B. The IBHP procurement and Carelon’s disqualification

1. The solicitation and initial evaluation.
   In December 2021, the Division of Purchasing issued an ITN seeking a managed care organization to administer the Idaho Behavioral Health Plan for the Department of Health and Welfare (IDHW). Three vendors bid:
   • Carelon (then Beacon Health Options);
   • Magellan;
   • Optum Idaho (United Behavioral Health).
   A nine-member evaluation committee scored the bids on technical and cost factors. Carelon and Magellan advanced as finalists; Optum was eliminated. After best-and-final offers, Carelon received the highest total score, and Purchasing issued a notice of intent to award the contract to Carelon.
2. Protests by Magellan and Optum based on § 67‑9230(8).
   Both losing bidders protested, arguing that Carelon was statutorily ineligible because:
   • Carelon had been hired by IDHW in 2019 to prepare a “Crisis System of Care” report (“2019 Report”) with recommendations for crisis service arrays and system design; and
   • The 2019 Report was used to prepare the ITN specifications or otherwise influenced the procurement process, triggering disqualification under § 67‑9230(8).
3. Determinations officer and Director’s decision.
   The Director appointed a determinations officer under § 67‑9232(3)(a)(ii) (non‑contested process). All three bidders submitted written arguments and participated in oral presentations.
   
   The officer concluded that Carelon’s 2019 Report had in fact been used to prepare significant portions of the ITN specifications, pointing to close parallels between eight “core components” recommended in the report and specifications in the ITN (24/7 hotline, mobile response tailored to children, crisis centers with first‑responder drop‑off, medication‑assisted treatment, 23‑hour crisis stabilization, cross‑agency crisis collaboration, etc.). The Director allowed additional written submissions, then adopted the recommendation, ruling that Carelon was ineligible to bid under § 67‑9230(8). Purchasing rescinded the intent to award to Carelon.
4. Award to Magellan and Carelon’s second challenge.
   Purchasing renegotiated solely with Magellan and issued a new notice of intent to award to Magellan. Optum was notified; Carelon was not, because it had been found ineligible and its scores had been removed. Carelon nonetheless submitted a new challenge, contesting:
   • Its disqualification under § 67‑9230(8); and
   • Alleged improper modifications of the ITN during Magellan-only negotiations and award to a non-bidding affiliate.
   The Director declined to appoint another determinations officer, finding Carelon lacked standing as an ineligible bidder, and in any event affirmed the award to Magellan. The Magellan contract was executed June 16, 2023.
5. District court litigation.
   Carelon then filed a civil action in district court (later amended), against the State (through the Department of Administration and IDHW), key officials, and Magellan; Optum intervened.
   
   Carelon sought:
   • Declaratory relief:
     1. That the Director’s interpretation of § 67‑9230(8) (disqualifying Carelon) was erroneous;
     2. That Magellan was ineligible for award due to lack of required accreditation;
     3. That the State unlawfully modified the ITN scope during negotiations with Magellan;
     4. That the State unlawfully executed a contract with a non‑bidding affiliate of Magellan;
     5. That the Procurement Act is unconstitutional insofar as it precludes judicial review of the Director’s decisions; and, alternatively,
     6. That § 67‑9230(8) itself is unconstitutional (separation of powers, void for vagueness).
   • A writ of mandate compelling the State to:
     • Terminate Magellan’s contract;
     • Rescind the notice of intent to award to Magellan; and
     • Reinstate Carelon as the “lowest responsible bidder” and revive its award.
   The State and Magellan moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) (lack of jurisdiction) and 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim). Optum opposed dismissal for lack of jurisdiction but supported dismissal on the merits. The district court dismissed:
   • Counts 1–4 (non‑constitutional declaratory claims) and the mandamus claim for lack of jurisdiction (impermissible judicial review);
   • Rejected the separation-of-powers and void-for-vagueness claims on the merits.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Original vs. appellate jurisdiction and the bar on judicial review

1. Constitutional framework

The Court begins with the constitutional foundations:

• Article V, § 20:

  The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases, both at law and in equity, and such appellate jurisdiction as may be conferred by law.

  District courts always have original jurisdiction, but appellate (review) jurisdiction exists only if the Legislature confers it.
• Article V, § 13:

  [T]he legislature shall provide a proper system of appeals, and regulate by law, when necessary, the methods of proceeding in the exercise of their powers of all the courts below the Supreme Court...

  This provision empowers the Legislature to define the availability and scope of appeals, including judicial review of administrative agencies.
• Hence, Idaho precedent consistently holds that:
  • “Actions by state agencies are not subject to judicial review unless expressly authorized by statute.” (Laughy v. Idaho Dep’t of Transp.)
  • When a district court entertains a petition for judicial review of an agency decision, it acts in an appellate capacity. (Burns Holdings, LLC v. Madison Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs)

Everyone agreed that, under Idaho Code §§ 67‑9229(1) and 67‑9232(7), only contested case decisions under § 67‑9232(3)(a)(iii) are appealable. The procurement actions at issue followed the non-contested recommendation route (§ 67‑9232(3)(a)(ii)), so no statutory right to judicial review existed.

2. The Declaratory Judgment Act does not create a new right to review

Carelon argued it was not seeking judicial review at all. Instead, it invoked Idaho’s Declaratory Judgment Act, Idaho Code § 10‑1202, which allows a person whose “rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute” to obtain a court declaration regarding that statute’s construction or validity.

The Court rejected this reframing by emphasizing two points:

• The Declaratory Judgment Act does not create new substantive rights; it only creates a remedial vehicle. (Sommer v. Misty Valley, LLC)
• Whether a case invokes original or appellate jurisdiction depends on the substance of the claim, not its caption:

  A challenge to a final agency action is an appeal.... An agency’s final decision “may not later be collaterally attacked by way of declaratory judgment action.”

  (Citing Chavez v. Canyon Cnty. and Carter v. Dep’t of Health & Welfare.)

The district court had looked past labels and concluded Carelon was, in substance, asking the court to:

• Set aside the Director’s decision that Carelon was ineligible to bid; and
• Compel reversal of the award to Magellan and reinstatement of the award to Carelon.

Those are classic appellate functions—reviewing and reversing agency decisions—not merely interpreting statutes in the abstract. The Supreme Court agreed:

Setting aside an agency action or determination is a function of judicial review....

Accordingly, Counts 1–4 were barred because they attempted a collateral attack on final procurement decisions where the Legislature had withheld any right to judicial review.

3. Why City of Ririe and Employers Resource do not help Carelon

Carelon relied heavily on two recent Idaho decisions:

• City of Ririe v. Gilgen (2022): concerned a city’s challenge under the Local Land Use Planning Act (“LLUPA”) to a county’s grant of a conditional use permit. The Court ultimately held the City lacked standing to seek judicial review under LLUPA, but it noted the City could instead file:
  • An original declaratory action to determine rights under an intergovernmental agreement; or
  • An enforcement action under a specific LLUPA provision (Idaho Code § 67‑6527) authorizing civil actions to enforce compliance with the Act.
  Thus, the City of Ririe had independent statutory and contractual causes of action supporting an original declaratory judgment claim.
• Employers Resource Management Co. v. Kealey (2020): involved a challenge to the constitutionality of the Idaho Reimbursement Incentive Act and related agency rules, not a challenge to a specific agency benefit award. The Court emphasized that:
  • The plaintiff was not attacking a particular agency action, but the statute itself;
  • Declaratory relief was expressly authorized under Idaho’s APA for challenges to the validity or applicability of administrative rules (Idaho Code § 67‑5278).

The Court distinguished both cases:

• Unlike LLUPA, the Procurement Act does not create an independent cause of action for a vendor to sue over a procurement decision.
• Carelon was not seeking an abstract declaration of its rights under § 67‑9230(8); it wanted the court to set aside specific procurement decisions and order a contract award to it.
• Employers Resource involved a purely constitutional challenge and a separate APA provision authorizing rule‑validity suits; it did not endorse using declaratory judgment as a workaround to a statutory bar on judicial review of particular agency actions.

Thus, those precedents did not authorize Carelon’s collateral attack.

4. Chavez v. Canyon County and the “ultra vires” distinction

The district court relied on Chavez v. Canyon Cnty. for the principle that a declaratory judgment action cannot substitute for an appeal where a party is essentially challenging a final agency decision. Carelon argued Chavez also recognized that declaratory actions may sometimes be used instead of judicial review.

The Court clarified:

• Chavez concerned an ultra vires claim—Chavez alleged the county acted outside its statutory authority by issuing a tax deed without required statutory notice—and was not an attack on the merits of the tax decision itself.
• The Court in Chavez reiterated that “the proper method of contesting an agency or judicial decision is by appeal” and that such decisions may not later be collaterally attacked by declaratory judgment.
• Here, Carelon was not asserting that the Director lacked any legal authority to make disqualification or award decisions; rather, it argued the Director misapplied the statute and erred in judgment. That is a merits review, which is purely appellate in nature.

Hence, the Chavez exception for ultra vires challenges did not apply.

B. Mandamus as an improper substitute for an appeal

Carelon argued that, if declaratory relief was unavailable, then mandamus (writ of mandate) should lie because:

• The State had a “clear legal duty” to award to the “lowest responsible bidder” (which Carelon claimed to be); and
• The Procurement Act precluded any other legal remedy (no judicial review), making mandamus the only avenue for relief.

Under Idaho Code § 7‑302 and long‑standing case law (e.g., Rogers v. Gooding Pub. Sch. Dist., Brady v. City of Homedale, Cowles Pub. Co.):

• Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, available only where:
  • The respondent owes a clear, non‑discretionary legal duty to perform the act sought;
  • The act is ministerial, not discretionary;
  • No adequate alternative remedy exists.
• “It is fundamental that a writ will not function as the equivalent of an appeal or a petition for review.” (The Associated Press v. Second Judicial Dist.)

The Court upheld the district court’s denial of mandamus for two key reasons:

1. The writ request was functionally a demand for appellate review.
   Carelon’s petition requested an order compelling the Director and Purchasing Administrator to:
   • Terminate Magellan’s contract;
   • Rescind the intent to award to Magellan;
   • Reinstate Carelon as the lowest responsible bidder and revive its award.
   To issue such a writ, the court would have to:
   • Re‑evaluate whether Carelon was rightly disqualified under § 67‑9230(8); and
   • Review the legality of the decision to award to Magellan.
   That is, again, judicial review of agency decisions—precisely what the Legislature chose not to allow in non‑contested procurement cases.
2. No “clear legal duty” to award to Carelon existed after its disqualification.
   Once the Director determined that § 67‑9230(8) rendered Carelon ineligible, the legal landscape changed. The statutory obligation to award to the “lowest responsible bidder” plainly does not mean “award to a bidder who is statutorily disqualified.” Thus, there was no clear nondiscretionary duty to award to Carelon that could be enforced via mandamus.

Mandamus could not be used to re‑litigate the Director’s discretionary determinations, and was therefore properly dismissed.

C. Separation of powers and the Procurement Act’s judicial review scheme

1. The separation-of-powers principle

Article II, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution establishes three departments of government and forbids one branch from exercising powers “properly belonging” to another. Article V, § 13 reinforces this for the judiciary:

The legislature shall have no power to deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it....

At the same time, Article V, §§ 13 & 20 authorize the Legislature to define appellate jurisdiction and the system of appeals.

2. What the Procurement Act does—and does not—do

Carelon argued the Procurement Act impermissibly:

• Allowed the Director, by choosing between non‑contested and contested paths, to decide which decisions would be insulated from judicial scrutiny; and
• “Deprived” district courts of their original jurisdiction over declaratory and mandamus actions.

The Court flatly rejected the latter premise and carefully separated:

• Original jurisdiction, which the Constitution grants to district courts “in all cases, both at law and in equity” and which the Legislature cannot remove; versus
• Appellate (review) jurisdiction, which exists only as “conferred by law,” and which the Legislature may restrict or withhold.

The Procurement Act, by its terms, only regulates the availability of appellate review of procurement decisions. It:

• Restricts judicial review to cases where the Director chooses the “contested case” route; and
• Precludes APA‑style judicial review of decisions issued after non‑contested recommendation proceedings.

Nothing in the Act strips district courts of their power to hear original suits, such as:

• Pure constitutional challenges to the statute itself;
• Potential future ultra vires claims where an agency acts wholly outside its statutory authority (if properly pleaded).

Indeed, the district court here exercised its original jurisdiction to adjudicate Carelon’s constitutional attacks on the Procurement Act and on § 67‑9230(8). That is the clearest proof the Legislature did not remove original jurisdiction.

3. Misplaced reliance on Finch, SRBA, and Wood

Carelon cited a trio of cases—State v. Finch, In re SRBA Case No. 39576, and Wood v. Idaho Transp. Dep’t—for the proposition that the Legislature cannot insulate administrative actions from any judicial scrutiny. The Court found these cases inapposite:

• Finch and SRBA both involved property rights and due process:
  • In Finch, revocation of a dredge mining permit implicated property interests; the Court held due process requires judicial review of such deprivations.
  • In SRBA, a statute requiring courts to “decree as reported” unobjected water-right determinations improperly forced courts to accept an agency’s legal conclusions about property rights without independent judicial judgment.
  Those decisions turn on due process protection of property interests, not on the broad claim that no agency decision can ever be shielded from review.
• Wood involved delegation of rulemaking authority to Idaho State Police concerning breath-test procedures; the question was whether that delegation invaded judicial powers. It did not concern limits on judicial review of agency decisions.

By contrast, Carelon:

• Did not plead a due process challenge based on deprivation of a vested property right; and
• Challenged only the refusal to provide appellate review for procurement decisions that the Legislature has chosen to treat as non-reviewable unless handled as contested cases.

Under Idaho’s constitutional framework, that legislative choice is permissible.

4. Out-of-state authority distinguished

Carelon also cited decisions from Hawaii and Missouri invalidating statutory schemes that entirely barred judicial review of administrative actions. The Idaho Supreme Court found them irrelevant because:

• Missouri’s Constitution expressly requires administrative decisions to be “subject to direct review by the courts,” unlike Idaho’s constitution.
• The Hawaii decision (Alaka’i Na Keiki, Inc. v. Matayoshi) framed judicial review in a way not directly analogous to Idaho’s sharp distinction between original and appellate jurisdiction.

Given Idaho’s explicit constitutional grant to the Legislature to define appellate jurisdiction, these out-of-state decisions did not control.

The Court ultimately held that:

[W]hile the State Procurement Act limits appellate review to instances where the Director initiates a contested case proceeding, this limitation is permissible under the Idaho Constitution.... The State Procurement Act does not restrict a district court’s original jurisdiction. Accordingly, the State Procurement Act does not violate the separation of powers doctrine....

D. Void-for-vagueness challenge to Idaho Code § 67‑9230(8)

1. Standing—civil vs. criminal components

Section 67‑9230(8) is the substantive disqualification rule. Section 67‑9231(1) makes violation of some Procurement Act provisions (including § 67‑9230(8)) a criminal misdemeanor. Carelon argued the Court should apply the stricter criminal vagueness standard because violation of § 67‑9230(8) is criminally punishable.

The Court first addressed standing. To challenge a statute’s constitutionality, a plaintiff must demonstrate:

• An actual or imminent injury in fact;
• Traceability to the challenged statutory provision;
• Likelihood of redress by a favorable decision. (Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife)

A plaintiff can sometimes bring a pre‑enforcement challenge if under a “credible threat of prosecution” (Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project). But here:

• Carelon had never been charged or prosecuted under § 67‑9231(1) for violating § 67‑9230(8); and
• Any potential prosecution was now barred by the one‑year limitations period for misdemeanors (Idaho Code § 19‑403(1)).

Since no credible threat of criminal prosecution remained, Carelon lacked standing to attack the criminal aspect of the statute. However, it still had standing to challenge the civil disqualification effect—its ineligibility to bid.

2. Preservation of an “as‑applied” challenge

The State argued that Carelon had only presented a facial challenge in the district court, and that its shift on appeal to an as‑applied challenge was unpreserved. The Court rejected this procedural objection as well.

In its amended complaint, Carelon alleged:

• The Director’s interpretation of § 67‑9230(8), “insofar as” that interpretation was correct, rendered the statute so vague that it failed to give adequate notice of prohibited conduct “if it does not require knowledge or intent”; and
• Sought a declaration that § 67‑9230(8) was unconstitutional as applied “under the proper interpretation” of the statute.

The Court saw this as functionally an as‑applied argument from the outset: Carelon complained that the statute, as interpreted and applied to bar its bid based on the 2019 Report, failed to give adequate notice. On appeal it merely refined its characterization; it did not present a different claim. Thus, the as‑applied vagueness challenge was preserved.

3. Interaction with the Procurement Act’s bar on judicial review

Magellan contended that even an as-applied void-for-vagueness challenge was impermissible because it inherently required review of the Director’s application of § 67‑9230(8), which the Procurement Act bars.

The Court disagreed, drawing a line similar to that in Employers Resource:

• A void-for-vagueness claim is a constitutional due process claim, not a statutory “appeal” of the agency’s decision; it properly invokes the court’s original jurisdiction.
• American Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. IDWR, relied on by Magellan, dealt with exhaustion and completeness of the administrative record, not a statutory prohibition on review. Here, the record was complete and administrative remedies had been fully used.

Thus, the Procurement Act did not bar an as-applied constitutional challenge to § 67‑9230(8).

4. Merits: is § 67‑9230(8) unconstitutionally vague as applied?

The Court then turned to the substance of the vagueness claim. Key principles:

• The Due Process Clause forbids statutes “so vague that people of common intelligence must necessarily guess at [their] meaning and differ as to [their] application.” (Walsh v. Swapp Law, PLLC, quoting Haw v. Idaho State Bd. of Med.)
• Statutes are presumed constitutional; doubts are resolved in favor of constitutionality. (Walsh, Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co.)
• Vagueness analysis is context‑sensitive:
  • Civil and economic regulations are permitted more leeway than criminal statutes because their consequences are less severe and regulated entities can seek guidance. (Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside)
  • A statute is invalid as applied only if it fails to provide sufficient warning in relation to the specific conduct at issue. (National Dairy Products, Walsh)

Section 67‑9230(8) states:

No vendor or related party, or subsidiary, or affiliate of a vendor, may submit a bid to obtain a contract to provide property to the state, if the vendor or related party, or affiliate or subsidiary was paid for services used in preparing the specifications or if the services influenced the procurement process.

The Court found the statute straightforward as applied to Carelon’s conduct:

• Carelon knew it had been paid by IDHW in 2019 to prepare the “Crisis System of Care” report describing best‑practice crisis system components.
• The 2019 Report expressly recommended that Idaho adopt specific crisis‑service components—for example, a 24/7 hotline, mobile crisis units, crisis centers with first‑responder drop‑off, etc.
• The ITN used by the State in 2021 for the IBHP contained highly similar—or, in the determinations officer’s view, nearly identical—specifications for crisis service components.

Carelon tried to argue that these specifications originated from independent national models (e.g., SAMHSA), not from its 2019 Report, and therefore it could not know its services had “influenced” the procurement. The Court rejected this:

• The statute focuses on whether the vendor was “paid for services used in preparing the specifications” or whether “the services influenced the procurement process,” not where the conceptual content originated.
• Whatever their ultimate intellectual source, it was Carelon that:
  • Delivered the crisis system design recommendations to IDHW as part of a paid consulting engagement;
  • Specifically recommended adoption of those components for Idaho’s crisis system.
• Given that the same crisis components later appeared in the IBHP ITN, a vendor of ordinary intelligence in Carelon’s position could understand that its prior paid work had been “used in preparing the specifications” or had “influenced the procurement process.”

The Court concluded:

Under Idaho Code section 67‑9230(8), it does not matter where the standards in Carelon’s 2019 report originally came from. Instead, what plainly matters is who provided those specifications to the State and whether that person or entity was paid by the State to provide them....

Accordingly, § 67‑9230(8) was not unconstitutionally vague as applied; it provided sufficient notice that Carelon’s circumstances triggered disqualification.

E. Attorney fees

Magellan sought attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12‑121, which allows fees where a party brought or defended the appeal “frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.” Although Magellan and the State prevailed on all issues, the Court declined to award fees:

• Carelon’s arguments, particularly on the interaction between declaratory judgment, mandamus, and statutory bars on judicial review in the Procurement Act context, involved issues of first impression and were supported by substantial authority.
• Its constitutional challenges, though unsuccessful, were not frivolous.

Both the State and Magellan, as prevailing parties, were awarded costs under Idaho Appellate Rule 40(a).

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. Judicial review vs. declaratory judgment vs. ultra vires suits

• Judicial review (appeal of agency action): A court reviews a final agency decision, usually under the APA, to determine whether it was lawful, supported by substantial evidence, or arbitrary/capricious. This is appellate in nature and requires statutory authorization.
• Declaratory judgment (original action): A party asks a court, in its original jurisdiction, to interpret the meaning or validity of a statute, contract, or ordinance, usually not tied to reviewing a specific agency decision. The Declaratory Judgment Act does not create new rights; it only provides a type of relief.
• Ultra vires action: A specialized kind of original action asserting that a governmental body acted without any legal authority—e.g., issuing a tax deed where statutory prerequisites were never met. Courts treat such actions differently from mere challenges to how an agency exercised discretion.

B. Contested case vs. non-contested recommendation under the Procurement Act

• Non‑contested recommendation (§ 67‑9232(3)(a)(ii)): The Director appoints a determinations officer to review documents and arguments and make a recommendation. There is no formal APA hearing. No judicial review is available from the Director’s final action taken on such a recommendation.
• Contested case (§ 67‑9232(3)(a)(iii)): The determinations officer conducts a formal evidentiary hearing under the APA. The resulting decision is subject to APA judicial review. Only this path opens the door to appellate review in district court.

C. Writ of mandate (mandamus)

• An extraordinary remedy compelling a government officer or body to perform a clear, non‑discretionary duty (e.g., signing a document when all statutory conditions are met).
• It cannot be used to:
  • Compel the exercise of discretion in a particular way;
  • Re‑weigh evidence or overturn discretionary agency determinations;
  • Serve as a substitute appeal when statutes foreclose judicial review.

D. Void-for-vagueness (civil context)

• A statute is void for vagueness if:
  • It fails to give people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits; or
  • It authorizes or encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
• Economic and civil regulations are given more leeway than criminal laws because:
  • Businesses can seek legal advice and clarification;
  • The penalties are generally less severe.
• An as‑applied challenge asks: was the statute sufficiently clear as applied to this plaintiff’s specific conduct?

VI. Impact and Broader Significance

A. Procurement law and bidder remedies in Idaho

The decision cements a strict rule for state procurement disputes in Idaho:

• No judicial review exists of procurement decisions issued after non‑contested recommendation proceedings unless the Legislature explicitly permits it.
• A disappointed bidder cannot:
  • Repackage a prohibited appeal as a declaratory judgment action;
  • Use mandamus to compel reversal of procurement awards or disqualification decisions.
• If the Director chooses not to invoke the contested case pathway, the Director’s decision—however controversial—is effectively final and unreviewable, absent a well-founded constitutional or ultra vires claim that does not seek to re‑litigate the merits.

This has important practical consequences for vendors:

• They must understand that the availability of judicial review turns entirely on the Director’s selection of process at the protest stage, not on how the vendor later labels its lawsuit.
• Vendors will likely:
  • Place greater emphasis on persuasion at the administrative level; and
  • Press the Director to choose the contested case route when they foresee the need for judicial review.

B. Clearer boundaries on the Declaratory Judgment Act in administrative law

Carelon provides a robust reaffirmation of two long‑standing but sometimes blurred doctrines:

• The Declaratory Judgment Act is not a general backdoor to judicial review when statutes deny appeals; it cannot be used to collaterally attack or overturn final agency actions.
• Courts must look to the substance of the relief sought:
  • If the plaintiff seeks to set aside a specific agency determination and obtain substitute relief (e.g., reinstatement of an award), that is appellate in nature, regardless of how the complaint is styled.
  • Only pure questions of statutory interpretation or constitutional validity, not tethered to vacating a particular agency decision, fit comfortably within the Declaratory Judgment Act when judicial review is otherwise barred.

This clarity should guide future litigants—and lower courts—in screening declaratory actions that are, in substance, forbidden appeals.

C. Constitutional boundaries: appellate vs. original jurisdiction

The decision also sharpens understanding of Idaho’s separation-of-powers framework:

• The Legislature has broad authority to regulate and limit appeals and judicial review of agency decisions, subject to due process constraints particularly where property rights are involved.
• Courts retain full original jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to statutes and, in appropriate cases, ultra vires claims of agency action.
• The mere fact that constitutional claims arise in a procurement context does not immunize them from adjudication; here, the Court fully addressed and rejected Carelon’s separation-of-powers and vagueness claims on the merits.

D. Substantive procurement policy: conflicts of interest and vendor consulting

On the substantive side, the Court’s reading of § 67‑9230(8) sends a clear compliance signal:

• Vendors who are paid to provide planning, design, or specification‑drafting services to the State—even at a “high level”—run a significant risk of later being disqualified from bidding on procurements that adopt those recommendations.
• The vendor’s argument that the underlying concepts are “industry standards” or derived from public sources does not defeat disqualification if:
  • The vendor was paid to present those standards to the State; and
  • The recommendations materially overlap with the later solicitation.

This will likely lead to:

• More careful structuring of consulting engagements with potential bidders (e.g., clearer disclaimers, firewalls, or excluding such vendors from subsequent competitions);
• More proactive assessment by vendors of whether their prior consulting work might “influence” future procurements and thereby trigger § 67‑9230(8).

E. Litigation strategy and constitutional claims

Carelon also illustrates how constitutional claims remain available even where statutory review is barred, but only on appropriate terms:

• Pure facial or as‑applied constitutional challenges to a statute (separation of powers, due process, vagueness) can proceed as original actions, as the Court did here.
• However, plaintiffs must maintain a clear boundary:
  • They cannot use a constitutional label simply to invite re‑assessment of facts and agency reasoning; that would convert the action into a forbidden appeal.
  • They must focus on how the statute, by its terms or necessary application, violates constitutional norms.

Carelon thus serves as both a caution and a roadmap for future constitutional litigation in the procurement context.

VII. Conclusion

Carelon Behavioral Health, Inc. v. State is a significant decision in Idaho administrative and procurement law. The Idaho Supreme Court firmly held that:

• When the Legislature limits judicial review of procurement decisions to contested cases, disappointed bidders cannot bypass that choice by recasting their grievances as declaratory or mandamus actions.
• The State Procurement Act’s selective provision for judicial review is a valid exercise of legislative power over appellate jurisdiction and does not violate separation of powers.
• Idaho Code § 67‑9230(8)’s disqualification rule is constitutionally sound and sufficiently clear, at least as applied to a vendor who previously provided paid consulting services that were used to craft procurement specifications.

At a broader level, the decision reinforces:

• The strict separation between original and appellate jurisdiction in Idaho’s constitutional design;
• The limited role of the Declaratory Judgment Act in the face of express statutory limits on judicial review;
• The legitimacy of legislative choices to channel, or even restrict, court review of agency decision‑making, absent due process concerns over property deprivations.

For agencies and vendors alike, Carelon underscores the importance of careful navigation of the Procurement Act’s protest mechanisms, a realistic understanding of when judicial review is available, and a heightened awareness of how prior consulting relationships can foreclose later participation in competitively bid contracts.