Breach of Trust, Not Retribution: Sixth Circuit Affirms Consecutive Max Revocation Terms and Enforces Range-Based Appeal Waivers Post-Esteras

Introduction

In United States v. Charles Henry Milton, III, Nos. 24-4066/4067 (6th Cir. Oct. 21, 2025) (not recommended for publication), the Sixth Circuit addressed two intertwined sentencing issues arising from a combined proceeding: (1) whether the district court procedurally and substantively erred in imposing a consecutive, statutory-maximum term of imprisonment upon revocation of supervised release, and (2) whether the defendant’s appellate challenge to his new substantive sentence was foreclosed by a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) appeal waiver.

The case places the Sixth Circuit’s post-Esteras approach to supervised release revocation sentencing in sharp relief. Against the backdrop of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Esteras v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2031 (2025), which prohibits reliance on the “retribution/just punishment” factor in revocation sentencing, the panel reaffirmed that district courts may still sanction the defendant’s “breach of trust” and may consider violation conduct to assess that breach—so long as they do not punish the violation conduct itself. The panel also enforced a negotiated appeal waiver tied to a guidelines range under Rule 11(c)(1)(C), foreclosing review where the sentence imposed fell at the top—but within—the agreed range.

The parties: the United States as appellee; Charles Milton, III as appellant. The panel: Judges Moore, Bush, and Davis; opinion by Judge Davis. The result: the court affirmed both the revocation sentence and the new substantive sentence.

Summary of the Opinion

Milton pleaded guilty in 2013 to being a felon in possession of a firearm, received 63 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release, and then, while on supervision, committed repeated violations culminating in new federal drug and firearms convictions in 2023. In a combined proceeding, the district court (Judge Barker) sentenced him to a total of 108 months on the new case (48 months concurrent on the drug and § 922(g) counts, plus a mandatory 60-month consecutive term for the § 924(c) count) and, on the supervised release violation, imposed a 24-month term to run consecutively.

On appeal, Milton attacked the revocation sentence as procedurally and substantively unreasonable, arguing the court improperly focused on the new case’s nature and circumstances rather than the original offense, and failed to credit that he had nearly completed his supervised release term. He also challenged the 108-month sentence on the new case as unreasonable. The Sixth Circuit:

• Held that Milton failed to preserve a procedural reasonableness challenge with the specificity required by Bostic/Coleman; thus, plain-error review applied. On the merits, no clear or obvious error occurred.
• Rejected the substantive reasonableness challenge, concluding the revocation term—capped at 24 months by statute and thus the applicable “guidelines range” under § 5G1.1(a)—was presumptively reasonable and not excessive, especially given the consecutive-sentence policy statement in U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f).
• Enforced Milton’s appeal waiver in his Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement. Because his 108-month sentence did not exceed either the agreed range (70–108 months) or any statutory maximums, his appellate challenge was foreclosed. The record showed the waiver was knowing and voluntary.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

• Esteras v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2031 (2025): The Supreme Court clarified that revocation under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) excludes consideration of the retribution/just-punishment factor in § 3553(a)(2)(A). The Sixth Circuit relied on Esteras to confirm that courts must consider only the specified subset of § 3553(a) factors when revoking supervised release. Importantly, the panel explained that Esteras did not disturb existing Sixth Circuit precedent permitting sanctioning of the “breach of trust” associated with violation conduct. The opinion notes Esteras expressly declined to resolve the “breach of trust” question—leaving the Sixth Circuit’s approach intact.
• Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000): Establishes that post-revocation sanctions are part of the penalty for the initial offense, not punishment for new criminal conduct, thereby avoiding double jeopardy concerns. The panel used Johnson to confirm that considering violation conduct as evidence of breach of trust is distinct from punishing that conduct.
• United States v. Morris, 71 F.4th 475 (6th Cir. 2023) and United States v. Johnson, 640 F.3d 195 (6th Cir. 2011): Reiterate that a court may sanction the breach of trust and must consider Chapter 7 policy statements, including § 7B1.3(f), which recommends consecutive terms upon revocation.
• United States v. King, 914 F.3d 1021 (6th Cir. 2019): District courts need not expressly cite § 7B1.3(f); it suffices if the record shows they considered it and offered a reasoned rationale for a consecutive term.
• Standards of Review and Preservation:
  • United States v. Hoyle, 148 F.4th 396 (6th Cir. 2025); United States v. Berry, 565 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 2009): Abuse-of-discretion review ordinarily applies to reasonableness and consecutive sentencing choices.
  • United States v. Sherrill, 972 F.3d 752 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Coleman, 835 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865 (6th Cir. 2004): Failure to lodge a specific, post-sentence objection triggers plain-error review for procedural challenges. Here, defense counsel’s bare “object[ion]” lacked the necessary specificity.
  • Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 589 U.S. 169 (2020): Substantive reasonableness is preserved by advocating for a lower sentence; thus abuse-of-discretion review applies to substantive claims even if not explicitly objected to post-sentencing.
• Guidelines and Presumption of Reasonableness:
  • United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2008): Within-guidelines sentences are presumed substantively reasonable.
  • U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a); United States v. Pizzino, 501 F. App’x 535 (6th Cir. 2012): Where a statutory maximum is below the otherwise-applicable guideline range, the statutory maximum becomes the guidelines term. That applied to Milton’s revocation sentence, converting 33–41 months to a 24-month “guidelines” ceiling.
  • United States v. Cunningham, 669 F.3d 723 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Bradley, 897 F.3d 779 (6th Cir. 2018): Defendants bear a heavy burden to overcome the presumption of reasonableness.
  • United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2018): Challenges that a sentence is “too long” sound in substantive reasonableness.
• Appeal Waivers and Rule 11(c)(1)(C) Agreements:
  • United States v. Milliron, 984 F.3d 1188 (6th Cir. 2021): Appeal waivers are binding if the appellate claim falls within the waiver’s scope and the waiver was knowing and voluntary.
  • United States v. Pitts, 997 F.3d 688 (6th Cir. 2021); United States v. Sharp, 442 F.3d 946 (6th Cir. 2006); Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N): The district court must ensure, in open court, the defendant understands the appeal waiver’s terms. The record here showed exacting compliance.
  • United States v. Presley, 18 F.4th 899 (6th Cir. 2021): Absent objection, plain-error review applies to enforcement of a waiver.
  • United States v. Russell, 26 F.4th 371 (6th Cir. 2022); United States v. Noble, 762 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2014): Failing to raise arguments in an opening brief waives them.

Legal Reasoning

1) Procedural reasonableness of the revocation sentence

The court reviewed procedural claims for plain error because defense counsel’s post-sentencing objection lacked specificity. Applying 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), which incorporates a subset of § 3553(a) factors in revocation, the panel held the district court sufficiently:

• Considered Milton’s history and characteristics (§ 3553(a)(1)), including his consistent noncompliance, poor attitude toward supervision, and new convictions.
• Addressed deterrence and protection of the public (§ 3553(a)(2)(B), (C)), finding prior leniency had not deterred Milton and that a consecutive term would underscore the consequences of violating supervision.
• Engaged with the applicable guideline policy statements (§ 3553(a)(4), (5)) by adopting probation’s statutory-maximum recommendation and by endorsing § 7B1.3(f)’s consecutive sentencing guidance, emphasizing there would otherwise be “no consequence” for the violation.

The court rejected Milton’s claim that the judge wrongly focused on his new case’s nature and circumstances instead of the original offense. While revocation punishment must be tethered to the initial offense (Johnson), the court may consider violation conduct to assess the severity of the breach of trust. The panel concluded the sentencing judge did exactly that—stressing a demonstrated pattern of disregard for supervision and the law, rather than imposing retributive punishment for the new crimes. The judge’s “disrespect for the law” comments, in context, referred to the breach-of-trust rationale and the need for deterrence, not impermissible retribution barred by Esteras.

The panel also rejected Milton’s two mitigation arguments. First, that he had completed 35 of 36 months of supervision: the record showed the court expressly considered this point but weighed it against repeated violations and prior leniency. Second, that the court ignored the original offense: the violation report and counsel’s arguments placed the original felon-in-possession conviction front-and-center, and the judge acknowledged that history.

2) Substantive reasonableness of the revocation sentence

On the “too long” claim, the court applied the presumption of reasonableness to the 24-month term because the statutory maximum became the guideline sentence under § 5G1.1(a). Given the record’s thorough engagement with the § 3553(a) factors and Chapter 7’s consecutive-sentence policy, Milton failed to overcome that presumption. The panel emphasized that mere dissatisfaction with a sentence is not a basis for reversal and reiterated the “heavy burden” to rebut the presumption.

3) Enforceability of the appeal waiver for the new 108-month sentence

Milton’s Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement included an appeal waiver reserving the right to appeal only if his sentence exceeded the agreed range (70–108 months) or any statutory maximum. He received exactly 108 months, within the agreed range, and well below any statutory maxima. His challenge was therefore within the waiver’s bar.

The panel further held that the waiver was knowing and voluntary. The district court satisfied Rule 11(b)(1)(N) by explaining the waiver’s “exact contours” in open court, confirming Milton had reviewed and understood the agreement with counsel, and obtaining his affirmative acknowledgments and signatures/initials throughout. Milton did not argue otherwise on appeal—waiving any challenge to the waiver’s validity—and, in any event, the record foreclosed such a challenge.

Impact

Although nonprecedential, the decision provides clear, practical guidance for revocation and appeal-waiver litigation in the Sixth Circuit:

• Revocation sentencing post-Esteras: District courts may not rely on retribution (§ 3553(a)(2)(A)) but may:
  • Sanction the breach of trust associated with violation conduct.
  • Consider violation conduct as evidence of that breach and to evaluate deterrence and danger to the public.
  • Adopt § 7B1.3(f)’s consecutive term recommendation, even without citing it expressly, if the record reflects consideration and a reasoned explanation.
• Consecutive terms are the norm upon revocation where new crimes occur: The “no consequence” logic—i.e., concurrency would nullify the supervisory sanction—remains a powerful rationale for consecutive imposition, especially when repeated violations follow prior leniency.
• Statutory caps convert the guidelines range: When the Chapter 7 range exceeds the statutory maximum (e.g., Class C/D felony revocations capped at 24 months under § 3583(e)(3)), the cap becomes the operative guidelines sentence, preserving the within-guidelines presumption.
• Preservation matters: To preserve a procedural reasonableness challenge, counsel must respond to the court’s Bostic inquiry with a specific objection identifying the alleged procedural error. A generic “we object” triggers plain-error review.
• Range-based appeal waivers in C pleas are enforceable: Where the sentence falls within an agreed range, appellate review is foreclosed absent a showing that the waiver was not knowing or voluntary. A robust Rule 11 colloquy will defeat such challenges.
• Near-completion of supervision is not dispositive mitigation: Completing most of the term does not outweigh a record of repeated noncompliance, especially when accompanied by new felony conduct.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Supervised release revocation vs. new prosecution: Revocation punishment is for the original crime, not the new violation conduct. But courts can consider the violation to gauge how seriously the defendant breached the court’s trust.
• Esteras rule: In revocation proceedings, courts cannot rely on the “just punishment” factor (§ 3553(a)(2)(A)). They may still consider deterrence, public protection, and needed treatment, as well as guidelines policy statements.
• Breach of trust: A sentencing concept (rooted in Chapter 7 policy) allowing courts to respond to the defendant’s failure to comply with supervisory obligations, separate from punishing the new criminal conduct itself.
• Consecutive vs. concurrent: A consecutive revocation term runs after the new sentence; concurrent runs at the same time. Chapter 7 encourages consecutive terms upon revocation to ensure the violation has real consequences.
• Grade A violation: The highest category of supervised release violation (e.g., new drug trafficking offense), which yields higher advisory ranges under Chapter 7.
• Statutory maximum and § 5G1.1(a): If the advisory revocation range exceeds the maximum allowed by law, the maximum becomes the effective “guidelines sentence.”
• Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness: Procedural concerns the steps and considerations used to choose a sentence; substantive addresses whether the length is too harsh given the factors. Preservation rules differ between the two.
• Bostic specificity: After sentence is announced, counsel must specifically state any procedural objections so the district court can address them; otherwise, appellate review is narrowed to plain error.
• Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea: A plea where the parties agree on a specific guidelines range or sentence. If the court accepts the plea, the sentence must conform to that agreement. Appeal waivers tied to that range are typically enforced if entered knowingly and voluntarily.

Conclusion

United States v. Milton offers a clear, post-Esteras template for revocation sentencing in the Sixth Circuit. The panel underscores that:

• District courts must eschew retribution in revocation but may forcefully sanction breach of trust, drawing on violation conduct to calibrate deterrence and public protection.
• Consecutive revocation terms remain the default in practice, reinforced by § 7B1.3(f)’s policy rationale that violations must carry independent consequences.
• Statutory caps can and do become the operative “guidelines sentence,” preserving the within-range presumption of reasonableness.
• Appeal waivers in Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreements will be enforced according to their terms when the record reflects a knowing and voluntary waiver—and when the sentence imposed falls within the agreed range.

While unpublished, the opinion’s methodical application of Esteras, Johnson, Chapter 7 policy statements, and preservation doctrine provides a cogent roadmap for district courts and practitioners. The key takeaways are practical: build a specific record to preserve procedural challenges; expect courts to rely on breach-of-trust and deterrence to justify consecutive revocation terms; and recognize that range-based appeal waivers in C pleas will generally bar review when the sentence stays within the negotiated parameters.