Borelli v. Bisignano: When Treating Sources Refuse, No Further Duty to Develop; Step-Four Denial May Rest on Ability to Perform the “Previous Specific Job”; Later Favorable Decisions Don’t Compel Remand

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Summary Order; nonprecedential)

Date: October 1, 2025

Docket No.: 24-3077

Panel: Circuit Judges Raggi, Wesley, and Pérez

Precedential status: The court issued a Summary Order. Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1, it is citable but does not have precedential effect.

Introduction

This appeal arises from a denial of Social Security disability benefits to Plaintiff-Appellant Jason Borelli for a closed period ending before the onset date established in a separate, later “favorable” award. The Second Circuit affirmed the District of Connecticut’s judgment on the pleadings upholding the Commissioner’s April 27, 2016 finding of no disability.

The case presents three recurring issues in Social Security practice:

Whether an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) failed to develop the record by not procuring treating-source opinions after those sources refused to provide them.
Whether substantial evidence supports a step-four residual functional capacity (RFC) determination that the claimant can perform past relevant work—here, as a security guard—despite allegations of pain, medication side-effects, and perceived conflict with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT).
Whether a subsequent favorable disability decision by a different ALJ requires remand or reconciliation when it covers a later period.

In a concise but instructive ruling, the court rejected Borelli’s challenges, holding (1) the ALJ satisfied the duty to develop where further efforts were shown to be futile and the record contained no “obvious gaps”; (2) substantial evidence supported the RFC for medium work with limitations and the step-four finding that Borelli could perform his previous specific job; and (3) a later favorable decision did not undermine the earlier denial or create an arbitrary onset date that required remand.

Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit affirmed the ALJ’s decision on three grounds:

Record development: The ALJ’s duty to develop the record was satisfied. After counsel advised that three treating sources refused or were unavailable to provide opinions and that further efforts would be fruitless, the ALJ reasonably concluded that the record was complete enough to decide without compelling further development.
Step-four determination: Substantial evidence supported the RFC (medium work with limitations) and the conclusion that Borelli could perform his past relevant work as a security guard. The court emphasized normal or near-normal objective findings in the record, and noted the vocational expert’s testimony and the claimant’s own job description. Even if there were a conflict between the vocational expert and the DOT as to how the job is performed generally, it did not matter because the ALJ permissibly relied on Borelli’s ability to perform his previous specific job.
Later favorable decision: The subsequent award in a different claim covering a later period did not require remand or reconciliation. Two ALJs may reach different conclusions on different records and periods under the substantial evidence standard. The earlier ALJ did not “reopen” the later award and made no affirmative onset finding that could be attacked as arbitrary.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

Estrella v. Berryhill, 925 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2019): Cited for the proposition that appellate review centers on the agency’s decision, not the district court’s. It frames the posture of review.
Zabala v. Astrue, 595 F.3d 402 (2d Cir. 2010); Machadio v. Apfel, 276 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2002): Restate the dual questions on review: whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision and whether the correct legal standards were applied.
Selian v. Astrue, 708 F.3d 409 (2d Cir. 2013); Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1983): Instruct the reviewing court to consider the entire record, including contradictory evidence. This underscores that the court took a holistic view and still found substantial evidence.
Brault v. Commissioner, 683 F.3d 443 (2d Cir. 2012): Provides the “very deferential” substantial-evidence lens: the court will overturn only if a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise. The panel explicitly applied this standard to the RFC and step-four findings.
Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1999); Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1996): Guide the duty to develop the record. Rosa recognizes that no further development is required where there are no “obvious gaps”; Perez confirms that the record may be adequate to determine disability even without specific treating-source opinions.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b(b)(2)(i): Regulatory authority allowing an ALJ to forego additional development when, based on experience, a source cannot or will not provide the necessary evidence—squarely applicable when treating sources refuse to opine.
Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2012); McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146 (2d Cir. 2014): Outline the five-step sequential evaluation and clarify burdens. At step four, the burden rests on the claimant.
Cage v. Commissioner, 692 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2012); Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496 (2d Cir. 1998): Emphasize deference to the ALJ’s resolution of conflicting evidence, and acknowledge that different ALJs can reach different outcomes on different records.
Lockwood v. Commissioner, 914 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2019): Addresses the ALJ’s duty to inquire into conflicts between vocational expert (VE) testimony and the DOT. The panel assumed arguendo a conflict but explained why it did not change the outcome at step four in light of Jasinski.
Jasinski v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2003): Critical step-four authority: a claimant must show both an inability to return to the previous specific job and an inability to perform the occupation as generally performed. The DOT speaks only to the latter. Because the ALJ found, and the claimant did not contest, the ability to perform the previous specific job, any DOT conflict about the “general” job was not outcome-determinative.
Bell v. Secretary of HHS, 732 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1984): Cited to distinguish cases involving an ALJ’s affirmative (and potentially arbitrary) onset finding. Here, the ALJ made no onset determination; the subsequent favorable decision’s onset did not bind or undermine the earlier adjudication.

Legal Reasoning

1) Duty to Develop the Record

The Social Security Act requires the agency to develop a “complete medical history” for at least the 12 months preceding the adverse determination when finding no disability. But the ALJ’s duty is not limitless. The court held there were no “obvious gaps” necessitating further development where:

The ALJ proactively sought treating-source statements by contacting Borelli’s counsel.
Counsel reported that three treating sources refused or were unavailable and that further efforts would be fruitless, and represented that all relevant evidence had been provided.
The ALJ correctly noted she could not compel completion of disability forms; counsel agreed.
Given 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b(b)(2)(i), the ALJ could reasonably forego additional attempts when the sources were known to be unwilling or unavailable.

Thus, as in Rosa and Perez, the record was “adequate” to decide disability without additional, futile development.

2) Step Four: Residual Functional Capacity and Past Relevant Work

The ALJ found Borelli capable of “medium work with limitations” and, therefore, able to perform his past work as a security guard. The court pointed to multiple objective findings supporting the RFC despite allegations of lumbar radiculopathy, gait disturbance, obesity, and other ailments:

Electromyography showed no radiculopathy.
Two MRIs did not reveal conditions requiring aggressive treatment.
Exams at various times showed full range of motion, full musculoskeletal strength, normal heel/toe walking, and intact reflexes.
Side effects from treatment were not shown to be work-preclusive.

On this record, a reasonable factfinder could conclude Borelli retained the RFC found by the ALJ. While Borelli argued for greater limitations based on pain and medication side effects, the court reiterated that it defers to the ALJ’s resolution of conflicting evidence under the substantial-evidence standard.

As to the vocational component, the ALJ relied on both a VE and Borelli’s own description of his security-guard job. Borelli’s main counter was an alleged conflict between the VE’s testimony and the DOT’s description of how the job is generally performed. Even assuming such a conflict, the panel relied on Jasinski: at step four, a claimant must establish the inability to do both the previous specific job and the occupation as generally performed. The DOT speaks only to the latter. Because Borelli did not challenge the finding that he could perform his previous specific job, any “general” discrepancy in the DOT was immaterial. Consequently, Lockwood’s conflict-inquiry requirement did not change the outcome.

3) Effect of a Subsequent Favorable Decision

Borelli later received a favorable decision on a separate application finding disability beginning on a later onset date. The ALJ in the instant case limited her review to the period before that onset date, thereby avoiding any conflict with the later award. The court rejected two arguments:

That the favorable decision undermined the earlier denial: Under substantial-evidence review, different ALJs can reach different conclusions on different records and time periods. The later award did not require the earlier ALJ to reconcile or adopt it.
That the ALJ created an arbitrary onset date: The earlier ALJ made no onset finding at all; she did not reopen or revise the later favorable decision. Without an affirmative onset finding in the earlier case, Bell’s concern about arbitrariness was inapposite.

In a footnote, the court emphasized the record “plainly belied” any assertion that the ALJ reopened the later favorable decision or reviewed both records in full to set an arbitrary onset.

Impact and Practical Implications

Record development duty is bounded by futility: Where counsel informs the ALJ that treating sources refuse or are unavailable to provide opinions and that further efforts would be fruitless—and the record otherwise contains the treatment notes and objective findings—the ALJ need not keep chasing opinions. Counsel’s on-the-record representations matter.
Step-four strategy must address both prongs (Jasinski): Claimants must marshal evidence and argument showing they cannot do their past work both as they actually performed it and as the job is generally performed. Focusing only on DOT-level conflicts while leaving the “previous specific job” unchallenged is insufficient.
VE/DOT conflicts at step four are not always dispositive: Even if a Lockwood-type conflict exists, it may not affect the outcome where the ALJ finds the claimant can perform the prior job as actually performed and that finding is supported and unchallenged.
Later favorable decisions usually won’t force remand: Absent reopening, a subsequent award covering a different period does not undermine an earlier denial if each is supported by substantial evidence in its own record/timeframe. Advocates must identify a legal or evidentiary bridge—such as new and material evidence tied to the earlier period—to justify remand.
Substantial evidence remains a high hurdle on appeal: The deferential Brault standard means that if the ALJ’s view is one that a reasonable factfinder could take—even if another view is also reasonable—the court will affirm.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Substantial evidence: A legal standard of review meaning “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” It is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Courts must affirm if a reasonable factfinder could agree with the ALJ.
Duty to develop the record: The ALJ must ensure a sufficiently complete record to decide disability, including obtaining a 12-month medical history before a denial. But when sources refuse to provide opinions and the record shows no “obvious gaps,” the ALJ need not conduct futile attempts to gather more.
Residual Functional Capacity (RFC): An assessment of what a claimant can still do despite impairments, expressed in work-related terms (e.g., “medium work” typically entails lifting up to 50 pounds occasionally, 25 pounds frequently, and standing/walking about 6 hours in an 8-hour day, with specified limitations).
Five-step sequential evaluation: Step 1 (substantial gainful activity), Step 2 (severe impairments), Step 3 (Listings), Step 4 (can the claimant perform past relevant work?), Step 5 (can the claimant do other work in the national economy?). Here, the case was decided at Step 4, where the claimant bears the burden.
Past relevant work “as actually performed” vs. “as generally performed”: At step four, a claimant must show they cannot do: (1) their prior job as they actually did it (previous specific job); and (2) the occupation as generally performed in the national economy (captured in sources like the DOT). Proving only one prong is insufficient.
Vocational Expert (VE) and the DOT/SCO: A VE provides expert testimony about job demands and how limitations affect work. The DOT and its companion, Selected Characteristics of Occupations (SCO), describe the general requirements of jobs in the national economy. Under SSR 00-4p and Lockwood, the ALJ should resolve apparent conflicts between VE testimony and the DOT—though, as this case shows, such a conflict may be immaterial if the “previous specific job” prong controls.
Subsequent favorable decision, reopening, and onset date: A later award on a different application can set a new onset date for a different period. Unless the earlier case is reopened or there is a legal error overlapping periods, the earlier decision is reviewed independently. An ALJ’s failure to make an “onset finding” in the earlier case avoids Bell concerns about arbitrariness.

Conclusion

The Second Circuit’s nonprecedential decision in Borelli v. Bisignano reinforces several durable principles of Social Security adjudication:

ALJs meet their development duty when additional efforts would be futile and the record otherwise contains sufficient medical evidence—especially when counsel confirms that all pertinent evidence has been submitted and treating sources refuse to opine.
At step four, the claimant’s burden encompasses both the “previous specific job” and the occupation “as generally performed.” Reliance on VE testimony and the claimant’s own job description to sustain the “specific job” prong is proper where supported by substantial evidence.
Even assuming a DOT conflict about the job as generally performed, a step-four denial survives if the claimant can do the job as actually performed.
A later favorable decision covering a different time period does not, without more, mandate remand or reconciliation with an earlier denial.

While not precedential, the order is citable and offers practical guidance. It underscores the centrality of the substantial-evidence standard, the bounded nature of the ALJ’s development obligations when sources refuse to cooperate, the strategic imperative for claimants to address both facets of step four, and the limited impact of later favorable decisions on earlier adjudications.