Bolden v. State and the Right to Counsel at Plea Withdrawal: Sequencing Counsel-Withdrawal Motions and the “Good Cause” Standard

I. Introduction

Bolden v. State (Del. Supr. Dec. 9, 2025) is a significant Delaware Supreme Court decision at the intersection of plea practice, the right to counsel, and trial-court case management. The opinion builds directly on Reed v. State, 258 A.3d 807 (Del. 2021), which articulated defense counsel’s obligations when a client wishes to withdraw a guilty (or no contest) plea.

In Reed, the Court held that when a represented defendant asks to withdraw a plea before sentencing, defense counsel must either (1) file the motion to withdraw the plea, or (2) move to withdraw as counsel so that the defendant can pursue the motion with new counsel or pro se. Bolden addresses the corresponding, and previously unresolved, question: what must the trial court do when counsel chooses option (2) and moves to withdraw?

The case arises from serious felony charges. Troy Bolden was indicted for, among other counts, Attempted Murder First Degree and firearms offenses. He ultimately entered a no-contest plea to reduced charges (Assault Second Degree and two firearms counts) in exchange for a sentencing cap on the State’s recommendation. Before sentencing, however, Bolden sought to withdraw his plea, claiming coercion and lack of understanding, largely directed at his appointed counsel’s performance and communication.

Trial counsel, complying with Reed, moved to withdraw as counsel and requested appointment of conflict/substitute counsel. The Superior Court convened a hearing, but instead of first ruling on the motion to withdraw as counsel, it turned directly to Bolden’s (not yet docketed) plea-withdrawal request and required Bolden to argue, in effect, a pro se oral motion. The court later allowed withdrawal of the plea as involuntary but denied counsel’s withdrawal request, kept original counsel on the case, and the matter proceeded to trial. Bolden was convicted of Attempted Murder and PFDCF and sentenced to 23 years of incarceration.

On appeal, Bolden challenged (1) the denial of his right to counsel during the plea-withdrawal proceedings, and (2) the continuation of the same counsel at trial after the plea was found involuntary. The Supreme Court reversed on the first ground and did not reach the second.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Core Holding

The Delaware Supreme Court establishes a clear procedural rule:

When defense counsel moves to withdraw from representation after a defendant expresses a desire to withdraw a plea, the trial court must first address and resolve the motion to withdraw as counsel before it may address the defendant’s plea-withdrawal motion.
The motion to withdraw as counsel is governed by the established “good cause” standard (conflict of interest, complete breakdown in communication, irreconcilable conflict, etc.).
When a defendant alleges that the plea was coerced or involuntary because of trial counsel’s representation, and the circumstances do not indicate gamesmanship or tactical manipulation, the law favors appointing substitute counsel.
If the court finds no good cause to appoint new counsel, but the defendant still insists on withdrawing the plea, the court must either:
- require existing counsel to pursue the motion (if ethically permitted), or
- if the defendant is to proceed pro se, conduct a full Faretta-type colloquy to ensure a knowing, voluntary waiver of counsel.

Because the Superior Court did not resolve the motion to withdraw as counsel first, and allowed Bolden effectively to represent himself at a critical stage (plea withdrawal) without any waiver of counsel, the Supreme Court held that Bolden’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated.

B. Remedy

The Court:

Reversed Bolden’s convictions and sentence.
Remanded to the Superior Court with instructions that:
- Bolden’s no-contest plea should be reinstated; and
- Substitute counsel should be appointed.
With the advice of new counsel, Bolden shall then decide whether to pursue a new plea-withdrawal motion under Superior Court Criminal Rule 32(d).

Jurisdiction was not retained.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Reed v. State (Del. 2021)

Reed is the immediate doctrinal foundation for Bolden. In Reed, the Delaware Supreme Court held:

A defendant’s decision whether to withdraw a plea is a fundamental objective of representation controlled by the defendant, not counsel.
When a defendant before sentencing instructs counsel to seek to withdraw a plea, counsel must either:
1. file the motion to withdraw the plea, or
2. move to withdraw as counsel so that the defendant can proceed with new counsel or pro se.
If the defendant’s reasons for withdrawal include claims that counsel coerced the plea or was ineffective, counsel should ask for appointment of unconflicted substitute counsel to handle the withdrawal motion.

In Bolden, trial counsel followed Reed: upon receiving Bolden’s pro se plea-withdrawal motion alleging coercion and ineffective assistance, counsel moved to withdraw and requested conflict counsel. The Supreme Court explains that, contrary to the Superior Court’s view, Reed does apply “here”:

Reed governs defense counsel’s obligations once a defendant requests plea withdrawal.
Bolden fills the doctrinal gap by defining the trial court’s corresponding obligations when a “Reed motion” to withdraw as counsel is filed.

2. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and “Critical Stages”

U.S. Const. amend. VI: guarantees the right to counsel in criminal prosecutions.
Purnell v. State, 254 A.3d 1053, 1104 (Del. 2021): the right to counsel is a “bedrock principle of justice” and foundational to the adversary system.
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 165 (2012): the right to counsel applies to all “critical stages that are part of the whole course of a criminal proceeding,” including plea negotiations and related decisions.
Reed v. State, 258 A.3d at 822: recognized that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is a critical stage triggering the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

Bolden reaffirms that plea-withdrawal proceedings are a critical stage and thus must be conducted with the defendant represented by counsel (unless there is a valid waiver).

3. Division of Decision-Making Authority: Client vs. Counsel

Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187 (2004): counsel controls most tactical decisions; the defendant retains authority over fundamental decisions such as whether to plead guilty.
Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803 (Del. 2009): emphasizes the client’s exclusive authority over basic objectives like whether to plead, testify, or waive a jury.

Bolden relies on this framework: decisions about entering or withdrawing a plea are client-controlled fundamental objectives, and counsel must facilitate them even if counsel disagrees with the client’s choice.

4. Substitution of Counsel and the “Good Cause” Standard

State v. Robinson, 209 A.3d 25 (Del. 2019); Bultron v. State, 897 A.2d 758, 762 (Del. 2006); Joyner v. State, 155 A.3d 832, 2017 WL 444842 (Del. 2017) (TABLE): trial courts have broad discretion in ruling on motions to withdraw as counsel; reviewed for abuse of discretion unless a constitutional violation is alleged (then de novo).
United States v. Gillette, 738 F.3d 63, 78 (3d Cir. 2013); United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 187 (3d Cir. 1982); McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 931 (2d Cir. 1981): an indigent defendant has a right to substitute appointed counsel only upon a showing of “good cause,” such as:
- a conflict of interest,
- a complete breakdown in communication, or
- an irreconcilable conflict likely to produce an unjust result.
Mere dissatisfaction or personality disputes generally do not meet the good-cause threshold (Bultron; Muto v. State, 843 A.2d 696, 2004 WL 300441 (Del. 2004) (TABLE)).

Bolden applies this good-cause standard in the specific configuration where the defendant claims his plea was coerced or involuntary due to counsel’s conduct. In that context, and absent evidence of delay tactics or gamesmanship, the Court states that the “interests of justice will often favor” appointment of substitute counsel.

5. Right to Counsel of Choice vs. Systemic Interests

United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 152 (2006): trial courts retain “wide latitude” to balance a defendant’s right to counsel of choice (for retained counsel) against fairness and calendar management.
United States v. Rankin, 779 F.2d 956, 959 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 57 (3d Cir. 1979): courts may deny last-minute requests for new counsel intended to delay proceedings.

Bolden incorporates these authorities to emphasize that while courts must take Sixth Amendment concerns seriously, they are not required to indulge manipulation or purely dilatory requests. The “favor” toward appointing conflict counsel in coercion/ineffectiveness allegations is conditioned on the absence of such tactical abuse.

6. Waiver of Counsel and Faretta Colloquy

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975): a defendant has a constitutional right to represent himself if he knowingly and voluntarily waives counsel.
Bultron v. State, 897 A.2d at 763–65: a valid waiver of counsel requires a “searching inquiry” by the trial court; the record must show that the defendant understands the “dangers and disadvantages” of self-representation.
United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d at 188–89: describes the elements of an adequate colloquy, including explanation of:
- the nature of the charges and included offenses;
- the range of possible punishments;
- possible defenses and mitigating circumstances;
- the technical and procedural challenges of self-representation; and
- the defendant’s dual-role problem (accused and advocate).

Bolden incorporates this framework and holds: if the court denies substitution of counsel but the defendant persists in wanting to withdraw his plea and insists on proceeding without the existing lawyer, the court must conduct a Faretta-compliant colloquy before allowing him to represent himself on a plea-withdrawal motion.

7. Harmless Error vs. Structural Error / Prejudice Analysis

The State argued that even if a Faretta colloquy was required, Bolden suffered no prejudice because he won the motion to withdraw his plea—i.e., the court agreed the plea was involuntary and allowed withdrawal. The Court rejects that view:

The Court distinguishes this case from a standard Strickland v. Washington-type claim (ineffective assistance) that would require showing outcome prejudice.
Instead, the error is characterized as denial of the right to counsel at a critical stage — a type of error generally treated as structural, or at least presumptively prejudicial.
The Court emphasizes that the key harm is that Bolden “did not have the assistance of counsel in deciding whether to pursue plea withdrawal” at all. The presence of counsel might have changed the decision to seek withdrawal, not just the outcome of the motion itself.

Thus, the Court finds that the error could not be deemed harmless merely because the immediate motion succeeded; the consequential decision to proceed to trial (and ultimate conviction) itself flowed from a process where Bolden lacked counsel.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Step One: Identify the Nature of the Stage – Plea Withdrawal as Critical

The Court starts from the Sixth Amendment framework:

Under Lafler and Reed, a motion to withdraw a plea is a critical stage of the criminal case.
At critical stages, the defendant is constitutionally entitled to counsel unless he validly waives that right.

Accordingly, the question is not whether the defendant is entitled to “good” or “effective” performance at that stage, but whether he is entitled to the assistance of counsel at all. If he is not properly represented (and has not waived counsel), there is a direct Sixth Amendment violation.

2. Step Two: Integrate Reed – Counsel’s Obligations Trigger Court’s Duties

Reed describes the obligations of defense counsel when a client wants to withdraw a plea. Bolden adds the complementary rule: when counsel takes the Reed step of moving to withdraw as counsel (especially with allegations of coercion or ineffective assistance), the trial court must:

Prioritize and decide the motion to withdraw as counsel first. The sequencing matters because until the counsel-issue is resolved, it is unclear:
- who represents the defendant, and
- whether the defendant is proceeding with or without counsel.
Apply the good cause standard in resolving the motion, weighing:
- alleged conflict or breakdown in the attorney-client relationship;
- claims that counsel pressured or coerced the plea;
- the absence or presence of gamesmanship or delay tactics; and
- the broader interests of justice and judicial economy.
Upon finding good cause (especially in the coercion/ineffectiveness context and no gamesmanship), appoint substitute counsel to advise and, if appropriate, litigate the plea-withdrawal motion.
If good cause is not found and the defendant still insists on proceeding without current counsel on a plea-withdrawal motion, conduct a thorough Faretta colloquy, ensuring:
- the defendant appreciates the risks and disadvantages of self-representation;
- understands the charges, potential penalties, and possible defenses; and
- knows that if the plea is withdrawn, he must either retain private counsel or proceed pro se at trial.

3. Step Three: Application to the Superior Court’s Conduct

Applying these principles, the Supreme Court finds multiple, compounding errors by the trial court:

Failure to rule first on counsel’s withdrawal motion.
- Trial counsel dutifully filed a motion to withdraw, attaching Bolden’s plea-withdrawal motion as an exhibit. The plea-withdrawal motion was not docketed as a separate motion, because Bolden remained represented.
- At the hearing, the court nonetheless “moved immediately” to Bolden’s request to withdraw the plea and effectively compelled Bolden to advance an oral, pro se application.
- The court brushed aside the Reed framework, incorrectly stating that Reed “doesn’t apply here” and focusing on whether counsel had been ineffective rather than on the sequencing and right-to-counsel issues.
No valid waiver of counsel.
- The court never asked Bolden whether he wished to waive counsel for the plea-withdrawal proceedings.
- No Faretta-style colloquy occurred; there was no “searching inquiry” into whether Bolden understood the risks of self-representation.
- On the contrary, the record indicates substantial confusion: Bolden struggled to understand sentencing ranges, the effect of the plea, and the evidence against him (compounded, he claimed, by mental-health medications).
Inadequate consideration of the conflict and breakdown with counsel.
- Bolden’s written plea-withdrawal motion alleged:
  - coercion by counsel (“cohersive in convincing me that my case was not winnable”);
  - lack of meaningful pretrial communication and explanation of the evidence;
  - lack of discovery review and inability to assess the strength of the State’s case; and
  - “bad faith” and absence of trust in counsel.
- Trial counsel’s motion independently asserted “a conflict” and a breakdown of trust and communication.
- Despite those consistent representations, the court characterized Bolden’s concerns as “mere dissatisfaction,” declined to appoint conflict counsel, and later described the issue as “moot” once the plea was withdrawn—without ever performing a structured good-cause analysis at the front end.

The Supreme Court finds that this sequence effectively left Bolden without counsel at a critical stage, in violation of the Sixth Amendment.

4. Step Four: Prejudice and Remedy

The Court rejects the notion that Bolden’s successful plea withdrawal cured or mooted the constitutional problem. The reasoning is:

The right to counsel includes the right to counsel’s advice in deciding whether to seek plea withdrawal in the first place.
That decision directly affected the trajectory of the case: from a plea with a capped recommendation to an open trial exposure, ultimately resulting in a 23-year sentence.
Without counsel’s advice, Bolden could not rationally weigh:
- the risks of reinstating the original indictment;
- the strength of the State’s evidence (including eyewitness identification, ammunition and residue evidence, and admissions of presence);
- the pros and cons of pursuing, instead, a more informed sentencing strategy under the no-contest plea.

Thus, the deprivation of counsel is not harmless; it undercuts the fairness of the entire decision tree leading to trial and conviction. The appropriate remedy is to unwind the case to the point before the error occurred—i.e., reinstatement of the plea, appointment of new counsel, and a fresh election by Bolden, this time with proper advice.

C. Impact on Future Cases and Practice

1. Clear Procedural Roadmap for Trial Courts

Bolden establishes a concrete sequence that Delaware trial courts must follow whenever a represented defendant seeks to withdraw a plea and trial counsel responds with a motion to withdraw:

Identify and prioritize any motion to withdraw as counsel.
That motion must be resolved before the court entertains, in substance, the plea-withdrawal motion.
Apply the “good cause” standard.
Evaluate whether there is:
- a conflict of interest (e.g., defendant alleging coercion or ineffective assistance);
- a complete breakdown in communication; or
- an irreconcilable conflict affecting the fairness of proceedings.
When the plea-withdrawal request is premised on alleged coercion/ineffectiveness, and absent gamesmanship, lean toward appointing substitute counsel.
If substitution is denied, address waiver of counsel before hearing any pro se plea-withdrawal argument.
Either:
- require existing counsel to file and argue the motion (if ethically permissible); or
- if defendant insists on self-representation, conduct a Faretta colloquy and obtain a knowing, voluntary waiver of counsel.
Only after the representation status is resolved should the court reach the merits of the Rule 32(d) motion to withdraw the plea.

2. Stronger Protection of Plea-Stage Autonomy and Fairness

Plea bargaining now dominates criminal adjudication. Bolden reinforces that decisions about entering and withdrawing pleas are not mere administrative steps; they are constitutionally sensitive stages that require robust protection of the right to counsel and client autonomy.

Practically, this will:

Increases the likelihood that defendants receive independent advice when alleging their plea was coerced by current counsel.
Reduce the risk of “tainted” advice from counsel who is simultaneously defending his own conduct.
Encourage clearer records on:
- whether counsel was allowed to withdraw;
- whether new counsel was appointed; and
- whether any waiver of counsel was validly obtained.

3. Guidance to Defense Counsel Under Reed and Bolden

Defense lawyers now have a well-defined framework:

Upon a client’s clear request to withdraw a plea before sentencing:
- Either file the motion (if ethically and strategically appropriate), or
- Move to withdraw as counsel and seek appointment of conflict counsel (especially if the client alleges coercion or ineffective assistance).
Counsel can rely on Bolden to argue that the court must address their withdrawal motion before forcing the client into de facto self-representation on plea withdrawal.

4. Constraints on “Gamesmanship” but Protection Against Real Conflicts

The opinion explicitly leaves room for trial courts to guard against abusive tactics:

If the record shows strategic delay, manipulation, or last-minute attempts to derail proceedings without genuine conflict, courts may:
- deny substitution of counsel; and
- require the defendant either to proceed with current counsel or validly waive counsel to proceed pro se.
However, where there are colorable claims of coercion or serious breakdowns in communication, and no evidence of dilatory intent, Bolden strongly signals that the “interests of justice” generally support appointing substitute counsel.

5. Anticipated Litigation and Applications

Going forward, we can expect:

More frequent appointment of conflict counsel at the plea-withdrawal stage in cases alleging coercion or ineffective assistance.
Appellate challenges where:
- the trial court failed to rule sequentially on counsel’s withdrawal motion;
- conflict counsel was denied in the face of serious allegations; or
- a defendant was allowed to argue pro se without a proper Faretta colloquy.
A clearer doctrinal distinction between:
- claims of ineffective assistance (governed by Strickland on collateral review or carefully framed on direct appeal), and
- claims of denial of counsel at a critical stage, which can require automatic reversal or strong presumptions of prejudice, as in Bolden.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Critical Stage” of a Criminal Proceeding

A “critical stage” is any part of a criminal case where substantial rights may be affected and where the presence and assistance of counsel are essential to a fair outcome. Examples include:

preliminary hearings in some circumstances,
plea negotiations,
entry of a plea,
motions to withdraw a plea,
trial, and
sentencing.

At a critical stage, a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel; proceeding without counsel is permissible only if the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives that right.

2. “Good Cause” to Substitute Appointed Counsel

An indigent defendant does not have a right to choose any particular appointed lawyer. Once counsel is appointed, the defendant can obtain substitute counsel only by showing “good cause,” commonly understood to include:

Conflict of interest (e.g., counsel’s interests diverge from the defendant’s, or counsel is accused of coercing a plea);
Complete breakdown in communication (lawyer and client cannot meaningfully discuss strategy or evidence);
Irreconcilable conflict that threatens the fairness of the trial or plea process.

Disliking counsel’s personality, style, or advice typically is not enough.

3. “Gamesmanship” in Requests for New Counsel

“Gamesmanship” refers to manipulative behavior by a defendant designed to gain unfair advantage, such as:

repeatedly seeking new counsel at the last minute to delay proceedings;
fabricating conflicts solely to undo unfavorable plea deals; or
using substitution requests as a tactic to frustrate the court’s schedule.

Courts may deny substitution where gamesmanship is apparent, even if the defendant claims dissatisfaction with counsel.

4. Faretta Waiver and Colloquy

A defendant may represent himself, but only if he:

clearly and unequivocally requests self-representation, and
after a searching inquiry, knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to counsel.

In practice, a Faretta colloquy includes the court explaining:

the complexity of legal rules and procedures;
the disadvantages the defendant faces without legal training;
the nature of the charges and possible penalties;
the fact that the court will not assist the defendant with legal strategy; and
that self-representation can seriously impair the defense.

Only if the defendant, after this explanation, still wishes to proceed without counsel, can the court accept the waiver.

5. Denial of Counsel vs. Ineffective Assistance

These are distinct legal concepts:

Denial of Counsel: The defendant had no lawyer at a critical stage, and did not validly waive the right to counsel. This is often treated as structural error, requiring automatic reversal because the system cannot reliably assess the impact.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (Strickland standard): The defendant had a lawyer, but performance was deficient and prejudicial. The defendant must show both deficient performance and a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome would have been different.

Bolden is a denial of counsel case, not a typical ineffective assistance case. The Court specifically declines to fold its prejudice analysis into Strickland, focusing instead on the deprivation of counsel’s advice at a critical decision point.

V. Conclusion

Bolden v. State meaningfully advances Delaware law in three interlocking ways:

It operationalizes Reed by clarifying what trial courts must do when defense counsel moves to withdraw after a defendant seeks to withdraw a plea. The court must resolve the counsel-withdrawal motion first, under the good-cause standard.
It strengthens the constitutional protection of defendants at the plea-withdrawal stage, reaffirming that this is a critical stage and that defendants cannot be left to navigate it without counsel unless they knowingly and voluntarily waive that right after a proper Faretta colloquy.
It recognizes that where a defendant alleges that a plea was coerced or involuntary due to counsel’s conduct, and where there is no sign of gamesmanship, the interests of justice will usually favor appointment of substitute counsel.

By reversing Bolden’s convictions and remanding with instructions to reinstate the plea and appoint new counsel, the Delaware Supreme Court underscores that the right to counsel is not merely formal. It includes the right to informed advice at pivotal decision points, such as whether to persist in a plea or risk trial. Bolden thus represents an important refinement in Delaware’s plea jurisprudence and a clear directive to trial courts and practitioners on how to manage the delicate intersection of plea withdrawal, conflicts of interest, and the constitutional right to counsel.