Boone v. City of Elizabeth: Limiting Interlocutory Appeals and Re-defining “Favorable Termination” after Thompson v. Clark

1. Introduction

In Marcus Boone v. City of Elizabeth, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit confronted a familiar procedural tangle: when, and to what extent, police officers may obtain immediate appellate review of a district court’s refusal to grant them qualified immunity. The panel (Judges Phipps, Freeman, and Chung) issued a split, non-precedential opinion that nonetheless offers persuasive guidance on three fronts:

1. How far the collateral-order doctrine stretches in the qualified-immunity context;
2. Whether “favorable termination” is satisfied when criminal charges are dismissed after an evidentiary suppression ruling in the wake of Thompson v. Clark (2022); and
3. The continuing viability of malice-based Fourth-Amendment malicious-prosecution claims where a plaintiff alleges the planting of evidence.

Although marked “NOT PRECEDENTIAL,” the decision crystallises several open questions left by Thompson, Manuel v. Joliet, and the Third Circuit’s own earlier cases such as Allen v. New Jersey State Police and Dennis v. City of Philadelphia.

2. Summary of the Judgment

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Role

• Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. (1949) – The origin of the collateral-order doctrine; sets the three-prong test for immediate appealability.
• Mitchell v. Forsyth (1985); Behrens v. Pelletier (1996) – Recognise qualified-immunity denials as a “small class” of immediately appealable collateral orders.
• Johnson v. Jones (1995) – Bars interlocutory review when the dispute centres on factual sufficiency, not legal questions.
• Thompson v. Clark (2022) – Eliminates the need for an affirmative showing of innocence for favourable termination; any end to prosecution short of conviction suffices.
• Hector v. Watt (3d Cir. 2000) – Addresses damages scope when evidence is illegally seized; officers mis-applied it to argue no constitutional violation if prosecution proceeds on illegally seized (or planted) evidence.
• Dennis v. City of Philadelphia (3d Cir. 2021) – Limits pendent appellate jurisdiction over Heck-type defences; relied on by both majority and dissent to stake out boundaries.
• Manuel v. Joliet (2017) – Affirms Fourth-Amendment protection against detention based on fabricated evidence.
• Numerous New Jersey state cases on suppression and probable-cause standards (Terry v. Ohio etc.).

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Jurisdictional Sorting
   The Court first conducted a rigorous Cohen-framework analysis:
   • Only questions of law about qualified immunity qualify. Any argument demanding re-weighing evidence (e.g., whether the gun was in fact planted) is unreviewable.
   • Defences sounding purely in estoppel, waiver, or superseding cause do not enjoy collateral-order status and fail pendent-jurisdiction tests.
2. Narrow Merits Review (Two Issues)
   • Probable Cause. Assuming the jury could credit Boone’s allegation that the firearm was planted, no probable cause existed. Hector does not immunise officers who fabricate or plant evidence—Manuel squarely rejects that logic.
   • Favourable Termination. Post-Thompson, dismissal after successful suppression meets this element. The Court rejected officers’ invitation to revive the stricter “affirmative indication of innocence” standard repudiated by the Supreme Court.
3. Qualified Immunity Outcome. Because a jury could find (i) no probable cause, (ii) malicious prosecution, and (iii) a clearly established right (fabricating evidence to procure charges violates the Fourth Amendment), the officers were not entitled to immunity on summary judgment.

3.3 Impact of the Decision

• Procedural Gate-Keeping. The decision reins in creative attempts by defendants to smuggle ordinary interlocutory questions into an immunity appeal. Expect more dismissals of “piggy-back” issues (e.g., estoppel, statute-of-limitations) at the appellate threshold.
• Favourable Termination in the Third Circuit. Boone cements Thompson’s rule that any non-conviction resolution suffices, even if dismissal follows a technical suppression ruling rather than an affirmative declaration of innocence. This overrules the more restrictive reading in Allen v. NJSP.
• Planting-of-Evidence Claims Remain Viable. Officers cannot shield themselves behind probable-cause paperwork where the plaintiff plausibly alleges fabrication. Manuel and Boone together anchor this principle in the Fourth Amendment.
• Guidance for District Courts. Trial judges should pinpoint which aspects of a summary-judgment order are legal (and therefore potentially appealable) and which are factual. Clear record findings can pre-empt jurisdictional disputes on appeal.
• Strategic Litigation Considerations. For civil-rights plaintiffs: focus discovery on evidentiary fabrication to bypass qualified immunity. For defence counsel: interlocutory appeals should be narrowly crafted; over-inclusion risks piecemeal dismissal.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Collateral-Order Doctrine

A judge-made exception allowing immediate appeal of a narrow set of trial-court decisions that are (1) final as to a distinct issue, (2) separate from the case’s merits, and (3) effectively unreviewable later. Denials of qualified immunity sometimes fit this exception.

Qualified Immunity

Shields government officials from suit unless (a) they violated a constitutional right and (b) that right was clearly established at the time. It is immunity from trial, not merely from liability, hence the need for possible early appellate review.

Malicious Prosecution (Fourth Amendment variant)

Modern §1983 cause of action requiring five elements: (1) initiation of criminal proceedings, (2) without probable cause, (3) malice, (4) favourable termination, and (5) pre-trial seizure. Boone addresses elements (2) and (4).

Favourable Termination

Post-Thompson, prosecution must simply end in a manner not resulting in conviction—dismissal, nolle prosequi, or acquittal all qualify. No need for court to utter “innocent.”

Pendent (or “piggy-back”) Appellate Jurisdiction

Discretionary power to review extra issues that ride along with an appealable issue only if they are inextricably intertwined or essential to resolve the primary appeal. Boone rejects pendent review of estoppel and superseding-cause defences.

5. Conclusion

Boone v. City of Elizabeth is a meticulous roadmap for litigants navigating qualified-immunity appeals in the Third Circuit. The ruling:

• Confirms that only pure legal errors tied to qualified immunity are immediately reviewable;
• Embraces Thompson’s broad standard for favourable termination, rejecting earlier, narrower circuit precedent; and
• Signals that fabrication or planting of evidence nullifies probable-cause defences, keeping malicious-prosecution claims alive.

Going forward, police defendants seeking interlocutory relief must sharpen their focus on discrete legal questions, while plaintiffs can rely on the expanded definition of favourable termination to survive summary judgment where prosecutions collapse without convictions. Although “not precedential,” Boone’s logical clarity will likely influence district courts and sister circuits confronting the same jurisdictional puzzles.