Brown v. City of Albion: Pleading Standards for Probable Cause and Charter Provision Clarity

Introduction

In Sonya Kenette Brown v. City of Albion, Michigan, the Sixth Circuit addressed whether a municipal official’s enforcement of a city‐charter provision and subsequent criminal prosecution could give rise to civil‐rights claims when grounded in alleged retaliatory motive. Plaintiff‐appellant Sonya Brown, a former Albion City Council member, alleged that her political adversaries on the Council orchestrated a retaliatory arrest, prosecution and malicious‐prosecution campaign—based solely on Facebook messages she sent to the interim City Manager—under a 1998 City Charter provision forbidding Council members from “directing the appointment or removal” of city staff. Brown also contended that the Charter provision was vague and overbroad in violation of the Due Process and First Amendments. The district court dismissed Brown’s retaliation, malicious‐prosecution, and conspiracy claims under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to plead absence of probable cause, and granted summary judgment on her Monell‐based challenge to the Charter. Brown appealed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Sixth Circuit affirmed in full. It held that

Brown’s First Amendment retaliation and malicious‐prosecution claims all required an allegation of absence of probable cause, and Brown’s pleadings did not plausibly negate probable cause because her own Facebook messages supplied at least a “probability or substantial chance” of criminal conduct under the Charter’s directive‐prohibition.
Brown’s attempted invocation of the Lozman exception (an official “policy of intimidation” context) and the Nieves exception (proof that similarly situated non‐speakers were not arrested) to avoid the probable‐cause requirement failed as neither exception applied on these facts.
On the Monell claim, the Charter’s prohibition against Council members individually directing personnel actions—plainly defined by its terms and by cross‐reference to the Charter’s officer definitions—was neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Hartman v. Moore (547 U.S. 250, 2006): mandates absence of probable cause as an element of retaliatory‐prosecution claims.
Nieves v. Bartlett (587 U.S. 391, 2019): recognizes narrow “similarly situated non‐arrestees” exception to the probable‐cause‐pleading requirement in retaliation‐arrest claims.
Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach (585 U.S. 87, 2018): creates an exception where an official policy of retaliation can be alleged without pleading absence of probable cause.
Monell v. Department of Social Services (436 U.S. 658, 1978): municipal liability requires a “policy, practice, or custom” causing a constitutional violation.
Vagueness and overbreadth decisions (e.g., Grayned, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008)): set standards for due‐process and First Amendment challenges to statutes and ordinances.

Legal Reasoning

Pleading Standards: Under Rule 12(b)(6) and Supreme Court cases (Twombly, Iqbal), a plaintiff must state “plausible” claims. For First Amendment retaliation involving arrest or prosecution, Brown had to plead that defendants acted with retaliatory motive and that there was no probable cause. The Sixth Circuit explained that, unlike ad‐hoc arrests, in the narrow Lozman context—where an official policy of retaliation is alleged—and in the Nieves context—where comparable non‐arrested individuals prove a pattern of non‐enforcement—a plaintiff may avoid the probable‐cause requirement. Here, Brown neither alleged a formal municipal policy to retaliate nor offered admissible comparator evidence. Instead, her own Facebook messages showed a “substantial chance” of Charter violation (urging the interim City Manager to “get rid of” an employee), supplying probable cause.

Charter Provision Challenge: The court dissected § 5.8—the ban on individual Council directives to appoint or remove “administrative officer[s] or employee[s]”—and found all key terms (Council member, direct, appointment, removal, officer/employee) anchored in common‐law and Charter definitions. The provision gave fair warning and explicit enforcement standards, defeating vagueness. Because it targeted unprotected employment actions rather than speech content, it did not implicate First Amendment overbreadth.

Impact

Reaffirms that absence of probable cause is an essential element of First Amendment retaliation claims involving prosecution or arrest, with very narrow exceptions.
Clarifies that Lozman applies only in fact patterns showing a formal “official retaliatory policy,” and Nieves requires concrete comparator evidence of non‐enforcement.
Highlights the value of precise legislative drafting: a narrowly tailored city‐charter prohibition, clearly cross‐referenced to defined officer categories, will survive vagueness and overbreadth attacks.
Guides municipal bodies on how to structure internal rules and on the importance of documenting cause before pursuing criminal enforcement against public‐office holders.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Probable Cause: A sufficient probability or substantial chance—based on objective evidence—that a crime occurred, not a definitive finding of guilt.
Lozman Exception: In unprecedented cases where a municipality adopts a formal, retaliatory policy against a specific speaker, a plaintiff need not plead absence of probable cause.
Nieves Exception: If a plaintiff can show that similarly situated non‐speakers were routinely not arrested for the same minor conduct, the absence of prosecution may support a retaliation claim despite probable cause.
Vagueness Doctrine: Laws must give ordinary people clear notice of prohibited conduct and guard against arbitrary enforcement.
Overbreadth Doctrine: A statute is invalid if it criminalizes a substantial amount of protected speech in relation to its legitimate applications.

Conclusion

Brown v. City of Albion underscores the judiciary’s insistence on rigorous pleading of the absence of probable cause in retaliation suits that flow from criminal arrests or prosecutions. It confines the reach of the narrow Lozman and Nieves exceptions and confirms that well‐drafted municipal charter provisions—targeting unprotected employment directives with clear definitions—will withstand vagueness and First Amendment overbreadth challenges. This decision offers critical guidance for civil‐rights litigants seeking to challenge alleged retaliatory prosecutions and for municipalities aiming to create constitutionally sound internal governance rules.