Business Court “Divisions” Are District Court Divisions: Judges Must Be Elected; Legislature Cannot Create New Trial Courts by Statute

I. Introduction

In WHITE AND WADDELL v. STITT (2025 OK 68), the Oklahoma Supreme Court, exercising original jurisdiction, struck down Senate Bill 632 (S.B. 632), a 2025 enactment designed to create “business court division[s] within the district court” in any judicial district containing a county with a population over 500,000 (effectively District Nos. 7 and 14).

The petitioners—Joe E. White, Jr. and Jason Waddell—challenged the Act on multiple constitutional grounds, with the centerpiece dispute being whether the Act could place “business court judges” into office through gubernatorial appointment (from a list provided by the Speaker of the House) with Senate confirmation, rather than by election.

Procedurally, the case also presented threshold questions: whether Governor Stitt was a proper party after legislative leaders were dismissed, whether petitioners had standing, and whether the Court should assume original jurisdiction to decide the constitutional challenge before the Act took effect.

II. Summary of the Opinion

Motion to Dismiss denied: The Governor was a proper respondent because S.B. 632 placed him at the center of the challenged appointment process.
Standing found: Petitioners had taxpayer standing due to imminent public expenditures to implement S.B. 632 and voter standing because the Act threatened to impair a voter’s constitutional right to elect district judges.
Original jurisdiction assumed: The Court deemed the matter publici juris and requiring prompt resolution to avoid spending public funds and disrupting case administration statewide.
Merits: The Act was unconstitutional. If read as creating a new court, it exceeded legislative authority under Article VII, Section 1. If read as creating divisions within the district courts (the Court’s “only accurate reading”), the “business court judges” were district judges who must be elected under OKLA. CONST. art. VI, § 9, making S.B. 632’s appointment and reappointment scheme invalid.
Severability: The unconstitutional provisions were not severable; therefore, the entire Act was void.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Proper party and the Governor’s “connection” to the challenged act

Women's Emergency Network v. Bush, 323 F.3d 937 (11th Cir. 2003): Invoked by the Governor to argue he was not a proper party. The Oklahoma Supreme Court treated it as supporting, rather than defeating, the “connection” principle: state officers may be sued when they are “responsible for” the challenged action and have “some connection” to it. The Court found that connection satisfied because S.B. 632 obligated gubernatorial appointments central to petitioners’ requested injunction.
Hunsucker v. Fallin, 2017 OK 100, 408 P.3d 599; Fent v. Fallin, 2014 OK 105, 345 P.3d 1113; Coats v. Fallin, 2013 OK 108, 316 P.3d 924; Fent v. Fallin, 2013 OK 107, 315 P.3d 1023: Cited to normalize naming Oklahoma governors in constitutional challenges to legislation—reinforcing the Court’s conclusion that the Governor’s role was not too “attenuated” to support justiciability.

2. Standing doctrine (taxpayer and voter standing)

Fent v. Contingency Review Bd., 2007 OK 27, 163 P.3d 512: Provided the Court’s framework for standing (injury-in-fact, causation, redressability) and the principle that taxpayers may challenge illegal expenditures.
Thomas v. Henry, 2011 OK 53, 260 P.3d 1251: Key authority for the proposition that resident taxpayers can challenge the constitutionality of non-fiscal/non-appropriation bills where implementing/enforcing the act entails sufficient public-funds involvement to risk wrongful expenditure. The Court applied this directly once the record reflected planned appropriations and an estimated $2 million implementation cost.
Gentges v. Okla. State Election Bd., 2014 OK 8, 319 P.3d 674: Supported voter standing even where the challenged restriction affects a broad class of voters. The Court analogized S.B. 632’s alleged infringement on electing judges to broadly applicable voting restrictions.
Hunsucker v. Fallin, 2017 OK 100, 408 P.3d 599, 619, as modified (Dec. 20, 2017) (Wyrick, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part): Quoted to clarify that a plaintiff’s standing is not defeated merely because relief would also vindicate rights shared by others; what matters is membership in the regulated/affected class.

3. Original jurisdiction and “publici juris”

Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 12 of Okla. Cnty. v. State ex rel. State Bd. of Educ., 2024 OK 39, 565 P.3d 23: Supplied the factors governing whether the Court exercises superintending original jurisdiction, including whether a matter is publici juris and whether prompt resolution is necessary.
Edmondson v. Pearce, 2004 OK 23, 91 P.3d 605: Cited for the caution that declaratory relief in original jurisdiction is rare; the Court used it to frame why this case was an exceptional circumstance.

4. Constitutional architecture: limits on legislative power to create courts

Jackson v. Freeman, 1995 OK 100, 905 P.2d 217: Central to the Court’s separation-of-powers analysis. The Court relied on Jackson’s account of the 1967 constitutional reforms that removed language formerly empowering the Legislature to create “such other courts” and replaced it with a limited, enumerated vesting of judicial power. Jackson was used to reject the Governor’s theory that Article VII, Section 1 implicitly authorizes creation of new courts beyond those enumerated.

5. Meaning of “division” within a district court

Jemigan v. Jernigan, 2006 OK 22, 138 P.3d 539: Used for the proposition that a “division” is an administrative subsection of the district court that may specialize by docket, yet remains part of the district court; thus, judges assigned to such divisions remain district court judges.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The Court’s two-track constitutional analysis: either reading of S.B. 632 fails

A notable feature of the opinion is its insistence that S.B. 632 is unconstitutional whether it is characterized as: (1) creating a new “business court” separate from the district courts, or (2) creating business court “divisions” within the district courts. This structure prevented the defense from escaping constitutional scrutiny through definitional maneuvering.

2. If S.B. 632 created a new court, the Legislature lacked power to do so

The Court emphasized that OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1 vests judicial power in enumerated courts and allows the Legislature only limited authority, including providing intermediate appellate courts, creating quasi-judicial boards/agencies/commissions, and creating/changing/abolishing municipal courts. A “business court” is not among the enumerated judicial-power courts, and “Boards, Agencies and Commissions” are not interchangeable with “courts.” Relying on the post-1967 constitutional design described in Jackson v. Freeman, the Court concluded the Legislature cannot create a new court of general judicial power absent constitutional authorization.

3. The “only accurate reading”: S.B. 632 created district-court divisions

The Court found S.B. 632’s text and operational mechanics made it a district-court division statute: it expressly created “business court division[s] within the district court,” relied on district court clerks, shared district resources and technology, and contemplated support from other district judges if caseloads were unmanageable.

The Court also placed S.B. 632 in statutory context: it pointed to earlier business-docket legislation (2004) and the more recent S.B. 473 framework (2024) that established “judicial office[s]” within District Nos. 7 and 14 “for the purpose of providing a business court judge” (effective July 1, 2026). That statutory ecosystem reinforced the conclusion that business court work is a specialized district court docket/division, not a free-standing court.

4. Because they are district court judges, they must be elected

Once “business court judges” were classified as district judges, the constitutional consequence followed: OKLA. CONST. art. VI, § 9 requires district judges to be “elected by the voters of the several respective districts or counties at a non-partisan election.” S.B. 632, however, mandated a gubernatorial appointment process (House list of three candidates; Senate consent), an eight-year term, reappointment, holdover service until replacement, and vacancy filling through the same appointment method. That design displaced the constitutional election mandate and was therefore unconstitutional.

The opinion also signaled that S.B. 632’s attempt to treat business court judges differently (qualifications, term timing and length, salary, and law clerk authorization) triggered additional constitutional concerns (including special-law issues and Article VII, Section 8’s delineation of district-court judicial classes), though the Court did not need to resolve each issue once it found the election violation.

5. Severability: why the entire Act fell

Applying 75 O.S. § 11a, the Court concluded severance could not salvage S.B. 632. The Court relied heavily on expressed legislative intent—especially counsel’s representation that the Act was meant to create appointed, stand-alone judges in a freestanding court— and held that once the core appointment architecture was unconstitutional, the remaining provisions were “incomplete” and incapable of execution consistent with that intent. Thus, S.B. 632 was void in its entirety.

C. Impact

1. Constraints on specialized trial-court experimentation

The opinion draws a firm constitutional boundary: the Legislature cannot create new trial courts wielding judicial power outside the courts enumerated in Article VII, Section 1. Policy innovations must be implemented through constitutionally permitted structures—most plausibly through district-court divisions/dockets administered within the judiciary’s constitutional framework.

2. Election requirement as a non-negotiable feature of district court judging

By holding that a “division” remains part of the district court and that its judge is therefore a district judge, the Court forecloses appointment-based end-runs around Article VI, Section 9. Any future effort to staff specialized district-court divisions with non-elected judges risks the same fate.

3. Standing and justiciability consequences

The standing analysis is consequential beyond business courts: the Court reaffirmed that resident taxpayers can challenge laws where implementation entails real public expenditures, and that voters have standing to challenge laws that burden voting-related constitutional rights even when widely shared. The Court also confirmed that a governor’s statutory duty to implement an allegedly unconstitutional appointment process can be enough to keep the governor in the case.

4. Litigation and legislative drafting signals

The nonseverability holding is a warning to drafters: when an act’s core design is constitutionally infirm, courts may refuse to reconstruct a different program by severance, especially where the program’s “unique” intent cannot be achieved within constitutional limits.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Original jurisdiction: Instead of waiting for a district court to decide first, the Oklahoma Supreme Court can sometimes hear a case directly, especially where the issue affects the public broadly and requires quick resolution.
Publici juris: A matter affecting the community at large (here, statewide case assignment/jurisdiction and expenditure of public funds) with a pressing need for a prompt judicial ruling.
Taxpayer standing: The ability of a taxpayer to sue to prevent illegal use of public money, when spending is imminent and tied to the challenged law.
Voter standing: The ability of a registered voter to challenge a law that burdens the voter’s right to vote (here, the right to elect district judges).
Severability: When part of a law is unconstitutional, a court asks whether the rest can still operate as a complete law consistent with legislative intent. If not, the whole law is struck down.
“Division” vs. “court”: A “division” is typically a specialized administrative segment within an existing court (like civil, probate, family). Calling something a “division” matters because it stays within the district court—and the constitutional rules for district courts still apply.

V. Conclusion

WHITE AND WADDELL v. STITT establishes a clear constitutional rule for Oklahoma: a legislatively created “business court division” housed within the district court is not a separate tribunal; it remains part of the district court system, and its judge is therefore a district judge who must be elected under OKLA. CONST. art. VI, § 9. At the same time, the opinion reiterates that the Legislature lacks authority under OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1 to create new trial courts vested with judicial power beyond those the Constitution enumerates.

By denying severance and voiding S.B. 632 in full, the Court not only invalidated a specific appointment-based business court model, but also signaled that structural reforms to Oklahoma’s judiciary must fit within constitutional limits on court creation, judicial selection, and separation of powers.