Brooks “Good-Cause” Exclusion: Clarifying Nebraska’s Speedy-Trial Clock for Pre-Hearing Discovery Delays

1. Introduction

In State v. Brooks, 319 Neb. 377 (2025), the Nebraska Supreme Court confronted the perennial question of how pre-trial motions and discovery affect the State’s six-month obligation to bring a defendant to trial under Nebraska’s speedy-trial statutes (Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-1207 & 29-1208). The case arose after Paul Douglas Brooks, charged with multiple sexual assaults, demanded an absolute discharge, arguing that the statutory time had lapsed. Central to the dispute was a three-month interval that elapsed while Brooks took depositions of other-acts witnesses identified in the State’s notice under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-414.

The high court affirmed the district court, crafting an important precedent on two fronts:

It reaffirmed that a “period of delay” under § 29-1207(4)(f) need not involve a formal continuance of a set hearing or trial date; any span in which trial cannot commence may qualify.
It clarified the scope of the “good-cause” exclusion when the defendant seeks extra time for discovery—holding that a defendant’s explicit request for a delayed § 27-414 hearing, so he can depose witnesses, is itself a substantial and legally excusable reason to toll the clock.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court (Miller-Lerman, J.) held:

The 53-day span between May 23 and July 15, 2024—triggered by Brooks’ request to finish depositions before the § 27-414 hearing—constituted a “period of delay … for good cause” under § 29-1207(4)(f) and was therefore excludable.
Once that period (together with an earlier plea-in-abatement interval) was excluded, the last permissible trial date extended to October 26, 2024, making Brooks’ October 1 trial setting timely and his September 18 discharge motion premature.
Because the good-cause exclusion alone resolved the appeal, the Court declined to decide whether the same span also qualified as a “continuance” under § 29-1207(4)(b).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

State v. Rashad, 316 Neb. 101 (2024) – Defined “good cause” as a substantial, legally excusable reason; placed burden on the State.
State v. Nelson, 313 Neb. 464 (2023) – Set out speedy-trial calculation method and clarified appellate review standards.
State v. Space, 312 Neb. 456 (2022) – Explained that a “continuance” under § 29-1207(4)(b) requires postponement of an already-set proceeding.
State v. Williams, 313 Neb. 981 (2023) – Demanded specific trial-court findings to justify a good-cause exclusion.
State v. Coomes, 309 Neb. 749 (2021) – Equated “period of delay” with “period of time,” regardless of trial-date changes.
State v. Murphy, 255 Neb. 797 (1998) – Noted that time to take depositions may be excludable under (f) if good cause is shown.
State v. Feldhacker, 267 Neb. 145 (2004) – Required the State to prove good cause, and the court to make explicit findings, for (f) exclusions.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

Existence of a “Period of Delay.”
Referencing Coomes, the Court reaffirmed that a delay period arises whenever trial cannot legally outset—here, because the § 27-414 hearing (a prerequisite to trial) could not be set before mid-July at the defendant’s behest.
Good Cause Analysis.
Applying Rashad and Feldhacker, the Court reasoned that Brooks’ explicit request for extra discovery time was:
- a substantial reason (completing crucial depositions); and
- a legal excuse (Neb. law recognizes the importance of adequate preparation, and § 27-414 itself implies a minimum 15-day notice period).
These findings were supported by the record: the court’s May 23 journal entry memorialized Brooks’ request, the State stood ready to proceed earlier, and no contrary facts were presented.
Scope of Appellate Review.
Because good cause is a fact question, the Supreme Court reviewed for clear error; it found none and therefore affirmed.
Redundancy with “Continuance.”
Although the district court had also invoked § 29-1207(4)(b), the Supreme Court declined to reach that issue, signalling that subsection (f) can independently dispose of such disputes.

3.3 Impact of the Decision

Discovery-Driven Delays. Trial courts now have explicit authority to exclude time when a defendant asks for additional discovery before a motion hearing, even if no formal date is being moved.
Specific-Findings Requirement Reinforced. Judges must detail why a requested span constitutes good cause; boilerplate will not survive appellate scrutiny.
Strategic Considerations for Counsel.
- Defense lawyers must weigh requests for extended discovery against potential speedy-trial tolling.
- Prosecutors, bearing the burden of proof, should create a record documenting the defendant’s request and the State’s readiness.
Trial-Court Calendaring. The ruling encourages courts to anchor speedy-trial calculations not to arbitrary docket dates but to demonstrable periods in which trial could not lawfully commence.
Citation Tool. Brooks will likely be cited whenever litigants debate whether pre-hearing preparation time qualifies as a § 29-1207(4)(f) exclusion.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Statutory Speedy-Trial Clock: The six-month countdown (exclusive of the filing day) within which the State must start trial, unless an enumerated exclusion applies.
§ 29-1207(4) Exclusions: Paragraphs (a)-(e) list automatic exclusions (e.g., pre-trial motions, competency exams). Paragraph (f) is a “catch-all” requiring a judicial finding of “good cause.”
Good Cause: A substantial, legally sufficient reason for delay. The party seeking the exclusion (usually the State) bears the burden of proof, and the court must make fact-specific findings.
Period of Delay vs. Continuance: A “continuance” usually means postponing a set date. A “period of delay” is broader—any span in which trial does not or cannot begin, irrespective of previously scheduled dates.
§ 27-414 Notice: Allows the prosecution to admit evidence of other sexual assaults by the defendant, but requires at least 15-days’ notice before trial; courts often hold a hearing to decide admissibility.

5. Conclusion

State v. Brooks crystallizes Nebraska’s approach to “good-cause” exclusions under the speedy-trial statutes. When a defendant himself asks the court to defer a critical pre-trial hearing—here, so he can finish depositions—the resulting interval is a bona fide “period of delay” that stops the six-month clock, provided the trial court enters clear, record-supported findings. The decision underscores that the speedy-trial framework balances prompt prosecution with meaningful preparation; each side must therefore reckon with the temporal consequences of its own requests.