California Supreme Court Upholds Section 31: Prohibition of Race and Gender Preferences in Public Contracting

California Supreme Court Upholds Section 31: Prohibition of Race and Gender Preferences in Public Contracting

Introduction

In the landmark case of Coral Construction, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco and Schram Construction, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, the Supreme Court of California addressed the constitutionality of section 31 of the California Constitution, also known as Proposition 209. This provision prohibits state and local government entities from discriminating or granting preferential treatment based on race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in public employment, education, and contracting.

The plaintiffs, Coral Construction and Schram Construction, challenged the City of San Francisco's Minority/Women/Local Business Utilization Ordinance, which provided preferential treatment to minority-owned and women-owned business enterprises (MBEs and WBEs) in public contracting. They argued that this ordinance violated section 31 by granting preferential treatment based on race and gender.

The core issues revolve around the interpretation of section 31, the applicability of the political structure doctrine—a judicial interpretation of the federal equal protection clause—and whether the ordinance was a necessary remedial action to counteract past and ongoing discrimination in public contracting.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of California affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the Court of Appeal. The Court held that section 31 of the California Constitution does not violate the political structure doctrine. Furthermore, the Court determined that the federal funding exception does not apply to exempt the ordinance from section 31. However, the Court remanded the case for further adjudication regarding the City's argument that the federal equal protection clause necessitated the ordinance as a remedial measure for intentional discrimination.

Ultimately, the Court concluded that the City's ordinance, which provided racial and gender-based preferences in public contracting, was unconstitutional under section 31. The judgment emphasizes that while remedial race-conscious measures may be permissible under federal law, California's section 31 precludes such preferences unless they are mandated by federal requirements.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment extensively discusses several key precedents that shape the Court's understanding of equal protection and affirmative action:

  • HI-VOLTAGE WIRE WORKS, INC. v. CITY OF SAN JOSE (2000): This case previously addressed the validity of similar ordinances and established that section 31 prohibits race- and gender-conscious preferences unless required by federal law.
  • HUNTER v. ERICKSON (1969): Introduced the political structure doctrine, addressing situations where state amendments place unique burdens on minority groups' ability to pass beneficial legislation.
  • WASHINGTON v. SEATTLE SCHOOL DIST. NO. 1 (1982): Further developed the political structure doctrine by focusing on how state laws can impede minority groups' political processes.
  • RICHMOND v. J. A. CROSON CO. (1989): The U.S. Supreme Court held that race-based set-asides in public contracting violated the Equal Protection Clause unless they were narrowly tailored to address intentional discrimination.
  • CRAWFORD v. LOS ANGELES BOARD OF EDUCATION (1982), GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER (2003), and Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 (2007): These cases further refined the standards for evaluating race-conscious affirmative action measures.

These precedents collectively inform the Court's approach to evaluating the constitutionality of race- and gender-based preferences in public contracting under both state and federal constitutional provisions.

Legal Reasoning

The Court's legal reasoning is anchored in a detailed interpretation of section 31 and its interaction with federal equal protection principles. The Court distinguishes between preferences that are merely permitted by the federal Constitution and those that are required as remedial measures against intentional discrimination.

Key elements of the Court's reasoning include:

  • Section 31 Interpretation: The Court reaffirmed that section 31 uses the terms "discrimination" and "preferential treatment" in their ordinary meanings, thereby broadly prohibiting race- and gender-conscious preferences unless mandated by federal law.
  • Political Structure Doctrine: The Court examined whether section 31 violated this doctrine, concluding that it does not. The political structure doctrine seeks to prevent laws that place unique burdens on minority groups to achieve legislative benefits. However, section 31's blanket prohibition does not single out race and gender in a manner that imposes structurally unique burdens as interpreted in Hunter and Seattle.
  • Federal Funding Exception: The City argued that the ordinance was necessary to maintain eligibility for federal funds under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court found this argument unpersuasive, noting that federal regulations do not explicitly require race-based preferences and that the ordinance went beyond what federal law mandates.
  • Federal Compulsion Argument: The City contended that federal equal protection imperatives required the ordinance as a remedial measure for past discrimination. The Court remanded this issue for further factual determination, recognizing that if the City can demonstrate intentional discrimination and the necessity of race-conscious remedies, it may affect the ordinance's validity.

The Court emphasized the supremacy of the California Constitution over state laws, asserting that section 31 must be upheld unless federal law explicitly mandates a deviation.

Impact

This judgment has significant implications for public contracting and affirmative action within California:

  • Affirmation of Section 31: The decision solidifies the prohibitive stance on race- and gender-based preferences in public contracting, reinforcing the legality of Proposition 209.
  • Limitations on Local Ordinances: Municipalities within California must navigate affirmative action policies without resorting to race- or gender-conscious measures unless federally mandated.
  • Federal vs. State Law: The ruling underscores the primacy of state constitutional provisions, requiring public entities to comply with both state and federal standards without conflating the two unless explicitly required by federal law.
  • Future Litigation: The remand for the federal compulsion argument suggests that cases involving remedial affirmative action measures may still reach the Supreme Court of California for comprehensive adjudication, potentially refining the boundaries of permissible state interventions.

Additionally, the ruling affects the broader landscape of affirmative action by limiting the tools available to address historical and ongoing discrimination in the public sector within California.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Section 31 of the California Constitution

Section 31, also known as Proposition 209, is a constitutional amendment that prohibits state and local governments in California from discriminating or providing preferential treatment based on race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in areas such as public employment, education, and contracting.

Political Structure Doctrine

The political structure doctrine is a legal principle derived from cases like HUNTER v. ERICKSON and WASHINGTON v. SEATTLE SCHOOL DIST. NO. 1. It prevents laws that place unique or additional burdens on minority groups to achieve legislative benefits, ensuring that all groups have equal opportunity to influence and pass beneficial laws without facing structural disadvantages.

Federal Funding Exception

This exception allows state or local laws that might otherwise violate section 31 if they are necessary to maintain federal funding. In other words, if a state or local entity must follow certain discriminatory practices to receive federal grants or funds, those practices may be exempt from the prohibitions of section 31. However, the Court found that in this case, the City's ordinance did not meet the criteria for this exception.

Strict Scrutiny

Strict scrutiny is the highest standard of judicial review applied by courts to government actions that classify individuals based on race or other suspect classifications. To pass strict scrutiny, the government must demonstrate that the classification serves a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of California's decision in Coral Construction, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco and Schram Construction, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco reaffirms the stringent prohibitions against race- and gender-based preferences in public contracting under section 31. While the Court upheld the constitutionality of section 31 against the political structure doctrine, it acknowledged the necessity of further review regarding the City's federal compulsion argument. This nuanced judgment preserves the overall integrity of anti-discrimination principles in California's public sector while still leaving room for potential exceptions in cases of proven, intentional discrimination mandate by federal law.

Moving forward, public entities in California must carefully design their contracting policies to comply with section 31, ensuring that any affirmative action measures are race-neutral unless explicitly required by federal mandates. This decision reinforces the balance between combating discrimination and maintaining equal opportunities within the framework of both state and federal constitutional law.

Case Details

Year: 2010
Court: Supreme Court of California.

Judge(s)

Kathryn Mickle WerdegarCarol A. CorriganCarlos R. Moreno

Attorney(S)

Dennis J. Herrera, City Attorney, Wayne K. Snodgrass, Danny Chou, Sherri Sokeland Kaiser and James M. Emery, Deputy City Attorneys; Mosconc, Emblidge Quadra, G. Scott Emblidge, Rachel J. Sater, Robert D. Sanford, Michael P. Brown; Meyers, Nave, Riback, Silver Wilson, Mara E. Rosales, Joseph M. Quinn and K. Scott Dickey for Defendants and Appellants. Lewis, Feinberg, Lee, Renaker Jackson, Bill Lann Lee, Vincent Cheng and Lindsay Nako for Council of Asian American Business Associations, Association of Asian American Attorney and CPA Firms, Chinese for Affirmative Action, Asian American Justice Center, Asian Law Caucus and Asian American Bar Association of the Greater Bay Area as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. Nancy Ramirez, Nicholas Espiritu; Sonnenschein Nath Rosenthal, Christopher E. Prince, Shirin Soleman, Demian L. Pay and Manuel Alvarez, Jr., for Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. Bingham McCutchen, Michael Isaku Begert, Karen Lu, Rianne E. Nolan, Renee M. DuPree, Nancy M. Wang, Elizabeth M. Hall; Sujal J. Shah; Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Oren Sellstrom for Coalition for Economic Equity as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. Frank C. Newman International Human Rights Clinic and Constance de la Vega as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. Pacific Legal Foundation, John H. Findley, Sharon L. Browne, Alan W. Foutz and Paul J. Beard II for Plaintiffs and Respondents. Gordon M. Fauth, Jr., and Michael J. Meyer for Asian American Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents. Law Office of Anthony T. Caso and Anthony T. Caso for American Civil Rights Institute as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents.

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