Broadening Materiality Under the False Claims Act: Insights from United States v. Strock

Broadening Materiality Under the False Claims Act: Insights from United States v. Strock

Introduction

The case of United States of America v. Lee Strock, Cynthia Ann Golde, Strock Contracting, Inc., Kenneth Carter (982 F.3d 51) adjudicated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on December 3, 2020, marks a significant development in the interpretation of materiality under the False Claims Act (FCA). This judgment addresses critical issues surrounding the assertion of material misrepresentations by defendants regarding their status as Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Businesses (SDVOSBs) in federal contracting.

Summary of the Judgment

The United States of America appealed the dismissal of its claims under the FCA by the United States District Court for the Western District of New York. The initial dismissal hinged on the court's determination that the government failed to sufficiently allege that the defendants' misrepresentations about their SDVOSB status were material to the government's payment decisions. Additionally, the district court dismissed the common law claims on jurisdictional grounds.

Upon review, the Second Circuit concluded that the district court erred in its narrow interpretation of materiality, as established in Universal Health Services, Inc. v. Escobar. The appellate court found that the initial dismissal of claims against Lee Strock and Strock Contracting, Inc. was incorrect regarding materiality and defendants' knowledge. Conversely, the dismissal of claims against Cynthia Golde was affirmed. Furthermore, the appellate court vacated the dismissal of the common law claims, asserting that the district court lacked jurisdictional authority, thereby reinstating the government's claims against the remaining defendants for further proceedings.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

A pivotal precedent in this judgment is Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar (136 S. Ct. 1989, 2016). This Supreme Court decision clarified the standards for materiality under the FCA, emphasizing that materiality depends on the potential or actual influence of a misrepresentation on the government's payment decisions rather than on whether the government would have chosen differently had it known the truth.

Additionally, the court referenced United States ex rel. Feldman v. Van Gorp and United States ex rel. Kirk v. Schindler Elevator Corp. to underline the principles surrounding fraudulent inducement and vicarious liability under the FCA.

Legal Reasoning

The Second Circuit expanded the understanding of "payment decision" to encompass both the initial awarding of contracts and the subsequent payments under those contracts. This broader interpretation aligns with the fraudulent inducement theory, where the misrepresentation impacts not just the award but also the legitimacy of the claims made under the contract.

The court meticulously assessed the materiality by evaluating factors such as whether the SDVOSB status was an express condition for both contract eligibility and payment, and the substantiality of the noncompliance. The appellate court found that the government had adequately alleged materiality concerning the initial contract awards, despite weaker support regarding post-award actions.

Regarding knowledge, the court determined that the complaint sufficiently alleged that Lee Strock acted with reckless disregard of the materiality of the SDVOSB status, meeting the scienter requirements under the FCA. However, the allegations against Cynthia Golde lacked the necessary specificity to establish individual knowledge.

Impact

This judgment sets a notable precedent by affirming a more expansive view of materiality under the FCA, particularly in cases involving fraudulent inducement. Future cases will likely reference United States v. Strock when determining whether misrepresentations influence both contract awards and payment decisions.

Additionally, the decision emphasizes the necessity for detailed allegations of knowledge under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for FCA claims, influencing how plaintiffs structure their complaints in fraud-related government contracting cases.

Complex Concepts Simplified

False Claims Act (FCA)

A federal law that imposes liability on individuals and companies who defraud governmental programs. It includes provisions for whistleblowers to sue on behalf of the government.

Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business (SDVOSB)

A designation for small businesses owned by veterans with service-connected disabilities, eligible for certain federal contracts set aside exclusively for such entities.

Materiality under FCA

Refers to the significance of a misrepresentation in influencing the government's decision to make a payment. It requires a misrepresentation to have a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, that decision.

Fraudulent Inducement

A legal theory where the government claims that a contract was procured through deceit or fraudulent actions, making any claims under that contract actionable under the FCA.

Conclusion

The Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Strock underscores a more nuanced approach to evaluating material misrepresentations under the False Claims Act. By broadening the scope of what constitutes a "payment decision" to include both the awarding and execution phases of contracts, the court has set a higher bar for defendants seeking to dismiss FCA claims based on materiality and knowledge.

This judgment not only impacts the immediate parties but also serves as a guiding framework for future litigation involving federal contract fraud. It emphasizes the importance of detailed pleadings and the significance of misrepresentations in both the procurement and execution stages of government contracts, thereby reinforcing the government's ability to hold fraudulent contractors accountable.

Case Details

Year: 2020
Court: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Judge(s)

KATZMANN, Circuit Judge

Attorney(S)

CHARLES W. SCARBOROUGH, Appellate Staff Attorney, for Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, James P. Kennedy, United States Attorney for the Western District of New York, Buffalo, NY, for Appellant. ROBERT C. SINGER, ESQ., Singer Legal PLLC, Williamsville, NY, for Defendants-Appellees Lee Strock and Strock Contracting, Inc. REETUPARNA DUTTA, ESQ. (David A. Short, on the brief), Hodgson Russ LLP, Buffalo, NY for Defendant-Appellee Cynthia Ann Golde.

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