Boyer v. State: Malice Without Motive and Tightened Limits on Alternative-Suspect Hearsay Under W.R.E. 803(8)(C)

Introduction

In Andrew Lee Boyer v. The State of Wyoming, 2025 WY 100 (Wyo. Sept. 12, 2025), the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed a first-degree arson conviction arising from a fire set in a trailer home in Gillette. The appeal presented two principal questions:

• Whether circumstantial evidence sufficiently established that Boyer maliciously set the fire with the specific intent to damage an occupied structure; and
• Whether the district court violated Boyer’s constitutional right to present a complete defense by excluding alternative-suspect evidence—specifically, a police “call detail report” documenting a former tenant’s threat to “burn the trailer down” and related testimony.

Writing for a unanimous Court, District Judge Froelicher (sitting by designation) upheld the conviction. The opinion is noteworthy for two doctrinal clarifications:

• First, the Court reaffirmed that “malice” in Wyoming’s first-degree arson statute can be proven without evidence of motive or animus; proof that the defendant acted “without legal justification or excuse” suffices to establish the specific intent element when coupled with evidence of intentionally setting the fire.
• Second, the Court sharply limited defense use of law-enforcement public records to introduce third-party statements as alternative-suspect evidence, holding a police report that merely recites a non-officer’s threat is inadmissible hearsay outside W.R.E. 803(8)(C); present-sense impression (803(1)) and state-of-mind (803(3)) exceptions likewise did not apply.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed Boyer’s conviction and sentence of eight to fourteen years. On sufficiency, it held that the jury could reasonably infer from a robust circumstantial record that Boyer intentionally set multiple fires inside his locked trailer and acted “maliciously,” i.e., without legal justification or excuse. On the evidentiary issue, the Court ruled the district court properly excluded a police call detail report memorializing a former tenant’s texted threat to burn the trailer. The report contained hearsay from a non-officer declarant and did not embody the officer’s first-hand factual findings. The Court also rejected, under plain error review, new arguments that the threat qualified under the present-sense-impression or state-of-mind exceptions, and found the proposed alternative-suspect showing lacked the required direct nexus to the crime.

Factual and Procedural Background

The State’s case was circumstantial but cohesive:

• Neighbor Charlene Haglund lent Boyer a lighter around the morning of August 2, 2022; she saw him head toward the main road. Roughly 30 minutes later, she observed and smelled smoke coming from Boyer’s trailer. No one else was seen entering or exiting. All doors and windows were later found shut and locked, with no signs of forced entry.
• Shortly after leaving the neighborhood, Boyer used a restroom at a nearby auto glass shop. The shop owner observed a strong bleach odor, bleach on the restroom floor, and bleach splatters on Boyer’s shirt and sandals. Boyer left on foot, changed shirts en route to his former partner’s home, and later discarded the bleach-marked shirt.
• Firefighters found four gas stove burners on with no pots; they observed two or three distinct points of origin (not connected), consistent with intentional ignition. An expert ruled out electrical or utility causes and deemed the fire incendiary. The trailer was uninsured.
• Boyer told police he chased escaped dogs, went straight to his former partner’s home, and then returned; police found his dogs near the trailer and considered his answers uncooperative and inconsistent with other testimony.

At trial, Boyer admitted methamphetamine use, denied setting the fire, and claimed he used cleaning spray in the restroom because soap was unavailable. He denied locking his trailer. A jury convicted him of first-degree arson. On appeal, he challenged sufficiency and the exclusion of evidence suggesting an evicted former tenant (“Julie”) had threatened to burn the trailer.

Analysis

Standards of Review

• Sufficiency of the evidence: The Court assumes the State’s evidence is true, disregards contrary defense evidence, grants the State all reasonable inferences, and asks whether any rational juror could find each element beyond a reasonable doubt. Hanson v. State, 2025 WY 80, ¶ 7, 571 P.3d 1282, 1285 (Wyo. 2025) (quoting Munoz v. State, 2024 WY 103).
• Evidentiary rulings: Abuse of discretion as to admissibility; de novo review for alleged constitutional violations of the right to present a complete defense. Detimore v. State, 2024 WY 109, ¶ 8; Anderson v. State, 2022 WY 119, ¶ 11.
• Unpreserved evidentiary theories: Plain error. Farrow v. State, 2019 WY 30, ¶ 22.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence: Circumstantial Proof of Intent and Malice Without Motive

Precedents Cited and Their Roles

• Montee v. State, 2013 WY 74, ¶ 21; Vialpando v. State, 494 P.2d 939, 941 (Wyo. 1972): Arson is often proven circumstantially.
• Fitzwater v. State, 2025 WY 88, ¶ 23; Stroble v. State, 2020 WY 158, ¶ 11: No legal distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence.
• Ogden v. State, 2022 WY 111, ¶¶ 18–19; Brown v. State, 2004 WY 57, ¶ 14: Opportunity, combined with other incriminating facts, can establish guilt.
• Harnden v. State, 2016 WY 92, ¶¶ 8–10; Keats v. State, 2003 WY 19, ¶ 16: First-degree arson is a specific intent offense; “malice” is shown either by proof the act was done without legal justification or excuse, or with ill will/hostility.
• Gonsalves v. State, 2024 WY 49, ¶ 11: Intent may be proven by circumstantial evidence alone.
• Wyant v. State, 2020 WY 15, ¶ 8; Cox v. State, 829 P.2d 1183, 1185 (Wyo. 1992): Specific intent means intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence.
• Winters v. State, 2019 WY 76, ¶ 82; Swett v. State, 2018 WY 144, ¶ 39: Motive is not an element; it is at most an intermediate fact the State may—but need not—prove.
• Esquibel v. State, 2022 WY 89; Harnden: Cited to show different ways of proving malice; not controlling because this case proceeded on the “without legal justification” prong rather than “ill will.”

Legal Reasoning Applied

Wyoming’s arson statute requires proof that the defendant “maliciously” started a fire “with intent to destroy or damage an occupied structure.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-101(a). The Court reaffirmed that “malice” encompasses an intentional act done either without legal justification or with ill will/hostility. This case proceeded under the “without legal justification or excuse” pathway to malice.

The circumstantial record was strong:

• Temporal proximity and opportunity: Boyer was at the trailer shortly before smoke was observed; no one else was seen; the structure was secured with no forced entry.
• Intentional setting: Multiple, unconnected points of origin; all stove burners on with nothing on them; expert ruled out accidental causes and utilities; deemed incendiary.
• Consciousness of guilt indicators: Bleach on Boyer’s clothing and footwear shortly after the fire; discarding the bleach-stained shirt; uncooperative and inconsistent statements about his movements; bleach’s potential to degrade forensic evidence.
• Pretextual narrative: Explanation regarding dogs did not align with officers’ observations; jury could infer the dog story was a cover to leave the scene and allow the fire time to develop.

From these facts, a rational juror could infer Boyer intentionally set fires in multiple locations inside his trailer and, having no lawful privilege to do so, acted maliciously. Notably, the Court rejected Boyer’s argument that the State had to prove his motive; motive is not an element and is distinct from the specific intent to damage. The jury could infer the specific intent to damage from the purposeful ignition of multiple points within an occupied structure—no motive was necessary.

Why Harnden and Esquibel Did Not Control

Boyer argued those cases involved direct proof of ill will or hostility absent here. The Court responded that malice can be proven alternatively by showing the defendant acted intentionally and without legal justification or excuse. Because the State satisfied that path, comparisons to cases relying on “ill will” were inapposite.

Impact on Sufficiency Doctrine

• The decision underscores that, in arson prosecutions, a clean circumstantial chain—opportunity, intentional ignition indicators, elimination of accident, and post-event conduct—can satisfy both the actus reus and mens rea without any motive evidence.
• It also fortifies the appellate deference standard: conflicts in testimony (e.g., Boyer’s claim he never locked the trailer) are disregarded on appeal when reviewing for sufficiency; courts credit evidence favorable to the verdict.

II. Alternative-Suspect Evidence and Hearsay: Public Records, Present-Sense Impression, and State of Mind

Precedents Cited and Their Roles

• Detimore v. State, 2024 WY 109, ¶ 21; Sparks v. State, 2019 WY 50, ¶ 45; Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 327 (2006): The right to present a complete defense does not displace legitimate evidentiary rules or proportional exclusions.
• Mraz v. State, 2014 WY 73, ¶ 8 n.2; Grady v. State, 2008 WY 144, ¶ 13; Bush v. State, 2008 WY 108, ¶¶ 62, 68–71: Alternate-suspect evidence is admissible only if it shows a direct nexus to the charged crime, not mere speculation; it must be legally admissible evidence.
• W.R.E. 801(c), 802, 803(8)(C): Hearsay rule and the public-records exception for “factual findings” from authorized investigations, when offered against the state in criminal cases, subject to trustworthiness.
• Kemper Architects, P.C. v. McFall, Konkel & Kimball Consulting Eng’rs, Inc., 843 P.2d 1178, 1188 (Wyo. 1992): Public-records exception does not permit admission of third-party out-of-court statements within an official report for their truth.
• Seaton v. State of Wyo. Highway Comm’n, Dist. No. 1, 784 P.2d 197, 199–201 (Wyo. 1989): Only an official’s first-hand observations and derivative factual findings qualify; third-party assertions embedded in official files remain hearsay.
• W.R.E. 803(1) and 803(3): Present-sense impression and then-existing state-of-mind exceptions.
• Majors v. State, 2011 WY 63, ¶ 29: State-of-mind exception cannot be used to prove the truth of the matter asserted about the defendant’s acts; it must be genuinely probative of the declarant’s mental state, not a backdoor for substantive accusations.
• Widdison v. State, 2018 WY 18, ¶ 44 n.5: The importance of an offer of proof to show relevance and preserve error.
• Farrow v. State, 2019 WY 30, ¶ 22: Plain error framework for unpreserved claims.
• Bruce v. State, 2015 WY 46, ¶ 79; Drennen v. State, 2013 WY 118, ¶ 20: No entitlement to theory-of-the-defense instructions unsupported by admissible evidence.

Legal Reasoning Applied

Boyer sought to introduce two pieces of “alternative suspect” evidence regarding a former tenant, Julie:

1. Haglund’s testimony about prior occupants (to suggest neighborhood awareness of Julie’s eviction and bad blood), and
2. A police call detail report documenting park owner Andrew Norton’s account that Julie had texted she would burn the trailer before surrendering it (two months pre-fire).

The Court upheld exclusion of both.

Direct Nexus Requirement and Relevance

Alternate-suspect evidence must connect the identified third party to the crime charged, not merely raise suspicions. Here, nothing placed Julie near the trailer on the day of the fire or linked her to any act or circumstance of the charged offense. Haglund’s general awareness of past events could not establish the required nexus; it was speculative. The Court therefore sustained the relevance-based exclusion.

Public Records Exception (W.R.E. 803(8)(C)) and Hearsay Within Hearsay

Officer Hunter’s call detail report was properly excluded as hearsay. The report did not contain the officer’s first-hand observations or derivative factual findings; it memorialized Norton’s account of Julie’s texted threat, and the officer could not reach Julie. Under Seaton and Kemper, W.R.E. 803(8)(C) does not authorize the admission of third-party statements embedded in official records to prove their truth. The “trustworthiness” proviso also cut against admission; the officer lacked first-hand knowledge and could not corroborate via the declarant.

Present-Sense Impression and Then-Existing State of Mind (Plain Error Review)

Boyer raised new theories on appeal. The Court found no plain error because neither rule clearly applied:

• W.R.E. 803(1) (present-sense impression) applies to statements describing or explaining an event while being perceived or immediately thereafter. Julie’s threat contemplated a possible future act; it did not describe an event she was then perceiving.
• W.R.E. 803(3) (state of mind) permits statements of intent, plan, or motive to prove the declarant’s then-existing mental state, not to prove the substantive truth that the declarant committed the charged act. Consistent with Majors, the attempt to use Julie’s threat as substantive evidence that she burned the trailer was improper.

Further, the district court did not bar Boyer from calling witnesses; it invited further development outside the jury’s presence. Defense counsel chose not to call Officer Hunter or Norton and made no offer of proof as to Haglund’s proposed testimony. Consequently, there was no violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law.

Impact on Alternative-Suspect Practice

• Wyoming reaffirms a high bar for alternative-suspect evidence: defendants must provide admissible proof establishing a direct nexus—temporal, geographic, or forensic—to the charged offense, not merely prior threats or grudges.
• Public-records reports are not vehicles for introducing third-party hearsay. Defense counsel must secure the declarant’s testimony, or find a valid hearsay exception, and meet foundational requirements (including unavailability and corroboration where applicable).
• Counsel must preserve evidentiary theories and make robust offers of proof to obtain theory-of-defense instructions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Specific intent vs. motive: Specific intent is the purposeful aim to bring about a particular result (here, to damage an occupied structure). Motive is why someone did it. The law requires proof of intent, not motive.
• Malice in arson: In Wyoming, “maliciously” is satisfied if the act is intentional and done without legal justification or excuse (or with ill will). The State may prove either route.
• Circumstantial evidence: Evidence of related facts (timelines, behavior, physical conditions) from which a jury can infer the main fact (here, who set the fire). It is as legally valid as eyewitness testimony.
• Present-sense impression (803(1)): A spontaneous description of an event as it happens or immediately after. It is not a prediction or threat about what someone might do later.
• State-of-mind (803(3)): A statement showing a declarant’s then-existing intent, plan, emotion, or physical condition. It cannot be used simply to prove the declarant did the thing they said they intended, without more.
• Public-records exception (803(8)(C)): Allows factual findings from official investigations to be admitted against the State in criminal cases if trustworthy. But an official report cannot smuggle in third-party hearsay for its truth.
• Hearsay within hearsay: When a document (like a police report) contains someone else’s out-of-court statement, each layer must fit a hearsay exception to be admissible.
• Direct nexus (alternative-suspect evidence): A concrete connection linking the identified third party to the specific crime (presence at the scene, contemporaneous threats with corroboration, forensic ties), not merely a prior dispute or general hostility.
• Plain error: Appellate relief for unpreserved claims requires a clear rule of law, a clear violation, and material prejudice. New evidentiary theories raised for the first time on appeal rarely meet this standard.

Practical Takeaways and Future Implications

For Prosecutors

• Arson prosecutions can rest on circumstantial evidence if intentional ignition is well supported (multiple unconnected origins, elimination of accidents/utilities, post-incident conduct such as evidence manipulation, inconsistent statements).
• Proof of motive is not required; frame malice via the “without legal justification” prong and the purposeful nature of the fire setting.
• When public-records reports are proffered by the defense, identify hearsay-within-hearsay and trustworthiness defects under W.R.E. 803(8)(C) and related rules.

For Defense Counsel

• Alternative-suspect proof must do more than suggest hostility or past threats. Gather admissible, case-specific links (presence, opportunity, corroborated statements against interest, forensic ties).
• To use third-party statements, secure the declarant’s testimony or fit a narrow hearsay exception with proper foundations. Public-records reports will not carry third-party assertions.
• Preserve evidentiary theories at trial and make offers of proof. Without admissible evidence, a theory-of-defense instruction is properly refused.
• Be cautious relying on 803(1) or 803(3): threats about future conduct ordinarily do not qualify as present-sense impressions, and state-of-mind cannot be a backdoor to prove third-party culpability.

For Trial Judges

• Holmes/Detimore balancing supports excluding speculative third-party culpability where the “direct nexus” is absent and hearsay rules are not satisfied.
• Apply Seaton/Kemper rigorously: distinguish between an officer’s own factual findings and third-party statements embedded in official records.

Conclusion

Boyer reaffirms two important principles in Wyoming criminal practice. First, in first-degree arson, the State may prove the requisite malice and specific intent without showing motive; evidence that a defendant intentionally set a fire in an occupied structure and did so without legal justification or excuse suffices, and circumstantial evidence can readily meet that burden. Second, the decision tightens the pathway for alternative-suspect evidence: police reports that merely transmit third-party threats are inadmissible hearsay under W.R.E. 803(8)(C), and neither present-sense impression nor state-of-mind exceptions provide a backdoor for their admission when offered for the truth of third-party culpability. The opinion thus strengthens evidentiary reliability while preserving a defendant’s right to present a complete defense grounded in admissible, probative proof directly connecting an identified alternate suspect to the charged crime.