California § 245(a)(2) Assault Not a “Crime of Violence”: A Comprehensive Commentary on United States v. Sjodin (10th Cir. 2025)

Introduction

In United States v. Sjodin, No. 23-4069 (10th Cir. 2025), the Tenth Circuit confronted two unsettled questions that routinely arise in federal firearms prosecutions:

1. What evidentiary showing is required when a defendant asserts a mistaken-but-genuine belief that his prior conviction has been expunged, set aside, pardoned, or that his civil rights have been restored under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), after Rehaif?
2. Does a conviction for assault with a firearm under California Penal Code § 245(a)(2) categorically qualify as a “crime of violence” under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.2?

Although the panel ultimately declined to classify the “rights-restoration” defense because the defendant offered no evidence of his subjective belief, the decision furnishes valuable guidance about the burden of production in post-Rehaif trials. Far more significant is the precedential holding on sentencing: relying on the Supreme Court’s plurality in Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021), the court ruled that § 245(a)(2) does not constitute a crime of violence because California permits conviction on a mens rea less culpable than recklessness. This ruling reshapes guideline calculations for defendants with prior California assault convictions and illustrates how Borden continues to narrow predicate-offense definitions nationwide.

Summary of the Judgment

• Conviction affirmed. The government introduced adequate evidence—stipulations and certified California records—showing that Kirk Ardell Sjodin knew of his felony status when he possessed a rifle, satisfying the knowledge-of-status element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
• Sentencing vacated and remanded. Counting Sjodin’s 2003 California assault as a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) was plain error; Williams, 29 P.3d 197 (Cal. 2001), makes clear the statute can be violated without at least reckless intent.
• No ruling on defense taxonomy. Because the defendant offered no evidence of his subjective belief, the panel left unresolved whether a bona fide mistake about rights restoration is (i) an affirmative defense, (ii) an element-negating defense, or (iii) no defense at all after Rehaif.

Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225 (2019)—established that § 924(a)(8) (“knowingly”) applies to both firearm possession and prohibited status. Rehaif frames the mental-state inquiry central to Sjodin’s “rights-restoration” argument.
2. Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503 (2021)—confirmed Rehaif’s two-fold knowledge requirement.
3. Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021)—plurality held crimes with reckless mens rea are not violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act; the Tenth Circuit applied Borden’s reasoning to the Guidelines.
4. People v. Williams, 29 P.3d 197 (Cal. 2001)—California Supreme Court interpreted § 245 to require only an intentional act likely to result in force, not subjective awareness of risk; decisive for the categorical mismatch.
5. Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189 (2016)—mistaken guideline ranges presumptively prejudice defendants; enabled plain-error resentencing.

B. Court’s Legal Reasoning

“The Government proved at trial beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Sjodin knew his prohibited status…
…California assault sweeps too broadly; mere volition does not equal intent to apply force to another.”
— McHugh, J.

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence (Conviction)

• Sjodin stipulated to firearm possession, interstate nexus, felony conviction, and >1-year imprisonment.
• No testimony, documents, or circumstantial evidence showed he believed his rights were restored; therefore, the government had no additional burden to disprove such belief.
• Knowledge inferred from length of prior sentence (eight years) and stipulation satisfies Rehaif.

2. Categorical Approach (Sentencing)

1. Elements Clause. Under Borden, § 4B1.2(a)(1) excludes offenses with mens rea below recklessness. Because Williams allows conviction when defendant merely intends the act, without conscious risk disregard, § 245(a)(2) fails.
2. Enumerated Offenses. Generic “aggravated assault” demands at least “extreme indifference” recklessness; California statute again over-inclusive.
3. Plain Error. Mis-classification raised offense level from 14 → 20, range 21-27 → 41-51 months. Under Molina-Martinez, prejudice and fourth-prong impact presumed.

C. Impact of the Judgment

• Guideline Calculations Nationwide. While binding only in the Tenth Circuit, the opinion adds weight to circuits already finding various state assault statutes non-violent post-Borden. Defendants with California § 245 priors prosecuted anywhere in the Tenth Circuit now avoid the § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) enhancement.
• Strategic Litigation. Defense counsel will likely introduce at least minimal testimony or documentation of mistaken rights-restoration beliefs to force courts to decide the unsettled defense-classification question.
• State-Federal Discrepancies. The case reinforces the idea that state crimes with lower mens rea thresholds often fail federal violent-crime predicates, intensifying pressure on Congress or the Sentencing Commission to clarify definitions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Categorical Approach”

A methodology requiring courts to compare the statutory elements of a prior conviction—not the defendant’s actual conduct—to the federal definition. If the statute covers any conduct that would not fit the federal definition, the conviction cannot count.

Mens Rea Spectrum

Levels of mental culpability, from highest to lowest: purposeful, knowing, reckless (conscious disregard), negligence, strict liability. Borden ruled that reckless is insufficient for violent-felony predicates.

Plain-Error Review

Four-part test on appeal when no objection preserved at trial: (1) error, (2) error is “plain” (clear), (3) affects substantial rights (prejudice), (4) seriously affects fairness/integrity of proceedings. Mis-calculated guideline ranges usually satisfy all four.

Rights-Restoration Exception (18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20))

Prior felony is ignored for § 922(g)(1) if it has been expunged, set aside, pardoned, or the person’s civil rights have been restored—unless the order expressly forbids firearm possession.

Conclusion

United States v. Sjodin cements two practical lessons:

1. Pursuant to Borden, California’s § 245(a)(2) assault—despite featuring a firearm—does not meet the Guideline definition of a crime of violence due to its permissive mens rea. District courts within the Tenth Circuit must exclude it (and identically worded statutes) from violent-crime enhancements.
2. A defendant’s mistaken belief that his firearm rights were restored has legal traction only when supported by evidence. Absent such a foundation, courts need not—and will not—shift any burden to the government under Rehaif.

By aligning with the Supreme Court’s restrictive reading of “use of force” and providing a clear evidentiary roadmap for rights-restoration defenses, the Tenth Circuit continues to narrow both the scope of federal firearms offenses and the reach of sentence-enhancement provisions. Practitioners should take note: guideline calculations and trial strategies in felon-in-possession cases just became more nuanced—and, for many defendants with California assault priors, potentially less onerous.