Calibrating Sanctions for Intentional Fee Conversion and Systemic Neglect:
Commentary on Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Benjamin R. Freeman
(Ewing, J., Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part)

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes Justice Ewing’s concurring and dissenting opinion (joined by Justice Bunn) in Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Benjamin R. Freeman, decided by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia on November 12, 2025. Although the majority opinion is not reproduced, Justice Ewing’s writing reveals the core dispute: what sanction is appropriate when a lawyer both:

• Intentionally converts a client’s unearned retainer to personal use and lies to disciplinary authorities, and
• Engages in a broad, repeated pattern of neglect, disobedience of court orders, and non-cooperation with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel across multiple client matters.

Justice Ewing agrees with the majority that disbarment (in West Virginia often termed “annulment” of the law license) is not required, and he concurs in adopting the Hearing Panel Subcommittee’s (HPS) findings of fact and liability under Office of Lawyer Disciplinary Counsel v. Jordan, 204 W. Va. 495, 513 S.E.2d 722 (1998). However, he sharply disagrees with the sanction: an eighteen-month suspension. He argues for a harsher sanction short of annulment.

The opinion is significant because it:

• Refines the distinction between “misappropriation” cases that usually warrant disbarment and “fee dispute / mishandled fee” cases that often draw a one-year suspension or less, as recently discussed in Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Harris, 251 W. Va. 376, 914 S.E.2d 249 (2025).
• Insists that where a lawyer’s conduct is intentional, self-serving, and dishonest, coupled with a systemic pattern of neglect and disobedience, an eighteen-month suspension undervalues the gravity of the misconduct.
• Emphasizes the Supreme Court’s role as the ultimate arbiter of sanctions in disciplinary cases, and criticizes excessive deference to an HPS recommendation.

Because only the concurring/dissenting opinion is available, this commentary focuses on how Justice Ewing reads and applies existing West Virginia disciplinary precedents, and what his reasoning implies for future cases.

II. Summary of Justice Ewing’s Opinion

A. Points of Agreement with the Majority

Justice Ewing expressly concurs in three major respects:

• The Supreme Court’s adoption of the HPS’s findings of fact.
• The HPS’s analysis of those facts under Jordan, the leading case on misappropriation and sanctions.
• The conclusion that Mr. Freeman’s conduct warrants a substantial sanction but does not require disbarment (annulment).

B. Core Disagreement: The Length and Rationale of the Suspension

The majority imposes an eighteen-month suspension. Justice Ewing believes that, under the applicable case law, this sanction is too lenient.

He contends that:

• With respect to Ms. Allison’s retainer (Count Three), Mr. Freeman’s conduct was knowing, intentional, self-serving, and dishonest—more serious than the “fee dispute” cases that usually justify only a one-year or shorter suspension.
• Even if the eighteen-month suspension could be justified solely for the misconduct in Count Three, the majority’s approach then fails to give independent weight to the other six counts and twenty-seven additional rule violations.
• In light of comparable West Virginia cases imposing suspensions of up to two years for similar or lesser patterns of neglect and non-cooperation, anything less than a substantially longer suspension unduly depreciates the seriousness of Mr. Freeman’s misconduct.

C. Treatment of Ms. Allison’s Retainer vs. Other Counts

The opinion observes that the majority (and the ODC’s argument) focus heavily on Count Three, involving Ms. Allison’s retainer. Citing Harris, Justice Ewing explains that:

• “Classic” intentional misappropriation of client funds (especially settlement funds, over time, in multiple matters, for personal use) usually requires disbarment.
• By contrast, mishandled fees or disputed retainers—where culpability is lower (e.g., negligence, lack of selfish motive, or significant mitigation)—often result in a one-year suspension or less.

He agrees that Mr. Freeman’s actions do not quite meet the full disbarment paradigm, but he concludes that they also far exceed the typical fee-dispute scenarios. He further stresses that:

• The eighteen-month suspension could be justified by Count Three alone, given the intentional personal use and dishonesty.
• Once we factor in the remaining twenty-seven rule violations (Counts One, Two, Four, Five, Six, and Seven), the sanction must increase beyond eighteen months to maintain consistency with precedent.

D. Pattern of Neglect and Disobedience

The remaining six counts predominantly involve:

• Failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness (Rule 1.3).
• Failure to communicate with clients (Rule 1.4(a)(3)).
• Failure to expedite litigation (Rule 3.2) in several child abuse and neglect appeals.
• Knowing disobedience of rules or orders of a tribunal (Rule 3.4(c)).
• Failure to respond to lawful demands from disciplinary authorities (Rule 8.1(b)).
• Conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice (Rule 8.4(d)).

In particular, Mr. Freeman:

• Failed to timely perfect five separate abuse and neglect appeals.
• Ignored multiple scheduling orders, notices of intent to sanction, and inquiries from both the Court and the ODC.
• Perfected each appeal only after the Court issued a Rule to Show Cause requiring him to appear and explain why he should not be held in contempt.
• Was held in contempt and ultimately removed from the court-appointed attorneys list.

Justice Ewing criticizes the majority for treating these violations as a “blip” and for failing to undertake a meaningful comparative analysis with prior cases involving similar misconduct, many of which resulted in two-year suspensions.

E. Treatment of Mitigation: “Caseload” and Being Overwhelmed

Mr. Freeman attributed his failings largely to being overwhelmed as a solo practitioner handling a heavy caseload, especially court-appointed matters. His explanation was boiled down to a single word—“Caseload”—and general statements that “things were hitting [him] left, right and center.”

Justice Ewing acknowledges that many solo practitioners face such pressures, but he insists that:

• Personal or workload problems cannot justify violating core professional duties to clients, courts, and the profession.
• Mr. Freeman could have taken relatively simple steps—communicating with clients and courts, requesting extensions, managing mail, and alerting courts to caseload issues—but did not.
• His remorse is “lukewarm” and “waffling” because he continues to shift blame to clients, clerks, mail delivery, and the courts rather than fully owning his misconduct.

Because much of the misconduct stems from poor law-office management, Justice Ewing suggests that any future reinstatement should consider supervised practice as a condition.

III. Legal Background and Framework

A. Structure of Lawyer Discipline in West Virginia

From the opinion and cited authorities, the basic disciplinary structure appears as follows:

• The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) investigates complaints and prosecutes formal charges against attorneys.
• A Hearing Panel Subcommittee (HPS) hears evidence, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and recommends sanctions.
• The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviews the record. Under Jordan and Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Cain, 245 W. Va. 693, 865 S.E.2d 95 (2021), the Court:
  • Conducts a de novo review of the record and the recommended sanction.
  • Gives “respectful consideration” to the HPS recommendation but is not bound by it.
  • Is the "final arbiter of legal ethics problems" and must make the ultimate decision on reprimands, suspensions, or annulments (Cain, Syl. Pt. 2).

Justice Ewing’s criticism of the majority is anchored in this framework: he believes the Court has abdicated part of its independent sanctioning responsibility by essentially ratifying the HPS’s eighteen-month recommendation without proper comparative analysis.

B. Substantive Rules Implicated

From the opinion, Mr. Freeman admitted or was found to have violated multiple provisions of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, including:

• Rule 1.3 – Diligence: requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.
• Rule 1.4(a)(3) – Communication: requiring that a lawyer keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter.
• Rule 3.2 – Expediting Litigation: requiring reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the client’s interests.
• Rule 3.4(c) – Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel: prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly disobeying an obligation under the rules of a tribunal.
• Rule 8.1(b) – Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters: prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly failing to respond to a lawful demand for information from a disciplinary authority.
• Rule 8.4(d) – Misconduct: prohibiting conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
• Rules governing safekeeping of client property (inferred from the IOLTA and fee issues; typically Rule 1.15), though the specific rule numbers are not quoted in the excerpt.

C. The Misappropriation / Fee-Dispute Framework under Jordan and Harris

Two key cases frame the analysis:

1. Office of Lawyer Disciplinary Counsel v. Jordan, 204 W. Va. 495, 513 S.E.2d 722 (1998)
   • Jordan is the foundational decision articulating that, absent compelling circumstances, intentional misappropriation warrants disbarment (Syl. Pt. 6, as quoted through Harris and this opinion).
   • The case involved an attorney who embezzled over $500,000 from an elderly client while acting as her appointed committee—an example of egregious exploitation of a vulnerable client.
2. Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Harris, 251 W. Va. 376, 914 S.E.2d 249 (2025)
   • Harris clarifies the distinction between:
     • “Intentional misappropriation” cases (usually disbarment) and
     • “Fee dispute” or mishandled fee cases (often a one-year suspension or less).
   • Factors reflecting the more serious “annulment” side include:
     • Multiple or repeated instances of intentional misappropriation.
     • Conversion of client settlement funds rather than merely unearned fees.
     • Conversion to personal use.
     • Other serious fraudulent conduct.
   • Less culpable cases involve “unreasonable and mishandled fee[s]” or “amounts designated and disputed as fees” and may be addressed by shorter suspensions where mental state is negligent or there are significant mitigating circumstances.

Justice Ewing’s analysis of Mr. Freeman’s misconduct is built on this dual framework, which he applies with a particular focus on mental state (intent, knowledge, negligence) and selfish motive.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The Fee Misconduct in Ms. Allison’s Matter: Between Fee-Dispute and Misappropriation

1. The Comparator Cases on the “Annulment” Side

Justice Ewing recites a series of decisions where intentional misappropriation of client or third-party funds led to annulment (disbarment), illustrating the “far end” of the sanction spectrum:

• Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Greer, 252 W. Va. 1, 917 S.E.2d 1 (2024) – Attorney knowingly took monies from multiple clients over many years.
• Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Kohout, 238 W. Va. 668, 798 S.E.2d 192 (2016) – Conversion of settlement proceeds causing injury to both client and third party, plus “a slew of aggravating factors” and no mitigation.
• Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Scotchel, 234 W. Va. 627, 768 S.E.2d 730 (2014) – Failure to remit proceeds from sale of a client’s business.
• Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Brown, 223 W. Va. 554, 678 S.E.2d 60 (2009) – Conversion of settlement funds to purchase cocaine instead of paying subrogation claims owed to client’s insurers.
• Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Coleman, 219 W. Va. 790, 639 S.E.2d 882 (2006) – Conversion of approximately $170,000 in legal fees by diverting client wire transfers into a personal account.
• Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Wheaton, 216 W. Va. 673, 610 S.E.2d 8 (2004) – Pattern of misappropriating client funds over a five-year span, including mishandling settlement funds and taking fees for services never performed.
• Jordan – Embezzlement of over $500,000 from an elderly client.

These precedents show hallmarks of disbarment-level misappropriation:

• Multiple victims and repeated misconduct.
• Conversion of settlement funds or entrusted property belonging unequivocally to clients or others.
• Substantial, often long-term financial harm.
• Clear personal enrichment or highly culpable motives (e.g., funding drug use).

By contrasting these with Mr. Freeman’s case, Justice Ewing underscores why annulment would be excessive, but also why a mere “fee dispute” label understates his culpability.

2. The Comparator Cases on the “Fee Dispute / One-Year Suspension” Side

On the other end of the spectrum, Justice Ewing references cases where mishandled fees or mishandled retainer arrangements led to approximately one-year suspensions, usually because the lawyer’s mental state was less culpable or meaningful mitigation existed:

• Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Morgan, 228 W. Va. 114, 717 S.E.2d 898 (2011)
  • Mr. Morgan accepted retainer fees, failed to carry out services, and failed to deposit retainers into a separate trust account.
  • The Court found his conduct intentional (pattern of offenses) but noted:
    • He did not realize his account was inadequate for IOLTA purposes.
    • He lacked a selfish or dishonest motive.
  • This supported a one-year suspension.
• Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Thorn, 236 W. Va. 681, 783 S.E.2d 321 (2016)
  • Multiple non-refundable retainers were placed into an operating account and never earned.
  negligent (except as to one client) and linked to a significant depressive episode.
  • Again, there was no selfish or dishonest motive, supporting a one-year suspension.
• Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Haught, 233 W. Va. 185, 757 S.E.3d 609 (2014)
  • One-year suspension where client funds were withdrawn from an IOLTA account, but not converted for personal use.
• Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Atkins, 243 W. Va. 246, 842 S.E.2d 799 (2020)
  • Nine-month suspension where negligent supervision of staff led to deposit of client funds into an operating account.

These “less-culpable” cases share key features:

• Negligence or a flawed understanding of trust-account obligations, rather than clear, self-serving intent.
• Absence of a selfish or dishonest motive.
• Mitigating mental health or supervisory issues.

3. Where Mr. Freeman Fits on This Spectrum

Justice Ewing places Mr. Freeman somewhere between the “annulment” misappropriation cases and the one-year fee-dispute cases:

• Mr. Freeman:
  • Knew he had not used his IOLTA account in more than two years.
  • Deposited Ms. Allison’s retainer directly into his operating account before it was earned.
  • Had a negative balance in that operating account.
  • Immediately withdrew funds to pay a personal debt.
  • Was later untruthful with the ODC about the status of the IOLTA account and unearned fees.
• Unlike Morgan and Thorn, Mr. Freeman:
  • Did act with a selfish and dishonest motive (personal debt, concealment).
  • Acted with knowledge of his failure to use an IOLTA account.

Based on these facts, Justice Ewing concludes:

• The one-year range (Morgan, Thorn, Haught, Atkins) is too lenient, because those cases lack the combination of:
  • Intentionality,
  • Personal use of client funds, and
  • Dishonesty to disciplinary authorities.
• The full disbarment paradigm (Greer, Kohout, Brown, etc.) is too harsh, because:
  • The record does not reflect multiple clients over many years, extreme dollar amounts, or some of the most aggravated fact patterns seen in those cases.
• Thus, Mr. Freeman’s misconduct in the Allison matter alone would properly sit at a “midpoint”—which Justice Ewing sees as approximately an eighteen-month suspension.

Crucially, this is only the starting point. Justice Ewing argues that once we add the remaining twenty-seven violations, the sanction must go higher.

B. The Twenty-Seven Additional Violations: Neglect, Disobedience, and Non-Cooperation

1. The Nature and Consequences of the Additional Misconduct

Counts One, Two, Four, Five, Six, and Seven involve:

• Repeated failure to perfect appeals in five separate child abuse and neglect cases before the Supreme Court of Appeals.
• Chronic non-compliance with court orders and deadlines, including:
  • Scheduling orders,
  • Notices of intent to sanction, and
  • Rules to show cause.
• Ignoring or seriously delaying responses to inquiries from the ODC, including by not responding to letters and even certified mail.
• Failure to keep clients (such as Mr. Young and Mr. Murray) informed and to move their cases forward.

The consequences in the child abuse and neglect appeals were especially severe:

• Children and parents endured an extended period of uncertainty about their future family status.
• Permanency for the children was needlessly delayed.

The Court itself had to repeatedly intervene by issuing show-cause orders, and Mr. Freeman was held in contempt, ultimately being removed from the court-appointed list.

2. Comparative Case Law on Similar Misconduct

Justice Ewing criticizes the majority for merely citing a few precedents without analyzing how Mr. Freeman’s conduct compares. He points to several cases:

• Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Conner, 234 W. Va. 648, 769 S.E.2d 25 (2015)
  • Attorney failed to perfect one appeal, was held in contempt, and failed to communicate with clients.
  • Sanction: ninety-day suspension plus two years of supervised practice.
  • Contrast: Mr. Freeman failed to perfect five appeals in abuse and neglect cases, was held in contempt, and was removed from the appointed list.
• Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Grindo, 231 W. Va. 365, 745 S.E.2d 256 (2013)
  • Emphasized that failing to respond to deadlines and “entreaties” from the Supreme Court regarding the filing of briefs “weighs heavily against” the attorney.
  • Justice Ewing notes that Mr. Freeman’s behavior should similarly weigh heavily in sanctioning.
• Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Curnutte, 251 W. Va. 839, 916 S.E.2d 681 (2025)
  • Attorney received a six-month suspension for eleven violations involving lack of diligence, failure to communicate, and ignoring the ODC.
  • Mr. Freeman has more than twice the number of similar violations (twenty-seven), yet the majority did not meaningfully distinguish his case from Curnutte.
• Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Schillace, 247 W. Va. 673, 885 S.E.2d 611 (2022)
  • Seven counts and fifty-three violations, including lack of diligence, ignoring clients and ODC, and disregard for court orders.
  • Sanction: two-year suspension, with mental health issues recognized as mitigating.
• Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Grafton, 227 W. Va. 579, 712 S.E.2d 488 (2011)
  • Attorney engaged in a “pattern and practice” of failing to communicate, failing to respond to the ODC, and deceiving a client into believing an appeal had been perfected.
  • Sanction: two-year suspension.
• Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Hardin, 217 W. Va. 659, 619 S.E.2d 172 (2005)
  • Two-year suspension imposed for disobeying discovery orders, missing hearings, and ignoring circuit court sanctions.

Viewed against these decisions, Justice Ewing finds:

• Mr. Freeman’s twenty-seven violations across six counts, especially involving multiple child abuse and neglect appeals, are at least as serious as the misconduct addressed in Schillace, Grafton, and Hardin, where two-year suspensions were imposed.
• The majority’s eighteen-month suspension—especially if mostly driven by Count Three—“unduly depreciates” the seriousness of these additional violations.

3. The “No Magic Formula” Principle and Its Application Here

Justice Ewing invokes Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Sirk, 240 W. Va. 274, 810 S.E.2d 276 (2018), which recognizes:

There is no “magic formula” for this Court to determine how to weigh the host of mitigating and aggravating circumstances to arrive at an appropriate sanction; each case presents different circumstances that must be weighed against the nature and gravity of the lawyer's misconduct.

He accepts that disciplinary sanctioning is not mechanical, but he emphasizes that:

• The “no magic formula” language does not authorize arbitrary or unexplained departures from comparable cases.
• Instead, it underscores the need for a reasoned, circumstance-driven analysis, which he finds lacking in the majority’s treatment of Freeman’s twenty-seven non-fee-related violations.

C. Mitigation, Remorse, and the Solo Practitioner’s “Caseload” Defense

In addressing mitigation, Justice Ewing carefully distinguishes between:

• Legitimate hardships that may explain or reduce culpability (such as severe mental illness, as in Thorn and Schillace), and
• Common but insufficient excuses such as being “too busy,” “overwhelmed,” or failing to organize a practice.

Quoting Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Sturm, 237 W. Va. 115, 785 S.E.2d 821 (2016), he reiterates:

While we understand that sometimes a lawyer's personal problems require the lawyer's utmost attention, this focus of a lawyer's attention cannot come at the client's expense.

He further stresses that:

• A lawyer cannot adopt an “ostrich-with-its-head-in-the-sand” approach—ignoring correspondence, deadlines, and court orders—and then invoke caseload as a shield.
• Mr. Freeman’s claimed remorse is diluted by his continued tendency to blame others (clients, clerks, mail, courts), suggesting a lack of full insight and accountability.
• Much of the misconduct could have been prevented by basic practice-management measures:
  • Opening and reading mail,
  • Responding to courts and ODC,
  • Requesting extensions or continuances,
  • Communicating candidly with clients about delays or overload.

Given that the root problem appears to be poor management rather than an isolated personal crisis, Justice Ewing suggests that supervision of Mr. Freeman’s practice should be considered as a condition in any future reinstatement proceeding.

D. The Court’s Role and the Critique of the Majority’s Approach

Justice Ewing relies on Cain and Jordan to reiterate that:

• The Supreme Court must give “respectful consideration” to an HPS recommendation, but
• Ultimately, it has an independent duty to:
  • Conduct a de novo review,
  • Weigh aggravating and mitigating factors,
  • Compare the case with precedent, and
  • Set sanctions that protect the public, deter future misconduct, and preserve confidence in the legal system.

He suggests that, in this case, the majority has:

• Either misclassified Count Three as akin to negligent fee mishandling (thus undervaluing its intentional and selfish character), or
• Treated Count Three as fully justifying the eighteen-month suspension, and then failed to add anything to reflect twenty-seven additional violations.

In either scenario, he believes the majority’s sanction:

• Diminishes the seriousness of both the fee misconduct and the broader pattern of non-compliance.
• Departs from the measured, comparative approach required by Jordan, Harris, and related cases.

V. Impact and Significance

A. Refining the Misappropriation vs. Fee-Dispute Dichotomy

The concurring/dissenting opinion further develops the conceptual line drawn in Harris:

• On one side: Intentional misappropriation of settlement funds or entrusted property, with substantial aggravation, typically leading to disbarment (absent compelling mitigation).
• On the other: Fee disputes and negligent mishandling of retainers, often without selfish motive, where one-year suspensions or less may suffice.

Justice Ewing emphasizes a crucial middle category:

• Cases involving intentional conversion of unearned fees to personal use plus dishonesty to disciplinary authorities, but without the scope or scale of classic misappropriation cases.

For this “middle” category, he implicitly endorses:

• Sanctions greater than one year but short of annulment.
• A sanctioning range where eighteen months might appropriately reflect the fee misconduct alone, with additional misconduct requiring upward adjustment.

Future disciplinary counsel and courts may cite this reasoning to argue that when a lawyer intentionally uses unearned fees for personal purposes and is dishonest in the disciplinary process—even in the absence of classic settlement-fund misappropriation—sanctions must exceed the standard one-year baseline.

B. Weighting Patterns of Neglect and Court-Rule Violations

The opinion reinforces that:

• Repeated failure to comply with court orders, deadlines, and disciplinary inquiries is itself grave misconduct, especially where:
  • It requires the Supreme Court to twice or more intervene with Rules to Show Cause.
  • It delays critical proceedings like children’s permanency in abuse and neglect matters.
• Such patterns warrant multi-year suspensions, as illustrated by Schillace, Grafton, and Hardin.

By highlighting that Mr. Freeman’s twenty-seven additional violations are comparable to, if not worse than, those in cases yielding two-year suspensions, Justice Ewing signals that:

• Courts should avoid letting a “headline” issue (here, a fee matter) eclipse a broader pattern of neglect.
• Sanctioning must reflect the totality of misconduct, not only the most dramatic count.

C. Implications for Solo Practitioners and Court-Appointed Counsel

The opinion candidly addresses a recurrent tension: many solo practitioners and court-appointed counsel face crushing caseloads, yet:

• Caseload pressures do not excuse ethical violations like ignoring clients, missing deadlines, and lying about trust accounts.
• Lawyers facing overload must:
  • Seek help or supervision,
  • Communicate with courts and clients,
  • Turn down appointments when necessary,
  • Implement basic practice-management systems.

Justice Ewing’s emphasis on practice supervision as a potential reinstatement condition suggests a trend toward structured remediation of practice-management deficiencies, rather than simply suspending and then fully restoring an attorney without oversight.

D. The Normative Role of a Concurrence/Dissent

Because this is a concurring and dissenting opinion, its reasoning is not itself binding precedent in the way the majority’s holding is. Nonetheless, such opinions often:

• Shape future development of the law by providing a well-reasoned alternative framework for analyzing similar cases.
• Offer guidance to the ODC, HPS, and practitioners about how at least some justices view the seriousness of certain categories of misconduct.
• Serve as a benchmark for proportionality when future courts consider whether sanctions are too lenient or too harsh relative to past practice.

Here, Justice Ewing’s detailed comparative analysis may influence future sanctioning even if the precise eighteen-month sanction for Mr. Freeman remains undisturbed.

VI. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

For non-specialist readers, several technical concepts in the opinion warrant clarification.

A. “Annulment” vs. Suspension

• Annulment (Disbarment): Complete termination of the attorney’s license to practice law. In West Virginia terminology, the license is “annulled.” Reinstatement is possible but difficult and requires a formal petition and proof of rehabilitation.
• Suspension: A temporary prohibition on practicing law, usually for a specified period (e.g., six months, one year, two years). Reinstatement may be automatic after the period or conditional on additional requirements.

B. IOLTA and Trust Accounts

• IOLTA (Interest on Lawyers’ Trust Accounts): A pooled trust account where lawyers hold client funds (e.g., retainers, settlement proceeds) that are not yet earned or belong in part to others. Interest is typically directed to a public-interest fund.
• Operating Account: The lawyer’s business account, used for office expenses and personal draws, into which only earned fees and firm funds should be deposited.
• Depositing unearned client funds into an operating account and using them for personal expenses is typically characterized as conversion or misuse of client property.

C. Misappropriation vs. Fee Dispute

• Misappropriation: Intentional taking or use of client funds (usually entrusted funds like settlements or escrow) without authorization, typically for personal or firm expenses.
• Fee Dispute / Mishandled Fee: A disagreement about what fees are owed or a negligent failure to properly segregate and account for client retainers, often without clear proof of intentional theft or selfish motive.
• Under Jordan and Harris:
  • Intentional misappropriation usually warrants disbarment.
  • Fee-dispute-type conduct, especially when negligent and without selfish motive, is often addressed with shorter suspensions.

D. Show-Cause Orders and Contempt

• Rule to Show Cause: A court order requiring a person (here, a lawyer) to appear and explain why they should not be held in contempt for failing to comply with a prior order or rule.
• Contempt: A finding that someone has disobeyed or been disrespectful toward the court’s authority, which can lead to sanctions, fines, or other disciplinary measures.

E. Abuse and Neglect Appeals and Permanency

• Abuse and neglect cases: Proceedings where the state alleges that a child is abused or neglected and seeks protective orders, removal, or termination of parental rights.
• Permanency: The long-term, stable living and legal arrangement for a child—such as reunification with parents, adoption, or guardianship. Delays in appellate proceedings can prolong instability and uncertainty in a child’s life.
• The Court treats delays in these appeals as especially serious because they directly affect children’s welfare and stability.

F. Standard of Review: De Novo

• De novo review: The Court reviews the matter anew, without being bound by prior recommendations on issues of law or the ultimate sanction, although it may defer to factual findings where appropriate.
• In disciplinary cases, the Supreme Court must independently decide the appropriate sanction, even though it gives respectful consideration to the HPS’s recommendations.

VII. Conclusion

Justice Ewing’s concurring and dissenting opinion in Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Freeman offers a thorough, precedent-based critique of the majority’s eighteen-month suspension. He agrees with the majority that this is not a case for annulment but argues that:

• Mr. Freeman’s intentional, self-serving misuse of Ms. Allison’s unearned retainer and subsequent dishonesty to the ODC warrant a sanction more severe than the one-year range appropriate to negligent fee-dispute cases.
• The additional twenty-seven violations—spanning repeated failure to perfect abuse and neglect appeals, disregard of court orders, and non-cooperation with disciplinary authorities—should significantly increase the sanction beyond eighteen months, in line with comparable two-year suspensions in prior cases.
• Caseload and feeling overwhelmed, while understandable, do not excuse this pattern of misconduct, especially where basic practice-management steps and candid communication could have prevented most violations.

In broader context, the opinion:

• Clarifies the sanctioning continuum between negligent mishandled-fee cases and full misappropriation/annulment cases.
• Reaffirms that patterns of neglect, court-rule violations, and contemptuous non-response are independently grave and may merit multi-year suspensions.
• Highlights the Supreme Court's duty to engage in independent, comparative sanction analysis, rather than defaulting to HPS recommendations.

Even though it is not the majority view, Justice Ewing’s detailed reasoning will likely inform future disciplinary proceedings in West Virginia, particularly when courts and the ODC confront cases that combine intentional misuse of client funds, systemic neglect, and practice-management failures. The opinion reinforces the central lesson that the privilege of practicing law carries an uncompromising responsibility: neither personal difficulties nor workload pressures can justify compromising clients’ funds, rights, or the integrity of the judicial process.