Broad Application of Montana Stalking Statute: Protecting Attorney‐Victims from Harassing Conduct

Introduction

The Supreme Court of Montana’s decision in Groenke v. Gabriel, 2025 MT 91, extends the protective reach of Montana’s stalking statute to individuals outside intimate or domestic relationships—most notably, attorneys targeted by pro se litigants. In this dispute, Kai Groenke, a family law attorney, obtained a ten-year order of protection against Ryan Gabriel, her former client’s ex-partner, who repeatedly threatened, harassed, and intimidated her through a course of abusive communications. This commentary examines the factual background, the Court’s reasoning, the precedents invoked, and the decision’s broader significance for future orders of protection under Montana law.

Summary of the Judgment

In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Beth Baker, the Court affirmed the District Court’s confirmation of a Flathead County Justice Court’s permanent order of protection. The record showed that Gabriel, proceeding pro se, sent repeated e-mails and voicemails threatening violence, professional discipline, and litigation against Groenke and her family. Under § 45-5-220, MCA (Montana’s stalking statute), and the statutory definition of “course of conduct,” the Court held that Gabriel’s repeated acts—threats to “shoot” Groenke’s father, accusations of felonies, attacks on her reputation—met the elements of stalking. The Court applied the “reasonable person” standard to conclude that Gabriel’s conduct would cause substantial emotional distress or fear for safety, justifying a long-term protective order.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Cook v. Bodine (2024 MT 189): Established that on appeal from a justice court, findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, conclusions of law for correctness, and discretionary rulings for abuse of discretion.
Fritzler v. Bighorn (2024 MT 27): Confirmed that appellate courts will not overturn protective orders absent an abuse of discretion and clarified factors for sustaining long-term orders.
Boushie v. Windsor (2014 MT 153): Interpreted “stalking” under § 45-5-220, MCA, identifying required elements of intent and emotional distress or fear.
Lockhead v. Lockhead (2013 MT 368): Defined the abuse-of-discretion standard in family law contexts, emphasizing that appellate review hinges on whether the trial court acted arbitrarily or exceeded reason.
Pengra v. State (2000 MT 291): Held that new arguments raised first in a reply brief will not be considered on appeal, which led to the Court declining Gabriel’s First Amendment free speech argument under Counterman v. Colorado.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s analysis centered on the text of § 45-5-220(1), MCA, which penalizes anyone who “purposely or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person” knowing that their behavior would cause substantial emotional distress or fear for safety. Montana law defines “course of conduct” to include “two or more acts” of harassment, intimidation, or threats. Here, Gabriel’s series of e-mails and voicemails—from disbarment threats to explicit shooting threats—constituted multiple acts. The Court applied an objective “reasonable person” standard (§ 45-5-220(2)(c), MCA) and concluded that similar conduct would cause a non-domestic victim substantial emotional distress and fear for third-party safety (Groenke’s father).

The Court rejected Gabriel’s focus on collateral issues—such as whether the Oregon dissolution court’s stay affected the property dispute—because § 45-5-220 does not require a property or domestic relationship nexus. Instead, what matters is the nature and effect of the defendant’s conduct. The Court further noted the Justice Court’s direct observations of Gabriel’s hostile demeanor during a three-hour hearing, crediting testimony from multiple witnesses about the emotional and safety dangers he posed.

Impact

This ruling marks an important precedent in Montana law by affirming that orders of protection under the stalking statute are available to any victim—regardless of relationship to the harasser—if the statutory elements are met. Attorneys, mental health professionals, journalists, and other professionals who face persistent, threatening communications from pro se litigants or third parties may now seek protection. The decision also signals judicial willingness to look beyond domestic violence paradigms and adopt an objective fear‐and‐distress analysis in harassment cases. Future litigants will cite Groenke v. Gabriel to secure protective relief against non-domestic stalkers, and courts will use its reasoning to interpret “course of conduct” and the “reasonable person” test in analogous contexts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Course of Conduct: At least two separate actions—like e-mails, calls, texts, or face-to-face encounters—that harass, threaten, or intimidate a person.
Stalking Offense: Under Montana law, an intentional pattern of behavior aimed at one individual that would make a reasonable person fear for their safety or suffer serious emotional harm.
Reasonable Person Standard: An objective test—would an average person in the victim’s shoes feel significant distress or fear? It protects against trivial or isolated communications.
Order of Protection: A court order that prohibits the respondent from continuing the harmful or threatening conduct and may include no-contact provisions for a set duration.

Conclusion

Groenke v. Gabriel establishes that Montana’s stalking statute provides robust protection for any victim—attorneys included—targeted by a harassing “course of conduct.” By focusing on the defendant’s objective behavior and its likely effects, the Court reinforced the stalking statute’s broad remedial purpose. This decision will guide future protective-order petitions, ensuring that victims experiencing repeated threats and intimidation outside domestic relationships can seek judicial relief. The ruling underscores courts’ duty to shield professionals and private citizens alike from escalating harassment and violence.