Establishing Categorical Moral Turpitude in Virginia Petit Larceny: Chavez v. Bondi

Introduction

In Eugenia Bautista Chavez v. Pamela Jo Bondi, the Fourth Circuit confronted the question of whether a 2011 Virginia conviction for petit larceny categorically qualifies as a “crime involving moral turpitude” under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Eugenia Chavez, a Mexican national present in the United States without inspection since 2000, faced removal proceedings after her conviction under Va. Code § 18.2-96. She conceded removability but sought cancellation of removal on the ground that her larceny offense did not meet the moral-turpitude threshold. The Board of Immigration Appeals and the Immigration Judge held otherwise, barring her from relief. On April 10, 2025, a unanimous panel of the Fourth Circuit denied her petition for review in a published opinion by Chief Judge Diaz.

Key issues:

• Does Virginia petit larceny require the specific intent necessary for moral turpitude?
• Does the offense involve “reprehensible conduct” independent of value?
• What is the impact of the Supreme Court’s Loper Bright decision on agency deference?

Summary of the Judgment

The Fourth Circuit, applying the categorical approach, held that Virginia petit larceny categorically involves moral turpitude because:

1. It is a common-law crime requiring specific intent to permanently deprive the owner of property;
2. The claim-of-right affirmative defense in Virginia turns on a defendant’s subjective good-faith belief (not mere negligence);
3. The act of taking another’s property against their will, with intent to keep it permanently, inherently involves “reprehensible conduct” regardless of the item’s value.

The court rejected Chavez’s arguments that the mental state could be purely negligent or that de minimis takings escape moral-turpitude classification. It also upheld the validity of a temporary Board member’s reconsideration decision under existing appointment regulations.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

• Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024): Overruled Chevron deference, making agency interpretations of statutory ambiguity persuasive rather than binding.
• Granados v. Garland (2021) & Martinez v. Sessions (2018): Articulated the “categorical approach” and two elements of moral turpitude—culpable mental state and reprehensible conduct.
• Diaz-Lizarraga (BIA 2016): Held that any theft offense committed with intent to permanently deprive is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude.
• Hernandez v. Holder (4th Cir. 2015): Recognized that Virginia petit larceny qualifies—but was concededly treated in that case.
• Virginia authorities—Brown v. Commonwealth (2019), Welch v. Commonwealth (2024), Liebenow II (Mass. SJC 2014): Defined larceny, claim-of-right defense, and clarified subjective-belief requirements.
• Other relevant circuit decisions—Ferreiras Veloz v. Garland (2nd Cir. 2022), Lopez v. Garland (9th Cir. 2024): Assumed petit larceny involves moral turpitude.

2. Legal Reasoning

The court’s analysis proceeded in three main steps:

1. Categorical Approach and De Novo Review. It looked solely to the statutory elements of Va. Code § 18.2-96 and Virginia common law, not the particular facts of Chavez’s case. After Loper Bright, the Board’s precedents are persuasive but not binding.
2. Culpable Mental State. Virginia petit larceny is a common-law specific-intent crime requiring proof of intent to permanently deprive the owner. The claim-of-right (abandonment) defense is purely subjective—based on an honest, good-faith belief—even if a factfinder may consider reasonableness as evidence of sincerity. There is no “larceny by negligence.”
3. Reprehensible Conduct. The act of taking another’s property without consent, with intent to keep it permanently, independently violates moral norms, regardless of the property’s monetary value. The court found no basis to carve out de minimis takings from the moral-turpitude category.

3. Impact

This decision cements a uniform rule in the Fourth Circuit—Virginia petit larceny is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude for immigration purposes. Its broader effects include:

• Clarifying that state claim-of-right defenses do not undermine the specific-intent requirement under the categorical approach.
• Reaffirming that moral-turpitude analysis focuses on statutory elements (mental state + reprehensible act), not the value or context of the stolen property.
• Demonstrating post-Loper Bright application of agency decisions as persuasive authority, not mandatory deference.
• Signaling consistency across circuits that theft offenses with permanent-deprivation intent remain disqualifying in immigration relief.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Categorical Approach

Courts look at the statute’s elements, not the facts of a particular defendant’s conduct. If every conceivable act under the statute is morally turpitudinous, the conviction is disqualifying.

“Crime Involving Moral Turpitude”

Requires two components:

• Culpable Mental State—usually specific intent to do wrong (not mere negligence).
• Reprehensible Conduct—an act violating a moral norm (vile, base, or depraved) independent of its illegality.

Claim-of-Right Defense

In Virginia, a defendant avoids larceny liability by proving an honest, good-faith belief that she had a right to the property. A jury may consider whether that belief was objectively reasonable as evidence of sincerity, but negligence is not enough.

Loper Bright and Agency Deference

The Supreme Court held that courts, not agencies, resolve statutory ambiguities (“no more Chevron”). Nonetheless, agencies’ past interpretations remain persuasive if well-reasoned and consistent.

Conclusion

Chavez v. Bondi establishes beyond doubt that Virginia petit larceny categorically involves moral turpitude under U.S. immigration law. The Fourth Circuit’s careful application of the categorical approach reaffirms two central tenets: (1) petit larceny requires a specific intent to permanently deprive and cannot be reduced to mere negligence; (2) the intentional taking of another’s property, even of minimal monetary value, intrinsically violates moral norms. Post-Loper Bright, the opinion also illustrates that while agency precedents no longer command deference, they retain persuasive force when grounded in thorough, consistent reasoning. For non-citizens convicted of Virginia petit larceny, cancellation of removal—and similar relief—remains barred by this ruling.