Campuzano v. Bondi: Safe-Harbor Authentication of Electronic Conviction Records and Categorical “Crime of Child Abuse” for Texas Indecency with a Child by Contact

1. Introduction

In Campuzano v. Bondi, No. 24-60575 (5th Cir. Dec. 22, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed two important questions in immigration law:

1. Whether the authentication methods set out in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(C) for electronically transmitted criminal conviction records are mandatory and exclusive.
2. Whether a conviction under Texas Penal Code § 21.11(a)(1) (“Indecency with a Child – Sexual Contact”) is categorically a “crime of child abuse” under INA § 237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).

The petitioner, Antonio Campuzano, is a Mexican citizen and lawful permanent resident (LPR) convicted in Texas state court of indecency with a child by sexual contact. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged him as removable for having committed a “crime of child abuse.” After the immigration judge (IJ) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) ordered him removed and denied cancellation of removal, Campuzano sought review in the Fifth Circuit.

The court’s opinion, authored by Judge Richman and joined by Judges Smith and Dennis, makes two key doctrinal contributions:

• It holds, as a matter of first impression in the Fifth Circuit, that § 1229a(c)(3)(C) provides a safe harbor for authentication of electronic conviction records, but does not supply the only permissible methods of authentication.
• It confirms that Texas Penal Code § 21.11(a)(1), indecency with a child by sexual contact, is categorically a “crime of child abuse” under the INA’s deportability provision.

Both holdings will have significant consequences for the evidentiary rules in removal proceedings and for noncitizens with Texas child indecency convictions.

2. Summary of the Opinion

2.1 Background and Procedural History

• Campuzano, a Mexican national and LPR, pleaded guilty in Texas to “Indecency with a Child – Sexual Contact” under Texas Penal Code § 21.11, a second-degree felony.
• In December 2023, DHS issued a Notice to Appear (NTA), charging him as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) for having been convicted of a “crime of child abuse.”
• To prove the conviction, DHS submitted:
  • Form I‑213 (Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien);
  • a police report;
  • the indictment; and
  • an order of deferred adjudication describing the offense as “Indecency With Child Sexual Contact” and classifying it as a second-degree felony.
• In his bond application, Campuzano himself wrote that he was found “guilty” of “Indecency with a Child Sexual Contact.” DHS submitted this application as additional evidence.
• Before the IJ, Campuzano:
  • Admitted his alienage (Mexican citizen and LPR);
  • Refused to admit the alleged conviction; and
  • Denied removability, moving to terminate proceedings on the ground that the alleged conviction was not a “crime of child abuse.”
• He also objected to the conviction records, arguing they were not properly authenticated under:
  • the DOJ Immigration Court Practice Manual, and
  • 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(C), which sets conditions for admitting electronically transmitted conviction records.
• The IJ overruled the objections, denied the motion to terminate, found him removable, and later denied his application for cancellation of removal, ordering removal to Mexico.
• The BIA dismissed his appeal, holding:
  • § 1229a(c)(3)(C)’s authentication methods are not “mandatory or exclusive”; and
  • Texas Penal Code § 21.11(a)(1) is categorically a “crime of child abuse.”
  It also affirmed the denial of cancellation of removal.

2.2 Holdings of the Fifth Circuit

The Fifth Circuit denied the petition for review, holding:

1. Authentication of Conviction Records. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(C) does not impose mandatory or exclusive authentication requirements for electronically transmitted conviction records. Instead, it creates a safe harbor: records complying with that subsection must be admitted, but records that do not comply may still be admitted if they are otherwise reliable and their use is “fundamentally fair.” The BIA therefore did not err in admitting the conviction documentation.
2. Categorical “Crime of Child Abuse.” Texas Penal Code § 21.11(a)(1), which criminalizes “sexual contact” with a child younger than 17 with the intent to arouse or gratify sexual desire, categorically matches the generic federal definition of a “crime of child abuse” as adopted by the BIA and previously approved by the Fifth Circuit. The statute necessarily involves sexual maltreatment of a child and satisfies the harm element of the child-abuse definition. Accordingly, Campuzano was properly found removable.

3. Analysis of the Opinion

3.1 Authentication of Electronic Conviction Records Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(C)

3.1.1 Statutory Framework

The core evidentiary question concerned 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(C), which provides that in removal proceedings:

“any record of conviction or abstract that has been submitted by electronic means to the Service from a State or court shall be admissible as evidence to prove a criminal conviction if it is—
(i) certified by a State official associated with the State’s repository of criminal justice records … or by a court official …; and
(ii) certified in writing by a Service official as having been received electronically from the State's record repository or the court's record repository.”

Campuzano’s argument was straightforward: because DHS had electronically submitted conviction records without:

• a state or court official’s certification; and
• a DHS official’s written certification of electronic receipt,

they did not satisfy § 1229a(c)(3)(C) and therefore should have been excluded.

The government conceded noncompliance with the statute’s literal terms but argued that § 1229a(c)(3)(C) merely guarantees admissibility when its requirements are met; it does not prohibit admission of other forms of proof that are reliable and fair.

3.1.2 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Fifth Circuit had not previously interpreted § 1229a(c)(3)(C)’s scope. It therefore looked to other circuits and its own general evidence-admissibility jurisprudence in removal proceedings.

(a) Ninth Circuit: Sinotes-Cruz v. Gonzales

Sinotes-Cruz v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2006).

The Ninth Circuit characterized § 1229a(c)(3)(C) as a safe harbor rule:

[Section] 1229a(c)(3)(C) “operates as a safe-harbor. It only tells us the conditions under which an electronically transmitted document must be admitted. That is, it establishes the maximum standard for authentication … but it does not establish a minimum standard.”

In other words, if DHS meets the statutory certification requirements, the IJ must admit the evidence; if DHS does not, the IJ still has discretion to admit the evidence under general reliability and fairness principles.

(b) Eighth Circuit: Fraser v. Lynch

Fraser v. Lynch, 795 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2015).

The Eighth Circuit likewise held that noncompliance with § 1229a(c)(3)(C) “by itself … does not render the evidence per se inadmissible.” The absence of statutory certification affects the weight of the evidence, not its categorical admissibility.

(c) Third Circuit: Township of Tinicum v. Department of Transportation

Township of Tinicum v. Dep’t of Transp., 582 F.3d 482 (3d Cir. 2009).

The Fifth Circuit also drew on general interpretive principles from a non-immigration case. Township of Tinicum distinguished between:

• “if” — describes a sufficient condition; and
• “only if” — describes a necessary condition.

Because § 1229a(c)(3)(C) says electronically submitted records “shall be admissible … if” they meet the listed certifications (rather than “only if”), the Fifth Circuit inferred Congress intended to describe a sufficient method of authentication, not the exclusive one.

(d) Fifth Circuit: Bustos-Torres v. INS

Bustos-Torres v. INS, 898 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1990).

Well before § 1229a(c)(3)(C) was enacted, the Fifth Circuit set a broad, flexible standard for evidence admissibility in deportation proceedings:

“The test for admissibility of evidence in a deportation proceeding is whether the evidence is probative and whether its use is fundamentally fair so as not to deprive the alien of due process of law.”

This “probative and fundamentally fair” standard undergirds the court’s conclusion that immigration courts may admit conviction records outside the strict § 1229a(c)(3)(C) framework as long as they are reliable and do not offend due process.

3.1.3 The Fifth Circuit’s Legal Reasoning

Synthesizing these sources, the Fifth Circuit reasoned as follows:

1. The statutory text uses “if,” not “only if.” Under ordinary usage and the interpretive logic drawn from Township of Tinicum, “if” states a sufficient condition, not a necessary one. Thus, § 1229a(c)(3)(C):
   • guarantees admissibility when its terms are satisfied, but
   • does not state that documents are inadmissible when those terms are not satisfied.
2. The Ninth and Eighth Circuits have already adopted this “safe harbor” understanding, and the Fifth Circuit saw no textual or structural reason to disagree. The court expressly “join[ed] our sister circuits” in holding that the methods in § 1229a(c)(3)(C) are not “mandatory or exclusive.”
3. The court harmonized § 1229a(c)(3)(C) with its earlier decision in Bustos-Torres by treating the statute as a specific guarantee (i.e., a particular way of authenticating that automatically satisfies the “probative and fair” standard), not as a universal evidentiary code displacing all other acceptable proof.

On that basis, the court held that the BIA did not err in admitting the conviction documents against Campuzano, even though DHS had not strictly complied with § 1229a(c)(3)(C).

3.1.4 Practical and Doctrinal Impact

(a) For DHS and immigration courts

• DHS is not required to obtain the specific dual certifications described in § 1229a(c)(3)(C) every time it submits an electronically transmitted record of conviction.
• If DHS does comply with § 1229a(c)(3)(C), the IJ must admit the record; the statute operates as a “maximum standard” for secure admission.
• If DHS does not comply, IJs may still admit the evidence under general standards of reliability and due process, using their discretion to evaluate:
  • the document’s source,
  • internal consistency, and
  • corroborating evidence, including admissions by the noncitizen.

(b) For noncitizen respondents and defense counsel

• Objections based solely on the absence of § 1229a(c)(3)(C) certifications will generally not succeed in excluding conviction records in the Fifth Circuit.
• Noncitizens must instead focus on:
  • challenging the accuracy or authenticity of the record (e.g., misidentification, altered documents);
  • showing unreliability (e.g., discrepancy between different official records); and
  • demonstrating prejudice or fundamental unfairness (e.g., inability to contest the document’s contents due to language or access issues).
• The DOJ Immigration Court Practice Manual’s procedural requirements (for certification, formatting, etc.) remain relevant, but violation of the Manual alone will not compel exclusion if the document is otherwise probative and reliable.

(c) Doctrinal framing

The decision reinforces a longstanding theme in immigration jurisprudence: removal proceedings are civil, not criminal, and so the strict rules of evidence applicable in criminal trials do not apply. The governing standard remains functional—probative value plus fundamental fairness—rather than rigid adherence to technical evidentiary codes.

3.2 Texas Indecency with a Child by Contact as a Categorical “Crime of Child Abuse”

3.2.1 The Statutory and Interpretive Framework

The deportability ground at issue is INA § 237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), which renders deportable:

“Any alien who at any time after admission is convicted of … a crime of child abuse ….”

Congress did not define “crime of child abuse” in the INA, and the legislative history does not provide a precise meaning. The term has therefore been developed through BIA interpretation and circuit precedent.

(a) BIA’s definition in Velazquez-Herrera

Matter of Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 503 (BIA 2008).

In Velazquez-Herrera, the BIA interpreted “crime of child abuse” broadly to include:

“any offense involving an intentional, knowing, reckless, or criminally negligent act or omission that constitutes maltreatment of a child or that impairs a child’s physical or mental well-being, including sexual abuse or exploitation.”

Key components of this definition, as summarized in Garcia v. Barr, are:

1. The victim is a person under 18 years old;
2. The conduct is done with at least criminal negligence (or higher mens rea); and
3. The conduct constitutes maltreatment or impairs the child’s well-being, including sexual abuse or exploitation.

Garcia v. Barr, 969 F.3d 129, 135 (5th Cir. 2020).

(b) Fifth Circuit acceptance in Sandoval Argueta v. Bondi

Sandoval Argueta v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 265 (5th Cir. 2025).

The panel in Campuzano notes that the Fifth Circuit has already embraced the BIA’s broad interpretation, holding that, “without invoking Chevron deference, the best reading of § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) confirms the BIA’s broad interpretation of ‘crime of child abuse.’” This framing is important: the BIA’s definition is not merely a permissible agency construction, but one the court finds to be the best reading of the statutory text.

(c) The categorical approach

Monsonyem v. Garland, 36 F.4th 639 (5th Cir. 2022); Garcia v. Barr, 969 F.3d 129 (5th Cir. 2020); Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013).

To determine whether a state conviction qualifies as a “crime of child abuse,” the court applies the categorical approach:

• The focus is on the elements of the statute of conviction, not the actual facts of the underlying conduct.
• The court asks whether the least serious conduct criminalized by the state law “categorically fits” within the generic federal definition.
• The conviction is presumed to rest on the minimum conduct necessary for a conviction under state law.

Where the statute sets out multiple alternative crimes (i.e., is “divisible”), courts may use the modified categorical approach to determine which specific offense formed the basis of conviction, by looking to a limited set of judicial records (charging documents, plea colloquies, judgments, etc.).

3.2.2 The Texas Statute: Texas Penal Code § 21.11

Texas Penal Code § 21.11(a) defines “indecency with a child” as follows:

“(a) A person commits an offense if, with a child younger than 17 years of age … the person:
(1) engages in sexual contact with the child or causes the child to engage in sexual contact; or
(2) with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person:
(A) exposes the person’s anus or any part of the person’s genitals, knowing the child is present; or
(B) causes the child to expose the child’s anus or any part of the child’s genitals.”

Subsection (d) then specifies:

“An offense under Subsection (a)(1) is a felony of the second degree and an offense under Subsection (a)(2) is a felony of the third degree.”

The Fifth Circuit treated subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) as creating two distinct crimes—indecency by sexual contact and indecency by exposure—thus recognizing the statute’s divisibility.

(a) Applying the modified categorical approach

The court examined the order of deferred adjudication, which:

• identified the offense as “Indecency With Child Sexual Contact,” and
• described the degree as “2nd Degree Felony.”

Because § 21.11(a)(1) is the only subsection that is a second-degree felony and involves “sexual contact,” the court concluded that Campuzano was convicted under § 21.11(a)(1).

(b) Definition of “sexual contact”

Texas Penal Code § 21.11(c) defines “sexual contact” as:

“any touching by a person, including touching through clothing, of the anus, breast, or any part of the genitals of a child; or any touching of any part of the body of a child, including touching through clothing, with the anus, breast, or any part of the genitals of a person, committed with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.”

Thus, the key elements of § 21.11(a)(1) are:

1. A victim who is a child younger than 17 (strict age element);
2. “Sexual contact” as defined above (touching, including through clothing, of specified body parts); and
3. Intent to arouse or gratify sexual desire (specific intent requirement).

3.2.3 Fitting § 21.11(a)(1) within the Generic “Crime of Child Abuse” Definition

The court then assessed whether every violation of § 21.11(a)(1) necessarily meets the three elements of the BIA’s generic child-abuse definition.

1. Victim’s age.
   The BIA’s generic definition requires a victim under 18. Section 21.11(a)(1) applies to a victim “younger than 17.”
   • Because all persons younger than 17 are, by definition, under 18, the Texas statute is narrower on age but not broader.
   • Therefore, every § 21.11(a)(1) conviction involves a victim satisfying the federal age requirement.
2. Mental state (mens rea).
   The generic definition covers acts committed intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence. Section 21.11(c) requires intent “to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.”
   • This is a specific intent standard, which is more demanding than mere criminal negligence.
   • Thus, § 21.11(a)(1) squarely satisfies the mens rea element of the child-abuse definition.
3. Maltreatment or impairment of the child’s well-being.
   The central dispute was whether the “sexual contact” criminalized by § 21.11(a)(1) “constitutes maltreatment of a child” or “impairs a child’s physical or mental well-being.”
   • Section 21.11(c) limits “sexual contact” to touching of the anus, breast, or genitals (or touching any part of the child’s body with those body parts), plus the sexual intent requirement.
   • The Fifth Circuit, relying on its own precedent, reaffirmed that this kind of intentional sexual touching necessarily constitutes sexual abuse and impairs a child’s well-being.

Garcia v. Barr, 969 F.3d 129, 136 (5th Cir. 2020) (“sexual contact … necessarily involve[s] acts that impair a child's physical or mental well-being”).

Thus, § 21.11(a)(1) categorically fits within the BIA’s definition of “crime of child abuse,” and any conviction under that subsection renders a noncitizen deportable under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).

3.2.4 Responding to the “No Harm” / “Mere Offensive Touching” Argument

Campuzano’s principal challenge was that § 21.11(a)(1) sweeps too broadly because:

• It encompasses “mere offensive touching,” not necessarily harmful conduct; and
• The BIA, in Matter of Silva-Trevino, had held § 21.11(a)(1) was not a “crime involving moral turpitude” (CIMT), suggesting that the offense can include less egregious conduct.

Matter of Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 826 (BIA 2016).

Additionally, the Fifth Circuit in Diaz Esparza v. Garland had emphasized that “offensive touching” does not constitute the level of harm necessary for certain moral turpitude analyses.

Diaz Esparza v. Garland, 23 F.4th 563 (5th Cir. 2022).

The court in Campuzano rejected this analogy for several reasons:

1. Different removal grounds have different standards.
   The fact that an offense is not a CIMT does not mean it cannot be a “crime of child abuse.” These are separate statutory categories with different purposes and thresholds.
2. The Texas statute is narrower than generic “offensive touching.”
   Section 21.11(a)(1) is not a general offensive touching statute. It:
   • Targets only deliberate sexual contact with a child,
   • Requires touching of highly intimate body parts or touching by such body parts, and
   • Demands a clear sexual intent to arouse or gratify.
   This is categorically more serious than an “offensive touching” that might, for example, involve non-sexual unwanted contact.
3. Harm is inherent in sexualized touching of a child.
   The Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its earlier conclusion in Garcia that intentional sexual contact with a child “necessarily involve[s] acts that impair a child’s physical or mental well-being.” Harm is built into the offense; it need not be separately pled or proved as a distinct element.

Accordingly, the court found Campuzano’s reliance on CIMT case law misplaced and held that § 21.11(a)(1) satisfies the harm element of “crime of child abuse.”

3.2.5 Relationship to Other Removal Grounds and Future Cases

Although the opinion focuses on the “crime of child abuse” ground, its reasoning has broader implications:

• Many child sex offenses that may or may not be CIMTs will still qualify as “crimes of child abuse” if they involve sexual touching of minors with the requisite mens rea.
• The Fifth Circuit’s endorsement of a broad, harm-presuming understanding of sexual contact means:
  • States with similar statutes—criminalizing sexual touching of minors’ intimate parts with sexual intent—are likely to be treated as “crimes of child abuse” under the INA.
  • Even where federal courts have been cautious in labeling certain offenses as CIMTs, those same offenses may carry mandatory removal consequences under the child-abuse ground.

For Texas specifically, Campuzano effectively settles that any conviction under § 21.11(a)(1) is automatically deportable as a “crime of child abuse” in the Fifth Circuit, regardless of the particular facts.

4. Clarifying Complex Legal Concepts

4.1 “Crime of Child Abuse” vs. “Crime Involving Moral Turpitude”

• Crime of child abuse (INA § 237(a)(2)(E)(i)) focuses on:
  • the victim’s age (under 18),
  • the defendant’s mental state (at least criminal negligence), and
  • whether the conduct constitutes maltreatment or impairs the child’s physical or mental well-being (including sexual abuse or exploitation).
• Crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) is a different concept, developed largely in case law, and asks whether the offense involves:
  • inherently base, vile, or depraved conduct,
  • contrary to accepted moral standards,
  • typically with a heightened mental state such as intent or recklessness toward a serious harm.

An offense can be:

• a CIMT but not a crime of child abuse (e.g., fraud against adults);
• a crime of child abuse but not a CIMT; or
• both, depending on the statute and case law.

4.2 The Categorical and Modified Categorical Approaches

• Categorical approach:
  • Looks only at the legal elements of the state crime, not the actual facts or evidence.
  • Asks whether the least serious conduct that can lead to conviction fits within the federal definition.
  • If any realistic scenario covered by the statute would not meet the federal definition, the statute is overbroad and does not categorically match.
• Modified categorical approach:
  • Used only when the statute lists multiple, alternative offenses (is “divisible”).
  • Allows courts to consult a narrow set of official documents (indictment, plea agreements, judgment, plea colloquy) to identify which alternative the defendant was convicted of.
  • Once the correct alternative is identified, the court returns to the usual categorical analysis on that specific offense.

4.3 Safe-Harbor Authentication Under § 1229a(c)(3)(C)

• Section 1229a(c)(3)(C) describes a guaranteed method of authenticating electronically transmitted conviction records: dual certification from a state/court official and a DHS official.
• If this method is used, the document “shall be admissible.”
• But the Fifth Circuit holds that this is a sufficient condition, not a necessary one:
  • Other forms of authentication can also suffice if they show the document is what it purports to be.
  • The overarching standard for admissibility remains whether the evidence is probative (tends to prove a fact in issue) and fundamentally fair (does not violate due process).

4.4 Deferred Adjudication and “Conviction” in Immigration Law

The opinion notes that the record included an “order of deferred adjudication” listing “Indecency With Child Sexual Contact” as the offense. In immigration law:

• The INA defines “conviction” broadly, to include certain deferred adjudications where:
  • a judge or jury has found the noncitizen guilty or the person has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt; and
  • the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on liberty.
• Thus, even if a state treats deferred adjudication as non-final or non-conviction for some local purposes, it can still count as a “conviction” for INA purposes if it meets this federal definition.

While the Fifth Circuit did not dwell on the definitional aspect here, the use of the deferred adjudication order as a conviction record is consistent with this broader federal concept.

5. Broader Impact and Future Implications

5.1 Evidentiary Practice in Removal Proceedings

Campuzano confirms that immigration courts in the Fifth Circuit retain broad discretion to admit conviction records, especially electronic ones, without strict adherence to formal certification protocols.

• DHS is encouraged to use § 1229a(c)(3)(C) when possible, because compliance guarantees admissibility and reduces litigation.
• However, DHS can also rely on:
  • scanned or emailed copies of judgments and plea agreements;
  • Form I‑213s referencing state databases;
  • noncitizen admissions in bond applications or other filings;
  • state printouts or uncertified court records;
  so long as the overall record is sufficiently reliable and its use is not fundamentally unfair.
• Noncitizens will need to marshal **substantive challenges** to reliability and fairness, rather than purely formal certification objections, to successfully contest these records.

5.2 Child Sexual Offenses and Deportability

On the substantive side, Campuzano solidifies the deportability consequences of certain Texas sex offenses and, by extension, similar statutes in other states.

• Any conviction under Texas Penal Code § 21.11(a)(1) will:
  • render an admitted noncitizen deportable as having committed a “crime of child abuse”;
  • likely foreclose certain forms of discretionary relief, depending on the individual statutory scheme; and
  • be treated categorically, without regard to mitigating factual circumstances (e.g., minimal contact, close-in-age relationships, etc.), unless those circumstances show the conduct was outside the statute’s elements.
• Defense attorneys representing noncitizens in Texas must assume that a plea to § 21.11(a)(1) will have grave immigration consequences, including likely loss of LPR status and removal.
• Immigration practitioners must be prepared to:
  • identify alternative plea options with less severe immigration outcomes; and
  • argue, in appropriate cases, that other state statutes are materially different (e.g., no required sexual intent, broader age ranges, or purely non-sexual “annoyance” conduct).

5.3 The Post-Chevron Landscape and Agency Interpretations

The opinion’s reliance on Sandoval Argueta—which endorses the BIA’s definition of “crime of child abuse” as the best reading of the statute “without invoking Chevron deference”—underscores a shift in how courts treat agency interpretations:

• Even if Chevron deference is constrained or unavailable, courts may independently concur with the BIA’s construction and treat it as authoritative.
• For practitioners, this means that the BIA’s broad definition of “crime of child abuse” is now entrenched in the Fifth Circuit as a matter of statutory interpretation, not merely as a deferential acceptance of agency reasoning.

5.4 Unaddressed Issues: Cancellation of Removal

Although Campuzano challenged the denial of cancellation of removal before the BIA, the Fifth Circuit’s opinion focuses only on:

• the admissibility of conviction records; and
• the child-abuse deportability finding.

The court does not discuss the cancellation denial, likely because either:

• the claim was not meaningfully raised or preserved on petition for review; or
• the issues involved factual or discretionary determinations over which the court lacks jurisdiction except to the limited extent authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and Wilkinson v. Garland.

Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024).

The omission signals that the central precedential value of the case lies in its evidentiary and categorical-approach holdings, not in any development about the reviewability or standards governing cancellation of removal.

6. Conclusion and Key Takeaways

6.1 Doctrinal Significance

Campuzano v. Bondi delivers two important clarifications in immigration law within the Fifth Circuit:

1. Safe-Harbor Authentication of Electronic Conviction Records.
   8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(C) is not a rigid, exclusive evidentiary code. Instead, it offers a safe harbor: when DHS meets its dual certification requirements, electronically transmitted conviction records must be admitted; when DHS does not, IJs may still admit records that are probative and whose use is fundamentally fair. This aligns the Fifth Circuit with the Eighth and Ninth Circuits and preserves flexible, due process–based evidentiary standards.
2. Categorical “Crime of Child Abuse” for Texas Indecency with a Child by Contact.
   Texas Penal Code § 21.11(a)(1), indecency with a child by sexual contact, categorically constitutes a “crime of child abuse” under INA § 237(a)(2)(E)(i). The statute’s elements—victim under 17, sexual touching of intimate areas, and intent to arouse or gratify sexual desire—necessarily involve sexual maltreatment and impairment of a child’s well-being, satisfying the generic federal definition as endorsed in Velazquez-Herrera, Garcia, and Sandoval Argueta.

6.2 Practical Takeaways for Practitioners

• Evidentiary objections in removal proceedings must go beyond formal certification defects and focus on substantive reliability and fairness.
• Texas § 21.11(a)(1) convictions will virtually always trigger deportability as “crimes of child abuse,” regardless of the specific facts of the case, in the Fifth Circuit.
• Defense counsel must approach plea negotiations in such cases with the understanding that avoiding aggravated felony or CIMT labels may still leave the client exposed to removal under the child-abuse ground.
• Immigration counsel must recognize that challenges based on CIMT case law (e.g., “offensive touching” arguments) will generally not undermine child-abuse categorizations where the statute involves intentional sexual contact with children.

In sum, Campuzano v. Bondi both strengthens the government’s evidentiary toolkit in removal proceedings and significantly heightens the immigration risks associated with Texas indecency-with-a-child-by-contact convictions, providing a clear and durable precedent in the Fifth Circuit on these two fronts.