Brown v. Mellekas: Retroactive Sex-Offender Registration Is Regulatory, Not Punitive

Introduction

In Brown v. Mellekas, 2d Cir. No. 24-970-cv (Apr. 3, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed whether Connecticut’s retroactive application of its sex‐offender registry (“Megan’s Law,” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-252) violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, procedural due process, substantive due process, and other constitutional safeguards. Plaintiff–appellant Ralston Brown, proceeding pro se, had entered an Alford plea in 1993 to conspiracy to commit third‐degree sexual assault under state law. Years later, Connecticut enacted a mandatory registration requirement for all sex offenders—past and future—without providing individualized hearings on dangerousness. Brown sued three state troopers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the retroactive registration scheme and its enforcement violated his constitutional rights. The District Court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), and the Second Circuit summarily affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Brown’s § 1983 claims.
The court held that Connecticut’s retroactive sex‐offender registry is regulatory rather than punitive and therefore does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Brown’s procedural due process challenge failed because Connecticut law predicates registration on conviction, not on a present‐dangerousness determination.
His substantive due process (privacy) claim was rejected for lack of conscience‐shocking government conduct.
The individual‐capacity § 1983 claims failed for lack of personal involvement by the officers in Brown’s 1993 plea or conviction.
Judicial estoppel did not apply because the appellees never adopted a prior inconsistent position in the state criminal case.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Rule 12(b)(6) standard (Chambers v. Time Warner, 282 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2002); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)).
Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed (Meadows v. United Servs., Inc., 963 F.3d 240 (2d Cir. 2020)).
Alford plea equivalence to guilty plea (North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); Burrell v. United States, 384 F.3d 22 (2d Cir. 2004)).
Ex Post Facto analysis (SEC v. Ahmed, 72 F.4th 379 (2d Cir. 2023); Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003)).
Sex‐offender statutes found regulatory (Smith v. Doe, supra; Doe v. Cuomo, 755 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2014); Roe v. Office of Adult Probation, 125 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1997)).
Connecticut decisions (State v. Kelly, 256 Conn. 23 (2001); Goguen v. Comm’r of Corr., 341 Conn. 508 (2021)).
Due process without individualized hearing (Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003)).
Substantive due process (Goe v. Zucker, 43 F.4th 19 (2d Cir. 2022)).
Personal involvement in § 1983 (Kravitz v. Purcell, 87 F.4th 111 (2d Cir. 2023)).
Judicial estoppel (Clark v. AII Acquisition, LLC, 886 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 2018); Swartz Family Tr. v. United States, 67 F.4th 505 (2d Cir. 2023)).
Plea‐bargain breach claim (United States v. Gen. Douglas MacArthur Senior Vill., 508 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1974)).

2. Legal Reasoning

To run afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause, a law must (1) be retrospective—applying to offenses committed before enactment—and (2) inflict “punishment” or increase the penalty for prior conduct (Ahmed, 72 F.4th at 401). The panel concluded that Connecticut’s registry is nonpunitive based on both legislative intent and its effects; it serves public safety and monitoring purposes, not retribution or deterrence (Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 105–06).

Brown’s procedural due process claim—that he was entitled to a hearing on current dangerousness—fails under Doe (538 U.S. at 4–8), which upholds a statute predicated solely on conviction. Substantive due process protects against conduct that “shocks the contemporary conscience” (Goe, 43 F.4th at 30); Brown’s mere registry requirement does not meet that standard.

A § 1983 plaintiff suing state actors in their individual capacities must show each defendant’s direct participation in the constitutional violation (Kravitz, 87 F.4th at 129). Brown alleged no involvement by Troopers Mellekas or Garcia in his 1993 plea or conviction. Finally, judicial estoppel requires that the same party adopt inconsistent positions in separate proceedings (Clark, 886 F.3d at 265); the state officers never took a position in the underlying criminal case.

3. Impact

This summary order, though non-precedential, reinforces key principles:

Sex‐offender registries—retroactive and based on conviction—are regulatory, not punitive.
Alford pleas establish valid convictions for registration purposes.
No individualized dangerousness hearing is required under statutes like Connecticut’s.
Section 1983 personal-capacity claims require direct personal involvement in the underlying violation.
Judicial estoppel applies only when the defendant has adopted a prior position in a related proceeding.

Future litigants in the Second Circuit will rely on Brown v. Mellekas to defend retroactive registration against Ex Post Facto, due process, and privacy challenges, and to structure § 1983 claims against individual officers.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Alford Plea: A guilty plea where a defendant maintains innocence but admits that the prosecution’s evidence would likely result in conviction.
Ex Post Facto Clause: A constitutional provision forbidding laws that retroactively increase the punishment for criminal acts.
Procedural vs. Substantive Due Process: Procedural due process requires fair legal procedures (e.g., hearings); substantive due process protects fundamental rights from arbitrary government action.
Judicial Estoppel: An equitable doctrine preventing a party from taking a position in a legal proceeding that contradicts one previously asserted to a different tribunal.
Personal Involvement in § 1983: To hold an individual official liable, a plaintiff must show the official’s direct role in depriving rights protected by the Constitution.

Conclusion

Brown v. Mellekas affirms that Connecticut’s retroactive sex-offender registration scheme is a regulatory measure that does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, procedural or substantive due process, or privacy rights. It underscores that convictions—even via Alford pleas—trigger registration duties without a separate dangerousness hearing. The decision also clarifies pleading requirements for pro se litigants and limits on personal‐capacity § 1983 liability and judicial estoppel. This ruling solidifies the line between punitive and regulatory enactments in the context of sex‐offender law, guiding courts and practitioners in future constitutional challenges.