Bowe v. United States: Federal Prisoners May Seek Certiorari from §2255 Gatekeeping Denials, and §2244(b)(1)’s “Old-Claim” Bar Does Not Govern Successive §2255 Motions

Court: U.S. Supreme Court
Date: January 9, 2026
Citation: 607 U. S. ___ (2026)

1. Introduction

Bowe v. United States arises from the interaction of AEDPA’s “second or successive” gatekeeping rules for state habeas petitions under 28 U. S. C. §2254 and federal postconviction motions under 28 U. S. C. §2255. Michael S. Bowe, a federal prisoner, is serving a sentence that includes a mandatory consecutive 10-year term under 18 U. S. C. §924(c) for using a firearm in relation to a “crime of violence.”

Subsequent Supreme Court decisions destabilized the legal foundations of Bowe’s §924(c) predicate offenses: United States v. Davis, 588 U. S. 445 (2019), invalidated §924(c)’s residual clause as void for vagueness, and United States v. Taylor, 596 U. S. 845 (2022), held attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence” under the elements clause. Separately, Eleventh Circuit law treated conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery as not satisfying the elements clause. See Brown v. United States, 942 F. 3d 1069 (2019) (per curiam).

Yet Bowe’s attempts to obtain authorization to file successive §2255 motions were repeatedly blocked by Eleventh Circuit gatekeeping rulings, including reliance on 28 U. S. C. §2244(b)(1)—AEDPA’s “old-claim” bar for state prisoners. The Supreme Court granted certiorari against a backdrop of an acknowledged circuit split over whether §2244(b)(1) applies to federal prisoners’ successive §2255 motions.

The case presented two issues of statutory architecture and judicial review:

• Jurisdiction: Does §2244(b)(3)(E) bar Supreme Court certiorari review of a federal prisoner’s request to file a second or successive §2255 motion?
• Merits: Does §2244(b)(1) (the old-claim bar) apply to federal prisoners seeking authorization under §2255(h)?

2. Summary of the Opinion

Justice Sotomayor, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson, held:

1. The Court has jurisdiction. §2244(b)(3)(E)—which bars certiorari review of authorization decisions on “second or successive” state “applications”—does not clearly extend to federal prisoners’ successive §2255 “motions” via §2255(h)’s cross-reference to §2244.
2. §2244(b)(1) does not apply to federal prisoners’ successive §2255 motions. By its text, §2244(b)(1) governs claims in “a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254.” Section 2255(h)’s cross-reference imports only panel-certification procedures, not §2244(b)(1)’s substantive old-claim dismissal rule.

The Court vacated the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment and remanded for reconsideration of authorization under the correct standard.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Substantive §924(c) backdrop (why Bowe’s sentence may be unlawful today)

• United States v. Davis, 588 U. S. 445: Held §924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause void for vagueness. This decision created the constitutional “new rule” hook Bowe used to seek successive relief under §2255(h)(2).
• United States v. Taylor, 596 U. S. 845: Held attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence” under §924(c)’s elements clause. Although central to Bowe’s equities, it was not itself a “new rule of constitutional law” for §2255(h)(2) gatekeeping, creating the procedural trap that set up this case.
• Brown v. United States, 942 F. 3d 1069 (per curiam): Eleventh Circuit authority that conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery does not satisfy the elements clause—completing the trio of predicate problems for Bowe.

B. AEDPA structure, “second or successive” gatekeeping, and jurisdiction

• United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321: Cited in the syllabus for the proposition that the syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion—important for interpretive discipline when relying on headnotes.
• Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U. S. 637 and Felker v. Turpin, 518 U. S. 651: Foundational AEDPA cases describing “second or successive” gatekeeping and confirming the certiorari bar’s operation for state prisoners.
• Burton v. Stewart, 549 U. S. 147 (per curiam): Cited for the stringency of AEDPA’s successive-filing rules and the gatekeeping mechanism’s rigidity.
• Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U. S. 465: Reinforced that §2255(h) provides the “two—and only two—conditions” for successive §2255 motions—supporting the majority’s refusal to graft additional §2244(b) content restrictions onto §2255(h).
• Castro v. United States, 540 U. S. 375: The majority’s key jurisdictional precedent: absent a “clear indication” Congress intended to close Supreme Court review, ambiguous cross-references are not read to strip certiorari jurisdiction for a class of habeas litigants.
• Hohn v. United States, 524 U. S. 236: Used by both sides: the majority to deny that Hohn resolved whether §2244(b)(3)(E) extends to federal prisoners; the dissent to argue Hohn treated the certiorari bar as a “clear limit” applicable in this context.
• Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U. S. 163: Invoked for the Court’s duty to satisfy itself of jurisdiction before reaching merits.
• Utah v. Evans, 536 U. S. 452 and Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U. S. 77: Cited to support narrow readings of jurisdictional limitations and reluctance to treat ambiguity as silently modifying jurisdiction.

C. Statutory interpretation principles and interpretive canons

• Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582 U. S. 79: The majority’s language-variation canon: differences in statutory language presumptively reflect differences in meaning—supporting the conclusion that §2244(b)(1)’s explicit limitation to “application under section 2254” is deliberate.
• Boechler v. Commissioner, 596 U. S. 199, Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, and Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428: Employed by the majority analogically for “clear statement” requirements in high-stakes classification contexts; attacked by the dissent as inapposite because §2244(b)(3)(E) is concededly jurisdictional.
• Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U. S. 247: Cited for “clear indication” methodology (extraterritoriality) as an example of clarity requirements not grounded in constitutional avoidance.
• Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 566 U. S. 449 and Garland v. Cargill, 602 U. S. 406: Used to rebut purposivist overrides of plain text and to emphasize the presumption against enacting “useless laws.”
• Dodd v. United States, 545 U. S. 353: Cited for the demanding nature of §2255(f)’s limitations period, which constrains repeat litigation even without §2244(b)(1).

D. Circuit split authorities (as listed by the Court)

The Court identified the split by naming the decisions on each side:

• Applying §2244(b)(1) to federal prisoners: Winarske v. United States, In re Bourgeois, In re Baptiste, United States v. Winkelman, Gallagher v. United States (per curiam), and Brannigan v. United States.
• Not applying §2244(b)(1) to federal prisoners: In re Graham, Jones v. United States, and Williams v. United States.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Jurisdiction: why §2244(b)(3)(E) does not bar certiorari in federal §2255 authorization cases

The jurisdiction dispute turns on statutory “cross-reference scope.” Section §2255(h) requires that a successive §2255 motion “must be certified as provided in section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals” to “contain” one of two threshold showings. The Government argued this imports §2244(b)(3)(E)’s bar on certiorari review.

The Court rejected that extension for three linked reasons:

• Textual mismatch and placement: §2244(b)(3)(E) is housed in §2244’s state-prisoner framework and speaks to “applications” rather than federal-prisoner “motions.” The Court treated this not as dispositive alone, but as reinforcing why any extension must come from a clearly expressed cross-reference.
• Narrow cross-reference function: The cross-reference is aimed at how a panel “certifie[s]” a successive filing—procedures like the three-judge panel requirement, prima facie screen, and 30-day timing. The certiorari bar, by contrast, governs what happens after the panel acts (appeal/rehearing/certiorari), involving a different actor (the litigant) and a different court (the Supreme Court).
• “Clear indication” requirement grounded in Castro v. United States: Given the breadth of §1254(1) and the Court’s reluctance to infer jurisdiction-stripping from ambiguity, the Court demanded clarity before concluding Congress “close[d] our doors” to a class of habeas litigants. Because §2255(h)’s text and structure could reasonably be read without importing §2244(b)(3)(E), ambiguity defeated the Government’s jurisdictional objection.

B. Merits: why §2244(b)(1) does not apply to federal prisoners’ successive §2255 motions

The central holding is straightforwardly textual: §2244(b)(1) applies to “[a] claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254.” Federal prisoners proceed under §2255, not §2254. The Court underscored that Congress elsewhere expressly distinguishes §2254 “applications” from §2255 “motions,” invoking Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc. for the presumption that these drafting differences matter.

The difficult part is refuting the “chain of incorporation” argument advanced by court-appointed amicus (and embraced by the dissent): if §2255(h) imports §2244(b)(3)(C)’s “prima facie showing” requirement, then “requirements of this subsection” might be read to include §2244(b)(1).

The Court rejected this chain for two primary reasons:

• Scope of incorporation is procedural and panel-focused: §2255(h) imports §2244 only insofar as §2244 “provid[es]” the mechanism by which a panel certifies that a successive §2255 filing “contain[s]” one of §2255(h)’s two gateways. It does not incorporate §2244(b)’s substantive content restrictions.
• Collision with §2255(h)’s own substantive design: Reading §2244(b)(1) into federal §2255 practice through §2244(b)(3)(C) would, by the same logic, also import §2244(b)(2)’s substantive gatekeeping rules—creating irreconcilable conflicts with §2255(h)(1)’s different new-evidence standard. The Court treated this as confirming that Congress did not intend wholesale importation of §2244(b)’s content regime into §2255(h).

C. Justice Jackson’s concurrence: “insulation” only for properly made gatekeeping determinations

Justice Jackson agreed with the Court’s holdings but emphasized a functional understanding of §2244(b)(3)(E): Congress likely intended to insulate a properly conducted, procedurally compliant gatekeeping determination. Where the panel dismisses for lack of jurisdiction under an inapplicable provision, it arguably has not made the kind of “grant or denial” Congress sought to protect from further review. While the majority did not adopt this narrower pathway as its holding, the concurrence highlights a second, independent sensitivity: “finality” provisions presuppose that the statutory gatekeeping process was actually followed.

D. Justice Gorsuch’s dissent: package-deal incorporation and finality-first reading

The dissent argued:

• No certiorari jurisdiction: §2255(h)’s instruction that a successive motion “must be certified as provided in section 2244” incorporates the whole §2244(b)(3) package, including (E). The dissent leaned on readings of Castro v. United States and Hohn v. United States as assuming (if not holding) the certiorari bar’s applicability to federal prisoners. It also pointed to alternative paths—original habeas and certified questions under §1254(2)—to resolve circuit splits without certiorari.
• §2244(b)(1) applies via §2244(b)(3)(C): Since (C) requires a prima facie showing that the “requirements of this subsection” are met, and (b)(1) is a “requirement,” the dissent concluded federal prisoners are barred from repeating claims. On its view, §2255(h) merely supplies federal-prisoner-specific substitutes for §2244(b)(2), leaving (b)(1) intact.

The majority’s response is essentially that the dissent’s “package deal” approach cannot be squared with the cross-reference’s limited function and with §2255(h)’s independent, carefully drawn substantive gateways—especially where importing §2244(b)’s content rules would create statutory collisions.

3.3 Impact

A. Immediate doctrinal impact

• Resolves the §2244(b)(1) circuit split: Federal prisoners pursuing successive §2255 motions are not subject to §2244(b)(1)’s old-claim bar, which by its terms governs §2254 applications.
• Opens a Supreme Court review channel: Federal prisoners may seek certiorari from court-of-appeals panel decisions denying authorization under §2255(h), because §2244(b)(3)(E) does not clearly bar such review.

B. Practical litigation consequences

• Repeat filings are not “free” filings: The Court emphasized that even repeat claims must still clear §2255(h)’s “strictly limited” gateways (citing Jones v. Hendrix), and must still satisfy §2255(f)’s statute of limitations (citing Dodd v. United States). The decision therefore removes one categorical dismissal rule but leaves formidable screening constraints intact.
• More Supreme Court petitions in authorization cases—selectively: The Court downplayed floodgate concerns by reference to ordinary docket controls, but as a structural matter this is a meaningful shift: federal-prisoner authorization denials can now present cert-worthy questions (especially systemic statutory-interpretation questions).

C. Broader implications for statutory cross-references

The opinion models a method for reading cross-references narrowly when they are function-specific (“certified … by a panel … to contain …”), resisting arguments that cross-references silently import downstream consequences (like certiorari bars) or upstream substantive regimes (like old-claim bars). For future AEDPA disputes, litigants will likely frame questions as “procedural certification mechanics” versus “substantive content constraints,” with Bowe standing for the proposition that not everything in §2244(b) travels through §2255(h).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Second or successive” (AEDPA gatekeeping): After one postconviction attempt, a prisoner generally needs permission from a three-judge court-of-appeals panel before filing again in district court.
• §2254 vs §2255: §2254 is the main federal habeas route for state prisoners; §2255 is the main collateral route for federal prisoners. AEDPA often treats these tracks differently, even though they share some procedures.
• Cross-reference (“certified as provided in section 2244”): A statute can borrow procedures from another statute by referencing it. The dispute in Bowe is about how much gets borrowed: only the steps for how a panel decides, or also extra rules like repeat-claim bars and certiorari prohibitions.
• “Old-claim bar” (§2244(b)(1)): A state prisoner cannot bring the same claim again in a second or successive §2254 habeas application if it was already presented before. Bowe holds that this specific bar does not apply to federal §2255 successive motions.
• Certiorari bar (§2244(b)(3)(E)): State-prisoner authorization decisions cannot be reviewed by certiorari. Bowe holds that Congress did not clearly extend that certiorari bar to federal prisoners via §2255(h).
• “Prima facie showing”: At the authorization stage, the panel performs a threshold screen—whether the motion plausibly fits within AEDPA’s narrow gateways—rather than fully adjudicating the merits.

5. Conclusion

Bowe v. United States establishes two significant AEDPA clarifications: (1) §2244(b)(3)(E) does not bar Supreme Court certiorari review of federal prisoners’ §2255 authorization denials, absent a clear congressional statement; and (2) §2244(b)(1)’s old-claim bar—textually limited to “application[s] under section 2254”—does not apply to federal prisoners’ successive §2255 motions.

The decision resolves a persistent circuit split, re-centers the successive §2255 inquiry on §2255(h)’s “two—and only two—conditions” (per Jones v. Hendrix), and signals a disciplined approach to cross-referenced AEDPA provisions: certification procedures may travel, but state-prisoner-specific content bars do not, unless Congress clearly says so.