Butler v. Collins: Texas Labor Code Chapter 21 Does Not Preempt Common-Law Tort Claims Against Individual Employees

Introduction

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Butler v. Collins, No. 23-10072 (5th Cir. June 25, 2025), revisited the doctrine of statutory preemption within the context of Texas employment discrimination law. The case centers on Cheryl Butler, a former non-tenured professor at Southern Methodist University (“SMU”), who brought a mélange of federal and state claims after the university denied her tenure application. A pivotal question emerged: Does Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code—commonly referred to as the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (“TCHRA”)—extinguish an employee’s ability to sue co-employees individually for state-law torts (fraud, defamation, conspiracy, negligent supervision) when the factual underpinnings overlap with discrimination or retaliation allegations covered by the statute?

After certifying the preemption question to the Supreme Court of Texas and receiving a negative answer (“No, Chapter 21 does not shield co-employees from tort liability”), the Fifth Circuit partially reversed the district court. The decision breathes new life into Butler’s common-law tort claims against the individual SMU defendants, while leaving intact the dismissal of her other federal and contractual causes. The ruling therefore crystallizes an important principle: TCHRA is exclusive only as to employer liability; it is not an implied grant of immunity for individual employees who allegedly commit independent torts.

Summary of the Judgment

1. Certified Question & Answer. The Fifth Circuit asked the Texas Supreme Court if Chapter 21 preempts common-law defamation and fraud claims against individual employees. The state court unequivocally answered “no,” emphasizing that the statute creates remedies against employers only.

2. Reversal & Remand. Armed with the state court’s guidance, the Fifth Circuit reversed the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of Butler’s fraud, defamation, and conspiracy-to-defame counts against the individual defendants, vacated that portion of the district court’s judgment, and remanded for further proceedings on those tort claims.

3. Affirmance of Remaining Rulings. The appellate panel affirmed:

The Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the negligent-supervision claim against SMU (preempted by Chapter 21 as applied to employers);
The district court’s denial of additional extensions, refusal to consider Butler’s late opposition to summary judgment, and grant of summary judgment on Butler’s federal claims; and
The denial of Butler’s request to reassign the matter to a different district judge on remand.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, 313 S.W.3d 796 (Tex. 2010) – Established that Chapter 21 affords the exclusive statutory remedy against an employer for discrimination. The district court extrapolated this exclusivity to bar claims against co-employees; the Texas Supreme Court declined to extend Waffle House that far.
Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs., 507 U.S. 380 (1993) – Discussed “excusable neglect,” guiding the Fifth Circuit’s affirmance of the district court’s denial of Butler’s late extensions.
Austin v. Kroger Texas, L.P., 864 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2017); Kitchen v. BASF, 952 F.3d 247 (5th Cir. 2020) – Clarified Rule 56 burdens and discretion to disregard dilatory filings; relied upon to uphold summary judgment.
Geiserman v. MacDonald, 893 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1990) – Reaffirmed broad docket-management discretion.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Statutory Interpretation. The Texas Supreme Court observed that Chapter 21’s liability provisions speak only to “employers.” The absence of any textual reference to individuals undermines the argument that the statute silently displaces long-standing tort remedies against co-workers.

2. Presumption Against Implied Immunity. Texas follows the principle that statutes abrogating common-law rights do so only by “clear and specific” language. Because Chapter 21 lacks such language, individual-defendant tort liability survives.

3. Exclusive-Remedy Doctrine Limited. While Waffle House built an exclusivity wall around an employer’s conduct qua employer, it never extended immunity to individual actors. The Fifth Circuit recognized that importing employer exclusivity into co-employee suits would “stretch Waffle House beyond its logical foundation.”

4. Rule 12(b)(6) Error. Because preemption was the only ground on which the district court dismissed Butler’s tort claims, once preemption fell, the claims had to be reinstated.

5. Docket-Management & Summary Judgment. The Fifth Circuit separately found the district court did not abuse its discretion in enforcing deadlines and granting summary judgment, emphasizing litigants’ responsibility to timely oppose motions.

C. Impact of the Judgment

Restored Tort Pathway. Plaintiffs may now pursue fraud, defamation, and other common-law torts against individual supervisors or colleagues even when the same facts support Chapter 21 claims against the employer.
Strategic Litigation Considerations. Practitioners can utilize state-law tort claims to obtain broader damages (e.g., mental anguish, punitive damages) and discovery avenues, possibly enhancing settlement leverage.
Employer-Employee Dynamics. Employers may revisit training and indemnification policies, aware that employees can face personal exposure for workplace statements or conduct.
Federal Diversity Jurisdiction. Including non-diverse individual defendants in tort claims could defeat diversity jurisdiction, potentially keeping cases in Texas state courts.
Preemption Jurisprudence. The ruling reinforces that exclusivity provisions must be precisely bounded and will not be judicially expanded absent explicit legislative direction.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Preemption. When a statute “preempts” a claim, it replaces or bars other legal remedies covering the same subject. Chapter 21 preempts employer-based common-law discrimination claims but, per this ruling, not tort claims against individual co-employees.
Rule 12(b)(6) Motion. A procedural device to dismiss claims that fail to state a legal cause of action. The district court had used this rule to toss Butler’s tort claims believing they were preempted.
Certification of Questions. A federal court may ask a state’s highest court to clarify unsettled state law. The answer binds the federal court on that question.
Exclusive Remedy Doctrine. A statutory scheme that provides the sole relief for a particular wrong, eliminating alternative causes of action. Waffle House applied it to employers under Chapter 21.
Summary Judgment (Rule 56). A tool allowing a court to dismiss claims pre-trial when no genuine factual dispute exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Conclusion

Butler v. Collins elucidates the contours of Chapter 21’s preemptive reach. The Fifth Circuit, guided by the Texas Supreme Court, held that TCHRA’s exclusive-remedy shield envelops employers only; it does not immunize individual employees from common-law tort liability. This doctrinal clarification not only revives Butler’s defamation-based claims but also reshapes the litigation landscape for workplace disputes in Texas. Litigants and counsel must now account for dual-track exposure: statutory claims against employers and independent tort claims against co-employees. The decision underscores the judiciary’s fidelity to textual statutory interpretation and the enduring vitality of common-law remedies absent explicit legislative abrogation.