Bypassing Batson Step One in Idaho: State v. Buck Clarifies Hernandez Mootness and Affirms Broad Trial-Court Discretion

Introduction

In State v. Buck, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Emerson Clyde Buck, IV, for first-degree murder (with a deadly weapon enhancement) and resisting and obstructing an officer. The case presented three principal appellate issues: (1) whether the prosecutor’s peremptory strike of the only Black juror in the venire violated Batson v. Kentucky; (2) whether the district court abused its discretion by limiting the defense’s cross-examination that pivoted toward alternate perpetrator suggestions; and (3) whether the court properly barred defense counsel from arguing facts not in evidence during closing.

The Court used this appeal to correct a recurring procedural error in Idaho’s Batson jurisprudence. Specifically, it clarified that once a prosecutor offers race-neutral reasons for a peremptory strike and the trial court rules on the ultimate issue of discriminatory intent (Batson step three), the preliminary prima facie inquiry (step one) is moot. In doing so, the Court abrogated the Idaho Court of Appeals’ contrary approach in State v. Wright to the extent it insisted on a separate, explicit step-one finding even after step two and step three had been reached.

On the evidentiary issues, the Court held that the defense’s cross-examination morphed into alternate-perpetrator insinuation unsupported by relevant evidence, justifying exclusion. And it approved the trial court’s instruction directing the jury to disregard defense closing remarks that asserted a “walk” alibi not supported by trial evidence.

Summary of the Opinion

Batson procedure: The Court held that under Hernandez v. New York, once the State offers race-neutral reasons (step two) and the trial court decides intentional discrimination (step three), the step-one prima facie inquiry is unnecessary. The Court expressly abrogated the Idaho Court of Appeals’ contrary reasoning in Wright.
Batson merits: Applying Flowers and related precedents, the Court upheld the trial court’s denial of Buck’s Batson challenge. The prosecutor’s reasons (the juror’s stated inability to focus due to school, work, and a pregnant partner, and his disengaged demeanor and strong desire not to serve) were race-neutral and not pretextual, and the trial court’s step-three finding was not clearly erroneous.
Alternate-perpetrator cross-examination: The Court affirmed exclusion of speculative, innuendo-driven “other suspect” questioning under Idaho Rules of Evidence 401 and 403, reiterating that alternate-perpetrator evidence must be more than conjecture.
Closing argument: The Court affirmed the trial court’s direction to disregard defense counsel’s assertion that Buck was “on a walk” when the homicide occurred, because that fact was not in evidence. The Court did not need to reach the separate alibi-notice rationale to affirm.
Cumulative error: Inapplicable because no error was found.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986): Establishes that peremptory strikes motivated by race violate the Equal Protection Clause. Idaho adheres to Batson’s three-step framework.
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991): Critical here. The Court quoted Hernandez’s teaching that once the prosecutor provides race-neutral reasons and the trial court rules on discriminatory intent, the step-one prima facie issue becomes moot. Idaho now expressly adopts this procedural posture and abrogates contrary Court of Appeals language in Wright.
Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005): Defines step one’s “inference of discriminatory purpose” standard. Buck argued step one was moot; the Court agreed in view of Hernandez once steps two and three were reached.
Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. 284 (2019): Reinforces Batson and identifies probative categories at step three (statistics, disparate questioning, side-by-side comparisons, misrepresentations, history, other circumstances). Idaho applied these factors to assess pretext.
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 332 (2003) and Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005): Emphasize the persuasiveness of the prosecutor’s reasons and the utility of side-by-side comparisons in exposing pretext.
Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008): Appellate courts give deference (“clear error” standard) to trial judges’ credibility findings at step three, especially for demeanor-based reasons.
Thaler v. Haynes, 559 U.S. 43 (2010): A trial judge need not personally observe the specific demeanor cited to accept a demeanor-based explanation; the judge should consider the judge’s own observations to the extent possible.
State v. Ish, 166 Idaho 492, 461 P.3d 774 (2020): Idaho’s leading Batson case, adopting Flowers’ analytical toolkit, reaffirming that even a single discriminatory strike violates equal protection, and emphasizing great deference to trial courts on step three.
State v. Wright, 174 Idaho 206, 552 P.3d 633 (Ct. App. 2023), review dismissed (2024): To the extent Wright suggested a trial court must make an explicit step-one finding even after the State has offered race-neutral reasons and the trial court has ruled on discriminatory intent, Buck abrogates that approach.
Alternate-perpetrator line: State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 220 P.3d 1055 (2009); State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 334 P.3d 806 (2014); State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 304 P.3d 276 (2013). These decisions teach that alternate-perpetrator evidence must be relevant (beyond mere speculation) and remains subject to Rule 403 balancing. Buck applies this law to cabin speculative cross-examination.
Relevance and discretion: I.R.E. 401–403; State v. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661, 462 P.3d 1125 (2020); State v. Ochoa, 169 Idaho 903, 505 P.3d 689 (2022); Dunlap v. State, 170 Idaho 716, 516 P.3d 987 (2022); State v. Radue, 175 Idaho 297, 564 P.3d 1230 (2025). Buck uses these standards to affirm the limitations on cross-examination and closing.
Closing argument boundaries: Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975); State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 77 P.3d 956 (2003); State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 156 P.3d 583 (Ct. App. 2007). Counsel may argue inferences from the evidence but cannot refer to facts not in evidence. Buck applies this rule to the “went for a walk” assertion.
Jury-selection context: State v. Harrell, 173 Idaho 45, 538 P.3d 818 (2023) (discusses COVID-era reduction to three peremptories per side, relevant to the procedural backdrop of voir dire in Buck).

Legal Reasoning

1) Batson Procedure and Merits

The district court, after denying a for-cause challenge to Juror 17, permitted peremptories. The prosecutor used a peremptory strike on Juror 17—the only apparent Black juror. The defense raised Batson. Though the sidebar was off the record, the court later summarized: it invited race-neutral reasons; the prosecutor offered two—(a) Juror 17’s life pressures (school, work, pregnant partner) would prevent fair attention and (b) observed disengagement/inattention. The court found the reasons genuine and non-pretextual, stressing that Juror 17 “very much did not wish to be here.”

On appeal, the Supreme Court first addressed the correct procedure under Hernandez. It held that the step-one inquiry (prima facie discrimination) becomes unnecessary once the State provides race-neutral explanations and the trial court rules on the ultimate question of discriminatory intent (step three). The Court abrogated the Court of Appeals’ insistence that a trial court must separately adjudicate step one in every case even after reaching step three. It further noted that where the parties do not dispute the apparent race of the defendant and struck juror, the prosecutor has “essentially” conceded step one; but in any event, after reasons are offered and step three is decided, step one is moot.

Turning to the merits at step three, the Court applied Flowers and Ish. While the statistical effect (100% of Black jurors struck, because there was only one) reflected a discriminatory impact, that statistic alone did not prove discriminatory intent. The defense’s “disparate questioning” argument failed because, unlike in Flowers (where the State interrogated Black jurors much more extensively than White jurors to generate pretext), the prosecutor here asked Juror 17 several targeted questions and moved for cause only after Juror 17 repeatedly confirmed an inability to be fair and a desire not to serve. The juror’s responses were materially different in content and certainty from the answers of Jurors 26 and 15—both of whom signaled willingness to rearrange obligations and serve.

Side-by-side comparisons likewise failed. The prosecutor’s stated reasons for striking Juror 17 (combined school/work/family pressures, stated unfairness, disengagement) did not equally apply to seated non-Black jurors invoked by the defense, who had narrower concerns (mostly work) and expressed willingness to manage them. The Court also addressed two “other circumstances”: (a) demeanor-based reasons need not be rejected for lack of an explicit demeanor finding (Thaler), especially where the court noted the “flavor” of remarks showed a strong wish not to serve; and (b) the State’s additional peremptories (against Jurors 15 and 21) did not establish purposeful discrimination—this issue was not litigated below, and the record supplied race-neutral reasons (Juror 15’s possible exposure to Buck’s flight and workload concerns; Juror 21’s strikingly high levels of doubt even under a simplified “cookie jar” hypothetical).

Applying Snyder’s “clear error” standard, the Court concluded the trial judge’s credibility determination deserved deference and was supported by substantial evidence. The Batson challenge was therefore properly denied.

2) Limits on Cross-Examination About “Other Suspects”

The detective testified on direct that other interviews yielded nothing “fruitful.” On cross, defense counsel began asking about individuals (D.E. and G.J.) ostensibly as investigative leads. After giving leeway, the trial court halted the examination when it became apparent the questioning was pivoting to suggest “someone else did it” without any substantive evidentiary foundation. The court characterized this as alternate-perpetrator insinuation—i.e., evidence directed to prove a third party committed the crime—without relevance (I.R.E. 401) and, alternatively, likely mischief under Rule 403 (confusion, waste of time).

Reaffirming Meister and Parker, the Supreme Court held that alternate-perpetrator evidence must do more than raise inference or innuendo; it must have a tendency to make the defendant’s guilt more or less probable. Here, defense counsel admitted there was no substantive basis beyond speculation linking others to the killing. That failure of relevance under Rule 401 was dispositive; although the trial court later referenced Rule 403 in explaining its ruling, the lack of relevance alone sustained exclusion. There was no abuse of discretion.

3) Closing Argument Confined to the Record

During closing, defense counsel stated Buck “decided to go for a walk” and left the house while all were “alive and well.” The State objected that this was both a fact not in evidence and an undisclosed alibi. The district court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the assertion.

The Supreme Court emphasized that while counsel has broad latitude to argue reasonable inferences, they may not refer to facts not in evidence. The record did not support the “walk at the time of the killing” narrative. To the contrary, testimony placed Buck in the home contemporaneously with the fatal events; additional physical evidence (James’s DNA on Buck’s socks; fresh cuts on Buck’s hands) reinforced presence. Because the remark lacked evidentiary support, the Court affirmed the trial court’s direction to disregard, without reaching the separate alibi-notice issue.

4) No Cumulative Error

The doctrine requires multiple errors; none were found. Thus, cumulative error did not apply.

Impact and Prospective Significance

1) Batson Practice in Idaho

Procedural clarity: Trial courts may bypass a formal step-one ruling once the prosecutor offers race-neutral explanations and the court rules at step three. Step-one disputes will typically be moot on appeal in such cases. To the extent Wright suggested otherwise, it is abrogated.
Record-building shifts to step three: Litigants should concentrate on developing the Flowers evidence at step three—statistics, comparative analysis, questioning disparities, prosecutor misstatements, historical patterns, and other context. Failure to surface and preserve side-by-side comparisons at trial may hamper appellate review (as Snyder cautions).
Demeanor reasons remain viable: Thaler and Snyder guide Idaho courts to give deference to trial judges on demeanor-based reasons, even without an explicit demeanor finding, provided the judge considers observations from voir dire.
Disparate questioning is nuanced: Both “more” and “less” questioning can be probative of pretext in the right context, but the Court declined to treat modest differences in follow-up style or volume as discriminatory per se. The focus is on whether the prosecutor’s reasons, viewed holistically, credibly apply to the struck juror and not comparably to those retained.

2) Alternate-Perpetrator Evidence

Threshold relevance matters: The Court reaffirmed that alternate-perpetrator theories must rest on evidence that tends to make the defendant’s guilt less likely—not mere conjecture. Courts may limit cross-examination that morphs into insinuation without a substantive link.
Practical tip: Where the defense seeks to explore “other suspect” routes, counsel should consider making a detailed offer of proof and, where feasible, pursue pretrial rulings on admissibility to avoid speculative presentation in front of the jury.

3) Closing Argument Discipline

Stay tethered to the record: Counsel must anchor summation to admitted evidence and reasonable inferences. Arguments implying an alibi or alternative timeline must be supported by testimony or exhibits admitted at trial.
Alibi notice: While the Supreme Court did not rest its holding on Idaho’s alibi-notice statute, practitioners should be mindful that undisclosed alibi theories risk exclusion or curative instructions if they surface for the first time in closing.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Peremptory challenge vs. for-cause challenge: A peremptory can remove a juror without stating a cause (subject to Batson limits); a for-cause challenge removes a juror for legal incapacity or bias proven to the court.
Batson’s three steps:
- Step One: The challenger raises an inference of discriminatory intent.
- Step Two: The proponent of the strike offers race-neutral reasons.
- Step Three: The court decides whether the challenger proved purposeful discrimination.
Under Buck, once step two occurs and the court rules on step three, step one is moot.
“Race-neutral” reason: A justification that does not rely on race (e.g., concerns about attention, fairness, prior experiences). The trial judge weighs its credibility at step three.
Clear-error review: Appellate courts defer to trial courts’ step-three determinations unless left with a firm conviction that a mistake was made, especially on credibility and demeanor.
Disparate questioning: Inquiry that is meaningfully different in scope or tone toward different racial groups can be probative of pretext, but differences must be evaluated in context, not by rote tallies.
Alternate-perpetrator evidence: Evidence that a third party committed the crime. It must be relevant and non-speculative; courts may exclude innuendo under Rules 401 and 403.
I.R.E. 401 and 403: Rule 401 defines relevance; Rule 403 permits exclusion if probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Closing argument limits: Counsel may argue reasonable inferences but may not state or suggest facts not introduced into evidence.

Conclusion

State v. Buck makes an important procedural clarification for Idaho Batson litigation: trial courts are not required to render a formal step-one ruling once the prosecutor has articulated race-neutral reasons and the court has decided the ultimate issue of discriminatory intent under step three. This aligns Idaho practice with Hernandez and abrogates contrary analysis in Wright. On the merits, the Court’s application of Flowers and Ish underscores the centrality of the trial court’s credibility determinations, the need for defense counsel to build a detailed comparative record, and the limited probative value of statistics standing alone when the venire includes only a single juror of the defendant’s race.

The opinion also reinforces settled evidentiary boundaries: alternate-perpetrator insinuations require a non-speculative evidentiary foundation to be relevant; and closing arguments must remain tethered to the trial record. Collectively, these holdings affirm broad trial-court discretion in managing voir dire, evidence, and argument, and they provide Idaho practitioners with sharper procedural and strategic guidance for raising and defending Batson challenges in future cases.