Braid v. Stilley: Interpleader Jurisdiction Meets Colorado River – Seventh Circuit Defines the Limits of Federal Intervention in S.B. 8 “Bounty Hunter” Actions

1. Introduction

In Alan Braid v. Oscar Stilley, the Seventh Circuit addressed an unusual collision of procedural devices, constitutional controversy, and federal-state comity. Dr. Alan Braid, a Texas obstetrician–gynecologist, publicly admitted that he performed an abortion after the “heartbeat” cutoff set by Texas Senate Bill 8 (S.B. 8). Three individuals from different states—Felipe Gomez (Illinois), Oscar Stilley (Arkansas), and Wolfgang Hirczy de Miño (Texas)—invoked S.B. 8’s private enforcement mechanism, each demanding at least \$10,000 in statutory damages. Fearing duplicative liability, Dr. Braid filed a statutory interpleader action and a constitutional declaratory-judgment claim, but chose the Northern District of Illinois rather than a Texas forum.

The district court dismissed the case on abstention grounds. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed—but on a more nuanced path that (1) recognizes federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1335, yet (2) holds that exceptional circumstances under the Colorado River doctrine justify abstention whenever parallel state S.B. 8 suits are pending.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Jurisdiction Confirmed: The court held that Dr. Braid’s action satisfied all § 1335 prerequisites (diverse claimants, \$500+ amount, and a deposited fund) even though liability had not been fixed and the fund was only \$10,000.
No Need to Decide Between Wilton-Brillhart and Colorado River: Although the district court used the lenient Wilton-Brillhart discretionary standard (traditional for Declaratory Judgment Act cases), the Seventh Circuit concluded that dismissal would be required even under the stricter Colorado River exceptional-circumstances test.
Abstention Factors Favored State Forum: The Texas proceedings were “parallel,” the state courts obtained jurisdiction first, and deciding complex Texas-law issues (allocation of S.B. 8 damages; state constitutional standing) would upend federal-state comity. Avoiding piecemeal litigation and potential conflicting judgments tipped the balance.
Holding: Judgment of dismissal AFFIRMED. Federal courts possess § 1335 jurisdiction over competing S.B. 8 claims but should abstain when parallel state enforcement actions are ongoing.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Wilton v. Seven Falls Co. (1995) & Brillhart v. Excess Ins. (1942): Recognize broad judicial discretion to decline jurisdiction in declaratory-judgment cases.
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States (1976): Establishes the “exceptional-circumstances” test for abstention in non-declaratory suits.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire (1967) & statutory history: Illustrate Congress’s broadening of interpleader to include suits “in the nature of interpleader,” even when the stakeholder contests liability.
Indianapolis Colts line of cases (7th Cir.): Supply circuit precedent on the “reasonable fear of double liability” requirement for Article III standing in interpleader.
Moses H. Cone, Tyrer, Clark, Driftless Area: Provide the modern multifactor framework for weighing Colorado River considerations.
Abortion-specific precedents: Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson (2021), Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health (2022) supply the constitutional backdrop but did not control the procedural outcome.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) Interpleader Jurisdiction

The panel emphasized Congress’s deliberate use of expansive language in § 1335 (“any obligation,” “money or property,” “in the nature of interpleader”). Even though S.B. 8 damages are not a pre-existing fund, they are a statutorily defined minimum obligation: at least \$10,000 per unlawful abortion. The court rebuffed the amicus argument that the fund must equal the largest claim (Stilley’s \$100,000 demand) because that figure is speculative; the statute guarantees only the \$10,000 floor.

b) Abstention Choice

The question was which abstention doctrine applies. While acknowledging the Third Circuit’s view that Wilton-Brillhart covers statutory interpleader (NYLife Distribs.), Seventh Circuit precedent (R.R. Street) suggested Colorado River when non-declaratory “independent” claims exist. Instead of definitively choosing, the panel assumed the stricter Colorado River standard and still found abstention warranted, thereby avoiding an inter-circuit split and leaving doctrinal clarification for a future case.

c) Application of Colorado River Factors

Parallelism: The Texas S.B. 8 suit (Stilley v. Braid) and the federal case shared the same nucleus of fact (the September 6, 2021 abortion) and involved overlapping issues of liability and constitutionality. Perfect symmetry is unnecessary.
Piecemeal Litigation: Allowing both forums to proceed risked conflicting judgments (e.g., state damage award vs. federal declaration of unconstitutionality) and undermined judicial economy.
Order of Jurisdiction & Forum Convenience: Texas actions were filed first; Illinois had no substantive tie to the dispute except claimant Gomez’s residence.
State-Law Dominance: Allocation of statutory damages, Texas standing doctrine, severability, and procedural defenses are all Texas law questions.
Adequacy of State Forum: The court rejected Braid’s assertion that S.B. 8 “rigs” Texas courts, reiterating the presumption of state-court competence to adjudicate federal rights.
Vexatious or Contrived Filing: Selecting an Illinois forum appeared strategic to escape Texas procedural rules, favoring abstention.

3.3 Impact of the Decision

Immediate Impact. Litigants seeking a federal venue to consolidate S.B. 8 (or similar private-enforcement statutes) claims via interpleader will encounter a jurisdictional green light but a substantive red light if parallel state actions are active.

Broader Impact.

Clarifies that § 1335 can reach bounty-statute liabilities (even when no traditional fund exists), expanding interpleader’s doctrinal reach.
Signals deference to state courts in first-instance interpretation of novel, state-crafted private enforcement schemes—reinforcing the “hands-off” posture shown in Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson.
Reinforces that Colorado River abstention remains a potent tool beyond property disputes, especially where novel state-law procedures intertwine with constitutional defenses.
Offers a roadmap for other circuits confronting similar statutes (e.g., California’s firearm-control analog, Idaho’s abortion ban with private actions, or Florida’s proposed S.B. 8 models).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Statutory Interpleader (28 U.S.C. § 1335): A mechanism allowing a potentially liable stakeholder to pay money into court and force all claimants to litigate in one action, shielding the stakeholder from multiple inconsistent obligations.
Wilton-Brillhart Abstention: Discretionary dismissal or stay of declaratory-judgment suits when parallel state litigation would more appropriately resolve the dispute.
Colorado River Abstention: A stricter doctrine permitting federal courts to defer to parallel state proceedings only under “exceptional circumstances” gauged by multiple comity-based factors.
Citizen-Suit Enforcement (S.B. 8): Texas delegated enforcement solely to private plaintiffs, who may obtain minimum \$10,000 damages per abortion; state officers are barred from enforcement.
Parallel Proceedings: State and federal actions are considered “parallel” when they involve substantially the same parties litigating substantially the same issues, even if not identical.

5. Conclusion

Braid v. Stilley establishes a two-part lesson for future litigants and courts:

Jurisdictionally, § 1335 interpleader is available to corral multiple S.B. 8 claimants—even for purely statutory “minimum” damages.
Prudentially, federal courts should abstain when parallel state enforcement suits exist, especially where state law is unsettled and comity risks are high.

The decision thus threads a needle: it welcomes unconventional use of interpleader while reaffirming the primacy of state courts in interpreting and applying state-crafted private enforcement regimes. Expect litigants confronting S.B. 8-style laws to recalibrate, focusing first on state forums and recognizing that federal intervention—though technically open—will rarely proceed while state cases are alive.