Broad “Relating To” Under § 2251(e) Survives Plain-Error Review: Applying the Enhancement to an Illinois Predicate that Also Protects Adults with Severe Intellectual Disabilities

Introduction

In United States v. Gary Wilson, No. 24-2375 (7th Cir. Nov. 12, 2025), the Seventh Circuit affirmed a sentence enhanced under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e) based on a prior Illinois conviction for possession of child pornography under 720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(a)(6). That Illinois statute criminalizes possession of sexually explicit images of “any child or person with a severe or profound intellectual disability” whom the possessor knows or should know is either under 18 or a person with such a disability. Wilson argued on appeal that the Illinois statute is categorically broader than the federal generic offense—because it also protects some adults—and therefore cannot serve as a qualifying predicate to trigger § 2251(e)’s increased penalties.

The complication: Wilson did not object to the enhancement in the district court. The Seventh Circuit therefore reviewed only for plain error. Against the backdrop of its recent “relating to” jurisprudence, the court held that any error was not “plain” and affirmed. The opinion builds on a line of cases interpreting “relating to” broadly in federal child-pornography recidivist enhancements, while expressly reserving whether a merits ruling might eventually exclude prior statutes that protect a materially different class of victims.

Parties and posture:

Plaintiff-Appellee: United States of America
Defendant-Appellant: Gary Wilson
Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Judges Kirsch, Jackson-Akiwumi, and Maldonado)
Disposition: Affirmed, on plain-error review

Summary of the Opinion

Wilson pleaded guilty to two counts of production of child pornography under § 2251(a). Because § 2251(e) imposes heightened penalties for defendants with a prior conviction “relating to” possession of child pornography, the district court applied an enhancement based on Wilson’s 2006 Illinois conviction under 720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(a)(6), resulting in a 60-year prison sentence. Wilson did not object below.

On appeal, he argued the Illinois statute is overbroad: unlike federal law, it also covers images of adults with severe or profound intellectual disabilities. The government agreed the Illinois statute is broader but maintained the predicates still “relate to” one another. Reviewing for plain error (Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b)), the Seventh Circuit held that even if there were error, it was not “plain”—i.e., not “clear” or “obvious”—in light of Congress’s capacious “relating to” language and circuit precedent broadly construing that phrase in child-pornography enhancements. The court emphasized that its precedents look to whether the laws target the same type of harm and concluded it was not clearly wrong to view the Illinois statute as related to § 2251(e), given that the Illinois statute still targets the sexual exploitation of minors along with an additional protected group. The court left open that a different case might refine the outer bound where differing victim classes sever the necessary relationship, but not on plain-error review here.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Plain-error framework: The court applied the four-part test from Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503, 504 (2021), requiring the defendant to show (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) affecting substantial rights, and (4) seriously affecting the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Citing United States v. Page, 123 F.4th 851, 866 (7th Cir. 2024) (en banc), the court focused on prong two: an error must be “clear” or “obvious” to be plain. Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189, 194 (2016), supplies the basic plain-error framework in sentencing contexts. United States v. Flores, 929 F.3d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 2019), confirmed forfeiture occurred because Wilson did not object below.
Categorical approach baseline: Under Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500, 504 (2016), courts compare elements, not facts, to see if the state offense categorically fits the generic federal offense; Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 260–61 (2013), cautions that categorical analysis typically demands a tight match. Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420, 441 (2021), reinforces that courts look to the “least serious conduct” covered by the predicate statute when performing the categorical analysis.
“Relating to” as a broad connector: The court emphasized that when Congress uses the phrase “relating to,” it signals breadth. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992), provides the ordinary-meaning definition: to have a bearing or concern, to pertain, to refer, or to bring into association or connection with.
Seventh Circuit’s child-pornography line of cases:
- United States v. Kraemer, 933 F.3d 675, 679–85 (7th Cir. 2019): A state law that criminalized images of a 13-year-old was still “related to” federal statutes that capped “child” at age 12; minor overbreadth in the protected age range did not defeat relatedness.
- United States v. Kaufmann, 940 F.3d 377, 380–81 (7th Cir. 2019): A state prohibition that encompassed more and different kinds of sexually explicit representations of minors still related to the federal ban on possession of child pornography.
- United States v. Liestman, 97 F.4th 1054, 1065–66 (7th Cir. 2024): A state prohibition on accessing images focusing on specific body parts of children related to the federal child-pornography offenses; the court looked to whether both laws target the same harm.
- United States v. Pemberton, 85 F.4th 862, 868 (7th Cir. 2023): The standard of review can affect categorical analysis outcomes—underscoring why plain-error posture matters.
These cases collectively endorse a functional “same harm” or “close kinship” lens when Congress uses “relating to.” They substantially informed the panel’s conclusion that any mismatch here was not “plain.”

Legal Reasoning

The court proceeded in three key steps.

Framework and standard of review: Because Wilson did not object to the § 2251(e) enhancement, the court reviewed for plain error and “begin[s] and end[s]” with whether any error was plain. Absent controlling authority squarely holding that the Illinois statute cannot qualify, the court looked to whether the misapplication (if any) was clear or obvious.
Categorical approach informed by Congress’s “relating to” text: Ordinarily, categorical analysis asks whether the state statute’s elements are the same as, or narrower than, the federal generic offense. But the Seventh Circuit emphasized that where Congress itself instructs the requisite linkage—here, a prior conviction “relating to” possession of child pornography—courts apply that broader textual standard rather than a strict one-to-one elements match (citing Kraemer and Morales).
Application to Illinois 720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(a)(6): Wilson’s best argument was that the Illinois statute covers a different victim class—adults with severe or profound intellectual disability—thus targeting a “different type of harm.” The government agreed Illinois is broader but contended the predicate still “relates to” the federal offense. The panel reasoned:
- The Seventh Circuit’s “relating to” cases look to whether the statutes target the same general harm; while Illinois extends protection beyond children, it still targets the sexual exploitation of minors—Congress’s core concern in § 2251.
- Past decisions tolerated modest overbreadth (e.g., age coverage in Kraemer; varied depictions in Kaufmann; body-part-focused laws in Liestman). These support the view that relatedness does not demand perfect congruence of elements or coverage.
- Although the victim-class difference here is arguably more qualitative than prior overbreadth issues, no precedent makes it “clear” or “obvious” that such a difference breaks the “relating to” link. The panel expressly left open that a future merits decision could draw that line; but on plain-error review, unsettled questions do not warrant reversal.

In short, Congress “cast a wide net” in § 2251(e) by requiring only a prior conviction “relating to” possession of child pornography. Given that breadth and existing Seventh Circuit guidance, it was not plain error to treat Wilson’s Illinois conviction as qualifying.

Impact and Implications

Plain-error posture is outcome-determinative: The opinion underscores that preservation matters. Because the defendant did not object, the court needed a “clear” or “obvious” error to reverse. Where the law is unsettled—especially under broad “relating to” language—defendants will struggle to meet that standard. Defense counsel should raise categorical challenges at sentencing to preserve de novo review.
“Relating to” remains capacious in the Seventh Circuit: Building on Kraemer, Kaufmann, and Liestman, the court continues to treat “relating to” as a wide connector that tolerates some overbreadth between the predicate and the federal generic offense. This decision extends that tolerance, at least under plain-error review, to a mismatch in victim class where the state statute still protects minors alongside additional groups.
Open question on victim-class mismatches: The panel flags a potential limiting principle: there could be statutes that protect such different victims that they cannot “relate to” child-pornography possession for § 2251(e). The court did not resolve that merits boundary here; future, preserved cases could crystallize it.
Practical sentencing effects: A qualifying prior increases § 2251(e)’s range from 15–30 years to 25–50 years per count. Where multiple counts are involved, total exposure can escalate dramatically. Given this opinion, prosecutors in the Seventh Circuit have support for invoking § 2251(e) using certain broader state predicates, and district courts may rely on the “relating to” breadth unless and until a merits decision narrows it.
Consistency with a harm-focused lens: The court’s emphasis on “targeting the same type of harm” will inform how judges evaluate other state predicates across federal child-pornography enhancements that use “relating to” or similarly broad linkage language.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Categorical approach: Courts compare the elements of the prior state offense to the “generic” federal offense, not the defendant’s actual facts. If the state law criminalizes more conduct than the generic federal definition, the prior is not a categorical match. But when Congress says “relating to,” that instruction relaxes the need for an exact match and asks instead whether the prior conviction bears a sufficient connection to the generic offense.
“Relating to” (ordinary meaning): This phrase is intentionally broad. It means the prior offense must have a bearing on, pertain to, or be connected with the federal offense. It is not limited to identical elements or conduct.
Plain-error review: If a defendant fails to object in the district court, the appellate court will reverse only if the error is (1) an error, (2) clear or obvious, (3) affects substantial rights (usually outcome-determinative), and (4) seriously affects the fairness or integrity of the proceedings. Unsettled legal questions usually fail prong two.
Least-serious-conduct principle: When using the categorical approach, courts imagine the least conduct that could violate the state statute. If that least conduct falls outside the federal generic offense, the state statute is overbroad. Here, even assuming the least conduct includes adults with severe intellectual disabilities, the question becomes whether that overbreadth severs the “relation” to child-porn possession; the panel said it is not clearly so.

Conclusion

United States v. Wilson reinforces two central points in the Seventh Circuit’s child-pornography enhancement jurisprudence. First, Congress’s “relating to” language in § 2251(e) is broad, and prior convictions that are somewhat overbroad can still bear the requisite connection when they target the same core harm—here, the sexual exploitation of minors—even if they also protect additional victims. Second, preservation is critical: on plain-error review, absent clear controlling precedent, a defendant will rarely show that applying the enhancement was “plainly” erroneous.

The panel deliberately reserves the merits question whether a statute protecting a different class of victims can ever be too dissimilar to “relate to” possession of child pornography under § 2251(e). Until that boundary is drawn in a preserved case, district courts and litigants should expect the Seventh Circuit to treat “relating to” as capacious and to deny relief where the asserted mismatch is, at most, debatable.