Brito-Arroyo v. United States: Eleventh Circuit Narrows Access to Evidentiary Hearings for Plea-Rejection Ineffective-Assistance Claims

Introduction

Case: Zury Brito-Arroyo v. United States, No. 22-14161 (11th Cir. July 1, 2025) (unpublished, non-argument calendar).
Panel: Luck, Brasher, and Abudu, JJ. (per curiam).

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s denial—without an evidentiary hearing—of a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion in which federal prisoner Zury Brito-Arroyo alleged that trial counsel’s “over-optimistic” suppression strategy caused him to reject a favorable 10-to-15-year plea offer and ultimately receive a 21-year sentence. The appellate court held that the record conclusively refuted prejudice under Lafler v. Cooper because the sentencing judge’s detailed § 3553(a) justifications indicated the same sentence would likely have been imposed even had the earlier plea been accepted. Accordingly, no evidentiary hearing was required.

The decision clarifies—in the context of plea-rejection ineffective-assistance claims—(i) the heavy burden a § 2255 movant bears to establish Lafler-style prejudice and (ii) when a district court may summarily dismiss without a hearing where the sentencing record forecloses relief.

Summary of the Judgment

Issue Certified: Did the district court err in denying, without an evidentiary hearing, Brito-Arroyo’s claim that counsel was ineffective for advising rejection of a favorable plea in favor of a suppression motion?
Holding: No. The district court did not abuse its discretion; the existing record “conclusively” showed no prejudice under Lafler.
Outcome: Affirmed—§ 2255 motion dismissed; no evidentiary hearing required.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The panel relied on—and in some respects extended—several Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit authorities:

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) – Two-prong test (deficient performance & prejudice).
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) – Applies Strickland in the plea context.
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012) – Counsel’s duty to communicate plea offers.
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012) – Elements of prejudice when a favorable plea is rejected.
Aron v. United States, 291 F.3d 708 (11th Cir. 2002) – Standard for evidentiary hearings in § 2255 cases.
Winthrop-Redin v. United States, 767 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2014) – No hearing when allegations are conclusory or record-contradicted.
Osley v. United States, 751 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2014) – Sentencing court’s reasons can defeat Lafler prejudice.
Other supportive citations: Brewster v. Hetzel, Holladay v. Haley, Blackledge v. Allison.

Integration of Precedents: The court synthesized Aron, Winthrop-Redin, and Osley to articulate a sharpened rule: when the sentencing record demonstrates that the district court would have likely imposed the same (or higher) sentence, prong-three Lafler prejudice cannot be satisfied, and an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary.

Legal Reasoning

Standard for Evidentiary Hearing. Under § 2255(b) a hearing is mandatory unless “the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show” the movant is not entitled to relief. The panel reviewed the denial for abuse of discretion.
Applying Strickland / Lafler.
- The court assumed, arguendo, that counsel’s performance could be deemed deficient (optimistic suppression advice) and focused on prejudice.
- To prove prejudice after rejecting a plea, the defendant must show a “reasonable probability” that (i) the plea would have been presented, (ii) the court would have accepted it, and (iii) the sentence would have been less severe. (Lafler, 566 U.S. at 164).
Record Foreclosing Prejudice.
- The sentencing judge provided “extensive, specific justifications,” including the defendant’s unlawful presence, large-scale meth operation, proximity to a school, and exposure of children to drug manufacture.
- These considerations would have been identical regardless of an early plea, signaling that the judge would not have endorsed a 10- to 15-year cap.
- Consequently, prong (iii) of Lafler failed; without prejudice, the § 2255 claim collapses.
Plea-Colloquy Estoppel. Under Blackledge, sworn statements at the Rule 11 colloquy carry a “strong presumption of verity.” Brito-Arroyo acknowledged satisfaction with counsel and awareness of sentencing uncertainty, further undermining his later claim.
No Hearing Required. Because the prejudice element was “affirmatively contradicted” by the record (Winthrop-Redin), the district court acted within its discretion in denying a hearing.

Impact of the Judgment

The decision, though unpublished, is instructive for the Eleventh Circuit and beyond:

Higher Bar for § 2255 Movants. Defendants must now address—not merely allege—how the sentencing judge’s stated rationale would have changed under an earlier plea.
Strategic Counsel Advice. Defense counsel remain liable for unreasonable predictions, but the prejudice showing becomes more difficult when the sentencing record is damning.
Judicial Economy. District courts gain reinforced authority to summarily dispose of plea-stage ineffective-assistance claims, conserving resources by avoiding needless hearings.
Plea-Bargain Negotiations. Prosecutors may leverage the ruling to argue that defendants cannot later relitigate rejected offers absent clear proof the court would have embraced the deal.
Fourth Amendment Litigations. Although the underlying suppression issue (tracker warrant void under state law but good-faith under federal law) was not resolved differently, the case shows collateral consequences of strategic suppression litigation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion: A federal prisoner’s post-conviction vehicle to challenge conviction or sentence on constitutional or jurisdictional grounds.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (IAC): Claim that defense lawyer’s performance was (1) objectively unreasonable and (2) prejudicial.
Strickland Test: Two-part framework for IAC (deficiency & prejudice).
Lafler/Frye Prejudice: When a favorable plea is lost by counsel’s bad advice, defendant must show (i) he would have accepted, (ii) court would have approved, (iii) sentence would be lower.
Good-Faith Exception: Evidence acquired with a technically invalid warrant may still be admissible if officers reasonably relied on it.
Void ab initio: Latin for “invalid from the outset.” Here, a state warrant issued outside a judge’s territorial jurisdiction.
§ 3553(a) Factors: Statutory considerations (seriousness of offense, deterrence, public protection, etc.) guiding federal sentencing.

Conclusion

Brito-Arroyo reinforces a pragmatic, record-based check on post-conviction litigation in the Eleventh Circuit. Even when counsel’s plea advice appears dubious, a defendant cannot secure an evidentiary hearing—let alone relief—unless he convincingly demonstrates that the sentencing court would have embraced the earlier plea’s sentencing cap. The panel’s reliance on the sentencing judge’s express rationale tightens the causal link required under Lafler, thus narrowing the path for prisoners asserting plea-rejection ineffective-assistance claims.

Practitioners should heed two lessons: (1) preserve clear, on-the-record explanations during sentencing—those reasons may later foreclose collateral attacks; and (2) when advising clients on plea decisions, thoroughly document risk assessments to avoid claims of overconfidence. For defendants contemplating § 2255 relief, Brito-Arroyo signals that mere “would-have-taken-the-deal” allegations are insufficient; the sentencing transcript can—and often will—speak louder than after-the-fact assertions.