Categorical Protection, Limited Domain: The Texas Religious Services Clause After Perez v. City of San Antonio

1. Introduction

In Gary Perez and Matilde Torres v. City of San Antonio, the Supreme Court of Texas delivered the first authoritative interpretation of the 2021 “Religious Service Protections” amendment to the Texas Constitution—Article I, Section 6-a (the “Texas Religious Services Clause”).

The case arises at the intersection of three sensitive domains:

• Native religious practice by members of the Lipan-Apache Native American Church;
• Municipal control and preservation of historic public parkland (Brackenridge Park in San Antonio); and
• Post-COVID constitutional reforms intended to prevent a repeat of pandemic-era shutdowns of religious gatherings.

Gary Perez and Matilde Torres, members of the Lipan-Apache Native American Church, conduct ceremonies in a “Sacred Area” on the south bank of a bend in the San Antonio River within Brackenridge Park. The natural features of that site—particularly ancient cypress trees and nesting cormorants—form part of what they term the “spiritual ecology” necessary to their religious services. The City’s park-improvement plan, funded through a voter-approved bond, calls for:

• Repairing eroded river retaining walls;
• Removing and replacing most of the trees in the area; and
• Deterring migratory birds, including cormorants, from nesting nearby because of health and safety concerns (notably, bird droppings).

Perez sued in federal court, claiming that the City’s plan would destroy the Sacred Area and therefore:

• Violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment;
• Violated the “Freedom of Worship” Clause in Article I, § 6 of the Texas Constitution;
• Violated the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (Texas RFRA, Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code ch. 110); and
• Violated the new Texas Religious Services Clause, Article I, § 6-a.

On interlocutory appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified a key state-law question to the Texas Supreme Court:

Does Article I, Section 6-a impose a categorical bar on any limitation of any religious service, regardless of the sort of limitation and the government’s interest in that limitation?

The Texas Supreme Court answered that question in two parts:

1. Force: When § 6-a applies, it operates as an absolute and categorical bar—no strict-scrutiny balancing, no “compelling interest” escape hatch.
2. Scope: The Clause’s application is limited. It does not reach every governmental action that incidentally affects religious practice. Specifically, it does not extend to governmental actions for the preservation and management of public lands of the kind at issue in this case.

The Court thus stakes out a powerful but carefully confined new constitutional protection: it is a per se rule against governmental limits on “religious services,” but it does not transform religious adherents into effective co-owners of public land or guarantee preservation of specific natural conditions that enable their worship.

2. Summary of the Opinion

2.1. The Text at Issue: Article I, § 6-a

The Religious Services Clause provides:

This state or a political subdivision of this state may not enact, adopt, or issue a statute, order, proclamation, decision, or rule that prohibits or limits religious services, including religious services conducted in churches, congregations, and places of worship, in this state by a religious organization established to support and serve the propagation of a sincerely held religious belief.

2.2. The Court’s Core Holdings

The Court’s answer to the certified question is twofold:

1. Force (how the Clause operates when it applies):
   § 6-a is categorical. If a state or local government “enact[s], adopt[s], or issue[s] a statute, order, proclamation, decision, or rule” that “prohibits or limits religious services” (within the Clause’s terms), that action is unconstitutional regardless of:
   • How compelling the governmental interest is; or
   • How narrowly tailored the restriction may be.
   In other words, the Court rejects importing a “strict scrutiny” test into § 6-a. There is no balancing once the Clause applies.
2. Scope (when the Clause applies at all):
   The Clause’s coverage is not boundless. The Court:
   • Identifies five explicit textual limitations; and
   • Holds that § 6-a does not extend to governmental actions for the preservation and management of public lands.
   On the facts presented, the City’s decisions to remove trees and deter birds in Brackenridge Park are characterized as actions in its role as owner and steward of public land, not as rules that “prohibit or limit religious services” within the meaning of § 6-a.

The Court declines to define the Clause’s full outer perimeter. It instead:

• Explains what § 6-a clearly covers (COVID-style closure orders, attendance caps, bans on core worship activities like singing, communion, etc.);
• Expressly rejects several limiting constructions offered by the parties and the State (e.g., “unequal treatment only”; “gathering-only” protections; amorphous “background principles” carve-outs); and
• Draws one concrete line for this case: public-lands preservation/management decisions fall outside § 6-a.

The Court does not decide whether Perez may obtain relief under:

• The federal Free Exercise Clause;
• Article I, § 6 (Freedom of Worship); or
• Texas RFRA.

Those questions are left to the federal courts applying federal law and the remaining Texas-law theories.

3. Factual and Procedural Background

3.1. The Sacred Area and the City’s Improvement Plan

Perez and Torres belong to the Lipan-Apache Native American Church. Their religious narrative centers on a creation story linked to a spring along the Yanaguana (the San Antonio River). A particular bend in the river—now within Brackenridge Park—has a shape resembling the constellation Eridanus and is considered a “sacred connection” between the physical and spiritual worlds.

A small “Sacred Area,” roughly 20-by-30 feet among cypress trees on the south shore of this river bend, is the locus of ceremonies. These services must, according to their beliefs:

• Occur at particular “holy moments” during specific days of the year; and
• Be conducted facing north, observing the cypress trees and cormorants in the area’s “spiritual ecology.”

Evidence suggests indigenous peoples have practiced similar religious ceremonies at or near this site for thousands of years. Perez has led ceremonies there for at least 25 years; Torres has worshipped there for at least 10 years. Their beliefs are not contested as to sincerity.

Brackenridge Park, however, is a City-owned, highly developed public park with numerous amenities. The Lambert Beach area, including the Sacred Area, has been used for public recreation for over a century. Over time:

• Retaining walls have eroded;
• Trees have weakened and died; and
• Bird droppings, especially from cormorants, have created public health and safety concerns.

In 2016, voters approved a bond including nearly $8 million for park improvements. The City’s design team proposed, among other things:

• Repairing and reinforcing retaining walls;
• Removing and replacing most of the trees; and
• Deterring migratory birds from nesting in and around the area.

Multiple governmental approvals (city, state, federal) are needed. The parties dispute:

• How necessary these measures are for public health and safety; and
• How far the City has gone—or reasonably could go—to accommodate the Church’s religious use of the Sacred Area.

3.2. The Litigation Path and Certification

In 2023, a retaining wall failed and a large tree branch fell near the Sacred Area. The City responded by temporarily blocking all access. Perez then filed suit in federal court. The district court:

• Granted immediate relief regarding access (ordering removal of the tree branch and renewed access for ceremonies); but
• Later denied a preliminary injunction against the tree-removal and bird-deterrence elements of the plan, while allowing certain limited ceremonial access on specific dates.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit initially affirmed, rejecting Perez’s First Amendment, Texas Constitution Article I § 6, and Texas RFRA claims, while concluding that Perez had insufficiently briefed § 6-a. After rehearing, the panel withdrew its opinion and certified the § 6-a question to the Texas Supreme Court. The Court accepted certification, received extensive briefing (including several amicus briefs from religious organizations and the State), and held oral argument.

3.3. The 2021 Adoption of the Religious Services Clause

Article I, § 6-a was proposed and ratified in the wake of COVID‑19–era restrictions on in-person religious worship. Across the country, and in Texas, governments:

• Issued “lockdown” or “stay-at-home” orders;
• Imposed social-distancing and occupancy limits; and
• In many instances, shuttered or heavily limited in-person religious services.

Some jurisdictions:

• Closed houses of worship entirely (indoors and outdoors);
• Permitted only remote or online services;
• Imposed stringent capacity caps (sometimes ten persons);
• Forbade particular worship practices (such as communal singing or chanting); and
• Limited spiritual counseling or pastoral visitation to narrow, regulated circumstances.

At the same time, many secular activities—grocery and liquor stores, marijuana dispensaries, some retail, and various “essential” services—were allowed to continue, sometimes with less stringent limits. In Texas, many restrictive orders on gatherings (including religious services) were issued by counties and cities. In response, the Governor eventually issued an order expressly defining “essential services” to include “religious services conducted in churches, congregations, and houses of worship.”

In 2021, the Legislature proposed Senate Joint Resolution 27, which added § 6-a to the Texas Bill of Rights. The measure passed the Senate (28–2) and the House (133–3, with three present not voting), and more than 62% of Texas voters ratified it in November 2021.

The legislative materials and public commentary consistently:

• Refer to pandemic-era “closure of churches and other houses of worship”;
• Criticize treating liquor stores and casinos as “essential” while churches were closed; and
• State a clear intent to prevent future governmental closure or capacity-limitation of religious services.

Notably, during House debate:

• A proposed amendment that would have added strict-scrutiny balancing language (“narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest”) was explicitly rejected, with the sponsor stating: “there is a reason we have left that language out.”
• Some opponents warned that the amendment might mean government “could never restrict capacity in a church service for any reason.”
• Editorial commentary (e.g., the Houston Chronicle) criticized the measure precisely because “no state interests can ever justify limiting religious services.”

This history is central to the Court’s reading of § 6-a as a categorical, rather than balancing-based, protection.

4. Analysis

4.1. Precedents and Prior Law Informing the Court’s Decision

4.1.1. Texas Constitutional Interpretation Methodology

The Court reiterates its “original public meaning” approach to state constitutional interpretation. Key prior authorities include:

• Hogan v. Southern Methodist University, 688 S.W.3d 852 (Tex. 2024): The Court must identify what a provision “would have meant to those who ratified it,” relying heavily on the text but reading it in “historical and linguistic context.”
• In re Abbott, 628 S.W.3d 288 (Tex. 2021): Original public meaning is determined by how the text was understood when ratified.
• Harris County Hospital District v. Tomball Regional Hospital, 283 S.W.3d 838 (Tex. 2009): Courts look at “history of the legislation, the conditions and spirit of the times, the prevailing sentiments of the people, the evils intended to be remedied, and the good to be accomplished.”
• Degan v. Board of Trustees of Dallas Police & Fire Pension System, 594 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. 2020): Constitutional text is construed in light of problems known at the time of adoption; legislative history of the proposal to the people can be informative.
• In re Dallas County, 697 S.W.3d 142 (Tex. 2024), and In re Nestlé USA, Inc., 387 S.W.3d 610 (Tex. 2012): The Constitution is read as a whole; provisions on similar subjects are harmonized; words are read contextually, not in isolation.
• Travelers’ Insurance Co. v. Marshall, 76 S.W.2d 1007 (Tex. 1934): A constitutional provision retains the meaning it had at adoption, although it may apply to new conditions.
• In re Allcat Claims Service, L.P., 356 S.W.3d 455 (Tex. 2011): Contextual evidence may illuminate meaning but “must ordinarily yield when the text’s plain meaning says the opposite.”

The Court distinguishes constitutional interpretation from statutory interpretation: while it has been hostile to ordinary “legislative history” when construing statutes (e.g., Brown v. City of Houston, 660 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. 2023)), it accepts that the debates and explanations surrounding the proposal of a constitutional amendment to the voters can be relevant to how ratifiers understood the text.

4.1.2. Federal and Texas Religious-Exercise Jurisprudence

The Court situates § 6-a amidst an established framework:

• Federal Free Exercise Clause – strict scrutiny:
  • Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963): government may not burden religiously motivated conduct unless it serves a compelling state interest and uses the least restrictive means.
  • City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997): characterizes strict scrutiny as “the most demanding test known to constitutional law.”
• Texas Article I, § 6 – Freedom of Worship:
  • Original to the 1876 Constitution; protects the “natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences.”
  • Texas cases (e.g., HEB Ministries, 235 S.W.3d 627 (Tex. 2007); Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1996)) generally treat it as coextensive with the federal Free Exercise Clause for purposes of strict scrutiny, absent argument to the contrary.
• Texas RFRA – statutory strict scrutiny:
  • Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 110.003: government may not “substantially burden” religious exercise unless the burden furthers a “compelling governmental interest” and is the “least restrictive means.”

The Court emphasizes that all three of these existing protections already make room for government regulation if strict scrutiny is satisfied. By contrast, § 6-a contains no such qualifier.

4.1.3. COVID-Era Free Exercise Cases

To explain the historical backdrop of § 6-a, the Court canvasses several prominent U.S. Supreme Court COVID cases:

• South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom (S. Bay I), 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020) (emergency application denied);
• Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603 (2020) (injunction denied, dissenting opinions decry preferential treatment of casinos over churches);
• Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. 14 (2020) (injunction granted against attendance caps treating houses of worship less favorably than comparable businesses);
• South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom (S. Bay II), 141 S. Ct. 716 (2021) (partial relief against California’s indoor worship ban and singing/chanting ban);
• Tandon v. Newsom, 593 U.S. 61 (2021) (per curiam) (holding that regulations are not “neutral and generally applicable” if any comparable secular activity is treated more favorably than religious exercise); and
• Other federal appeals court cases challenging shut-down orders.

These illustrate both:

• The breadth of COVID restrictions on religious gatherings; and
• The uneven and evolving judicial response under the federal Free Exercise standard.

4.1.4. Certified Questions and Judicial Restraint

The Court emphasizes the special posture of certified questions:

• Article V, § 3-c of the Texas Constitution authorizes the Supreme Court to answer questions of Texas law certified by federal appellate courts.
• Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 58 implements this mechanism.
• Cases like Amberboy v. Société de Banque Privée, 831 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1992), and Janvey v. GMAG, L.L.C., 592 S.W.3d 125 (Tex. 2019), stress that the Court’s role is to answer the legal question in a way useful to the federal court, not to decide the entire case or to render broad advisory opinions.

The Court warns of the risk of pronouncing sweeping constitutional doctrines untethered to a developed factual record or Texas lower-court jurisprudence. That concern shapes its limited but pointed statement on § 6-a’s scope.

4.1.5. Public Lands and Religious Exercise: Lyng and Apache Stronghold

Though the Court explicitly avoids deciding federal constitutional issues, it highlights two federal cases that illuminate the tension between religious liberty and governmental control of public land:

• Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988): The U.S. Supreme Court held that federal plans to harvest timber and build a road through areas sacred to Native American tribes did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The Court reasoned that:
  • The government was not “coercing” religious adherents to act contrary to their beliefs;
  • It was not discriminating or denying equal benefits; and
  • Requiring the government to preserve these lands for religious use would amount to conferring de facto beneficial ownership of large tracts of public property.
• Apache Stronghold v. United States, 101 F.4th 1036 (9th Cir. 2024) (en banc), cert. denied, 2025: The Ninth Circuit, relying on Lyng, held that the transfer of land (Oak Flat) to a mining company—although it would destroy a site central to Apache religious practice—did not violate the Free Exercise Clause or RFRA because it did not “coerce” adherents to violate their beliefs or discriminate against them.

The Texas Supreme Court does not incorporate Lyng or Apache Stronghold into its formal interpretation of § 6-a, but it uses them descriptively to show the type of conflict that can arise when religious communities claim rights in public land. The Court’s ultimate line-drawing—excluding public-lands management from § 6-a’s scope—functionally aligns state law with the federal Court’s refusal to treat such land-use decisions as free-exercise violations.

4.1.6. Establishment Clause Concerns and Denominational Neutrality

The City argued that reading § 6-a as categorical could pressure government to favor some religions over others or over secular concerns, threatening to violate the federal Establishment Clause. The Court references:

• Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor & Industry Review Commission, 605 U.S. ___, 2025 WL 1583299 (2025): The U.S. Supreme Court reiterated that laws that differentiate among religions along “theological lines” constitute discriminatory denominational preferences.
• Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982): The classic denominational-preference case: explicit discrimination among denominations triggers strict scrutiny under the Establishment Clause.

The Texas Supreme Court concludes that § 6-a is facially neutral among religions: it protects “religious services” by any “religious organization established to support and serve the propagation of a sincerely held religious belief.” Any disparate impact among faiths (e.g., some rely more on public land) stems from neutral secular criteria (who owns the property, how it is managed), not denominational favoritism.

4.2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

4.2.1. Force: § 6-a Is Categorical Rather Than Balancing-Based

The Court first asks: When § 6-a applies, does it operate as a categorical rule or as a strict-scrutiny balancing test? The answer: it is categorical.

Key components of this conclusion:

1. Plain text: “may not … that prohibits or limits religious services”
   The Clause says that the state or a subdivision “may not enact, adopt, or issue” a rule that “prohibits or limits religious services.” There is:
   • No “unless” clause (e.g., “unless narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest”);
   • No reference to “substantial burden” (as in RFRA);
   • No textual hook for importing strict scrutiny.
   The Court contrasts this with many other constitutional and statutory provisions that explicitly recognize exceptions (e.g., tax levies allowed “unless approved by voters,” or RFRA’s explicit compelling-interest exception).
2. Avoiding redundancy with existing protections
   If § 6-a simply replicated a strict-scrutiny regime, it would add little or nothing to:
   • The Free Exercise Clause (as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court);
   • Article I, § 6 of the Texas Constitution; and
   • Texas RFRA (which statutorily implements strict scrutiny).
   Constitutional provisions must be read to give “independent meaning and operative effect.” If § 6-a was meant merely to codify strict scrutiny for religious services, it would be superfluous.
3. Historical context: a reaction to perceived inadequacy of existing protections
   The Legislature and voters understood that many COVID restrictions survived or at least were not clearly forbidden by the federal Free Exercise Clause and RFRA. The stated legislative purpose was “to do more” to protect religious worship and to ensure that similar restrictions could not be imposed in the future. The failure of an amendment to insert strict-scrutiny language is particularly telling: the Legislature intentionally declined a balancing framework.

The City’s contention that “all rights must be limited” is addressed not by watering down § 6-a’s force, but by restricting its scope—i.e., by determining where the Clause applies at all.

4.2.2. Scope: Five Explicit Textual Gateways

The Court identifies at least five textual conditions that must be satisfied before § 6-a is even triggered:

1. Government actor: The actor must be “this state or a political subdivision of this state.” Purely private conduct is outside the Clause.
2. Type of governmental action: The government must “enact, adopt, or issue” a:
   • “statute,”
   • “order,”
   • “proclamation,”
   • “decision,” or
   • “rule.”
   Informal actions or omissions may be more difficult to characterize as falling under these categories.
3. Subject matter: “religious services”
   The Clause protects “religious services, including religious services conducted in churches, congregations, and places of worship.” The inclusion of “including” signals an illustrative, not exhaustive, list. The protected category is “religious services” themselves, not the entire breadth of “free exercise” or “religious exercise.”
4. Provider: The services must be conducted “in this state by a religious organization established to support and serve the propagation of a sincerely held religious belief.”
5. Effect: The governmental action must “prohibit[] or limit[] religious services.” The case turns heavily on what counts as a “prohibition” or “limitation” in this sense.

Most of these gateways are uncontested in this case. The conflict is over whether changing the physical environment of a public park, which in turn affects the practical ability of a religious group to conduct services in a particular way, is a “limitation” on “religious services.”

4.2.3. Rejected Theories of Scope

Three competing theories of scope are advanced and rejected:

1. City’s theory: § 6-a only prohibits unequal treatment of religious services vs. secular activities.
   The City argued that § 6-a merely requires religious services to be treated at least as favorably as “essential” secular activities (a codification of the comparative logic in cases like Tandon and Roman Catholic Diocese).
   
   The Court rejects this as under-inclusive:
   • The text does not speak in comparative terms or in terms of “essential” designation.
   • COVID orders in Texas and elsewhere completely closed religious gatherings in some instances, not simply relative disadvantage vs. secular gatherings.
   • Legislative history reflects concern not only with disparity but with shutdowns and capacity limits per se.
2. State’s theory (as amicus): § 6-a protects only the right to gather, not what occurs within the service.
   Under this view, § 6-a covers closures, location bans, and capacity caps, but not rules regulating communion, singing, or ritual acts within a service.
   
   The Court finds this too narrow:
   • Legislators explicitly referenced bans on singing and other internal practices as targets of the amendment.
   • Sponsors repeatedly framed the goal as protecting both the right to “assemble” and the right to “worship.”
   • Historically, some of the most contentious COVID restrictions concerned internal liturgical acts (e.g., singing, chanting, sharing the Lord’s Supper).
   The Court therefore holds that § 6-a protects not just gathering but also the conduct of worship that “inherently comprise[s] religious services.”
3. Perez’s theory: scope is limited by “longstanding interpretive principles” and “background law.”
   Perez concedes that § 6-a does not protect religious services that contravene deeply embedded legal norms—for instance:
   • Services that interfere with emergency responses (e.g., during imminent floods or when a tree is about to fall);
   • Services held in violation of private property rights (trespass, nuisance);
   • Services that monopolize public property to the exclusion of other lawful users; or
   • Services that consist of criminal conduct (such as human sacrifice).
   He suggests that § 6-a leaves these pre-existing limitations intact as implicit carve-outs.
   
   The Court is unwilling to adopt this amorphous “background principles” limitation:
   • It lacks textual grounding or a clear, objective standard.
   • It would allow future governments (and courts) to redefine “background principles” and thereby shrink constitutional rights over time.
   • It undermines predictability for both government and religious organizations.
   The Court therefore acknowledges that some of these scenarios may well fall outside § 6-a’s scope, but it will not adopt “background principles” as the defining test.

4.2.4. What § 6-a Clearly Covers

Despite its reluctance to fully map § 6-a’s outer boundary, the Court clearly states that the Clause “generally forbids” governmental enactments that:

• Prohibit people from gathering for a religious service at all—like early COVID “stay-at-home” orders that banned in-person religious gatherings;
• Restrict the number or relationships of people who can gather—such as attendance caps or bans on gatherings that are stricter for religious services than for comparables; or
• Regulate the activities in which people may engage when they gather for worship—such as bans on singing, chanting, or administering communion.

These are the sorts of restrictions that triggered the political movement leading to § 6-a, and the Court treats its application to them as straightforward.

4.2.5. The Key New Limitation: Public-Lands Preservation and Management

The central doctrinal innovation in this opinion is the holding that § 6-a does not apply to “governmental actions for the preservation and management of public lands.”

Applied to this case:

• The City’s improvement plan—removing trees and deterring birds—targets the physical condition of City-owned parkland for public health, safety, and infrastructure reasons.
• These decisions are not directed at religious services as such; they are part of the City’s role as landowner and steward.
• They may have profound incidental effects on the religious value of the area to the Lipan-Apache Church, but that is not enough to constitute a “prohibition” or “limitation” of religious services under § 6-a.

Critically, the Court:

• Accepts that the Sacred Area is of immense religious importance, with long historical usage; but
• Draws a line that constitutionalizes freedom to gather and conduct services, not an entitlement to the retention of specific natural features on public land.

The Court notes that Perez himself concedes that:

• The City could sell the property (subject to deed restrictions, but not because of § 6-a); and
• The City may take steps to ensure that other members of the public can use and enjoy Lambert Beach equally with the Church.

This reinforces the Court’s view that § 6-a does not transform public parkland into a kind of quasi-sacred private property immune from ordinary governmental management decisions.

4.3. Impact of the Decision

4.3.1. A New Tier in Texas Religious-Liberty Protection

Texas now has a layered structure of religious-liberty protections:

• Federal Free Exercise Clause: Protects religious exercise against federal and state action, subject (in many contexts) to a strict-scrutiny test when laws are not neutral and generally applicable.
• Texas Constitution Article I, § 6 (Freedom of Worship): Historically applied roughly coextensively with the federal Free Exercise Clause.
• Texas RFRA (Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code ch. 110): Statutory strict scrutiny for “substantial burdens” on religious exercise.
• Texas Constitution Article I, § 6-a (Religious Services Clause): Now interpreted as:
  • Categorical where it applies (no strict-scrutiny balancing); but
  • Limited in scope, with at least one clear exclusion (public-lands preservation/management).

For religious organizations in Texas, this means that:

• If the challenged action is fairly characterized as a “statute, order, proclamation, decision, or rule” that “prohibits or limits religious services,” § 6-a offers a bright-line constitutional shield.
• If the action falls outside that category (for example, it is a general land-use decision), plaintiffs must instead rely on more nuanced and fact-intensive Free Exercise or RFRA claims.

4.3.2. Emergency and Public Health Regulation Post-COVID

The decision constrains how Texas governments may respond to future emergencies:

• No direct bans on religious services: Future “lockdowns” that explicitly close houses of worship or cap religious attendance would almost certainly violate § 6-a.
• No targeted bans on worship practices: Rules forbidding particular liturgical activities (e.g., singing, communion) as such are disallowed, even if backed by strong public-health rationales.

More difficult questions remain (and are not resolved here), such as:

• Whether general occupancy limits on all indoor gatherings, framed without specific reference to religious services, might still be deemed limitations of “religious services” under § 6-a; and
• Whether neutral public-safety ordinances (e.g., fire codes, building capacity, noise curfews) applied even-handedly could be treated as “limitations” that nonetheless fall outside the Clause’s intended scope.

The Court hints, via legislative-history quotes, that ordinary fire, health, zoning, and safety laws were not meant to be displaced by § 6-a, but it stops short of a definitive ruling and flags those issues for future cases.

4.3.3. Indigenous Spiritual Practices and Public Lands

For Native and other religious communities connected to sacred public lands, the immediate implication is sobering:

• § 6-a does not provide a constitutional basis to prevent the state or its subdivisions from altering natural features (trees, wildlife, terrain) of public lands, even if those features are integral to religious services.
• Claims that public land must be preserved in its current religiously significant condition must instead be grounded in:
  • Federal Free Exercise and RFRA (subject to the limitations illustrated by Lyng and Apache Stronghold);
  • State RFRA (substantial-burden analysis);
  • Historic-preservation statutes, environmental laws, or deed restrictions; or
  • Political and administrative processes (public comment, consultation, etc.).

Thus, while § 6-a offers robust protection against direct legal restrictions on ceremonies, it does not constitutionalize a right to particular landscapes on public property.

4.3.4. Municipal Governance and Policy Design

For cities and counties:

• Park and land management: They retain broad discretion to manage, preserve, and improve public parks and other public lands—even if religious communities use those lands—without triggering § 6-a, provided their actions are not framed as rules about “religious services.”
• Regulatory drafting: Governments must be cautious about:
  • Issuing orders that explicitly reference “religious services” or houses of worship; and
  • Crafting regulations that, in practical effect, can only be understood as aimed at religious gatherings.

Expect more careful framing of emergency orders and public-safety rules in Texas to avoid the “religious services” trigger point.

4.3.5. Litigation Strategy Going Forward

For litigants:

• Plaintiffs will likely:
  • Plead parallel claims under the Free Exercise Clause, Article I § 6, RFRA, and § 6-a;
  • Characterize challenged actions whenever possible as “orders” or “decisions” that “prohibit or limit religious services”; and
  • Emphasize direct impact on services (gathering, attendance, core rituals) rather than more attenuated or environmental burdens.
• Government defendants will likely:
  • Emphasize neutral, general applicability and non-religious purpose;
  • Argue that a challenged rule is not about “religious services” but about land management, public safety, or property use applicable to all; and
  • Invoke the public-lands limitation as a template for other context-based scope limits.

4.3.6. Constitutional Interpretation in Texas: Use of Context and History

This opinion also reaffirms several methodological points:

• Texas constitutional interpretation is firmly rooted in text as understood at ratification.
• Legislative history and public debate surrounding constitutional amendments are admissible and influential context, though not “binding.”
• There is a conscious differentiation from the Court’s skepticism toward legislative history in statutory cases.

By giving significant weight to:

• The refusal to adopt strict-scrutiny language;
• Statements by sponsors and opponents; and
• Public-explanatory materials warning that no “state interests” would justify limits on services,

the Court uses ratification history to confirm and sharpen the textual reading of § 6-a as categorical.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

5.1. Categorical Rule vs. Strict Scrutiny

A categorical rule means that once the conditions are met, the government action is simply forbidden. There is no:

• Weighing of government interests against individual rights; or
• Room for justifying the infringement by pointing to public safety, public health, or other compelling needs.

By contrast, strict scrutiny is a two-part balancing test:

1. The government must show a compelling governmental interest—an objective so important that it justifies overriding fundamental rights (e.g., stopping a deadly epidemic, national security, preventing imminent violence).
2. The law must be narrowly tailored—the least restrictive means suitable to achieve that interest (no broader than necessary; no less-rights-infringing alternative is available).

Strict scrutiny is “the most demanding test” used in constitutional law, but it still allows the government to sometimes prevail. A categorical rule, by contrast, does not: when triggered, it is absolute. § 6-a falls into the latter category, but only within its defined scope.

5.2. “Force” vs. “Scope” of a Constitutional Right

The Court distinguishes between:

• Force: How powerful is the right, once we know it applies? Does it always win (categorical) or can it be outweighed by governmental interests (balancing)?
• Scope: What kinds of situations, actors, and actions fall under the right in the first place? Is every governmental action affecting religious life covered, or only certain types (e.g., explicit rules governing religious services)?

In this opinion:

• § 6-a’s force is maximal: when it applies, the government cannot justify its rule, no matter how compelling its reasons.
• Its scope is carefully limited: it does not, for example, apply to routine public-land management, and it may not apply to some other neutral, general public-safety regulations.

5.3. “Substantial Burden” vs. “Prohibits or Limits”

Under Texas RFRA, claimants must show that a law imposes a “substantial burden” on the free exercise of religion. That is a fact-intensive inquiry focusing on:

• How seriously the law interferes with religious practice; and
• Whether the adherent is being pressured to break a religious tenet or abandon important religious conduct.

By contrast, § 6-a’s language is sharper: it forbids government rules that “prohibit or limit religious services.” That:

• Focuses on the nature of the governmental act (does it restrict religious services themselves?); rather than
• Quantifying the severity of the burden in a granular way.

Once a governmental act is correctly categorized as “prohibiting” or “limiting” a religious service, § 6-a kicks in categorically; there is no “how substantial?” debate.

5.4. Certified Questions and Judicial Federalism

A certified question is a procedure by which a federal appellate court asks a state supreme court to clarify an unsettled question of state law that is necessary to decide a federal case. It:

• Respects the primacy of state courts in interpreting their own constitutions and statutes;
• Promotes consistency and predictability in state law; and
• Avoids federal courts predicting state-law outcomes in areas with no controlling state precedent.

Here, the Fifth Circuit certified the question of how § 6-a should be interpreted because:

• The provision is new (2021);
• No Texas appellate court had yet construed it; and
• The issue is determinative to Perez’s state-constitutional claim.

5.5. Public Ownership of Land and Religious Use

Public parks and lands are generally held “in trust” for public use. That means:

• The government must keep them open for lawful use by all, without arbitrary exclusion; but
• It must also regulate their use to ensure safety, order, and general convenience.

Religious use of public land (like holding services in a park) is protected by general free-speech and religious-exercise principles, but does not ordinarily:

• Give religious groups a legal right to control how the land is maintained; or
• Freeze the physical environment (trees, wildlife, structures) in a specific configuration.

The Court’s holding that § 6-a does not extend to “preservation and management of public lands” preserves this baseline understanding.

6. Open Questions and Future Litigation

Although Perez answers the certified question, it leaves several substantial issues open:

• Neutral, generally applicable safety codes: Are fire codes or building-capacity rules that incidentally limit religious services outside § 6-a’s scope, or are they “limitations” that trigger the categorical ban? The Court strongly suggests the former but does not decide.
• Noise ordinances and curfews: If a city enforces a general nighttime noise ban in a way that restricts late-night religious services outdoors, is that a § 6-a “limitation,” or a permissible general rule?
• Police actions and emergencies: The Court hints that genuine emergency interventions (e.g., evacuating a burning church) are not what § 6-a was meant to address, but it does not articulate a firm doctrinal test.
• Ad hoc “decisions” vs. formal regulations: The text covers “decisions” as well as statutes and rules. How far down does that reach? Could one-off decisions by individual officials (like a police officer dispersing a service) be challenged under § 6-a?
• Private property disputes: Section 6-a binds the state and its subdivisions, not private parties. If a landlord refuses to rent a space for religious services, can state-court enforcement of that private right itself trigger § 6-a? The opinion does not address such state-action questions.
• Criminal law and extreme hypotheticals: The Court rejects an open-ended “background principles” test but does not explicitly state how § 6-a interfaces with criminal prohibitions (e.g., human sacrifice) that are framed generally. Presumably, such activities would not be recognized as constitutionally protected “religious services,” but the Court has yet to spell out that boundary.

7. Conclusion

Perez v. City of San Antonio inaugurates the jurisprudence of Texas’s Religious Services Clause with two clear propositions:

1. Categorical force: When Article I, § 6-a applies, it absolutely forbids state and local government from imposing rules that “prohibit or limit religious services.” There is no strict-scrutiny back door and no weighing of compelling interests.
2. Limited scope: The Clause does not reach all governmental actions that affect religious life. At a minimum, it does not extend to governmental preservation and management of public lands, even when such management seriously impairs a religious community’s ability to conduct ceremonies in a particular natural setting.

The decision thus vindicates the central political intent behind § 6-a—to prevent a repeat of COVID-era shutdowns and direct regulatory intrusions into worship services—while refusing to convert the amendment into a general veto over land-use and management decisions. Future litigation will refine the boundaries of “prohibits or limits religious services,” but Perez firmly establishes that:

• Texas courts will treat direct legal constraints on religious gatherings and worship practices as per se unconstitutional under state law; yet
• They will not treat every incidental or environmental impact on religious practice—especially on public lands—as a constitutional “limitation” under § 6-a.

In that sense, Perez both strengthens religious liberty in its core domain—freedom to gather and worship—and clarifies that the 2021 amendment does not displace the ordinary governance of public space. The federal courts must now apply this understanding to Perez’s claims, while Texas courts can expect a growing body of litigation that tests, in concrete contexts, where the powerful new shield of Article I, § 6-a begins and ends.