Cannon’s Rule: Rational Basis Governs Equal Protection Challenges to SVPA Jury Waiver Procedures; the Jury Decision Rests with the Defendant

Introduction

In People v. Cannon (Cal. Aug. 18, 2025), the California Supreme Court addressed a focused but consequential constitutional question arising in Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) proceedings: what standard of equal protection scrutiny applies when the SVPA’s jury demand and waiver procedures are challenged for differing from the procedures prescribed in other civil commitment schemes? The Court held that rational basis review governs such equal protection claims.

The case arises from the civil commitment of William Joseph Cannon under the SVPA after he completed a prison sentence for assault with intent to commit rape and dissuading a witness. At multiple pretrial hearings that Cannon did not attend, his counsel waived a jury; the trial court never personally advised Cannon of his jury right or secured his personal waiver. After a bench trial, the court found Cannon to be an SVP and committed him to an indeterminate term. On appeal, Cannon argued for the first time that the SVPA violates equal protection because—unlike commitment schemes for offenders with mental health disorders (OMHD; formerly MDO) and for persons found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI)—it does not require a judicial advisement of the jury right and a personal waiver.

Justice Corrigan authored the majority opinion (joined by Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Kruger, Groban, and Jenkins), holding that rational basis review applies to Cannon’s equal protection challenge. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s remand for development of a factual record on two issues: (1) whether the People can justify the SVPA’s procedures under equal protection principles, and (2) whether Cannon knowingly and intelligently chose to waive a jury. Justice Liu dissented (joined by Justice Evans), arguing that heightened scrutiny should apply because the absence of personal advisement and waiver appreciably burdens the fundamental jury trial right in civil commitment.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that rational basis review governs equal protection challenges to the SVPA’s jury demand/waiver procedures when compared with NGI and OMHD schemes that require personal judicial advisement and waiver.
The Court emphasized that the fundamental liberty interest in civil commitment requires the availability of a jury trial, but does not itself constitutionalize any particular advisement-and-waiver mechanism.
The Court clarified that under the SVPA, the decision whether to demand or waive a jury belongs to the alleged SVP—assuming competency—not to counsel; however, the statute allows counsel to communicate the client’s decision to the court.
Because Cannon did not raise the equal protection claim below, the Court conditionally affirmed his commitment and remanded to: (a) allow the People to present rational-basis justifications for the SVPA’s distinct procedures, and (b) determine whether Cannon knowingly and intelligently waived a jury, with the burden on the proponent of waiver to establish that the defendant was advised and agreed.

Factual and Procedural Background

Cannon pleaded no contest in 2010 and served a seven-year prison sentence. Before his release, the Mendocino County District Attorney filed an SVPA petition. Although early scheduling repeatedly contemplated a jury, Cannon’s then-counsel twice waived a jury at pretrial conferences that Cannon did not attend. The trial court never advised Cannon on the record of his jury right nor obtained his personal waiver. A four-day court trial resulted in Cannon’s civil commitment as an SVP.

On appeal, Cannon argued the SVPA’s omission of personal advisement and waiver violated equal protection because OMHD (Pen. Code, § 2960 et seq.) and NGI (Pen. Code, § 1026.5) proceedings require those safeguards. The Court of Appeal applied rational basis review (relying on People v. Barrett (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1081), rejected the People’s justifications on the record then available, but remanded to allow the People to build a fuller record and to litigate whether Cannon knowingly waived a jury. The California Supreme Court granted review on the narrow question of the applicable equal protection standard of review.

Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Influence

In re Gary W. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 296

Established that due process and equal protection require the availability of a jury trial in civil commitment when liberty is at stake, because involuntary commitment entails a fundamental liberty interest. The remedy in Gary W. was to require a jury trial “on demand” for the affected class.
In Cannon, Gary W. frames the foundational due process right: the availability of a jury trial is constitutionally required in civil commitments. But Gary W. did not constitutionalize specific advisement-and-waiver protocols.

People v. Barrett (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1081

Addressed an equal protection claim by a developmentally disabled person committed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6500. There, the statute provided no jury right; the Court implied a jury right on request (by equal protection parity with other commitments) but rejected a constitutional requirement for a judicial advisement and personal waiver, applying rational basis review.
Barrett characterized advisement/personal waiver as “ancillary” to the core jury right, and concluded that different commitment schemes may constitutionally employ different mechanisms, subject to rational basis review.
Cannon leans on Barrett to reaffirm that rational basis governs challenges to the absence of specific advisement/waiver procedures in civil commitment schemes.

People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113 and People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160

Both construed statutes (OMHD and NGI) that expressly require judicial advisement of the jury right and the defendant’s personal waiver. The Court held those statutes reserve the jury decision to the defendant, not counsel, and that failing to comply with the statutory advisement/waiver regime is treated as effectively denying the jury right—reversible absent an affirmative record of knowing, voluntary personal waiver or incapacity.
Cannon distinguishes Blackburn and Tran as statutory decisions; they do not stand for a constitutional entitlement to identical advisement/waiver procedures in all civil commitment schemes. Still, Cannon borrows their allocation-of-decision principle: under the SVPA, the defendant has final say on a jury.

People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172

Recognized that SVP commitments can be compared with other commitment schemes for equal protection purposes and directed remand to develop a factual record to justify differences. McKee’s “remand-first” template is followed in Cannon: the Court affirms remand to let the People justify the SVPA’s procedural differences and to develop facts on waiver.

People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834

Recalibrated equal protection analysis by diminishing the separate “similarly situated” threshold in cases where statutes facially distinguish between groups, emphasizing that the justification step is the critical inquiry under the appropriate tier of scrutiny.
Cannon applies Hardin’s framework and announces that rational basis is the controlling tier here.

Other authorities

Nationwide Biweekly Admin. v. Superior Court and Grafton Partners v. Superior Court: Civil jury trial is preserved as it existed at common law; the Legislature controls civil jury waiver mechanisms by statute.
Hubbart v. Superior Court, Kansas v. Hendricks, Conservatorship of John L., Ben C.: Civil commitments are special civil proceedings with some, but not all, criminal-like protections; due process is flexible and context-specific.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Fundamental interest and due process baseline: The Court reiterates that an involuntary commitment burdens a fundamental liberty interest; due process therefore requires the availability of a jury trial. The SVPA satisfies that baseline by providing a jury on request by either party (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6603).
No separate constitutional right to a particular advisement/waiver mechanism: The Court holds there is no independent constitutional right to judicial advisement and the defendant’s personal waiver across all commitment schemes. Those procedures are important, but “ancillary” to the core right to a jury and not themselves fundamental constitutional rights.
Standard of review: rational basis: Because the challenged difference concerns “ancillary” procedures rather than a direct denial of the jury right, and does not employ a suspect classification, equal protection is reviewed under rational basis. The challenger bears the burden to show there is no plausible legitimate purpose served by the different procedure.
Who decides on jury under the SVPA: Reading the SVPA’s text (e.g., § 6603), the Court holds that the alleged SVP—not counsel—controls the jury demand/waiver decision, subject to competency. Counsel may, however, convey the client’s choice to the court.
Record sufficiency on waiver: Even absent a judicial advisement requirement, “the record must support a judicial conclusion” that counsel explained the right and obtained the client’s decision. On remand, the trial court must determine by a preponderance whether Cannon knew of his right and chose to waive it.
Remand and conditional affirmance: Following the Court of Appeal’s approach (and the McKee model), the Supreme Court conditionally affirms Cannon’s commitment and remands to: (1) allow the People to develop rational-basis justifications for procedural differences; and (2) resolve whether Cannon personally chose to proceed without a jury.

3) The Dissents

Justice Liu (joined by Justice Evans): heightened scrutiny should apply

Justice Liu reframes the core issue under the “fundamental interest” strand of equal protection. The question is not whether personal advisement/waiver is an independent fundamental right (as a matter of due process), but whether denying those procedures to SVPs burdens the fundamental right to a jury in civil commitment.
Relying on Blackburn and Tran, the dissent argues that the absence of personal advisement and waiver is “tantamount to denial” of the jury right, save in limited circumstances—thus, there is a fundamental interest in these procedures.
Justice Liu would apply a heightened review akin to McKee’s remand framework: the state must show that selective denial is reasonably tied to unique features of SVP proceedings, not stigma. He cautions against both lax rational basis and near-fatal strict scrutiny and invites a more nuanced approach in civil commitment cases.

4) Likely Impact of Cannon

Statewide standard of review: Cannon settles that rational basis governs equal protection challenges to the SVPA’s jury advisement/waiver differences, aligning with Barrett and clarifying the analysis after Hardin.
Allocation of decision-making: The Court definitively states the jury decision belongs to the alleged SVP, not counsel. This is a substantive clarification for SVPA practice.
Practical record-building: Even without a statutory advisement requirement, trial judges should ensure the record reflects that counsel advised the client and that the client made the jury choice. Best practice—though not mandated—is to secure the defendant’s personal confirmation on the record.
Remand template: Trial courts on remand (in Cannon and similar cases) must: (a) take evidence on the advisement and the defendant’s decision; and (b) entertain the People’s rational-basis justifications for the SVPA’s distinct procedure. Commitments may be set aside and retried if the record does not establish a knowing and intelligent decision or if no rational basis exists.
Future litigation: Cannon’s rational basis holding raises the bar for equal protection challenges to SVPA procedures. The defense must negate plausible legislative reasons for the on-demand model, while the People can justify differences through legislative objectives (e.g., administrative efficiency, the presence and role of counsel, the People’s co-equal jury demand right, characteristics of SVP proceedings).
Effect on pending cases: The Court notes related cases are pending review. Cannon’s standard-of-review holding will likely control those matters; their outcomes will turn on record-specific showings.

Complex Concepts Simplified

SVPA vs. NGI vs. OMHD: All three are civil commitment schemes. Each provides a jury trial, but they differ in how the jury right is invoked or waived:
- SVPA (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.): Jury is provided “on demand” (by the person or the People). No built-in requirement for a judge to advise the defendant or secure a personal waiver before a bench trial.
- NGI (Pen. Code, § 1026.5) and OMHD (Pen. Code, § 2960 et seq.): Statutes require the court to advise the defendant of the jury right and obtain the defendant’s personal waiver to proceed without a jury.
Due process vs. equal protection: Due process secures baseline individual protections (e.g., the availability of a jury in civil commitment). Equal protection tests whether treating one group differently from another is adequately justified.
Levels of scrutiny:
- Strict scrutiny: For suspect classifications or significant burdens on fundamental rights; the state must show a compelling interest and narrow tailoring.
- Rational basis: Default standard; the challenger must show there is no plausible relation to a legitimate purpose.
Fundamental right vs. “ancillary” procedure: The fundamental right here is the availability of a jury. Whether a court must personally advise and obtain a personal waiver is a procedural mechanism; the Court labels that “ancillary” (important, but not itself constitutionally guaranteed for every commitment scheme).
Structural error vs. harmless error (Blackburn/Tran): When statutes require personal advisement/waiver, a court’s failure is treated as effectively denying the jury right and usually requires reversal unless the record affirmatively shows a valid personal decision or incapacity.
Hardin’s update on “similarly situated”: In facially classifying statutes, courts no longer dwell on a separate “similarly situated” threshold; the justification analysis under the applicable scrutiny does the real work.

Practice Pointers

For trial courts:
- Even though the SVPA does not require judicial advisement/personal waiver, confirm on the record that the defendant has discussed the jury right with counsel and personally decided to demand or waive a jury.
- Where possible, obtain the defendant’s on-the-record confirmation to minimize remand risk.
- When reviewing past waivers, make findings whether the defendant was aware of the right and chose to waive.
For defense counsel:
- Treat the jury decision as the client’s decision. Advise the client in clear terms, document the discussion, and be prepared to state on the record that the client chose the path taken.
- If a bench trial is contemplated, consider submitting a written, signed statement by the client to reduce waiver litigation.
For prosecutors:
- On remand or prospectively, be prepared to articulate rational-basis justifications for the SVPA’s on-demand model, such as legislative reliance on counsel’s role, the state’s co-equal right to request a jury, docket management, and features unique to SVP adjudications.
- When a bench trial proceeds without a personal waiver, ensure the record reflects that defense counsel advised the client and that the client decided to waive.

Unresolved Questions and Remand Scope

Equal protection merits on this record: The Supreme Court left the ultimate equal protection determination to the trial court under rational basis review. The People must offer plausible reasons; the defense may seek to rebut them.
Validity of Cannon’s waiver: The trial court must decide whether the People can prove that Cannon knew of his jury right and personally chose to waive, notwithstanding the absence of a judicial advisement and his repeated absence from pretrials.
Generalizability: While Cannon sets the standard of review, distinct factual records may yield different outcomes on waiver validity or rational basis.

Conclusion

People v. Cannon establishes two key propositions in California civil commitment law. First, equal protection challenges to the SVPA’s jury advisement/waiver procedures are reviewed under rational basis; the Constitution does not mandate that every commitment scheme adopt the NGI/OMHD model of personal judicial advisement and waiver. Second, even within the SVPA’s on-demand framework, the choice to demand or waive a jury belongs to the alleged SVP, not counsel—courts must be satisfied that the record shows counsel advised the client and that the client made the decision.

By adhering to Barrett’s rational-basis approach while updating the analysis under Hardin, the Court clarifies that different commitment schemes may constitutionally use different mechanisms to implement the jury right, provided those differences have a rational justification. At the same time, the Court underscores that the robustness of the jury right in civil commitment depends on ensuring the individual—whose liberty is at stake—actually makes the choice of factfinder. Trial courts, counsel, and prosecutors should now structure SVPA proceedings to create a reliable record of that choice. On remand, Cannon will test both the sufficiency of the People’s justifications and the integrity of the waiver record; statewide, Cannon will guide equal protection litigation and day-to-day SVPA practice for years to come.