Bodycam Footage, Hidden Hands, and Qualified Immunity at the Pleading Stage: Commentary on Johnson v. Williams

I. Introduction

This commentary examines the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished decision in Timothy E. Johnson v. Agent Tony Williams, et al., No. 25‑10718 (11th Cir. Nov. 21, 2025) (per curiam), affirming dismissal of a pro se excessive-force suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage on qualified immunity grounds.

The case sits at the intersection of several important strands of federal civil rights doctrine:

The scope and timing of qualified immunity determinations in § 1983 suits;
The increasing centrality of police body-worn camera (“bodycam”) footage in resolving factual disputes;
The application of the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard to an armed, fleeing suspect who is prone on the ground but concealing his hands (and a firearm) beneath his body; and
The treatment of pro se allegations when contradicted by incontrovertible video evidence.

Although designated “Not for Publication” and therefore non-precedential under Eleventh Circuit rules, the opinion is an instructive application of recent Eleventh Circuit precedents such as Baker v. City of Madison, 67 F.4th 1268 (11th Cir. 2023), and Johnson v. City of Atlanta, 107 F.4th 1292 (11th Cir. 2024), on the use of video evidence at the motion to dismiss stage. It also reinforces the Eleventh Circuit’s robust qualified immunity jurisprudence in the context of rapidly evolving confrontations with armed suspects.

II. Case Background and Procedural Posture

A. Factual Allegations in the Complaint

Plaintiff Timothy Johnson, proceeding without counsel, brought a § 1983 action against three Palm Bay, Florida, police officers—Agent Tony Williams, Officer Breet Naymik, and Agent Cole McDonald—in their individual capacities. He alleged violations of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments arising from the officers’ use of deadly force.

The key allegations in Johnson’s complaint, viewed in isolation, painted the following picture:

Johnson was parked on a dead-end street next to a park when an unidentified pickup truck pulled up behind him.
Feeling “scared,” he backed up, hit the truck, and then drove off “on the park field.”
He then stopped, exited his car, ran into a nearby yard, and—upon hearing a police radio—assumed officers were nearby.
He claims he lay down behind a car in the backyard with his hands in front of him.
According to Johnson, Officer Williams approached from behind, did not identify himself, and shot Johnson in the foot while Johnson lay empty-handed on the ground, hands out in front.
Officers Naymik and McDonald allegedly then fired multiple additional shots while Johnson remained prone, resulting in injuries to his forehead and thigh and subsequent surgeries.
Johnson admitted he possessed a firearm, but claimed it was not in his hands and had no bullet in the chamber; he alleged the gun was concealed under his chest during the encounter.
He further alleged that no officer said they saw him with a firearm until they rolled him over and discovered the gun beneath him.

Johnson also attacked the integrity of the bodycam record, alleging Officer Williams’s camera had no audio until after shots were fired. He sought over $1.3 million in compensatory and punitive damages.

The district court took judicial notice of Johnson’s related state criminal charges arising from the same incident, including aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer with a deadly weapon (a motor vehicle), trafficking/possessing controlled substances, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and resisting an officer without violence.

B. Motion to Dismiss and Bodycam Footage

The defendant officers moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing:

They were entitled to qualified immunity; and
The bodycam footage Johnson himself referenced conclusively refuted his version of events and showed that their use of force was reasonable.

The officers submitted bodycam footage with the motion. The Eleventh Circuit describes the footage in notable detail:

At approximately 6:14 p.m., the video captures the sound of Johnson’s vehicle striking the officers’ unmarked truck.
The camera then shows Johnson’s car drive up onto a curb, crash through a fence, and enter a park.
Officers can be heard yelling “hands, hands” and exclaiming “he hit us, he hit us.”
An officer begins a foot pursuit when Johnson’s vehicle stops near a private residence; the driver’s door is open, and Johnson has fled.
On Williams’s bodycam, initially without audio, Williams jumps a fence into a residential backyard and moves toward the rear of the property.
Rounding a corner, Williams encounters Johnson lying on the ground in front of a vehicle, with his hands not visible and apparently under his body; Johnson moves his head from side to side, looking at and away from Williams.
Williams fires into the ground near Johnson and then activates audio, shouting “hands, let me see your hands.”
Other officers also fire several shots; separate bodycam audio confirms that multiple “let me see your hands” commands are issued before shots are fired.
After shots are fired, Johnson’s hands become visible, extended flat above his head.
Officers can be heard saying “gun” and acknowledging its presence; Williams repeatedly states that Johnson’s hands are out but the gun is still under him, near his left chest, along with a bag.
Officers wait for a ballistic shield, approach, remove the gun from under Johnson, and secure him.

The district court concluded that the video was properly considered under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine and that it clearly contradicted key aspects of Johnson’s account. Finding no constitutional violation, the court granted the motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds. Johnson appealed.

III. Summary of the Eleventh Circuit’s Decision

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that:

The district court properly considered the bodycam footage at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine, because Johnson referenced it in his complaint, it was central to his claim, and its authenticity was unchallenged.
Where clear video evidence “obviously contradicts” the plaintiff’s factual allegations, courts must accept the video’s depiction and view the facts “in the light depicted by the video,” while resolving ambiguities in the plaintiff’s favor.
Under the facts as revealed by the video and undisputed allegations, the officers’ use of deadly force was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, given:
- Johnson’s collision with the police truck,
- his flight by vehicle through a fence into a park,
- his subsequent flight on foot into a residential backyard,
- his being armed, and
- his refusal to show his hands while concealing a gun beneath his chest.
Because there was no underlying constitutional violation, Johnson could not overcome qualified immunity. The court therefore affirmed dismissal without needing to address in depth whether any right was “clearly established.”
Johnson’s assertions that the officers were in “plain clothes and ski masks,” did not identify themselves, or fired without commands were rejected to the extent contradicted by the video, which showed:
- Officers in marked police uniforms with visible badges and “POLICE” labels,
- Marked police vehicles with lights activated at the scene, and
- Commands to show hands issued before shots were fired.

On this basis, the panel concluded that the officers’ use of force, including brief use of deadly force, was not objectively unreasonable given the rapidly evolving, dangerous situation involving a fleeing, armed suspect with concealed hands, and thus qualified immunity barred Johnson’s claims.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Baker v. City of Madison, 67 F.4th 1268 (11th Cir. 2023)

Baker is central to the court’s treatment of the bodycam footage at the pleading stage. The opinion quotes and applies the following propositions from Baker:

Under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine, a court may consider a document referenced in a complaint if (1) it is “central to the plaintiff’s claim,” and (2) its authenticity is “unchallenged.”
When video evidence is “clear and obviously contradicts the plaintiff's alleged facts,” the court must accept the video’s depiction over the complaint’s account and “view the facts in the light depicted by the video.”
At the motion to dismiss stage, courts “must construe all ambiguities in the video footage in favor of the plaintiff.”

In Johnson, these principles justify considering the officers’ bodycam videos at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage and treating them as controlling where they conflict with Johnson’s narrative.

2. Johnson v. City of Atlanta, 107 F.4th 1292 (11th Cir. 2024)

The panel cites Johnson v. City of Atlanta for two related propositions:

The standard of review: appellate courts review Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals de novo, accepting well-pled facts as true and viewing them in the plaintiff’s favor, subject to the qualifications about video evidence.
An extension of the incorporation-by-reference doctrine: even documents not mentioned in the complaint may be considered at the pleading stage if they are (1) central to the plaintiff’s claims and (2) undisputed in authenticity.

This underscores a broader Eleventh Circuit willingness to resolve factual disputes at the dismissal stage when objective, undisputed records—especially videos—are available.

3. Qualified Immunity and Use-of-Force Precedents

The court situates its analysis within well-established Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit qualified immunity doctrine.

Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7 (2015)
Cited for the core principle that qualified immunity shields officers unless they violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known,” and that it protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”
Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188 (11th Cir. 2002)
Cited for:
- The burden-shifting framework: once an officer shows he acted within discretionary authority, the plaintiff must show (1) a constitutional violation and (2) that the right was clearly established.
- The reminder that officials are not required “to err on the side of caution,” and qualified immunity is appropriate in “close cases.”
Brooks v. Miller, 78 F.4th 1267 (11th Cir. 2023)
Cited for the definition of qualified immunity’s scope and for restating the two-part test: violation plus clearly established right.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)
The foundational case for Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims:
- Excessive force during arrest or seizure is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard.
- Courts must weigh the “nature and quality of the intrusion” against governmental interests, considering the “severity of the crime,” whether the suspect poses an “immediate threat,” and whether he is “actively resisting” or “attempting to evade arrest by flight.”
- Officers often must make “split-second judgments in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.”
Jean-Baptiste v. Gutierrez, 627 F.3d 816 (11th Cir. 2010)
Cited to emphasize:
- The “only perspective that counts” is that of a reasonable officer on the scene.
- Officers need not wait until a suspect actually points or fires a deadly weapon; they may act preemptively to neutralize a perceived deadly threat.
- Use of deadly force was upheld where an armed suspect, believed to have committed violent crimes, attempted to elude police and thereby posed a threat to officers and nearby residents.
Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2009)
Cited as an example where significant force (31 canine bites) was held reasonable because the suspect had fled, was believed armed, and officers were entitled to doubt his professed willingness to surrender.
Patel v. City of Madison, 959 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2020)
Quoted for the articulation of the objective reasonableness standard—asking whether the officer’s conduct was reasonable “in light of the facts confronting the officer,” from the officer’s perspective.

Collectively, these authorities provide the legal scaffolding for the court’s conclusion that deadly force was constitutionally permissible in the circumstances depicted on the videos.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Use of Bodycam Video at the Motion to Dismiss Stage

The first significant doctrinal move is the court’s embrace of bodycam footage as part of the pleadings under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine:

Johnson’s complaint explicitly referenced Officer Williams’s bodycam and attached significance to the absence of audio before the shots.
The officers then submitted the actual footage, which was central to Johnson’s claim (it purportedly supported his story) and whose authenticity was not challenged.
Under Baker and Johnson v. City of Atlanta, this allowed the district court—and now the Eleventh Circuit—to treat the videos as part of the complaint for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes.

The court then applies the key Baker rule:

“Where [the] video is clear and obviously contradicts the plaintiff’s alleged facts, we accept the video’s depiction instead of the complaint’s account, and [we] view the facts in the light depicted by the video.”

At the same time, the court recognizes that ambiguities in the video must still be construed in the plaintiff’s favor. But here, the critical factual disputes—commands to show hands, visibility of uniforms, presence of marked police vehicles, timing of Johnson’s compliance—were, in the court’s view, not ambiguous:

Commands to show hands were audible on at least one bodycam before shots were fired.
Officers were visibly in full police uniforms, with badges and large “POLICE” lettering, and were supported by marked patrol units with lights on.
Johnson’s hands were concealed beneath his body until after shots were fired.
The gun was found under Johnson’s chest, in the very location officers described contemporaneously on the video.

These conclusions allow the court to effectively rewrite the operative facts for purposes of the motion to dismiss by substituting video-based findings for Johnson’s contradictory allegations.

2. Qualified Immunity Framework

The court applies the standard two-step qualified immunity analysis:

Was the officer acting within the scope of discretionary authority?
If so, did the plaintiff show (a) a constitutional violation, and (b) that the right was clearly established?

Johnson did not contest that the officers were acting within their discretionary authority. Accordingly, the burden shifted to him to show:

That the officers’ use of deadly force violated the Fourth Amendment; and
That any such right was clearly established at the time (June 14, 2023).

The panel resolves the appeal solely on the first prong—finding no constitutional violation—and thus does not need to reach the “clearly established” inquiry. This is a common and permissible approach under Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009), even though Pearson is not cited expressly in the opinion.

3. Application of the Graham Factors

The core of the court’s reasoning is an application of Graham v. Connor’s objective reasonableness test to the specific circumstances captured on video. The court highlights the following:

Severity of the Crime at Issue
Johnson:
- Reversed into and struck a police vehicle;
- Then drove erratically, up onto a curb and through a fence into a public park; and
- Was later revealed to be armed and charged with serious felonies, including aggravated battery on an officer and firearm possession as a felon.
This combination—striking a police vehicle, reckless driving into a park, and possession of a firearm by a felon— weighs heavily toward the high end of criminal severity.
Immediate Threat to Officers or Others
Several facts support the court’s conclusion that Johnson posed an immediate threat:
- He was armed (a fact Johnson admitted and which officers confirmed during the encounter).
- He actively fled first in a vehicle, then on foot, into a residential backyard.
- He lay on the ground with his hands concealed under his torso, which the officers believed (correctly) also concealed a firearm.
- He failed to comply with commands to show his hands until after shots were fired.
The court notes that, from the officers’ perspective, these facts indicated an armed suspect who had already engaged in dangerous conduct and might reach for the gun under his chest at any moment.
Resistance or Attempted Flight
Johnson’s flight is substantial:
- He left the initial traffic encounter by colliding with the officers’ truck and driving off;
- He crashed through a fence and crossed a park; and
- He continued to flee on foot into private property, ignoring police presence and, allegedly, commands.
His failure to reveal his hands—after clear “show me your hands” commands—also qualifies as resistance in a context where officers knew he was armed.

Weighing these factors, the court holds that the use of deadly force was not objectively unreasonable. The officers were not required to wait until Johnson actually drew or fired the weapon:

“The law does not require officers in a tense and dangerous situation to wait until the moment a suspect uses a deadly weapon to act to stop the suspect.” (citing Jean-Baptiste).

Notably, the court also emphasizes that the officers ceased firing once Johnson complied by extending his hands above his head, underscoring that the force used was both responsive and limited in duration.

4. Johnson’s Alleged Ignorance of the Officers’ Identity

A distinctive feature of Johnson’s argument is his claim that:

The officers wore plain clothes and ski masks; and
He did not realize they were police officers until he heard radio traffic.

The court rejects these factual assertions as contradicted by the video, which shows:

Officers in standard uniforms with badges and “POLICE” markings;
No ski masks; and
Marked patrol cars with lights at the scene, in broad daylight.

More importantly, the court declares Johnson’s subjective awareness (or lack thereof) legally irrelevant:

“[W]hat Johnson knew or believed in the moment is not relevant to the qualified immunity analysis. … [T]he only perspective that counts is that of a reasonable officer on the scene at the time the events unfolded.”

This is a significant clarification: under Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness, the court focuses exclusively on what a reasonable officer would perceive, not on the suspect’s state of mind (e.g., whether he thought he was facing criminals rather than police).

5. Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Claims

Johnson’s complaint invoked the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments alongside the Fourth. The court, following Graham, quickly and correctly channels the analysis:

The Eighth Amendment applies to punishment after conviction; excessive force during arrest is governed by the Fourth Amendment, not the Eighth.
Although not elaborated, the Fourteenth Amendment due process framework is generally reserved for pretrial detainees or non-seizure contexts; here the seizure is classic Fourth Amendment territory.

Thus, the opinion effectively collapses Johnson’s multiple-constitutional-amendment claims into a single Fourth Amendment inquiry.

C. Impact and Doctrinal Significance

1. Reinforcement of Video-Driven Pleading-Stage Resolution

While unpublished, the opinion strongly reinforces a growing Eleventh Circuit pattern:

Courts are increasingly willing to resolve excessive-force and qualified immunity questions on a motion to dismiss when bodycam or similar video evidence is clear, undisputed, and central to the claims.
The combination of Baker, Johnson v. City of Atlanta, and now Johnson v. Williams underscores that plaintiffs cannot survive dismissal merely by alleging a narrative contradicted by clear video.

The practical effect is to move disputes about force from discovery and summary judgment back to the pleading stage, at least in cases where video is decisive. This:

Reduces litigation costs and exposure for defendants;
Limits plaintiffs’ ability—especially pro se litigants—to rely on disputed factual narratives; and
Raises the evidentiary bar for surviving early dismissal in police-misconduct cases involving video footage.

2. “Hidden Hands” and the Perceived Threat of an Armed Suspect

Substantively, the opinion deepens Eleventh Circuit precedent that:

An armed suspect’s refusal to show his hands, especially after fleeing from officers and concealing a firearm beneath his body, can justify the use of deadly force—even if the suspect is prone or not yet pointing a weapon.
Brief, targeted use of deadly force is permissible to compel compliance and neutralize a perceived threat, especially where the suspect’s recent behavior shows dangerousness and disregard for police authority.

This aligns with and reinforces Jean-Baptiste, where officers were not required to wait for the suspect to actually aim or fire a gun before shooting, and with Crenshaw, where substantial force was allowed against a fleeing, possibly armed suspect.

3. Subjective Belief of the Suspect as Irrelevant

The court’s explicit statement that Johnson’s belief about the officers’ identity is irrelevant clarifies that:

In excessive-force analyses, the suspect’s subjective perception—that he is under attack, that the pursuers are not police, or that he is attempting to surrender—plays no role unless it somehow bears on what a reasonable officer would perceive.
The constitutional inquiry remains entirely officer-centered: what would a reasonable officer infer from the suspect’s conduct?

This conceptual separation can have far-reaching implications in cases where suspects claim confusion, fear, or misidentification.

4. Pro Se Plaintiffs and the Limits of Leniency

While courts traditionally construe pro se pleadings liberally, this opinion illustrates clear limits:

Liberal construction does not permit courts to credit allegations that are flatly and clearly refuted by objective video evidence.
Pro se status does not forestall early dismissal when core allegations cannot be reconciled with bodycam footage.

For litigants, particularly those incarcerated or without counsel, this sharpens the need to:

Align factual allegations with what the video actually shows; and
Focus on legal theories that remain viable even if the video undermines some parts of their account.

V. Clarification of Key Legal Concepts

A. Qualified Immunity (Simplified)

Qualified immunity is a legal doctrine that protects government officials, including police officers, from being sued for money damages unless:

They violated a constitutional right (for example, by using excessive force); and
The right was “clearly established” at the time, such that a reasonable officer would have known the conduct was unlawful.

In Johnson:

The officers were plainly performing discretionary duties (responding to a fleeing suspect, attempting an arrest).
Johnson thus had to show that their use of deadly force violated the Fourth Amendment and that the violation was clearly established.
The court never reached the “clearly established” question, because it found no violation at all.

Functionally, qualified immunity operates as a powerful shield, often resolving cases at an early stage—especially when video evidence supports the officers’ account.

B. Fourth Amendment Excessive Force and the Graham Factors

Under Graham v. Connor, excessive force claims connected with an arrest or seizure are evaluated by asking whether the force used was “objectively reasonable” in light of all circumstances. Courts consider:

Severity of the crime – more severe crimes justify higher levels of force;
Immediate threat – if the suspect poses a serious threat to officers or others, more force is justified;
Resistance or flight – active resistance or attempts to escape support a higher level of force.

Additional considerations include the extent of injury, the need for force, and the relationship between the need and the amount used, all from the viewpoint of a reasonable officer on the scene, not with 20/20 hindsight.

In Johnson, the court applied these factors to conclude that:

Johnson’s crimes were serious;
He posed an immediate threat as an armed, fleeing suspect concealing his hands and weapon; and
He was actively evading arrest, both by vehicle and on foot.

Accordingly, deadly force was deemed objectively reasonable.

C. Incorporation-by-Reference and Video Evidence

The incorporation-by-reference doctrine allows a court ruling on a motion to dismiss to consider documents or media not physically attached to the complaint if:

The complaint refers to them or they are central to the claim; and
Their authenticity is not disputed.

When applied to bodycam or surveillance video:

If the video clearly contradicts the plaintiff’s story, the court must accept what the video shows instead of the complaint’s version.
If the video is ambiguous, the ambiguity must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor at the pleading stage.

In Johnson, this doctrine allowed the court to:

Reject Johnson’s assertions that no commands were given before shots, that officers were in plain clothes, and that he had hands visible and empty;
Adopt instead the video-based facts showing visible police identification, commands to show hands, and concealed hands over a concealed gun.

VI. Conclusion

Johnson v. Williams is a paradigmatic example of the modern interplay between body-worn camera technology, qualified immunity, and Rule 12(b)(6) practice in the Eleventh Circuit. Although unpublished, it illustrates several important themes:

Video as Decisive Evidence at the Pleading Stage – When bodycam footage is clear, undisputed, and central to the claim, courts will treat it as controlling over contradictory allegations, enabling early dismissal of § 1983 suits.
Robust Protection for Officers Confronting Armed, Fleeing Suspects – The court reiterates that officers may use deadly force preemptively when a suspect is armed, has fled, and refuses to show hands, without waiting for an overt act of gun use.
Objective, Officer-Centered Perspective – The suspect’s subjective belief or confusion—such as not realizing the pursuers are police— is irrelevant to the qualified immunity and Fourth Amendment analysis; the focus is entirely on what a reasonable officer would perceive.
Limits of Pro Se Leniency – Courts will not credit a pro se plaintiff’s allegations where they are plainly and conclusively refuted by video evidence.

For future excessive-force litigants in the Eleventh Circuit, Johnson sends a clear signal: when bodycam footage exists and is adverse, any viable claim must be carefully framed around what the video actually shows, and plaintiffs must be prepared to engage with a highly deferential objective reasonableness standard that gives officers significant latitude in tense, rapidly evolving encounters with armed suspects.