Bruen and Rahimi Do Not Abrogate Eleventh Circuit Precedent Upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Rozier Controls)

Introduction

In United States v. Brady Castro (11th Cir. Dec. 31, 2025) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Brady Antonio Castro’s conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and his 77-month sentence (the bottom of the advisory guideline range). Castro raised three appellate claims: (1) an as-applied Second Amendment challenge under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen; (2) procedural unreasonableness, alleging the district court relied on sentencing facts inconsistent with the presentence investigation report (“PSI”); and (3) substantive unreasonableness, emphasizing self-protection, mental health issues, and a non-violent history.

The key legal issue with broader significance is the panel’s application of the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule: whether Bruen and United States v. Rahimi altered the circuit’s binding holding in United States v. Rozier that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional.

Summary of the Opinion

Second Amendment: Castro’s challenge was foreclosed by circuit precedent. Under United States v. Dubois (Dubois II), neither Bruen nor Rahimi abrogated United States v. Rozier, which upheld § 922(g)(1) even where a felon claims self-defense.
Procedural reasonableness: Applying plain-error review (no contemporaneous objection), the panel found Castro failed to show the district court relied on erroneous facts or that any claimed error affected the sentence.
Substantive reasonableness: The within-guidelines 77-month sentence was upheld; the district court permissibly weighed criminal history, deterrence, and disparity concerns against mitigation.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

A. Standards of review and appellate constraints

United States v. Fleury and United States v. Peters: de novo review is typical for constitutional questions, but constitutional challenges raised for the first time on appeal are reviewed for plain error.
United States v. Turner and United States v. Innocent: define the plain-error elements and emphasize that an error is “plain” only if directly resolved by statute/rule or controlling precedent.
United States v. Pugh, Gall v. United States, and United States v. McNair: set the two-step reasonableness review (procedural then substantive) and apply plain-error review to unpreserved procedural objections.
United States v. Barrington: clear-error standard for factual findings.
United States v. Arias-Izquierdo: explains substantial-rights prejudice in sentencing—reasonable probability of a lower sentence absent the error.

B. Second Amendment merits and the prior-panel-precedent rule

District of Columbia v. Heller: recognized an individual right to possess handguns for self-defense in the home while stating that “nothing in [its] opinion should be taken to cast doubt” on “longstanding prohibitions” on felons possessing firearms, describing such regulations as “presumptively lawful.”
United States v. Rozier: the Eleventh Circuit’s controlling decision holding § 922(g)(1) constitutional “even if a felon possesses a firearm purely for self-defense,” relying on Heller’s “presumptively lawful longstanding prohibition” language rather than means-end scrutiny.
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen: adopted a text-and-history framework (plain text coverage; then historical tradition consistency) and repeatedly referred to the Second Amendment as protecting “law-abiding” citizens—language later used by the Eleventh Circuit to conclude that Bruen did not clearly overrule Rozier.
United States v. Rahimi: upheld § 922(g)(8) under Bruen and reiterated that felon-dispossession prohibitions are “presumptively lawful,” which the panel treated as reinforcing, not undermining, Rozier.
United States v. Dubois (Dubois I) and United States v. Dubois (Dubois II): the Eleventh Circuit’s post-Bruen and post-Rahimi decisions holding § 922(g)(1) remains constitutional in this circuit because Rozier remains binding under the prior-panel-precedent rule. Dubois II specifically reasoned that Rahimi “reinforced -- not undermined -- Rozier.”

C. Sentencing fact-finding and reasonableness

United States v. Matthews: sentencing facts may come from the plea, undisputed PSI statements, or evidence at sentencing; courts may draw reasonable inferences.
United States v. Wade: failure to object to PSI factual allegations admits them for sentencing purposes.
United States v. Tome, United States v. Hunt: defendant bears the burden to show unreasonableness; within-guidelines sentences are ordinarily expected to be reasonable.
United States v. Irey (en banc), United States v. Shabazz, United States v. Rosales-Bruno: define substantive-reasonableness abuse-of-discretion and emphasize district courts’ discretion to weigh § 3553(a) factors unequally.

Legal Reasoning

1) Second Amendment claim: foreclosed by binding circuit precedent

The panel’s constitutional analysis is principally institutional: it does not re-litigate whether § 922(g)(1) satisfies Bruen on a clean slate. Instead, it applies the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule as articulated in United States v. Dubois (Dubois II). Under that rule, United States v. Rozier remains controlling unless abrogated by an on-point Supreme Court decision that “demolish[es] and eviscerate[s]” its “fundamental props.” The panel held neither Bruen nor United States v. Rahimi meets that standard—indeed, Rahimi reiterated felon bans are “presumptively lawful.”

Practically, the opinion establishes that, within the Eleventh Circuit, an as-applied challenge by a felon asserting self-defense or victimhood remains barred so long as Rozier stands.

2) Procedural reasonableness: no plain error shown

Castro argued the government portrayed the incident as a “shootout” and as if he were the aggressor, conflicting with the PSI’s account that he was shot and reacted as men approached him. Because Castro did not object at sentencing, the panel applied plain-error review (citing United States v. McNair).

The panel found no plain error for two related reasons: (i) the record did not show the district court actually relied on the contested “aggressor/shootout” framing; rather, the court described Castro’s account as “very convincing” and accepted that he feared for his life and family; and (ii) Castro did not show prejudice under United States v. Arias-Izquierdo—no reasonable probability of a lower sentence absent the alleged mischaracterization—because the court anchored its decision in other § 3553(a) considerations (criminal history, deterrence, avoiding disparities) and still sentenced at the bottom of the range.

3) Substantive reasonableness: within-guidelines and supported by § 3553(a)

On substantive reasonableness, the panel emphasized deferential review under Gall v. United States and the expectation of reasonableness for within-guidelines sentences under United States v. Hunt. It relied on United States v. Rosales-Bruno and related cases to affirm that the district court could weigh criminal history and deterrence more heavily than mitigation.

Impact

Second Amendment litigation in the Eleventh Circuit: The opinion reinforces a bright-line practical rule: § 922(g)(1) challenges—especially as-applied claims grounded in self-defense or “non-violent” felon status—are unlikely to succeed absent an en banc overruling of United States v. Rozier or a clearly on-point Supreme Court decision that directly repudiates the reasoning relied upon in Rozier and reaffirmed in United States v. Dubois (Dubois II).
Appellate sentencing challenges: The decision illustrates the uphill climb under plain-error review when a defendant does not object to the government’s factual narrative at sentencing. Even where a PSI contains more favorable facts, an appellant must show the district court actually relied on the allegedly erroneous version and that it likely affected the sentence.
District court practice: The opinion implicitly encourages explicit sentencing explanations tying the outcome to § 3553(a) factors (disparity, deterrence, criminal history), which can insulate a sentence from procedural and substantive attacks.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“As-applied” constitutional challenge: A claim that a statute may be valid generally but is unconstitutional when applied to the specific defendant’s circumstances.
Plain-error review: A stricter appellate standard used when an issue wasn’t preserved in the district court; the defendant must show a clear legal error and that it likely affected the outcome.
Prior-panel-precedent rule: In the Eleventh Circuit, a later panel must follow an earlier panel’s published decision unless the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc clearly overrules it.
PSI (presentence investigation report): A probation-prepared report summarizing offense conduct, criminal history, and guideline calculations. Unobjected-to factual statements are treated as admitted.
Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness: Procedural concerns focus on the process (correct guideline range, accurate facts, adequate explanation); substantive concerns focus on whether the length of the sentence is reasonable in light of § 3553(a).
Downward variance: A sentence below the advisory guideline range based on § 3553(a) factors (as opposed to a guidelines “departure”).

Conclusion

United States v. Brady Castro is chiefly a reaffirmation of institutional constraint: the Eleventh Circuit will continue to treat 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) as constitutional under binding circuit law because United States v. Rozier remains intact after New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi, as confirmed by United States v. Dubois (Dubois II). On sentencing, the decision underscores that unpreserved factual disputes are hard to convert into reversals, and that a bottom-of-the-guidelines sentence supported by deterrence, criminal history, and disparity considerations will ordinarily withstand substantive reasonableness review.