Bright-Line Ban on Extra-Record Fact-Finding in Postconviction Proceedings: Structural Error Under the Minnesota Constitution

Introduction

In State of Minnesota v. Buay David Duol (Minn. Sept. 3, 2025), the Minnesota Supreme Court clarified and extended a core procedural due process safeguard: judges may not conduct deliberate, independent investigations into facts outside the record and then rely on those facts as a finder of fact—not only at trial, but also in postconviction proceedings. The Court held that when a district court judge independently researches and considers extra-record facts to decide a postconviction petition, the judge violates the petitioner’s constitutional right to an impartial adjudicator. This violation constitutes a structural error under the Minnesota Constitution’s Due Process Clause and requires automatic reversal without harmless-error analysis. The Court reversed in part and remanded for a new evidentiary hearing before an impartial judge.

The case arises from Buay David Duol’s 2022 Hennepin County convictions for first-degree premeditated and second-degree intentional murder. During a stayed direct appeal, Duol petitioned for postconviction relief on a “newly discovered evidence” theory, centered on testimony from fellow inmate Dequarn Bell that would undermine testimony from a key State witness, S.P., who testified at trial that Duol confessed. After a one-day evidentiary hearing, the district court denied relief, finding Bell not credible—while drawing extensively on details about Bell’s criminal history that the court had researched on its own and that were not introduced into evidence by either party. On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed whether that extra-record research and use of it by the judge violated Duol’s due process right to an impartial judge, the appropriate remedy, and the applicability of Dorsey’s bright-line rule to postconviction proceedings.

Summary of the Opinion

• The district court violated Duol’s constitutional right to an impartial judge by deliberately investigating and considering extra-record facts about witness Dequarn Bell’s criminal history (including plea transcripts, a presentence investigation, an appellate opinion, and juvenile history) to assess credibility.
• The Court reaffirmed a bright-line prohibition on judicial independent extra-record fact-finding and applied it to postconviction proceedings, not just criminal trials.
• This violation is structural error under the Minnesota Constitution’s Due Process Clause, mandating automatic reversal; harmless-error analysis does not apply.
• The proper remedy is not a new trial but a new postconviction evidentiary hearing before an impartial judge—tailored to the locus of the violation.
• The Court declined to reach arguments about judicial disqualification under the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct and Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, given the dispositive constitutional holding.
• The decision rests independently on the Minnesota Constitution, explicitly invoking state constitutional grounds consistent with Michigan v. Long.

Factual and Procedural Background

After a jury convicted Duol of murdering Lavelle Jackson, one of the State’s key witnesses was S.P., a jailhouse informant who testified that Duol confessed and sought help fabricating an alibi. During a stay of the direct appeal, Duol petitioned for postconviction relief based on new evidence from inmate Dequarn Bell, who claimed S.P. was a “jailhouse snitch” willing to “jump on” cases for leniency and had proposed doing so in Duol’s case. At the evidentiary hearing, Bell testified consistently with that theme, although he was impeached with prior convictions and a discrepancy regarding whether he saw S.P. reviewing Duol’s discovery. The district court denied relief, concluding Bell lacked credibility, and it supported that conclusion with extensive extra-record facts about Bell’s criminal matters—facts the court independently gathered and the parties had not offered into evidence.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• State v. Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d 238 (Minn. 2005):
  Dorsey established a “bright-line rule that judges may not engage in independent investigations of facts in evidence” and must decide facts solely on the record. Dorsey treated judicial extra-record fact-finding as fundamentally incompatible with impartial adjudication and as a structural defect not subject to harmless-error analysis. The Court in Duol expressly reaffirmed Dorsey’s bright-line rule and extended its application to postconviction proceedings.
• State v. Lopez, 988 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 2023):
  Lopez recently reaffirmed that a judge’s “act of seeking information outside the record effectively transform[s] the court into an investigator … thereby eliminating any vestige of impartiality.” The Duol Court relied on this formulation to emphasize that the constitutional violation arises from the act of extra-record investigation itself, regardless of whether it occurs in open court or in a written order.
• Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991); Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987):
  These United States Supreme Court cases distinguish between trial errors subject to harmless-error review and structural defects that “defy analysis by harmless-error standards.” Gray and Fulminante identify the right to an impartial adjudicator as a structural right. The Minnesota Supreme Court invoked these cases to reinforce that judicial impartiality is a fundamental structural guarantee.
• State v. Shoen, 598 N.W.2d 370 (Minn. 1999):
  Cited to support Minnesota’s structural-error doctrine. While the opinion does not elaborate within this case’s text, it treats Shoen as part of the line of authority recognizing structural errors requiring automatic reversal in Minnesota.
• State v. Krause, 817 N.W.2d 146 (Minn. 2012); State v. Jackson, 977 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 2022):
  These cases inform the remedy principle that courts tailor relief to the violation. In Krause (denial of counsel at a postconviction hearing) and Jackson (improper closure of a post-trial Schwartz hearing), the Court remanded for new hearings rather than new trials. Duol applies the same “appropriate remedy” principle to judicial-extra-record-error at a postconviction evidentiary hearing.
• State v. Schlienz, 774 N.W.2d 361 (Minn. 2009); Butala v. State, 664 N.W.2d 333 (Minn. 2003):
  Schlienz underscores a judge’s duty to preserve the integrity of the adversarial system “at all stages of the proceedings.” Butala explains that postconviction proceedings serve to vindicate fundamental rights. Together, they support applying due process safeguards—especially judicial impartiality—to the postconviction context.
• Rainer v. State, 566 N.W.2d 692 (Minn. 1997); Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1928), overruled by United States v. Mitrione, 357 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2004):
  Rainer sets out Minnesota’s four-prong test for newly discovered evidence. Larrison provides a three-prong test for false-testimony/recantation claims; though overruled in the Seventh Circuit, Minnesota courts continue to apply Larrison to recantation/false-testimony questions. The district court attempted to assess Duol’s claim under both frameworks, but the Supreme Court did not reach the merits under either test because the structural error in the evidentiary hearing requires a new hearing first.
• Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983):
  The Court invoked Long to clarify that its holding rests independently on the Minnesota Constitution—even if federal law were construed differently—ensuring this decision stands on adequate and independent state grounds.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three steps.

1. Identification of the constitutional violation:
   The record showed that the district court did not merely notice the existence of prior convictions; it researched and recited detailed extra-record facts—e.g., content from a plea transcript, a PSI, an appellate opinion, and additional adult/juvenile history—to degrade Bell’s credibility. The State conceded the order contained “amount and specificity” indicating independent inquiry and that the court used that information in credibility determinations. Under Dorsey and Lopez, a judge’s independent extra-record fact-finding violates the defendant’s due process right to an impartial judge.
2. Applicability in postconviction proceedings:
   Although Dorsey arose at trial, the Court held that the due process guarantee of an impartial judge applies equally to postconviction proceedings, which exist to vindicate fundamental rights and must maintain the integrity of the adversarial process “at all stages.” The bright-line rule against judicial extra-record investigation therefore governs postconviction evidentiary hearings as well.
3. Remedy and structural error:
   The judicial-impartiality violation is a structural error under the Minnesota Constitution. As such, harmless-error analysis is inapplicable. The appropriate remedy is to reverse in part and remand for a new evidentiary hearing before an impartial judge. This tailored remedy aligns with Krause and Jackson, which emphasize calibrating relief to the place where the constitutional error occurred.

Rejection of the State’s Arguments

• Statutory authority (Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3):
  The State contended that the postconviction statute—which permits courts to “inquire into and decide any grounds for relief, even though not raised by the petitioner”—authorized extra-record investigation. The Court rejected this reading. The statute permits courts to grant relief on unraised legal grounds; it does not license independent fact-finding outside the adversarial record to deny relief. Reading the statute otherwise would create serious constitutional concerns because due process forbids a judge from becoming an investigator.
• Dorsey limited to trials:
  The State argued that Dorsey’s rule is “specific to a criminal trial.” The Court held otherwise, clarifying—expressly for the first time—that due process demands judicial impartiality and record-bound fact-finding in postconviction proceedings as well.
• No open-court advantage:
  The State suggested there was no constitutional violation because the judge did not reveal or discuss the extra-record facts at the evidentiary hearing, hence conferring no procedural advantage. The Court rejected this, explaining that the violation stems from the act of seeking and using extra-record facts, whether or not done in open court. The judge’s role changes from neutral adjudicator to investigator, undermining impartiality in itself.

Remedy

Because the error is structural, the Court ordered automatic reversal of the postconviction denial and remanded for a new evidentiary hearing before an impartial judge. The Court emphasized that remedies should be calibrated to the locus of the constitutional violation; the appropriate relief here is a new postconviction evidentiary hearing—not a new trial—because the taint occurred at the postconviction stage. The Court explicitly declined to decide whether the judge should have recused under the Code of Judicial Conduct or Rule 26.03, leaving those frameworks to apply in the ordinary course on remand.

Independent State Constitutional Ground

The Court anchored its holding separately and independently in Article I, Section 7 of the Minnesota Constitution, consistent with Michigan v. Long. Although it noted that federal authority (e.g., Fulminante, Gray) points to a similar rule under the U.S. Constitution, the Minnesota constitutional holding controls even if federal doctrine were interpreted differently in the future.

Impact and Practical Implications

This decision has immediate and systemic consequences for postconviction practice in Minnesota and beyond:

• Extension of Dorsey’s bright-line rule: Judges presiding over postconviction evidentiary hearings are now unequivocally barred from sua sponte investigating and relying on facts not introduced by the parties. The proscription includes consulting plea hearing transcripts, PSIs, appellate opinions, and juvenile records from other cases, unless those materials are properly made part of the evidentiary record in the case at bar through the adversarial process.
• Structural-error consequences: Independent judicial fact-gathering at a postconviction hearing is structural error; denials based on such tainted processes will be automatically reversed and remanded, without harmless-error review. This creates a strong incentive for rigorous adherence to record-limited adjudication.
• Record-building responsibilities: Parties must ensure that credibility-related materials (e.g., certified convictions, transcripts, reports) are properly introduced if they want a judge to consider them. Courts should not fill gaps by independent research.
• Bench practices and training: Judges must avoid internet searches, docket dives, or cross-file reviews for facts not adduced by the parties. If a judge believes additional facts are necessary, the appropriate step is to request briefing or additional evidence, on the record, affording both parties the opportunity to be heard.
• Clarified reading of Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3: The statute does not authorize fact-finding outside the record to deny relief. Courts may identify unraised legal grounds to grant relief but cannot cure factual gaps by independent investigation.
• Independent state constitutional footing: By resting the doctrine on the Minnesota Constitution, the Court ensures that this protection remains robust regardless of any future shifts in federal due process jurisprudence.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Impartial judge: A judge who is neutral and decides facts based only on evidence properly presented in court. The judge cannot function as an investigator or rely on personal knowledge or materials outside the record.
• Extra-record facts: Information not admitted into evidence through the formal adversarial process. Examples include materials a judge obtains through personal research, such as other case files, PSIs, appellate opinions in unrelated cases, police reports, or internet searches not introduced by the parties.
• Structural error: A fundamental defect in the “framework” of the proceeding (e.g., lack of an impartial judge) that cannot be assessed for harmlessness. It mandates automatic reversal.
• Harmless-error analysis: A review framework for many trial errors that asks whether the error affected the outcome. Structural errors bypass this analysis entirely.
• Postconviction relief: A statutory process allowing a convicted person to challenge the conviction or sentence after direct appeal, often based on newly discovered evidence, constitutional violations, or other claims that could not have been raised earlier.
• Newly discovered evidence (Rainer): Requires showing, among other things, that the evidence was not known and could not have been discovered through due diligence before trial, is material and not cumulative or impeaching, and would probably produce a different result at a new trial.
• Larrison test (false testimony/recantation): In Minnesota practice, applied where a witness’s false testimony or recantation is alleged; focuses on whether the testimony was false, whether the jury might have reached a different verdict, and whether the party was surprised by the false testimony or could not meet it at trial.
• Judicial notice (not at issue here): A limited doctrine allowing courts to accept certain facts as true without proof (e.g., facts “generally known” or “accurately and readily determined”). The State did not argue judicial notice here, and the Court did not reach it.

Guidance for Practitioners and Courts

• For judges:
  • Do not independently research facts. If additional factual context is needed to resolve credibility or materiality, solicit supplemental submissions or witness testimony from the parties on the record.
  • Distinguish between legal research (permissible) and factual investigation (impermissible).
  • When in doubt, seek briefing on whether and how the parties propose to introduce a document (e.g., PSI excerpts, transcripts) into evidence, and on any evidentiary objections.
• For prosecutors and defense counsel:
  • Anticipate credibility disputes at evidentiary hearings and proactively move to admit necessary records (e.g., certified judgments, transcripts) with proper foundations, rather than assuming a court will consider them sua sponte.
  • Object promptly if a court appears to reference extra-record information, and request that any materials the court is considering be marked, introduced, and litigated on the record.
  • Where judicial partiality is implicated, preserve objections under both due process and disqualification doctrines, but note that structural error on the due process ground may be dispositive.

Unresolved Issues and Future Litigation

• Scope and limits of judicial notice in postconviction: The State did not invoke judicial notice, and the Court did not address it. Future cases may clarify when, if ever, judicial notice allows consideration of certain adjudicative facts in postconviction matters without violating the bright-line rule.
• Application of Rainer and Larrison on remand: The Court did not reach the merits of Duol’s newly discovered evidence or false-testimony claim. The new evidentiary hearing will require a fresh credibility assessment confined to the record, potentially refining Minnesota’s application of Rainer and Larrison to jailhouse-informant dynamics.
• Interplay with recusal standards: Although the Court did not decide the recusal question under Rule 2.11(A) and Rule 26.03, those standards remain applicable. Future cases may explore when the “appearance of bias” warrants recusal independent of, or in addition to, a due process structural-error analysis.

Conclusion

State v. Duol significantly reinforces a foundational due process guarantee in Minnesota: judges must not conduct independent, extra-record factual investigations, and must decide cases solely on the record made by the parties. The decision extends the Dorsey bright-line prohibition to postconviction proceedings and classifies violations as structural errors requiring automatic reversal. It clarifies that Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3 does not authorize extra-record research to deny relief and that Minnesota’s Constitution independently secures this protection. By remanding for a new evidentiary hearing before an impartial judge, the Court both remedies the constitutional violation and preserves the integrity of the adversary process at the postconviction stage. Going forward, the decision provides clear guidance to trial courts and litigants alike: credibility and fact-finding in postconviction hearings must be built—and tested—on the record, or not at all.