Allen, Moser Marsalek for appellants. (1) On the record the judgment against W.R. Gentry, receiver, is erroneous. A receiver for a corporation is not liable for damages due to an injury alleged to have been caused by the wrongful act of the corporation or its servants before the receiver's appointment. Smith v. Railroad Co., 151 Mo. 402; Allen v. Railroad Co., 184 Mo. App. 492; Sec. 125, Title 28, U.S. Code; Northern P. Ry. Co. v. Heflen, 83 F. 93; McDermott v. Crook, 20 App. Cas. 465; Emory v. Faith, 113 Md. 253, 77 A. 386; Decker v. Gardner, 124 N.Y. 334, 26 N.E. 814; Arnold v. Suffolk Bank, 27 Barb. 424; Brown v. Warner, 78 Tex. 543, 14 S.W. 1032; Flynn v. Furth, 25 Wn. 105, 64 P. 904. (2) The court erred in overruling the demurrers at the close of all the evidence requested by defendants Hamilton-Brown Shoe Company and its receiver, because the evidence was insufficient to show that defendant Doneghy was engaged in the discharge of any duty for his codefendants when the accident occurred. (a) When the evidence was introduced showing just what Doneghy was doing on the occasion of the accident, whatever presumption might otherwise have arisen from Doneghy's general employment for the shoe company, and the company's ownership of the automobile involved, fell out of the case. Guthrie v. Holmes, 272 Mo. 237. (b) According to the undisputed evidence Doneghy had completed his work for the shoe company more than two hours before the accident occurred, and in the interim, and at the time of the accident, was engaged in his own private pursuits. Under such circumstances there can be no liability upon the part of the shoe company or its receiver for Doneghy's acts. Calhoun v. D.C. E. Mining Co., 202 Mo. App. 564; Kilroy v. Crane Agency Co., 203 Mo. App. 302; Vallery v. Hesse Building Material Co., 211 S.W. 95; Lansing v. Hayes, 196 A.D. 671, 118 N.Y.S. 329; Southern Casualty Co. v. Ehlers, 14 S.W.2d 111; Otto v. Chapin, 243 Mich. 256, 220 N.W. 661. (3) The court erred in permitting plaintiff's second amended petition to be read to the jury. (a) It has been held repeatedly that the pleadings are for the court, and not for the jury, and that the reading of the pleadings to the jury is not proper. Gorman v. Railroad Co., 325 Mo. 334; Van Orman v. J.C. Penney Co., 60 S.W.2d 412; Blackmore v. Railroad Co., 162 Mo. 455. (b) In this case the error was prejudicial to defendants, because the injuries and damages alleged in the petition were for the most part unproven, and the plaintiff's instruction on the measure of damages did not specifically limit the jury to the items they could consider. Under such circumstances the plaintiff erroneously went to the jury on all the allegations of damage pleaded in his petition. Crossno v. Terminal Railroad Assn., 41 S.W.2d 800; Cox v. Terminal Railroad Assn., 43 S.W.2d 576. (4) The court erred in submitting the case without instructions advising the jury of the facts necessary to be found to warrant a verdict against the respective defendants. (a) This court has constantly criticized the submission of negligence cases without an instruction defining the issues. Kohr v. Met. St. Ry. Co., 117 Mo. App. 302; Allen v. Transit Co., 183 Mo. 435; Keehn v. D.R.F.R. I. Co., 328 Mo. 1046. (b) The court has held such course to be reversible error where the trial court gives a general instruction on the subject, likely to mislead and confuse the jury. Freeman v. Berberich, 60 S.W.2d 396. (5) The court erred in giving, at plaintiff's request, Instruction C. (a) Even though technically correct, an instruction should not be given which submits a bare principle, in cryptic form, to the jury, without hypothesizing the facts according to which the verdict should be for the one party or the other. Such course constitutes reversible error. Yarnell v. Railway, 75 Mo. 575; Boland v. Railroad Co., 284 S.W. 145; Freeman v. Berberich, 60 S.W.2d 395; Millhouser v. K.C. Pub. Serv. Co., 55 S.W.2d 673; Peppers v. Railroad Co., 316 Mo. 1104; Felts v. Spesia, 61 S.W.2d 404; Henry v. Disbrow Mining Co., 144 Mo. App. 362; Raybourn v. Phillips, 160 Mo. App. 534. (b) An instruction should be in plain and simple language, clear and explicit, definite, and direct in statement. It should not leave too much to the discretion of the jury. Gillette v. Laederich, 242 S.W. 112. (6) The court erred in giving the jury, at plaintiff's request, Instruction D. This instruction was likely to confuse and mislead the jury, in that it presupposed that a verdict for plaintiff should be against all the defendants, especially inasmuch as neither this instruction nor any other instruction given distinguished or pointed out the circumstances under which a verdict could be rendered against one defendant and in favor of the others. Beem v. Beem, 141 N.E. 81, 193 Ind. 481; Ratte v. P. Berry Sons, 119 A. 894, 98 Conn. 522; Beaver v. Taylor, 68 U.S. 644, 17 L.Ed. 601; Blackman v. Bloom, 31 Ill. App. 614. (7) The court erred in orally instructing the jury as to the form of their verdict. (a) Our statute requires instructions to be in writing, and an oral instruction, under some circumstances, will constitute reversible error. Sec. 967, R.S. 1929; State ex rel. v. Rubber Mfg. Co., 149 Mo. 196; Bergfeld v. Dunham, 201 S.W. 641. (b) The instruction was further erroneous because it required the jury to use one of the forms of verdict before them, when they had no form for a finding in favor of plaintiff and against one defendant and in favor of the other defendants. See authorities under Point 6, supra. (8) The court erred in giving the jury plaintiff's Instruction B on the measure of damages. (a) The instruction went beyond the evidence in authorizing the jury to consider the damage to plaintiff's wagon and team when evidence was entirely lacking as to the reasonable value of the wagon and one of the mares. Duke v. Railroad, 99 Mo. 347; Simpson v. Burnett, 299 Mo. 246. (b) The instruction is further erroneous in that it fails to give the jury the correct measure of damages for loss or destruction of property, which is the difference between the reasonable value of the property immediately before and immediately after the occurrence. Pannell v. Allen, 160 Mo. App. 722; Smith v. Railroad, 183 Mo. App. 188; Streett v. Laumeier, 34 Mo. 469; Badgley v. City of St. Louis, 149 Mo. 134; Jackels v. Railroad Co., 231 S.W. 1025. (c) The part of the instruction relative to plaintiff's personal injuries fails to limit the allowance to fair and reasonable compensation, and fails to confine the jury to a consideration of the damage sustained as a result of the collision in question. It is a wholly general, roving commission, and as such is fatally erroneous. Fisher v. Transit Co., 198 Mo. 589; Camp v. Wabash Railroad Co., 94 Mo. App. 272; Jacquemin v. Grand Avenue C. Co., 57 Mo. App. 335; Boyd v. Transit Co., 108 Mo. App. 303; Maggioli v. Transit Co., 108 Mo. App. 416; Rose v. W.U.T. Co., 38 S.W.2d 483. (9) The court erred in refusing to discharge the jury and to declare a mistrial on account of improper and prejudicial argument before the jury by plaintiff's counsel. Jackman v. Ry. Co., 206 S.W. 244; Smith v. Railroad Co., 31 S.W.2d 105; Warren v. Guidici, 9 S.W.2d 541; Williams v. Columbia Taxi Cab Co., 241 S.W. 970; Ryan v. Sheffield, C. E. Co., 24 S.W.2d 166. (10) The court erred in permitting plaintiff's counsel to read excerpts from the deposition of defendant Doneghy. If the plaintiff desired to introduce said deposition as an admission against interest by the defendant, it was the plaintiff's duty to read the entire document. Bompart's Admr. v. Lucas, 32 Mo. 123; Milliken v. Thyson Com. Co., 202 Mo. 654. (11) The court erred in permitting Dr. Roy M. Wolf to testify to alleged nervous conditions not pleaded in the petition. Said injuries were not a necessary result of the injuries pleaded, and it was reversible error to admit evidence thereof over the objection of the defendants. Hall v. Manufacturers Coal Coke Co., 260 Mo. 370; Rosenweig v. Wells, 308 Mo. 634. (12) The court erred in permitting plaintiff to read in evidence Plaintiff's Exhibit A, a statement of account. Said exhibit was incompetent; it was not properly identified and constituted mere hearsay. Karr and Conn v. Cade School District, 297 S.W. 734; Johnson v. American R.E. Co., 245 S.W. 1071; Ramsey v. Watters, 1 Mo. 406; 22 C.J. 929, sec. 1138. (13) The verdict is grossly excessive, and the court erred in refusing to set it aside and grant the defendants a new trial. (a) The evidence was insufficient to show that the plaintiff had suffered any permanent injuries. Plank v. Brown Petroleum Co., 61 S.W.2d 334; Lebrecht v. United Rys. Co., 237 S.W. 112; Rosenweig v. Wells, 308 Mo. 640; Clark v. Ry. Co., 324 Mo. 419. (b) The excess due to the inclusion in the award of property damages, not sustained by the evidence, cannot be computed and cannot be cured by remittitur. Duke v. Railroad, 99 Mo. 347; Rhoades v. Nevada, 47 Mo. App. 501; Haworth v. Railroad Co., 94 Mo. App. 227; Simpson v. Burnett, 299 Mo. 246; Morris v. Grand Avenue R. Co., 144 Mo. 508. (c) Where an excessive verdict is due to prejudicial evidence the error cannot be cured by remittitur. Olian v. Olian, 59 S.W.2d 678. (d) The verdict is grossly excessive when compared with recoveries permitted for similar injuries in other cases. Kleinlein v. Foskin, 13 S.W.2d 648; Bragg v. Met. St. Ry. Co., 192 Mo. 365; Nichols v. Crystal P.G. Co., 126 Mo. 55; Dean v. Railroad Co., 229 Mo. 425; Corn v. Ry. Co., 228 S.W. 78; Clark v. Ry. Co., 324 Mo. 419. Rieger Rieger, Murrell Murrell and Waldo Edwards for respondent. (1) Leave to sue W.R. Gentry; the receiver of the defendant, Hamilton-Brown Shoe Company, was not necessary and is not jurisdictional. There was no attempt to interfere with the actual possession of property in the hands of the receiver. The receiver appeared, answered, and contested the claim of respondent and he is now bound by the judgment. Secs. 124, 125, Title 28, U.S. Code; Jacobs v. Railroad Co., 132 Misc. 144; Texas, etc., v. Cox, 145 U.S. 593; Reed v. Railroad, 277 Mo. 86. In any event, even though the court should reverse the judgment as against the receiver, it would stand against the other defendants. (2) It was admitted that the car being operated by the defendant Doneghy at the time of the collision was owned by the defendant shoe company, was furnished to him for the purpose of using it in the furtherance of the company's business, and it is conclusively shown that the defendant Doneghy was in the general employment of the shoe company. This establishes a prima facie case as against the defendant shoe company, and the question was one for the jury. Barz v. Fleischman Yeast Co., 271 S.W. 364; Peterson v. Railroad, 265 Mo. 462. A slight deviation or incidental things done by a servant or agent for his own benefit while in the line of his service, are not sufficient to exonerate the master from liability for the negligence of the servant. The evidence conclusively establishes that Doneghy at the time of the accident was engaged in the furtherance of his employers' business. Guthrie v. Holmes, 272 Mo. 236; Schulte v. Grand Union Tea Coffee Co., 43 S.W.2d 835; Vanneman v. Laundry Co., 166 Mo. App. 685; Anderson v. Nagel, 214 Mo. App. 134; Burgess v. Garvin, 272 S.W. 114; 39 C.J. 1298. And in determining whether or not Doneghy was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident, the court must take into consideration the particular character of his employment. The words "acting within the scope of his employment" have no peculiar legal or technical meaning, but must be accepted in their ordinary sense. Nichols v. Ry. Co., 282 S.W. 275; Noland v. Morris Co., 212 Mo. App. 1. (3) Defendants under the third assignment of errors complained that the court erred in permitting plaintiff's second amended petition to be read to the jury. The cases cited by defendants under this head do not hold that this is reversible error, and the same is not reversible error and never has been so held by any appellate court in this State. Under the same point, complaint is made that plaintiff's instructions on measure of damages was erroneous because the case went to the jury on all of the allegations of damages contained in the petition. This statement is incorrect. Plaintiff's instructions did not refer the jury to the allegations of plaintiff's petition as to damages alleged, but referred the jury to the evidence as to the damages received by the plaintiff, and the authorities cited under this point have no application to the case at bar. (4) Appellants criticize respondent's Instruction B, directing the jury that if they find for the plaintiff against the defendants they should assess his damages at such sum as they believe from the evidence will reasonably compensate him for his injuries, etc. While such instructions have been criticized they have never been held to be reversible error by this court, and the cases cited by appellant so hold. There is no duty on plaintiff to request nor on the trial court to give instructions in a civil case, and the submission of same by plaintiff upon an instruction on the measure of damages alone is not reversible error. McDonald v. Central Ill. Const. Co., 183 Mo. App. 415; Stewart v. Mason, 186 S.W. 578; Williams v. Columbia Taxi Cab Co., 241 S.W. 970; Roemer v. Wells, 257 S.W. 1056; Meyers v. Cement Co., 260 S.W. 778; Roberson v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 285 S.W. 127; Gruenewald v. Iron Works, 5 S.W.2d 709; Luikart v. Miller, 48 S.W.2d 867. (5) Appellants in their assignment of errors criticize plaintiff's Instruction C because the same directed the jury that unless they found against the defendant Doneghy they could not find against his codefendants. This instruction was favorable to the appellants because it is elementary law that unless Doneghy was guilty of negligence, his principals could not be guilty of negligence. (6) Appellants criticize respondent's Instruction D. This instruction is not correctly set forth in the motion for new trial, but is correctly set forth in appellant's abstract of the record, page 113, and the court can readily see that the criticism levelled against the same is unjustified. (7) The assignment of error that the court orally instructed the jury is without merit. The colloquy between the court, the attorneys and the jury is not oral instruction, and if it is on a conceded point, it is not reversible error. Simmons v. Haberkorn, 139 Mich. 130; Walsh v. Drayage Co., 40 Mo. App. 339; Lumatz v. Car Co., 217 Mo. App. 95. Section 967, Revised Statutes 1929, is not to be interpreted as forbidding the court to direct the jury ore tenus concerning their ordinary duties as jurors or as a jury. Baxter v. Magill, 127 Mo. App. 400. (8) Plaintiff's Instruction B, requires the jury to assess such damages as they believe from the evidence will reasonably compensate him for such damages as he received. Since this instruction refers the jury to the evidence and if there was no evidence as to damage to the wagon, then it cannot be assumed that the jury included any damage to the wagon. There is no merit in this assignment of error. (9) Argument of counsel for the plaintiff was not improper. It was only a statement that counsel would do their duty and collect the judgment if one was rendered against the defendants. Further, the same was withdrawn and the jury was instructed not to consider the same. This cured any error that might have existed at the time. Christopher v. C.B. Q. Ry. Co., 55 S.W.2d 452. (10) Appellants did not request the court to order plaintiff's counsel to read the entire deposition to the jury. The court offered to let appellants read all or any part of the deposition they desired to introduce. They did not avail themselves of this opportunity. Kritzer v. Smith, 21 Mo. 296; Norris v. Brunswick, 76 Mo. 256; Rettlia v. Salomon, 274 S.W. 366; Cox v. Reynolds, 18 S.W.2d 575. No objection was made to the testimony of Dr. Wolf as to condition of plaintiff at the time he gave the testimony, except that counsel for the plaintiff said, "We object to the speech," and requested Dr. Wolf to confine himself to the condition of the patient. There was no motion to strike out this part of his testimony, and the record shows that the appellants at that time were apparently satisfied with the same. (11) It was admitted that the defendant, Hamilton-Brown Shoe Company, was the owner of the car, and the admission in evidence of Plaintiff's Exhibit A was harmless error, if it was error at all. (12) The verdict was not excessive. Plaintiff's physicians all testified that he had received serious and permanent injuries. A verdict for a much greater sum for injuries of a similar nature has been affirmed by this court. Ruggeri v. Mitchell Clay Mfg. Co., 15 S.W.2d 778.