Bostic v. Murray: Clarifying Supervisory Liability and Deliberate Indifference for Subordinate Sexual Misconduct in the Seventh Circuit

I. Introduction

In Lorena E. Bostic v. Clarence D. Murray & Jan Parsons, No. 23‑1665 (7th Cir. Nov. 21, 2025), the Seventh Circuit confronted a deeply troubling set of facts: a probation officer, Miroslav Radiceski, repeatedly sexually assaulted and ultimately raped a female probationer, Lorena Bostic, in a courthouse stairwell. The appeal, however, did not concern the officer’s liability—he was criminally convicted and civilly found liable for $750,000—but instead sought to impose civil rights liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on his supervisors: Chief Probation Officer Jan Parsons and Supervising Judge Clarence Murray.

The case presented two core legal questions:

1. Procedurally, did the magistrate judge have authority to enter final judgment, and was Bostic’s appeal timely under the federal rules?
2. Substantively, under § 1983, when and how can supervisory officials be held liable—consistent with Ashcroft v. Iqbal—for a subordinate’s sexual assault of a citizen, under a substantive due process “bodily integrity” theory?

While affirming that Radiceski’s conduct violated Bostic’s constitutional right to bodily integrity, the Seventh Circuit held that Parsons and Murray did not themselves commit a constitutional violation and were therefore entitled to qualified immunity. In doing so, the court used this case as a vehicle to clarify:

• the post‑Iqbal framework for supervisory liability under § 1983;
• the deliberate indifference standard for substantive due process claims involving bodily integrity;
• the limits of supervisory liability for sexual misconduct by subordinates; and
• doctrinal refinements on implied consent to magistrate jurisdiction and the Rule 58 “150‑day” judgment rule.

The decision is thus an important supervisory liability precedent in the Seventh Circuit, particularly in cases involving sexual misconduct by public officials.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Facts

Judge Murray placed Bostic on probation in 2011. In mid‑2011, another female probationer, A.R., reported to Chief Probation Officer Parsons that probation officer Miroslav Radiceski had behaved inappropriately: he asked her intimate questions about her sex life and tattoos, took her to a secluded stairwell, and asked her to lift her shirt and lower her pants so he could see her tattoos, allegedly moving her clothing himself.

Parsons investigated: she interviewed A.R., consulted security to see if a stairwell video existed (it did not), and obtained a written denial from Radiceski. Together, Parsons and Murray deemed the complaint an unproven, first‑time “allegation” and chose not to fire, suspend, or retrain him. They did, however, impose a gender‑based restriction: for approximately 18 months he was barred from supervising female probationers, though he could do “intakes” for female probationers. Parsons testified this was the only gender‑specific restriction she had imposed in her thirty‑year career. During the restriction, Parsons noticed one troubling incident: Radiceski repeatedly asked to supervise a particular female probationer with mental health issues, requests she consistently denied.

Around late 2012, facing a shortage of probation officers, Parsons began assigning some female probationers to Radiceski again, including Bostic. Initially, Bostic’s interactions with him were uneventful. In March 2013, however, he put his hand on her leg during a meeting; she removed it and asked him not to do that. Shortly thereafter he filed a petition to revoke her probation, exposing her to three years in prison. At a subsequent meeting he told her “Only I can help you … you need me.” Bostic testified that, at every probation appointment after the revocation petition, he non‑consensually groped her breasts and buttocks and placed his hands inside her pants. Terrified that complaining would land her in prison and believing probation staff were “all friends,” she did not report this.

On November 26, 2013, after a revocation hearing, Radiceski directed Bostic into a stairwell, forced her to perform oral sex, then raped her. Bostic reported immediately to a rape hotline and obtained medical care. Within a week, Radiceski was suspended with pay pending investigation and was fired by the end of December 2013. He was criminally charged and pled guilty to official misconduct, receiving three years of home‑detention.

B. Procedural History

Bostic sued under § 1983 in federal court, naming Radiceski, Parsons, Murray, and other state and county actors. She alleged:

• Against Radiceski: violation of her Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily integrity through sexual assault.
• Against Parsons and Murray: “supervisory liability” for facilitating or failing to prevent the assault by knowingly assigning a dangerous officer to supervise her.

The case proceeded by consent to a magistrate judge (initially Magistrate Judge Cherry, later Magistrate Judge Kolar after Cherry’s retirement). The parties orally consented to magistrate jurisdiction, and when Judge Kolar took over, he gave them 30 days to object; none did.

Judge Kolar granted summary judgment for several defendants, including Parsons and Murray, on January 23, 2023, largely on qualified immunity grounds, finding no clearly established law put them on notice that their conduct was unconstitutional. The case against Radiceski went to trial in February 2023; the jury awarded Bostic $750,000. The clerk then entered judgment only against Radiceski; no separate Rule 58 judgment was entered as to Parsons or Murray. Bostic filed a notice of appeal on March 29, 2023, challenging only the summary judgment for Parsons and Murray.

C. Holdings

The Seventh Circuit’s key rulings were:

1. Magistrate jurisdiction: The parties impliedly consented to Judge Kolar’s exercise of civil jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), so he had authority to enter a final, appealable summary judgment order.
2. Timeliness: Because the clerk’s judgment omitted the claims against Parsons and Murray, Rule 58’s “separate document” requirement was not satisfied. Under the “150‑day fail‑safe,” judgment as to Parsons and Murray was deemed entered 150 days after the dispositive order, on July 31, 2023. Bostic’s premature March 29 notice of appeal “sprang forward” and became effective on that date, rendering the appeal timely.
3. Supervisory liability / qualified immunity:
   • Supervisors are liable under § 1983 only for their own misconduct, not vicariously for subordinates (Ashcroft v. Iqbal), and must (a) be personally involved, and (b) act with the state of mind required by the underlying constitutional provision.
   • For substantive due process “bodily integrity” claims, the requisite mental state is deliberate indifference, meaning actual knowledge of impending harm and a conscious refusal to prevent it.
   • Although Parsons and Murray were personally involved in handling prior complaints and assignment decisions, the record did not show they had actual knowledge that Radiceski posed a risk of raping Bostic, nor that they consciously chose to allow such a risk to materialize. Their response—investigating the earlier complaint, imposing an unprecedented gender‑based restriction, and later, for staffing reasons, reassigning him to female probationers—might be negligent, but was not deliberately indifferent.
   • Because their conduct did not amount to a constitutional violation under this standard, they were entitled to qualified immunity; the court did not need to reach the “clearly established” prong.

The Seventh Circuit thus affirmed summary judgment in favor of Parsons and Murray, concluding that, “This is a tragic case, but the only liability is with Radiceski.”

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Procedural Rulings

1. Implied Consent to Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction

Civil litigants may consent under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) to have a magistrate judge conduct “all proceedings” including entry of final judgment. Consent may be:

• Express (typically via a signed consent form), or
• Implied, if parties, after being informed of their right to refuse, act in a way that manifests consent, such as participating in proceedings without objection.

The court relied on:

• Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580 (2003): the Supreme Court held consent can be implied from litigants’ conduct where they are informed of their right to decline and nonetheless proceed without objection.
• Marion HealthCare, LLC v. S. Illinois Hosp. Servs., 41 F.4th 787 (7th Cir. 2022), and Stevo v. Frasor, 662 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2011): reaffirm that implied consent is valid when parties have notice of the right to refuse.
• Coleman v. LIRC, 860 F.3d 461 (7th Cir. 2017): explains that some “concrete action” following notice (e.g., appearing and litigating) is necessary for implied consent.
• Mark I, Inc. v. Gruber, 38 F.3d 369 (7th Cir. 1994): confirms magistrate judges may conduct civil trials and enter final judgments upon consent.

Application here:

• The parties orally told Magistrate Judge Cherry that they consented to magistrate jurisdiction. Although the usual written form was not completed, Cherry treated the oral consent as sufficient.
• When Cherry retired and the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Kolar, he issued an order giving the parties 30 days to object to his continued exercise of jurisdiction, explicitly warning that failure to object “shall operate as consent.” No objections were filed.
• The parties litigated before Judge Kolar, including the summary judgment motion.

Under Roell and Marion HealthCare, this conduct constituted implied consent to Kolar’s jurisdiction. The court emphasized that implied consent is particularly appropriate where the parties have express notice of their right to refuse and nonetheless proceed.

2. Timeliness of Appeal and Rule 58’s 150‑Day “Fail‑Safe”

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 requires that a judgment be set forth in a separate document. Failure to comply can create confusion about when the time to appeal begins. The Seventh Circuit relied on:

• Brown v. Fifth Third Bank, 730 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2013): explains that where no separate judgment is entered, judgment is deemed entered 150 days after the court’s final dispositive order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c)(2)(B) and Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii).
• Bell v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 982 F.3d 468 (7th Cir. 2020): describes this rule as a “150‑day fail‑safe.”
• TDK Elecs. Corp. v. Draiman, 321 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 2003): similar application of the 150‑day rule.
• Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843 (7th Cir. 2011) and Bell v. Kay, 847 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2017): apply Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(2), under which a premature notice of appeal filed after the court announces a decision but before formal entry of judgment “springs forward” and becomes effective once judgment is entered.

Here:

• The January 23, 2023 summary judgment order disposed of claims against Parsons and Murray but was not followed by a separate, comprehensive judgment covering all defendants.
• On February 28, 2023, after trial, the clerk entered a judgment that mentioned only the $750,000 verdict against Radiceski, omitting the six other defendants including Parsons and Murray. Thus, as to them, no Rule 58‑compliant judgment was ever entered.
• Under Rule 58(c)(2)(B) and the cited precedents, the judgment as to Parsons and Murray is deemed entered 150 days after the last dispositive order—here, on Monday, July 31, 2023.
• Bostic’s March 29, 2023 notice of appeal, although premature, “sprang forward” on July 31 and became effective on that date. Her appeal was therefore timely.

This portion of the opinion reinforces appellate practitioners’ need to track both the separate document requirement and the “deemed entry” rules when judgments are incomplete or irregular.

B. Supervisory Liability Framework Clarified

The substantive heart of the opinion is the Seventh Circuit’s attempt to clarify the doctrine of supervisory liability post‑Iqbal, particularly in a substantive due process “bodily integrity” context. The court explicitly acknowledges that “how, exactly, liability for supervisors works in the wake of Iqbal is still somewhat unsettled,” citing scholarly commentary describing the law as a “muddled mess.”

1. Rejecting “Supervisory Liability” as Vicarious Liability

The court begins by reiterating Iqbal’s central holding on this point:

• “Supervisory liability” is a misnomer.
• Under § 1983, a supervisor cannot be held liable on a theory of respondeat superior (employer‑style vicarious liability).
• The supervisor is liable only for his or her own misconduct. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–77.

The court contrasts this with its prior and contemporaneous cases where claims against high‑level officials failed for lack of any connection:

• Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2019): a university president was dismissed from a suit challenging a disciplinary proceeding because the plaintiff did not allege he knew of, let alone “facilitated, approved, or condoned” the actions at issue.
• Brown v. Randle, 847 F.3d 861 (7th Cir. 2017): a warden could not be held liable for delayed medical visits where the plaintiff did not claim the warden “had anything to do with the timing” of those visits.
• Vinning‑El v. Evans, 657 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011): a warden was entitled to summary judgment where there was no evidence he made or ratified the relevant diet decision.

By emphasizing these cases, the court signals that merely occupying a supervisory role is never enough. Plaintiffs must tie the supervisor’s own decisions or omissions to the alleged violation.

2. Two Elements for Supervisory Liability After Iqbal

The court synthesizes its precedent into a two‑part test (citing, among others, Stockton v. Milwaukee County, 44 F.4th 605 (7th Cir. 2022), Backes v. Vill. of Peoria Heights, 662 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2011), and Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742 (7th Cir. 2011)):

1. Personal involvement:
   • There must be “some causal connection or affirmative link between the action complained about and the official sued.” (Arnett, quoting Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995)).
   • The supervisor must have “caused or participated in” the deprivation (Milchtein v. Milwaukee County, 42 F.4th 814, 824 (7th Cir. 2022); Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996)).
2. Correct state of mind:
   • The supervisor must act with the state of mind required to prove a violation of the underlying constitutional right. This follows Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 781 (7th Cir. 2015), and Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
   • The state of mind is not uniform across all contexts; it tracks the substantive standard for the right in question.

The court then gives concrete examples of how the required mental state varies:

• Substantive due process claims (like bodily integrity or certain liberty‑interest cases): the standard is deliberate indifference. See Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 204 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Martinez v. Santiago, 51 F.4th 258, 262 (7th Cir. 2022).
• Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement: also deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm. See Haywood v. Hathaway, 842 F.3d 1026, 1033 (7th Cir. 2016).
• Equal protection: purposeful discrimination is required. A supervisor facilitating a racially discriminatory firing must act with “the specific intent to discriminate,” tying the mental state to the substantive equal protection requirement. See Locke v. Haessig, 788 F.3d 662, 669 (7th Cir. 2015); T.E. v. Grindle, 599 F.3d 583, 588 (7th Cir. 2010).
• Pretrial detainee failure‑to‑protect (Fourteenth Amendment): liability is based on objective unreasonableness, not subjective deliberate indifference, under Kingsley v. Hendrickson. See Kemp v. Fulton County, 27 F.4th 491, 498 (7th Cir. 2022) (holding Kingsley’s objective test applies to supervisory claims as well).

This explicit alignment of supervisory liability’s mental state with the underlying right is one of the opinion’s most important clarifications, and squarely responds to confusion identified by the academic literature (e.g., William N. Evans, Supervisory Liability in the Fallout of Iqbal, 65 Syracuse L. Rev. 103 (2014)).

3. Caution About the “Turn a Blind Eye” Formulation

In a significant doctrinal refinement, the court addresses a familiar pre‑Iqbal formula from older Seventh Circuit cases—often quoted as allowing supervisory liability where the official:

“know[s] about the conduct and facilitate[s] it, approve[s] it, condone[s] it, or turn[s] a blind eye for fear of what [he] might see,”

and thereby “act[s] either knowingly or with deliberate, reckless indifference.” See Backes, 662 F.3d at 870; Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992–93 (7th Cir. 1988).

The court notes:

• This formulation is rooted in pre‑Iqbal caselaw and in some instances assumed deliberate indifference would suffice in any supervisory context. See, e.g., Nanda v. Moss, 412 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 2005).
• Iqbal made clear that the required mental state must match the underlying constitutional right; deliberate indifference is not always enough.
• The Supreme Court majority in Iqbal rejected exactly this kind of broad supervisory standard; Justice Souter’s dissent cited it as an approach the majority declined to adopt.

The Seventh Circuit therefore “cautions courts” not to reflexively apply the “turn a blind eye” standard:

• It is still accurate where the underlying right itself uses a deliberate indifference standard (e.g., many Eighth Amendment and some substantive due process claims). See, for example, Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 344 (7th Cir. 2017).
• But it is inaccurate where the underlying right requires purposeful discrimination (equal protection) or objective unreasonableness (Kingsley/pretrial detainee claims), or other mental states.

This warning is doctrinally important: it effectively narrows when courts should invoke the “condone or turn a blind eye” formula and aligns supervisory liability with Iqbal.

4. Deliberate Indifference in Substantive Due Process / Bodily Integrity

Because Bostic asserted a substantive due process claim (bodily integrity), the court identified deliberate indifference as the required state of mind for supervisory liability, citing Martinez and Vance v. Rumsfeld.

Drawing on Hill v. Shobe, 93 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 1996), and West v. Waymire, 114 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 1997), the court defined deliberate indifference in this context as:

• The official must have actual knowledge of impending harm, not just what he “should have known.”
• The official must consciously refuse to prevent that harm.
• The official’s knowledge must be sufficiently specific that one can infer he intended the resulting injury (“sufficient knowledge of the danger that one can infer he intended to inflict the resultant injury”).
• Mere incompetence, negligence, or irresponsibility—even gross negligence—does not satisfy this standard; the conduct must show a deliberate decision to allow the constitutional violation to occur.

The court also cited Martinez and West to reinforce that this is a very demanding mental state, higher than negligence or even some forms of recklessness.

C. Application to Parsons and Murray

1. Personal Involvement

The court readily found that Parsons and Murray were personally involved in the chain of events:

• They personally addressed A.R.’s 2011 complaint about inappropriate sexual conduct by Radiceski, chose how to investigate, and agreed on the sanction (if any).
• They jointly decided not to discipline him formally (no suspension, termination, or retraining), but to impose a gender‑based restriction: he was barred from supervising female probationers for roughly 18 months.
• They later relaxed that restriction due to staffing shortages, allowing him again to supervise some female probationers, including Bostic.

Thus, unlike Purdue or Brown v. Randle, where top managers knew nothing of the particular incident, here there was “some causal connection … between the action complained of”—the rape—and the actions of Parsons and Murray. They were not sued simply because they were at the top of the org chart; their own decisions were the subject of the claim.

2. What They Knew (and Did Not Know)

The deliberate indifference analysis hinged on what Parsons and Murray actually knew about the risk posed by Radiceski before he assaulted Bostic:

• They knew:
  • A.R.’s 2011 complaint describing highly inappropriate and sexually intrusive behavior in a stairwell: intimate questioning, demands to expose tattoos, and physical manipulation of clothing.
  • There was no corroborating video footage; Radiceski denied the allegations in a written statement.
  • No prior or subsequent formal complaints of sexual misconduct by Radiceski had been made, apart from A.R.
  • During the gender‑based restriction period, Radiceski repeatedly sought to supervise a particular female probationer with mental health issues; Parsons refused his requests.
• They did not know:
  • About any of Radiceski’s groping, coercive conduct, or escalating harassment of Bostic after he filed the revocation petition; she did not report it because she feared retaliation and prison.
  • About any pattern of rapes or completed sexual assaults by him; none had been reported to them.

Thus, the question became whether knowledge of one serious but disputed harassment incident and one troubling request to supervise a vulnerable woman sufficed to establish actual knowledge of a likely impending rape of another female probationer.

3. The Court’s Rejection of Deliberate Indifference

The Seventh Circuit concluded that, even viewing the evidence in Bostic’s favor:

• Parsons and Murray had some indication that Radiceski could be “inappropriate with women,” but no basis to foresee that he would escalate to rape in a stairwell.
• Their reaction to A.R.’s complaint—interviewing her, checking for video, taking a statement from Radiceski, and then imposing an unprecedented, lengthy gender‑based supervision restriction—indicated that they took the risk seriously, at least to some degree.
• Relaxing that restriction after 18 months, especially under staffing pressure, was unwise and arguably negligent, but did not amount to a “conscious refusal” to prevent a known, specific risk of rape. The record did not show they made a deliberate choice to expose female probationers to sexual assault.

The court’s reasoning relied heavily on its earlier substantive due process and supervisory liability precedents:

• Hill v. Shobe and West v. Waymire:
  • In Hill, a police supervisor’s allegedly lax policies that may have contributed to a fatal traffic collision were not enough; there must be actual knowledge of the specific risk and a deliberate choice to disregard it.
  • West similarly stressed that carelessness or incompetence does not equal a due process violation.
  • These cases shape the high bar for deliberate indifference: “actual knowledge of impending harm which he consciously refused to prevent.”
• Hess v. Garcia, 72 F.4th 753 (7th Cir. 2023):
  • There, a police chief knew of vague accusations that an officer acted inappropriately “with females,” yet allowed him to lead a ride‑along with a 17‑year‑old; the officer sexually assaulted the girl. The Seventh Circuit held the chief’s inaction did not rise to deliberate indifference.
  • The court analogized Hess directly to Bostic’s case: knowledge that an officer is “inappropriate with women” may warrant discipline, but absent more specific information, it does not equate to knowledge that he is likely to commit a sexual assault or rape a particular person.
• Hunter v. Mueske, 73 F.4th 561 (7th Cir. 2023), and Frake v. City of Chicago, 210 F.3d 779 (7th Cir. 2000):
  • These cases emphasize that “the possibility that [an official] could have done more does not evince deliberate indifference.”
  • The existence of “other better policies” does not by itself prove deliberate indifference; choosing a less‑than‑optimal policy is not unconstitutional.
  • Applied here, the fact that Parsons and Murray could have fired Radiceski or permanently excluded him from supervising women does not automatically make their chosen compromise deliberately indifferent.

In sum, the court found:

“The information they did have, though troubling, is not enough to put Parsons and Judge Murray on actual notice of the risk that Radiceski would eventually grope and rape Bostic.”

Without actual knowledge of an impending rape and a conscious decision to ignore or permit that risk, deliberate indifference was not established. Because deliberate indifference is the required mental state for this substantive due process claim, no constitutional violation existed as to the supervisors.

D. Qualified Immunity Analysis

Qualified immunity shields government officials from damages liability unless they violate a constitutional right that was “clearly established” at the time, such that a reasonable official would have known his conduct was unlawful. The standard was drawn from:

• Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (per curiam),
• Holloway v. City of Milwaukee, 43 F.4th 760, 767 (7th Cir. 2022), and
• Tousis v. Billiot, 84 F.4th 692, 697 (7th Cir. 2023).

The usual two‑part qualified immunity inquiry asks:

1. Did the official’s conduct violate a constitutional right?
2. Was that right clearly established at the time?

The district court had granted qualified immunity because Bostic did not identify any precedent clearly establishing that Parsons and Murray’s conduct violated her right to bodily integrity.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit took a different route: it resolved the case solely on the first prong. Because it found no constitutional violation (given lack of deliberate indifference), there was no need to consider whether any right was clearly established. This approach is consistent with the Supreme Court’s direction (e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, though not cited) that courts may address either prong first.

By resting on the absence of a constitutional violation, the opinion clarifies that under current substantive due process and supervisory liability standards, Parsons and Murray’s specific conduct did not cross the constitutional line—regardless of how clearly established law may have been.

E. The DeShaney “Failure to Protect” Theory

Bostic initially pursued a “failure to protect” theory based on DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989), arguing that officials failed to protect her from violence.

The district court rejected this theory, and Bostic conceded the point on appeal. The Seventh Circuit summarily agreed, noting:

• DeShaney governs situations where state officials fail to protect individuals from private violence (for example, child abuse by a parent).
• Here, the harm was inflicted by another public official acting under color of state law; the claim thus falls outside the DeShaney framework and instead within the substantive due process “bodily integrity” doctrine applied in cases like Hess v. Garcia.

This maintains the conceptual separation between state failure to stop private actors and state liability for its own agents’ direct misconduct.

F. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Beyond the cases already discussed, several other precedents shaped the court’s reasoning:

• Doe v. Gray, 75 F.4th 710 (7th Cir. 2023): cited for the de novo standard of review on summary judgment—reviewing the facts and law anew, with inferences drawn in favor of the non‑movant (Tousis likewise reinforces this standard).
• Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994) (plurality): cited to confirm that certain liberty interests are protected through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause rather than other textual provisions.
• Martinez v. Santiago, 51 F.4th 258 (7th Cir. 2022): emphasized that deliberate indifference is the general substantive due process standard and that not every negligent or incompetent official act amounts to a due process violation.
• Haywood v. Hathaway, 842 F.3d 1026 (7th Cir. 2016): supports applying deliberate indifference for supervisory liability in Eighth Amendment prison condition claims.
• Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2017): an example where the older “know, facilitate, approve, condone, or turn a blind eye” supervisory standard was properly used in a deliberate‑indifference context; cited to illustrate that the test still has a limited role.
• Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2010): cited approvingly for the proposition that deliberate indifference can still suffice for supervisory liability where that is the underlying constitutional state of mind.

Taken together, these authorities support the court’s project of harmonizing supervisory liability with Iqbal, while preserving deliberate indifference in appropriate substantive due process and Eighth Amendment contexts.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Section 1983 and Supervisory Liability

42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows individuals to sue state officials who, acting “under color of” state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights. But it does not automatically make a supervisor liable for everything a subordinate does. To sue a supervisor:

• You must show what the supervisor personally did or failed to do, not just that they occupied a supervisory position.
• You must also show the mental state required by the underlying constitutional right (deliberate indifference, discriminatory intent, etc.).

2. Substantive Due Process and “Bodily Integrity”

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause has a “substantive” component that protects certain fundamental rights from arbitrary government action, even if the government follows proper procedures. Among those rights is the right to bodily integrity—freedom from unwanted physical intrusion, particularly sexual assault by government officials (e.g., police, probation officers, corrections staff).

3. Deliberate Indifference

“Deliberate indifference” in this context is:

• More than negligence or careless behavior.
• Requiring that the official knows about a serious, impending risk (for example, a strong likelihood that a particular person will be assaulted) and then decides not to do anything meaningful to prevent it.
• Requiring evidence closer to actual knowledge and conscious disregard than to mere failure to foresee a risk.

4. Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity protects officials from money damages unless:

1. They violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and
2. Any reasonable official in their position would have known their conduct was unconstitutional, in light of precedent (“clearly established law”).

If either element is missing—no violation, or not clearly established—the official is immune.

5. Magistrate Judge Consent

Federal magistrate judges can handle entire civil cases—including trials and final judgments—if all parties consent. Consent:

• Can be expressed in writing or stated on the record; or
• Can be implied if, after being told they can refuse, parties proceed before the magistrate without objection.

6. Rule 58’s “Separate Document” and 150‑Day Rule

A judgment must usually be on a separate document from the court’s opinion. If the court never enters such a document:

• Judgment is deemed entered 150 days after the court’s final decision.
• A notice of appeal filed after the decision but before that deemed entry is treated as filed on the day judgment is deemed entered.

This prevents parties from losing appeal rights due to technical incomplete judgments.

V. Impact and Future Implications

A. For Victims and Plaintiffs

The decision underscores just how difficult it is to hold supervisors liable for a subordinate’s sexual assault under § 1983. Plaintiffs must:

• Produce evidence that supervisors had specific, actual knowledge of a serious risk that the subordinate would commit similar sexual violence—including, ideally, prior substantiated incidents, repeated complaints, or explicit warnings.
• Show that supervisors consciously chose not to act, or adopted a plainly ineffective response, in the face of that risk.

Evidence of a single disputed prior incident, followed by some intermediate remedial steps (investigation and restrictions), will often be insufficient. This raises the bar significantly for supervisory liability in cases of official sexual misconduct.

B. For Supervisors and Government Entities

The opinion provides both guidance and a form of protection:

• Documentation and remedial action matter. Parsons and Murray’s decision to investigate A.R.’s complaint and impose a gender‑based restriction, even if incomplete, weighed heavily against a finding of deliberate indifference.
• Intermediate responses can avoid liability. The court effectively signals that, where reasonable remedial steps are taken in response to allegations—even if not the most aggressive—the constitutional floor may be satisfied.
• Training and procedures remain important. Although the decision shields the supervisors here, a pattern of similar complaints, or weaker remedial responses (e.g., doing nothing at all), might satisfy deliberate indifference in future cases.

C. Doctrinal Clarification in Supervisory Liability

The court’s insistence that the state of mind for supervisory liability must match the underlying right will shape litigation:

• In equal protection cases, plaintiffs must allege and prove discriminatory intent by supervisors, not merely that they were indifferent.
• In pretrial detainee cases, the focus will be on the objective reasonableness of supervisors’ decisions, per Kingsley and Kemp.
• In substantive due process and Eighth Amendment cases, the deliberate indifference standard—actual knowledge plus conscious disregard—remains demanding.

District courts are put on notice not to mechanically apply the old “turn a blind eye” formula without first confirming that deliberate indifference is the correct mental state for the underlying constitutional right.

D. Relationship to Sexual Misconduct Oversight

This decision will likely be read alongside Title IX and similar frameworks (though not mentioned in the opinion), where institutional liability for sexual harassment often turns on deliberate indifference to known harassment. Here, however, the Seventh Circuit appears to require a more specific and individualized showing of knowledge and disregard for § 1983 supervisory liability.

Practically, government entities may respond by:

• Improving complaint intake and record‑keeping systems to ensure that patterns of misconduct can be documented and acted upon.
• Adopting clearer policies on responding to sexual misconduct allegations (suspensions, relocations, permanent restrictions), knowing that limited remedial measures may shield them from constitutional liability but not necessarily from political, administrative, or employment consequences.

E. Procedural Lessons

For litigators, the case reinforces several practice points:

• Magistrate consent: Silence after notice can equal consent; parties who wish to preserve an objection to magistrate jurisdiction must assert it promptly.
• Judgment entry and appeals: When a clerk’s judgment omits claims or parties, counsel should be aware of the Rule 58 “150‑day” deeming rule and the “spring forward” doctrine for premature notices of appeal.
• Framing supervisory claims: Complaints and summary judgment responses must carefully allege and support:
  • Exactly what each supervisor knew, when, and how;
  • What each supervisor did or failed to do in response; and
  • Why those actions or inaction meet the specific mental state requirement for the underlying right.

VI. Conclusion

Bostic v. Murray is simultaneously a tragic narrative and a doctrinally important opinion. On the human level, it confirms that a probationer raped by her probation officer suffered a grave constitutional injury, for which the officer was criminally punished and civilly liable. On the legal level, however, the Seventh Circuit holds that her supervisors’ misjudgments—however serious—did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference required for a substantive due process violation of her bodily integrity.

In reaching this result, the court:

• Clarified that supervisory liability under § 1983 requires both personal involvement and the specific mental state appropriate to the underlying constitutional right;
• Reaffirmed that deliberate indifference—actual knowledge of impending harm and conscious refusal to act—is a demanding standard in substantive due process cases;
• Cautioned against uncritical use of pre‑Iqbal supervisory liability formulas; and
• Reinforced key procedural rules on magistrate consent and Rule 58 judgment entry.

The opinion thus narrows the circumstances under which supervisors can be held constitutionally liable for a subordinate’s sexual misconduct, while providing clearer guidance on the structure of supervisory liability in the Seventh Circuit going forward.