But-For Causation Satisfies Inclusion of Prior Sentence under U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(e)(1)

Introduction

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Leonel Miller Hinojosa, Jr. (6th Cir. May 30, 2025) addresses when a prior sentence “resulted in” incarceration during the 15-year guideline lookback period under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e)(1). Leonel Hinojosa, Jr., a repeat offender, was originally sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment for a violent robbery and related firearms offenses. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit vacated that sentence because it was unclear whether a 1994 state assault conviction properly counted toward his criminal history. On remand, the government produced evidence that—but for the 1994 conviction—Hinojosa would have served at least eight fewer months in prison during the lookback window. The district court again imposed a total 240-month term, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Parties: United States (Plaintiff-Appellee) v. Leonel Miller Hinojosa, Jr. (Defendant-Appellant).
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Judge writing opinion: Judge Murphy, joined by Chief Judge Sutton and Judge Batchelder.

Summary of the Judgment

On remand from a prior Sixth Circuit decision (67 F.4th 334, 343–47 (6th Cir. 2023)), the district court considered additional records showing how Hinojosa’s 1994 assault sentence extended his incarceration into the 2004–2019 guideline lookback. Applying a “but-for” causation analysis, the court found that without credit for time served on the 1994 conviction, Hinojosa would have been released at least eight months earlier—within the lookback period. The court therefore lawfully counted the 1994 sentence under § 4A1.2(e)(1), yielding a guidelines range of 120–150 months on the robbery and felon-possession counts, plus a mandatory consecutive 120-month term for the § 924(c) offense. The total of 240 months matched the original within-guidelines sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed both the procedural calculation and the substantive reasonableness of the term.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

United States v. Hinojosa, 67 F.4th 334 (6th Cir. 2023) – Vacated prior sentence for unclear application of § 4A1.2(e)(1).
Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014) – Interpreting “results from” to adopt but-for causation.
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) – Causal language “because of” construed under but-for standard.
Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992) – Examination of proximate cause in statutory language.
Comcast Corp. v. National Ass’n of African American-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327 (2020) – Background rule favoring ordinary-meaning interpretation.
Bartley, 618 F. App’x 439 (10th Cir. 2015) – Independent-cause exception discussion (not adopted here).

Legal Reasoning

The Sixth Circuit examined U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e)(1), which provides two paths for counting prior sentences over 13 months: (1) imposed within 15 years of the current offense and (2) “whenever imposed” if it “resulted in” incarceration during any part of the 15-year lookback. The court held that ordinary-meaning principles and Supreme Court precedents support a but-for causation test: a prior sentence “results in” incarceration if that incarceration “would not have occurred in the absence of—that is, but for—the” sentence (Burrage, 571 U.S. at 211).

The government demonstrated that Hinojosa’s 1994 assault conviction delayed his release on his 2002 assault sentence by at least eight months. Under Michigan law, time served on a prior sentence reduces the minimum term of a later sentence. Because Hinojosa did not receive credit for the eight months spent in custody on his 1994 conviction, he served those eight months during the 2004–2019 lookback window “but for” the 1994 crime. That showing sufficed under § 4A1.2(e)(1), and the district court properly added three criminal history points.

The court also rejected Hinojosa’s proximate-cause and independent-cause arguments as forfeited: he did not argue either below. And he could not demonstrate any exception to the but-for standard in this record.

Impact

Clarifies that U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e)(1) adopts a but-for causation test for the “resulted in” language when counting old sentences in criminal history.
Confirms that sentencing courts may examine state credit-for-time rules to establish how prior convictions extended incarceration into the federal guideline lookback.
Limits the need to develop a proximate-cause or independent-cause exception unless properly raised by the defendant.
Guides lower courts on the burden of proof and type of evidence needed to show a causal link between a prior conviction and post-conviction incarceration.
Strengthens the procedural soundness of within-guidelines sentences when criminal history scoring correctly applies established causal standards.

Complex Concepts Simplified

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e)(1) lookback period: A 15-year window before the current offense in which prior sentences over 13 months may count toward criminal history.
But-for causation: A standard asking whether the result would have occurred “but for” the defendant’s past action or event.
Independent-cause exception: A rare doctrine under which multiple concurrent causes each independently suffice to bring about a result, even if neither is strictly a but-for cause.
Credit-for-time rules: State or federal statutes that reduce a sentence’s minimum term by counting prior custody time against it.
Procedural vs. Substantive Reasonableness: Procedural concerns focus on correct guideline calculations; substantive concerns address whether the ultimate sentence is fair under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Hinojosa establishes that a prior sentence “resulted in” incarceration during the guideline lookback if, but for that sentence, the defendant would have served less or no time in prison during the relevant period. By endorsing a straightforward but-for causation test, the court provides clear guidance to practitioners and sentencing courts on counting old convictions in criminal history calculations. The ruling reaffirms the district court’s within-guidelines sentence as procedurally correct and substantively reasonable, underscoring the weight given to public safety and a defendant’s history of violence when imposing a federal term of imprisonment.