Brown v. McMillon: Eleventh Circuit Rejects “Administrative Default Judgments by Acquiescence” and Clarifies Futility Standard for Pro Se Pleadings

Introduction

In Mubbrika S. Brown & Alquddus Brown v. Carl McMillon & John Rainey, No. 24-13169 (11th Cir. 15 Aug 2025) (unpublished), the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a pro se action brought by a former Walmart employee and her brother against Walmart’s CEO and CFO.

The plaintiffs attempted to enforce a self-styled “administrative judgment” worth 14 million USD, claiming that the executives had “defaulted by silence” when they failed to answer various unilateral demand letters. They asked the federal court only to “collect” on the purported judgment, not to litigate underlying employment-related grievances.

The Eleventh Circuit held that (1) a private party cannot unilaterally generate a default judgment or lien through notice-and-silence tactics; (2) the complaint failed to state any plausible claim against individual executives; and (3) amendment would have been futile given the plaintiffs’ express litigation posture. The decision furnishes an emphatic repudiation of “sovereign-citizen-style” UCC-lien schemes and clarifies when a district court may dismiss a pro se complaint without granting leave to amend.

Summary of the Judgment

Dismissal Affirmed. Each of the twelve counts was either legally impossible (no private right of action or no individual liability) or factually insufficient under Twombly/Iqbal.
No Duty to Permit Amendment. Because plaintiffs insisted they already possessed a valid judgment and sought only collection, any amendment would have been futile.
Recusal/ Bias. The court declined to consider a late-raised recusal argument under the “civil plain-error” standard; no miscarriage of justice resulted.
Sanctions. Plaintiffs’ request for sanctions against defense counsel was rejected as unfounded.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) & Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)
Required the complaint to contain plausible, non-conclusory facts. The Eleventh Circuit applied this threshold to dismiss every count that merely recited legal labels.
Waldman v. Conway, 871 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2017) & Campbell v. Air Jamaica, 760 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2014)
Confirmed that pro se pleadings are construed liberally but still must allege some factual support; courts will not rewrite deficient pleadings. Guided the court in refusing to rescue the Browns’ threadbare allegations.
Silberman v. Miami-Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123 (11th Cir. 2019) & Woldeab v. Dekalb Cty., 885 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2018)
Outlined when a pro se plaintiff must be given a chance to amend. The Browns’ explicit denial of any need to litigate the merits signaled futility, allowing dismissal with prejudice.
Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826 (11th Cir. 2007)
Holds that Title VII and ADA do not impose individual liability on corporate employees. Disposed of counts aimed at McMillon and Rainey personally.
Jeter v. St. Regis Paper Co., 507 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1975)
Recognized there is no private right of action under OSHA, defeating any OSHA-based theories.
Standard Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Reed, 572 So. 2d 389 (Ala. 1990) & Ex parte Bole, 103 So. 3d 40 (Ala. 2012)
Set the elements of fraud and defamation under Alabama law. The Browns alleged none of the required specific facts.
Jenkins v. Anton, 922 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2019) & In re Lett, 632 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir. 2011)
Established the “civil plain-error” review of unpreserved recusal claims, foreclosing the Browns’ bias argument.

B. Legal Reasoning

Inadequate Substantive Claims. Many of the asserted statutes (ADA, Title VII, OSHA) simply do not permit suits against individual executives or create private rights of action at all. Others (fraud, defamation, conspiracy) lacked the elemental facts.
Plausibility Analysis. The court sifted each count under Twombly/Iqbal, distinguishing legal conclusions (“retaliated,” “harassed,” “conspired”) from factual allegations (dates, actors, statements, actions). None survived.
Rejection of the “Administrative Judgment” Concept. The Browns’ entire case relied on a theory that silence equates to contractual acceptance and default judgment. The court confirmed that only an Article III tribunal (or a tribunal empowered by statute) can enter a judgment; private notices cannot. Equating non-response with consent contradicts Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55, which governs default judgments.
Futility of Amendment. Because plaintiffs expressly disclaimed intent to litigate underlying employment grievances—insisting judgment already existed—no plausible amended complaint could be filed. This justified dismissal without leave to amend.
Recusal and Sanctions. No bias or misconduct was evident; failure to raise recusal below invoked “civil plain-error,” which the court found unmet.

C. Impact of the Judgment

Sovereign-Citizen / “UCC Redemption” Tactics Curtailed. The opinion joins a growing body of federal authority rejecting attempts to create self-executing liens and “administrative” defaults against public or corporate officials.
Guidance for District Courts. The decision confirms that when a pro se litigant’s theory is intrinsically defective, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate even without granting leave to amend.
Clarification of Individual Liability. Reinforces that Title VII and ADA claims lie against the employer entity, not executives.
Procedural Clarity. Highlights the necessity of obtaining an actual court judgment before pursuing collection, preventing misuse of state UCC filing systems.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Default Judgment vs. “Default by Silence.” • Judicial Default: Obtained under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 after filing a lawsuit, serving a defendant, and showing failure to plead. • Private “Default”: Sending letters that threaten liability absent a response has zero legal force; silence does not create a contract or judgment.
UCC Financing Statement. A UCC-1 simply provides public notice of a claimed security interest; it does not establish the interest’s validity. Filing a UCC-1 without an underlying debt or judgment is ineffective and may be unlawful.
Private Right of Action. Some statutes (e.g., OSHA) empower only government enforcement; private individuals cannot sue under them.
Pro Se Futility Principle. Even though courts must be lenient with self-represented parties, they need not allow endless amendments when the core theory is legally untenable.
Recusal & Plain Error. A judge must step aside if impartiality might reasonably be questioned. If a party never asks for recusal in the trial court, the appellate court reviews only for “plain error”—an error so serious that refusal to correct it would cause a miscarriage of justice.

Conclusion

Brown v. McMillon provides an instructive roadmap for courts confronting litigants who rely on quasi-commercial paperwork to fabricate judgments. The Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed three key principles: (1) courts, not private letters, issue enforceable judgments; (2) pro se plaintiffs must still satisfy federal pleading standards; and (3) district courts may dismiss with prejudice where amendment would plainly be futile.

Though unpublished and therefore non-precedential under Eleventh Circuit rules, the opinion adds persuasive weight against “administrative default” theories and solidifies existing doctrine on individual liability, private rights of action, and pro se amendment. It also underscores the judiciary’s limited tolerance for litigation tactics that clog dockets with legally baseless collection suits.

Key Takeaway: Silence is not consent, self-issued “judgments” are not enforceable, and even pro se litigants must traverse—rather than bypass—the established procedural pathways of the federal courts.