution statewide, reconciling it with adult standards and ensuring that restitution compensates actual, causally connected losses.