Butts v. Kelch: Plausibility Pleading, Non‑Cognizability of § 1983 Disability Retaliation, and the Inapplicability of LMRA and Individual ADA Retaliation Liability in Public‑School Employment Disputes

Case: Butts v. Kelch, et al., No. 25‑0481
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Panel: Livingston, C.J.; Parker & Carney, JJ.
Date: November 18, 2025
Disposition: Summary order affirming dismissal of all federal claims and denial of reconsideration

Note: This is a Second Circuit summary order. Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1, it may be cited, but it does not have precedential effect. It nonetheless offers a useful synthesis of existing doctrines on pleading standards, Section 1983 employment claims, ADA retaliation, and public employees’ inability to sue under the Labor Management Relations Act.

I. Introduction

This appeal arises from a public‑school teacher’s wide‑ranging federal lawsuit against:

the New York City Department of Education (“DOE”),
two DOE officials (Eugenia Kelch and Theresa Davis), and
the United Federation of Teachers (“UFT”) and several union representatives (Stella Inserra, Ryan Welch, and William Kalogeras).

Plaintiff‑Appellant Candace A. Butts alleged:

Employment discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause (enforced via 42 U.S.C. § 1983),
Hostile work environment based on her membership in a protected class,
Retaliation—primarily for complaining about violations of her students’ Individualized Education Programs (“IEPs”) and disability‑related concerns, and
Claims under the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 185–188, against the UFT and its representatives.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Merchant, J.) dismissed all federal claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and denied a motion for reconsideration. On appeal, Butts pressed:

her challenges to the dismissal of discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation claims against individual DOE officials Kelch and Davis, and
her argument that the district court was obliged to remand her LMRA claims to state court rather than dismissing them.

The Second Circuit affirmed in all respects, addressing several important, recurring issues in public‑employment and education‑related litigation:

the Twombly/Iqbal “plausibility” pleading standard and the continued, but limited, relevance of Swierkiewicz,
what suffices (and what does not) to show an inference of discriminatory intent and a hostile work environment at the pleading stage,
the non‑cognizability of disability‑based retaliation claims under § 1983,
the absence of individual liability for ADA retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a),
the need to plead a causal connection between protected activity and adverse action for ADA retaliation, and
the fact that public school employees are not covered by the LMRA, with the consequence that related claims fail on the merits rather than for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction.

II. Summary of the Second Circuit’s Disposition

The Second Circuit’s summary order makes the following determinations:

Waiver as to DOE discrimination/hostile environment/retaliation claims:
Butts did not adequately brief her challenges to the dismissal of her federal claims against the DOE itself. Those issues were therefore deemed waived on appeal under Norton v. Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1998). In any event, the panel notes she failed to plead a municipal policy or custom as required for § 1983 liability (Batista v. Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1983)).
§ 1983 discrimination (Kelch & Davis):
Applying Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2015), the court holds that Butts did not meet even the “minimal burden” of alleging facts from which an inference of discriminatory motivation could plausibly be drawn. The discrimination claims were correctly dismissed.
Hostile work environment (Kelch & Davis):
Relying on Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2007), and Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365 (2d Cir. 2002), the court agrees that, even considered cumulatively, the alleged incidents did not rise to the level of an objectively abusive environment, nor were they plausibly alleged to be “because of” Butts’s protected characteristics.
Retaliation under § 1983 (Kelch & Davis):
Under Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2015), a § 1983 retaliation claim requires retaliation for opposing discrimination. Butts’s allegations centered on her complaints about violations of students’ IEPs. The panel adopts the district court’s conclusion that “disability‑based retaliation claims are not cognizable under Section 1983” and holds her § 1983 retaliation claims fail as a matter of law.
Retaliation under the ADA (reframed on appeal):
Even assuming she could state an ADA retaliation claim without expressly naming the statute in her complaint, the court holds:
- No individual liability exists for ADA retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a), citing Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2010). Thus, claims against Kelch and Davis cannot proceed.
- As to the DOE, even assuming no waiver, Butts failed to plausibly plead a causal connection between any protected activity and adverse employment actions, as required by Fox v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 918 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2019).
LMRA claims against UFT and union officials:
Citing Green v. Dep’t of Educ. of N.Y.C., 16 F.4th 1070 (2d Cir. 2021), the court reaffirms that public employees are not covered by the LMRA. Thus, Butts’s LMRA claims were properly dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), and the district court was not required to remand those claims to state court.
Pleading standard clarification:
Responding to Butts’s reliance on Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), the panel reiterates that the old “no set of facts” standard has been superseded by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). The complaint must contain enough nonconclusory facts to make the claims plausibly viable, as discussed in E.E.O.C. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 768 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2014).

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Procedural Posture and Standard of Review

The Second Circuit reviews de novo the district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor (Kuck v. Danaher, 600 F.3d 159, 162 (2d Cir. 2010)). Under the Twombly/Iqbal standard, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face’” (Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

In this framework, the panel addresses each category of claim:

federal employment discrimination and hostile work environment under § 1983,
retaliation under § 1983 and the ADA, and
LMRA claims against the union and union personnel.

B. § 1983 Discrimination Claims Against Kelch and Davis

1. Legal framework and precedent: Littlejohn v. City of New York

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against state actors who deprive individuals of constitutional rights under color of state law. In the employment context, Equal Protection claims under § 1983 are analyzed with the same substantive standards as Title VII discrimination claims.

Under Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2015), a complaint alleging discrimination (absent direct evidence) must plausibly allege:

the plaintiff is a member of a protected class;
the plaintiff was qualified for her position;
the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action (e.g., termination, demotion, material changes in responsibilities or pay); and
at least minimal support for the proposition that the employer was motivated by discriminatory intent.

The key point, for pleading purposes, is the “minimal burden” on the plaintiff: she need not fully prove discrimination at this stage, but must provide enough factual allegations to give rise to a plausible inference that the adverse action occurred because of her protected characteristic (e.g., race, gender, disability, etc.).

2. Application in Butts

The panel agrees with the district court that Butts failed to meet even this modest threshold. While the order does not detail her specific factual allegations, it emphasizes that she did not provide:

facts tying the allegedly adverse actions to discriminatory bias (e.g., derogatory comments, disparate treatment compared with similarly situated colleagues, or suspicious timing tied to protected traits), or
any other concrete indicators from which discriminatory intent could reasonably be inferred.

Accordingly, the complaint did not cross the plausibility line set by Twombly and Iqbal, as filtered through Littlejohn.

3. Pleading standard: Swierkiewicz vs. Twombly/Iqbal and Port Authority

Butts invoked Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), to argue that a complaint could be dismissed only if “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations”—a formulation derived from Conley v. Gibson. The Second Circuit explicitly rejects this position as “obsolete,” citing:

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007);
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); and
E.E.O.C. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 768 F.3d 247, 253–54 (2d Cir. 2014).

As Port Authority explains:

“Contrary to Conley’s ‘no-set-of-facts’ standard, which requires only that a complaint not preclude the viability of claims, Twombly and Iqbal require that a complaint support the viability of its claims by pleading sufficient nonconclusory factual matter to set forth a claim that is plausible on its face.”

In other words, employment discrimination complaints remain notice‑pleading documents, but plaintiffs must now provide concrete factual content—not merely legal conclusions or speculative assertions—that make discrimination a plausible inference, not just a theoretical possibility.

C. Hostile Work Environment Claims

1. Legal test: Patane and Alfano

The Second Circuit reiterates the standard for a hostile work environment claim, as articulated in Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2007):

The conduct must be objectively severe or pervasive—sufficient to create an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive.
The plaintiff must subjectively perceive the environment as hostile or abusive.
The hostility must occur because of the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class.

The court also invokes Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365 (2d Cir. 2002), for the proposition that:

Facially neutral incidents (i.e., actions not overtly discriminatory on their face) can be considered as part of the totality of circumstances only if there are reasons to think they were motivated by discriminatory animus.

2. Application to Butts’s allegations

Butts argued that the district court improperly evaluated the alleged incidents “in isolation.” The panel disagrees, noting that it has considered “all of Butts’s allegations as a whole” and still finds:

The incidents, even viewed collectively, do not rise to the level of an objectively abusive environment.
Critically, Butts did not plead facts plausibly indicating that the alleged conduct was because of her membership in a protected class. The order explicitly underscores this causal element, echoing Patane and Alfano.

Thus, the hostile work environment claim fails both at the “severity or pervasiveness” prong and at the “because of protected status” prong.

D. Retaliation Claims: § 1983 and the ADA

1. Retaliation under § 1983: Vega and non‑cognizability of disability‑based retaliation

Under Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2015), a plaintiff asserting a retaliation claim under § 1983 must plausibly allege that:

the defendants acted under color of state law;
the defendants took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff; and
they did so because the plaintiff complained of or otherwise opposed discrimination.

Retaliation in this context means adverse action taken because the employee engaged in “protected activity”—i.e., complaining about or opposing discrimination prohibited by federal law (such as Title VII, § 1983 Equal Protection violations, ADA, etc.).

Butts alleged that Kelch and Davis retaliated against her because she complained about violations of her students’ IEPs, which she viewed as violations of the students’ rights (i.e., disability‑related educational guarantees). The panel upholds the district court’s conclusion that:

Disability‑based retaliation claims are not cognizable under § 1983.

The order does not elaborate on the doctrinal basis for this conclusion, but it aligns with the understanding that where a comprehensive remedial scheme exists (e.g., under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act), § 1983 is generally unavailable as an additional vehicle to enforce the same substantive rights. In other words, disability discrimination and retaliation claims should proceed under the ADA (and/or § 504), not under § 1983.

2. Attempted reframing as ADA retaliation: Spiegel and Fox

Recognizing the § 1983 defect, Butts argued on appeal that she had in substance alleged a retaliation claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), specifically 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a), even though she did not explicitly invoke the ADA in her complaint.

The panel gives her the benefit of the doubt arguendo, accepting that a plaintiff need not name the statute expressly if the factual allegations clearly implicate that statute. However, the claim still fails for two independent reasons:

(a) No individual liability under ADA retaliation: Spiegel v. Schulmann

In Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 2010), the Second Circuit held that the ADA’s retaliation provisions do not authorize suits against individuals. The reasons are twofold:

The ADA’s remedial structure mirrors Title VII’s, which the Second Circuit has long interpreted as imposing liability only on employers, not individual supervisors.
The ADA’s statutory language defines covered entities and remedies in a way that excludes individual employees from being proper defendants for retaliation claims.

Applying Spiegel, the panel holds that Butts cannot maintain an ADA retaliation claim against Kelch or Davis in their individual capacities. Those claims are therefore categorically barred.

(b) Lack of causal nexus for ADA claim against DOE: Fox v. Costco

As to the DOE itself, the court addresses causation under the ADA’s anti‑retaliation provision. In Fox v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 918 F.3d 65, 72–73 (2d Cir. 2019), the Second Circuit explained that ADA retaliation claims require plausible allegations that:

the plaintiff engaged in protected activity (e.g., complaining about disability discrimination or participating in a disability‑related investigation or proceeding),
the employer knew of the protected activity,
the employer took an adverse action, and
there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.

Here, the panel concludes that, even if Butts’s complaints about IEP violations could qualify as ADA “protected activity” (a debatable but unaddressed assumption), her complaint still fails because she has not “plausibly alleged a causal connection between the alleged protected activity and any alleged adverse employment actions taken against her.”

Absent concrete allegations of:

temporal proximity of suspicious tightness,
explicit retaliatory statements, or
other objective indicia that complaints about disability issues prompted the alleged adverse actions,

her retaliation theory against the DOE cannot survive Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny.

E. Claims Against the DOE and Municipal Liability Under § 1983

1. Waiver on appeal: Norton v. Sam’s Club

The court first notes that Butts has “waived her challenge” to the dismissal of claims against the DOE for discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation because she failed to “address these claims sufficiently” in her appellate briefs. Under Norton v. Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1998):

“Issues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived and normally will not be addressed on appeal.”

This is a procedural but critical point: appellate courts do not generally rescue or reconstruct underdeveloped arguments.

2. Merits: Batista v. Rodriguez and municipal policy/custom

Even assuming arguendo that the claims were not waived, the panel adds that Butts failed to state a § 1983 claim against the DOE because she did not plead the essential elements for municipal liability. Citing Batista v. Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1983), the court reiterates:

“[T]o hold a city liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional actions of its employees, a plaintiff is required to plead and prove three elements: (1) an official policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional right.”

This is the well‑known Monell standard (after Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)), as elaborated by Batista. Plaintiffs must allege, with some factual specificity, that:

the municipality itself adopted or tolerated a policy, practice, or custom that is unconstitutional, or
a final policymaker implemented or ratified the challenged decision.

Merely alleging that individual employees of the municipality acted unlawfully is not enough. Because Butts did not plead any municipal policy, custom, or practice, her § 1983 claims against DOE fail as a matter of law.

F. LMRA Claims and Public Employees: Green v. DOE

1. Scope of the LMRA

The Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), particularly § 301 (29 U.S.C. § 185), allows employees to bring certain suits against employers and unions concerning violations of collective bargaining agreements and the union’s duty of fair representation. However, crucially:

The LMRA applies to private “employers” as defined in the National Labor Relations Act.
Public employers—such as states, their political subdivisions, and agencies—are generally excluded from the definition of “employer” for these purposes.

Accordingly, public school employees, like those employed by the New York City Department of Education, are typically outside the LMRA framework.

2. Precedent: Green v. Dep’t of Educ. of N.Y.C.

The Second Circuit’s decision in Green v. Dep’t of Educ. of N.Y.C., 16 F.4th 1070, 1075–76 (2d Cir. 2021), squarely held that:

Public employees are not covered by the LMRA and therefore cannot state a claim under LMRA § 301 for breach of a collective bargaining agreement or related duty‑of‑fair‑representation theories.
This defect is one of substantive law, not jurisdiction: the claim fails under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, rather than under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction.

This distinction matters because if the federal court lacks subject‑matter jurisdiction, it generally must remand removed claims to state court. But if the court has jurisdiction yet the federal claim fails on the merits, dismissal—often with prejudice—is appropriate.

3. Application to Butts’s LMRA claims and her remand request

In Butts, the plaintiff argued that the district court “was required to remand her claims pursuant to the LMRA to state court.” The Second Circuit, however, follows Green and holds:

The LMRA does not cover public employees like Butts.
Consequently, her LMRA claims (against the UFT and specific union officials) fail to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
Because this is a failure on the merits, not a jurisdictional defect, the district court was not required to remand those claims. Dismissal was proper.

This closes the door on LMRA‑based federal suits by New York City public school teachers challenging their union or collective bargaining arrangements in federal court under § 301.

IV. Key Legal Concepts Explained (for Non‑Specialists)

1. Summary Orders vs. Precedential Opinions

The Second Circuit labels this decision as a summary order and expressly states it has no precedential effect. Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1:

Summary orders may be cited in later cases (with proper notation),
but they do not bind future panels as precedent.

Nonetheless, such orders often reflect how a panel understands and applies existing precedent and can be persuasive, especially on factually similar issues.

2. Rule 12(b)(6) and the Plausibility Standard

Rule 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Under the Twombly/Iqbal standard:

A complaint must contain enough factual allegations to make the claim plausible, not merely conceivable.
Conclusory statements (e.g., “I was discriminated against because of my race”) are not enough without supporting facts (who, what, when, where, how).
The court assumes factual allegations are true, but need not accept mere legal conclusions or implausible inferences.

3. Protected Class, Adverse Employment Action, and Discriminatory Intent

Protected class: a category protected by anti‑discrimination laws, such as race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age (40+), disability, etc.
Adverse employment action: a materially significant change in employment status or conditions, such as firing, demotion, denial of promotion, significantly diminished responsibilities, or major shifts in benefits.
Discriminatory intent: the employer’s action must be taken because of the employee’s protected class. Plaintiffs typically show this indirectly—e.g., through disparate treatment, biased remarks, patterns of decisions, or suspicious timing.

4. Hostile Work Environment

A hostile work environment exists when:

workplace harassment is severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of employment,
a reasonable person would find it hostile or abusive,
the victim actually experiences it as hostile, and
the hostility occurs because of the victim’s protected characteristic (e.g., racist or sexist slurs, disability‑based ridicule).

Ordinary workplace friction, criticism, and personality conflicts—even if unpleasant—do not generally qualify unless linked to a protected trait and sufficiently serious or continuous.

5. Individualized Education Programs (IEPs)

An Individualized Education Program (IEP) is a legally required document under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) for every public school child receiving special education services. It describes the child’s present performance, goals, and the special services the school will provide.

Teachers who complain about non‑compliance with IEPs are often advocating for students’ disability rights. However, that advocacy does not automatically translate into a viable employment‑retaliation claim by the teacher; the standards of the ADA or other statutes must be met.

6. ADA Retaliation and Individual Liability

Under 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a), the ADA prohibits retaliation against an individual who:

opposes any act or practice made unlawful by the ADA, or
participates in an ADA investigation, proceeding, or hearing.

However, per Spiegel v. Schulmann (2d Cir. 2010), only employers, not individuals, can be sued for ADA retaliation. Supervisors and co‑workers are generally immune from personal liability under the ADA’s anti‑retaliation provision in the Second Circuit.

7. LMRA and Public Employees

The Labor Management Relations Act mainly governs labor‑management relations in the private sector. Public employers—like a city’s department of education—fall outside its scope. As a result, public employees typically cannot:

bring a § 301 LMRA action for breach of a collective bargaining agreement, or
pursue a federal duty‑of‑fair‑representation claim against their union under the LMRA.

Instead, they are generally limited to state‑law labor regimes and public‑sector labor relations statutes.

V. Practical and Doctrinal Implications

1. Reinforcement of Strict Pleading Requirements in Employment Cases

This order reinforces that employment‑related civil rights complaints in the Second Circuit must be drafted with specific, concrete facts. Plaintiffs should:

identify particular discriminatory or harassing incidents,
connect those incidents to protected characteristics with plausible inferences (e.g., comparative treatment of other employees, biased comments), and
avoid relying on broad, conclusory assertions or outdated pleading standards like the Conley “no set of facts” language.

The panel’s discussion of Swierkiewicz, Twombly, Iqbal, and Port Authority serves as a cautionary reminder for practitioners who still cite pre‑Twombly pleading formulations.

2. Clear Message on Disability‑Based Retaliation Under § 1983

By affirming that “disability‑based retaliation claims are not cognizable under Section 1983,” the court signals that:

litigants alleging retaliation for disability‑related advocacy or complaints must generally proceed under the ADA and/or Rehabilitation Act, not § 1983, and
attempts to circumvent the ADA’s structure—particularly its limitations on individual liability—by re‑labeling the claim as a § 1983 action are disfavored.

This adds weight to the notion that comprehensive statutory schemes like the ADA displace § 1983 as an enforcement mechanism for the same rights.

3. Limits on ADA Claims: Individual Liability and Causation

For plaintiffs and attorneys:

Individual supervisors are not proper defendants for ADA retaliation claims in the Second Circuit.
Even when suing the employer entity (like the DOE), plaintiffs must show a plausible Fox v. Costco.

This opinion underscores that merely engaging in advocacy related to disability, without specific, well‑pleaded links to subsequent employment decisions, will not suffice for a viable retaliation claim.

4. Municipal Liability Remains a Substantive Hurdle

The reference to Batista and the necessity of pleading a policy or custom reminds practitioners that municipalities cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for employees’ actions unless:

the actions were taken pursuant to an official policy or long‑standing custom, or
a final policymaker was directly involved.

Complaints against entities such as DOE must, at the pleading stage, identify some facts suggesting the existence of such a policy or custom; failure to do so will result in dismissal.

5. LMRA Inapplicability to Public‑School Employment Disputes

By reaffirming Green, the panel draws a clear boundary around LMRA litigation:

New York City public school employees cannot use LMRA § 301 to sue DOE or the UFT in federal court.
Grievances about collective bargaining agreements or union representation in the public sector must typically be addressed under state labor law frameworks, such as New York’s public‑sector labor statutes (e.g., the Taylor Law), not the LMRA.

Additionally, the court clarifies that the absence of LMRA coverage for public employees is a merits issue, allowing the federal court to dismiss instead of remand.

6. Practical Advice for Public‑School Litigants

For public‑school teachers, union members, and their counsel:

Be cautious about invoking the LMRA in federal court; such claims will almost certainly be dismissed under Green.
When raising retaliation claims, tie the adverse actions directly to legally recognized protected activity—such as filing discrimination complaints or participating in civil‑rights investigations—and plead the connection with specificity.
Understand the limits of § 1983 in disability‑related contexts; ADA and Rehabilitation Act remedies are typically the appropriate channels.
Ensure that appellate briefs fully develop any issues you intend the court to review—sparse or perfunctory briefing will likely result in waiver (Norton).

VI. Conclusion

Although Butts v. Kelch is a non‑precedential summary order, it provides a compact yet instructive survey of several important doctrines at the intersection of public employment, disability rights, and federal pleading standards in the Second Circuit.

The decision:

reaffirms Twombly/Iqbal’s plausibility requirement and rejects reliance on outdated “no set of facts” language from Conley and a misreading of Swierkiewicz,
applies Littlejohn, Patane, and Alfano to confirm that discrimination and hostile work environment claims must include factual allegations supporting both the severity/pervasiveness of the conduct and its connection to a protected class,
embraces the view that disability‑based retaliation claims are not cognizable under § 1983, pushing such claims into the ADA/Rehabilitation Act framework,
reiterates that individual defendants cannot be held personally liable for ADA retaliation and underscores the need for a plausible causal nexus under Fox v. Costco,
restates the Monell/Batista requirement of a municipal policy or custom for § 1983 liability against the DOE, and
confirms, via Green, that public school employees may not invoke the LMRA, and that attempts to do so fail on the merits (Rule 12(b)(6)), not for lack of jurisdiction.

In the broader legal context, Butts functions as a warning against overbroad, conclusory federal employment complaints and as a doctrinal checkpoint for attorneys litigating public‑sector disputes, particularly in the education and disability‑rights arenas. While this order is not binding precedent, it aligns squarely with, and illustrates the continuing force of, established Second Circuit and Supreme Court authority in these areas.