Bodily DNA, Inevitable Discovery, and Accomplice Testimony: A Commentary on State v. Steeprock

Bodily DNA, Inevitable Discovery, and Accomplice Testimony: Commentary on State v. Steeprock, Minnesota Supreme Court (Dec. 3, 2025)

I. Introduction

The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Steeprock, A23‑0875 (Dec. 3, 2025), is a major opinion at the intersection of criminal procedure, constitutional law, and evidentiary safeguards. It does three doctrinally significant things:

  1. Fourth Amendment / Article I, § 10: It holds that a warrantless buccal swab of a charged defendant’s DNA, obtained under Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.02, subd. 2(1)(f), is an unreasonable search under both the U.S. and Minnesota Constitutions, absent a valid warrant or established exception.
  2. Exclusionary Rule & Inevitable Discovery: It requires suppression of the resulting DNA evidence, finds no applicable exception to the exclusionary rule, and explicitly overrules In re Welfare of J.W.K., 583 N.W.2d 752 (Minn. 1998), as inconsistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s inevitable discovery doctrine in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), and the court’s own decision in State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 2011).
  3. Accomplice Corroboration Statute: It interprets “testimony” in Minn. Stat. § 634.04 (which bars conviction on uncorroborated accomplice testimony) to mean only statements made under oath. Unsworn out-of-court accomplice statements—even when admitted as substantive evidence—do not trigger the statutory corroboration requirement.

The case arises from a 2020 Duluth shooting, where respondent Seneca Warrior Steeprock was convicted of attempted first-degree premeditated murder and unlawful firearm possession. Central to the prosecution’s case was DNA from a handgun recovered in a snowbank and incriminating jail calls and texts from a charged accomplice, A.C. The court of appeals reversed based on the unconstitutional buccal swab; the State sought review, and Steeprock cross-petitioned on the accomplice-instruction and hearsay issues.

The Supreme Court (Justice Gaïtas writing for the Court; Justices McKeig and Moore concurring in part and dissenting in part) affirms the court of appeals: the DNA must be suppressed, the error is not harmless, a new trial is required, and no accomplice‑corroboration instruction was warranted.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Core Holdings

  1. Buccal swab as unconstitutional search
    • A buccal swab for DNA is a “search.”
    • A Rule 9.02 discovery order is not a search warrant and cannot substitute for one.
    • No recognized exception to the warrant requirement applies; the search is per se unreasonable.
  2. Suppression and new trial
    • The exclusionary rule applies; no exception (inevitable discovery or good-faith) saves the DNA.
    • In re Welfare of J.W.K. is overruled as inconsistent with Nix and Diede on inevitable discovery.
    • Admission of the DNA evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; the conviction is reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
  3. Scope of Minn. Stat. § 634.04
    • “Testimony” in § 634.04 is a technical legal term: statements by a witness under oath (in court, deposition, affidavit, or similar proceeding).
    • A.C.’s jail calls and text messages, while admitted as statements against interest, are not “testimony” and do not trigger the accomplice‑corroboration instruction.

B. The Split on Inevitable Discovery

Justice McKeig, joined by Justice Moore, agrees that the buccal swab was unconstitutional, but would admit the DNA evidence under the inevitable discovery doctrine and affirm the conviction. The dissent criticizes the majority for:

  • Overruling J.W.K. and partially Eppler without a compelling reason.
  • Adopting an “extraordinarily high” and practically unworkable standard for inevitable discovery, especially in DNA cases.
  • Misreading Nix and Diede; in the dissent’s view, the State clearly would have obtained a valid DNA warrant based on the record.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Shooting and Investigation

  • Victim C.J. was shot multiple times in a Duluth apartment in December 2020; he survived but had serious blood loss.
  • He could not recall who shot him; the apartment resident heard multiple voices (male and female) and thought two guns were involved.
  • C.J. was visiting his cousin T.J.; the day before, he spent time with T.J.’s friend A.C. There was a known conflict between C.J. and A.C.’s brother, M.C.

Police later found C.J.’s car outside Gateway Towers. As they watched, A.C. and Steeprock emerged from the building and approached the car. When Steeprock saw police, he ran, then lay down in the snow and surrendered. He had no gun on him; a gun was later found in A.C.’s purse. Another gun was eventually located in a snowbank near where Steeprock had lain, with the help of a dog.

  • Ballistics tied A.C.’s purse gun to 7 of 15 cartridge casings from the scene.
  • Ballistics tied the snowbank gun to the other 8 casings.
  • DNA swabs were taken from both guns.

B. Initial Search Warrant and Subsequent Rule 9.02 Order

  • Investigators obtained a search warrant for, among other things, buccal swabs from A.C. and Steeprock.
  • A.C. mounted a Franks v. Delaware challenge to that warrant in her case.
  • In response, the State stipulated in Steeprock’s case that it would not use any evidence obtained under that warrant (including his buccal swab).
  • The State did not seek a new warrant.
  • Instead, it moved under Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.02, subd. 2(1)(f), for a pretrial discovery order compelling “saliva” (ultimately collected via a buccal swab) for DNA comparison with the snowbank gun.
  • Over defense objection, the district court ordered Steeprock to “provide a DNA sample.” Law enforcement then collected a buccal swab at the jail.

The DNA mixture from the snowbank gun included a profile consistent with Steeprock’s DNA from that buccal swab.

C. Trial and Evidence at Issue

The State prosecuted Steeprock as a principal for attempted first-degree premeditated murder and unlawful firearm possession. Its case relied heavily on:

  • DNA evidence: A BCA scientist testified that DNA on the snowbank gun matched Steeprock’s reference sample.
  • A.C.’s jail calls and texts: Over hearsay objections, the court admitted four recorded jail calls between A.C. and her brother M.C. and six text messages A.C. sent or received from jail.
  • Those statements detailed plans to shoot someone, described the shooting, and referenced Steeprock, and were admitted as statements against penal interest under Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3).

Defense requested a jury instruction under Minn. Stat. § 634.04 (accomplice‑corroboration) on the theory that A.C.’s statements were the functional equivalent of accomplice testimony. The district court refused, reasoning that “testimony” means statements given under oath, which these were not.

The jury convicted on both counts; concurrent sentences of 240 months (attempted murder) and 60 months (firearm possession) followed.

D. Appeal and Court of Appeals Ruling

On appeal, Steeprock challenged:

  • The constitutionality of the warrantless Rule 9.02 DNA order and admission of DNA evidence;
  • The denial of an accomplice‑corroboration instruction;
  • The admission of A.C.’s statements under Rule 804(b)(3).

The court of appeals:

  • Held the buccal swab unconstitutional and the DNA admission prejudicial, reversed the conviction, and remanded for a new trial.
  • Agreed that A.C.’s unsworn statements were not “testimony” under § 634.04, so no accomplice instruction was required.
  • Declined to reach the hearsay issue.

The State petitioned on the DNA issue; Steeprock conditionally cross-petitioned on the accomplice‑instruction and hearsay questions. The Supreme Court granted both and now:

  • Affirms the suppression and new trial requirement.
  • Affirms the denial of the accomplice‑corroboration instruction.
  • Again declines to address the hearsay ruling, while cautioning trial courts about overbroad use of Rule 804(b)(3).

IV. Constitutional Holding: Warrantless Buccal Swabs and Rule 9.02

A. Framework: Fourth Amendment and Minnesota Constitution

Both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 10 of the Minnesota Constitution protect against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” The opinion reiterates core principles:

  • The purpose of these provisions is to protect “personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State” (Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966)).
  • Bodily intrusions—like blood draws or buccal swabs—implicate “most personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy” (Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148 (2013)).
  • The “touchstone” is reasonableness, and reasonableness typically requires a warrant supported by probable cause issued by a neutral magistrate (Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977); State v. Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8 (Minn. 2008)).
  • A search is “presumptively unreasonable” if conducted without a valid warrant unless a specific exception applies (State v. McNeilly, 6 N.W.3d 161, 175 (Minn. 2024)).

B. Was the Buccal Swab a “Search”?

The State conceded that the buccal swab was a search. The court cites Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 446 (2013), which held that “using a buccal swab on the inner tissues of a person’s cheek in order to obtain DNA samples is a search.” The point is now doctrinally settled.

C. Is There a Special Exception for Investigatory Buccal Swabs of Charged Defendants?

The State’s primary argument was functional: even without a traditional warrant, it should be lawful to take a minimally intrusive buccal swab from someone already charged, so long as a judge issues a Rule 9.02 discovery order. It argued for something akin to a “limited search” exception—especially for bodily identification evidence—once probable cause to charge is already present.

It cited:

  • Other states allowing court-ordered handwriting samples, saliva, or participation in lineups via discovery orders rather than search warrants;
  • Rule 9.02, subd. 2(1)(f), which expressly authorizes courts, “subject to constitutional limitations,” to order a defendant to provide “blood, hair, saliva, urine, or samples of other bodily materials that do not involve unreasonable intrusion,” upon a showing that it will “materially aid” in determining whether the defendant committed the offense.

The majority firmly rejects any such new exception, for four reasons.

1. Distinguishing identification from evidence-gathering

The court distinguishes King, where the U.S. Supreme Court upheld buccal swabs done as a routine booking procedure for identification under a Maryland statute:

  • In King, DNA was treated much like fingerprints, used to “connect the arrestee with his or her public persona”; the statute restricted the purpose to identification.
  • Here, the State’s purpose was purely evidentiary: to link Steeprock to the snowbank gun and the shooting.

That purpose matters. As the Court notes (citing Thompson, Riley, and McNeely), when “law enforcement seeks to conduct a search to uncover evidence of criminal wrongdoing,” reasonableness “generally requires” a judicial warrant. “Identification” searches may be a different category; the court emphasizes this line.

2. DNA’s long-term privacy implications

Although the physical intrusion of a buccal swab is minimal, the Court underscores the broader privacy concerns:

  • DNA samples can be retained and potentially reveal “highly personal information” such as ancestry, disease markers, and physical traits (citing Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438 (2016), and Justice Procaccini’s concurrence in State v. Carbo, 6 N.W.3d 114 (Minn. 2024)).
  • The privacy intrusion, therefore, far exceeds a simple momentary cheek swab.

3. Weakness of other jurisdictions’ precedents

The State’s reliance on out-of-state decisions upholding court-ordered saliva or other samples was unpersuasive because:

  • Some treated the mouth as exposed in ordinary life (e.g., In re Nontestimonial Identification Order to R.H. (Vt.)),
  • Others minimized bodily intrusion in ways inconsistent with Minnesota’s precedent in State v. Hardy, 577 N.W.2d 212 (Minn. 1998), which held that ordering a suspect to open his mouth to look for drugs is itself a significant search requiring probable cause.

4. Rule 9.02 is “subject to constitutional limitations”

The plain language of Rule 9.02, subd. 2(1)(f), undercuts the idea that it creates a freestanding exception:

“[T]he court before trial may, subject to constitutional limitations, order a defendant to … permit the taking of blood, hair, saliva, urine, or samples of other bodily materials that do not involve unreasonable intrusion.”

The rule itself explicitly subordinates its authority to constitutional requirements—most centrally, the warrant requirement for searches.

D. Is a Rule 9.02 Order Functionally a Warrant?

Alternatively, the State argued that a Rule 9.02 order is “functionally equivalent” to a warrant because:

  • The defendant has already been charged, so probable cause to believe he committed the offense has been established.
  • The rule requires a showing that the procedure will “materially aid” in determining whether the defendant committed the offense, which the State claimed is equivalent to probable cause to search.

The Court rejects this functional equivalence on two independent grounds:

  1. Different standards
    • Probable cause to charge: “facts … showing a reasonable probability that the person committed the crime” (State v. Lopez, 778 N.W.2d 700, 703 (Minn. 2010)).
    • Probable cause to search: a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place” (State v. Wiggins, 4 N.W.3d 138, 145 (Minn. 2024)).
    • “Materially aid” (Rule 9.02): a lower bar, requiring only that the procedure will aid in determining whether the defendant committed the offense—without requiring a fair probability that evidence will be found in a specific place.
  2. Constitutional formality: oath or affirmation
    • Both the U.S. and Minnesota Constitutions require warrants to be supported by “oath or affirmation.”
    • The Rule 9.02 request here rested solely on the prosecutor’s unsworn statements.
    • That omission is fatal to treating the order as a warrant.

In short: a discovery order may resemble a judicial authorization, but it does not meet the substantive and procedural requirements of a warrant.

E. Conclusion on Constitutionality

With no valid warrant and no established exception to the warrant requirement, the buccal swab was an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 10. That finding sets up the exclusionary-rule analysis.

V. Exclusionary Rule and Its Exceptions

A. The Exclusionary Rule in Federal and Minnesota Law

The exclusionary rule bars use of evidence obtained in violation of constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. Key points:

  • Federal law: The rule is a judicially created remedy designed primarily to deter unlawful police conduct (United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)).
  • Minnesota law: The Minnesota Constitution’s exclusionary rule also aims to preserve judicial integrity and deter unlawful government conduct more broadly (State v. Malecha, 3 N.W.3d 566 (Minn. 2024)).
  • Suppression is not automatic; it depends on whether applying the rule serves these underlying purposes. Minnesota recognizes exceptions such as:
    • Inevitable discovery (Licari);
    • A limited good-faith exception (Lindquist, Malecha);
    • Independent source (Hodges).

B. Inevitable Discovery: Nix, J.W.K., and Diede

1. The Nix v. Williams standard

Under Nix, evidence obtained unlawfully is admissible if the State can show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it “ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” The inquiry must:

  • Rely on “demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment”; and
  • Avoid “speculative elements” and post hoc reconstruction.

2. Minnesota’s earlier approach: In re Welfare of J.W.K. and Eppler

In J.W.K., police had consent to draw a juvenile’s blood in one case; they retained the sample and later used it without consent or warrant in a different case. This Court held inevitable discovery applied because:

  • If they had not used the sample, police “presumably” would have sought consent or a warrant;
  • DNA profiles do not change over time, so any later lawful sample would have matched.

Similarly, in State v. Eppler, 362 N.W.2d 315 (Minn. 1985), we reasoned it was “inevitable” that police would have taken and used the defendant’s photograph lawfully because they had probable cause to arrest her.

These cases allowed the State to satisfy inevitable discovery by arguing: “if we had not done it illegally, we would have done it legally.”

3. The corrective in State v. Diede

In Diede, police illegally searched a cigarette pack and found methamphetamine. The State argued that it could have (and thus inevitably would have) arrested Diede and discovered the meth during a search incident to arrest.

The Court rejected that argument explicitly:

“The State may not show inevitable discovery by claiming that if it had not searched illegally, it would have done so legally.” (Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 849.)

The focus must be on what actually was happening—ongoing lawful investigative processes that already would have led to the evidence—not on what police could have chosen to do but did not.

4. Overruling J.W.K. and limiting Eppler

The majority concludes that J.W.K. is “clearly in conflict” with the Nix/Diede formulation:

  • Nix/Diede: No inevitable discovery based on “we would have gotten a warrant” if police never actually initiated that lawful path.
  • J.W.K.: Relied centrally on speculative assertions that police “presumably” would have sought consent or a warrant.

The Court labels J.W.K. “clearly and manifestly erroneous” in this respect and formally overrules it. It also clarifies that Eppler’s speculative statement that “it appears inevitable” police would have obtained a lawful photograph is likewise “no longer good law” to the extent it purports to apply inevitable discovery.

5. Application to Steeprock

The State’s inevitable discovery argument here was simple: DNA is stable; the State could have obtained a warrant for Steeprock’s DNA and would have done so had it not used Rule 9.02. The Court finds this indistinguishable from what Diede forbids:

  • There were no “historical facts” showing that, after abandoning the first warrant, the State actually pursued a second warrant, or that a parallel lawful process was underway that would inevitably have produced the DNA.
  • The fact that the State might readily have obtained a second warrant if it had applied for one is speculative, not historical.

Thus, under Diede (and Nix), the inevitable discovery exception does not apply; the DNA must be suppressed.

C. Good-Faith Exception

Under federal law (United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)), evidence may be admitted if officers acted in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant later found defective. Minnesota has adopted a much narrower good-faith doctrine:

  • It applies only when officers “obtain evidence in reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent that specifically authorizes the police conduct at issue” (State v. Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d 863, 876 (Minn. 2015); reaffirmed in Malecha).
  • Minnesota has explicitly declined to adopt Leon’s broader rule allowing good-faith reliance on a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate (Garza v. State, 632 N.W.2d 633, 639–40 (Minn. 2001)).

The State argued that Rule 9.02, subd. 2(1)(f), is akin to “binding appellate precedent” because it is a rule promulgated by the Supreme Court itself, so reliance on it should fall within Minnesota’s good-faith exception.

The Court sidesteps whether a court rule can ever be treated as “binding appellate precedent” for this purpose and resolves the issue more narrowly:

  • Even if a rule could qualify, Rule 9.02 does not “specifically authorize” warrantless buccal swabs; instead, it expressly says orders are “subject to constitutional limitations.”
  • No reasonable officer could believe that a Rule 9.02 order alone eliminated the need for a warrant in the face of that explicit proviso.

Result: the good-faith exception does not apply. The DNA must be excluded if the error was not harmless.

D. Harmless Error Analysis

Because the admission of the DNA evidence flows from a constitutional violation, the standard is whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt—i.e., whether the verdict was “surely unattributable” to the error.

The Court considers:

  • The centrality and persuasiveness of the DNA evidence;
  • How it was presented and emphasized in closing arguments;
  • Whether it was effectively countered by the defense; and
  • The overall strength of the remaining evidence.

Findings:

  • The DNA from the snowbank gun was “persuasive and central”; it was the primary forensic link between Steeprock and the actual shooting weapon.
  • The prosecutor repeatedly highlighted the DNA in closing and rebuttal.
  • Defense tried to diminish the weight of the mixed DNA profile, but the State re-emphasized its importance.
  • No other evidence physically tied Steeprock to the shooting scene.

On this record, the Court cannot say there is no “reasonable possibility” that the illegal DNA evidence contributed to the conviction. The error is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. A new trial is required.

VI. Statutory Interpretation: “Testimony” in Minn. Stat. § 634.04

A. The Accomplice Corroboration Rule

Minnesota Statutes § 634.04 provides:

“A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice, unless it is corroborated by such other evidence as tends to convict the defendant of the commission of the offense.”

Key features:

  • An “accomplice” is someone who could be indicted and convicted of the same crime as the defendant (State v. Cox, 820 N.W.2d 540, 548 (Minn. 2012)). Here, A.C.—also charged with attempted first-degree murder—qualifies.
  • The statute has spawned a long-standing rule that courts must instruct juries that they cannot convict based on uncorroborated accomplice testimony (State v. Davenport, 947 N.W.2d 251, 260 (Minn. 2020); State v. Strommen, 648 N.W.2d 681 (Minn. 2002)).
  • The pattern instruction is CRIMJIG 3.18.

The unresolved question here: Does “testimony” include unsworn out-of-court statements by an accomplice that are admitted as substantive evidence at the defendant’s trial (e.g., jail calls, texts)?

B. Is “Testimony” Ambiguous?

Section 634.04 does not define “testimony.” The opinion follows the usual statutory-interpretation steps:

  • Look to the statutory text in context.
  • Determine whether the term is ambiguous.
  • If unambiguous, apply its plain meaning; if ambiguous, consider canons of construction and legislative intent.

The Court concludes “testimony” here is a technical legal term because:

  • It appears in Chapter 634, titled “Evidence; Witnesses,” and arises in a distinctly legal context.
  • Under Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1), “technical words and phrases” used in a technical sense are construed according to their special meaning.

Turning to Black’s Law Dictionary, the Court notes:

“Testimony” is “[e]vidence that a competent witness under oath or affirmation gives at trial or in an affidavit or deposition.”

On this basis, the Court finds the statute unambiguous: “testimony” means statements made under oath (or affirmation) in a formal proceeding or sworn document.

C. Application to A.C.’s Jail Calls and Texts

A.C.’s statements:

  • Were made in phone calls from jail and in text messages;
  • Were not made under oath or subject to penalty of perjury;
  • Were admitted not as sworn testimony but under the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest, Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3).

They therefore are not “testimony” within the meaning of § 634.04. As a result:

  • The statutory corroboration requirement does not apply.
  • The district court did not err in refusing an accomplice‑corroboration instruction.

This is consistent with Davenport, where the Court held that accomplice plea-hearing statements later introduced at trial were “testimony”—specifically because they were given under oath in a court proceeding.

The upshot is a narrowing of § 634.04’s reach: it protects defendants from uncorroborated accomplice evidence only when the accomplice speaks under oath. Unsworn accomplice accusations—though they may still be subject to other evidentiary and constitutional safeguards—are outside the statute’s scope.

VII. The Concurrence/Dissent: A Competing View of Inevitable Discovery

A. Justice McKeig’s Reasoning

Justice McKeig (joined by Justice Moore) agrees that:

  • The buccal swab was an unconstitutional search; and
  • A Rule 9.02 order is inadequate as a warrant substitute.

But she would admit the DNA evidence anyway under inevitable discovery and affirm the conviction. Her key points:

  1. Consistency with Nix and prior Minnesota cases
    • The inevitable discovery doctrine is “longstanding” and was adopted by Nix.
    • In J.W.K., Minnesota properly applied Nix to admit unlawfully obtained DNA, reasoning that police would have lawfully obtained the same DNA by consent or warrant.
    • In her view, Diede did not narrow the doctrine; it simply found the State failed to carry its burden on the particular facts in that case.
  2. “Demonstrated historical facts” in Steeprock
    • Officers had already obtained a search warrant for buccal swabs earlier in the investigation; a judge had already signed such a warrant.
    • The complaint and Rule 9.02 motion showed ample probable cause: location of the gun near where Steeprock was apprehended, ballistics tying that gun to the shooting, and DNA recovered from the gun.
    • DNA evidence was crucial to the State’s case; it is inconceivable the State would simply give up on obtaining it if Rule 9.02 were unavailable.
    • These are “demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification” showing that the State would have obtained a warrant.
  3. Critique of overruling J.W.K. and narrowing inevitable discovery
    • Stare decisis: the Court should not overrule precedent without a “compelling reason”; she sees none here.
    • Both J.W.K. and Eppler rest on longstanding inevitable discovery principles drawn from Nix.
    • The majority’s new standard risks making inevitable discovery virtually impossible to prove in DNA contexts.
    • She cites a recent unpublished court of appeals decision, State v. Babineaux, where a district court stated explicitly that it would have granted a warrant on the same facts as a Rule 9.02 order, and worries that even that may fail under the majority’s logic.
  4. Practical justice concerns
    • She warns against requiring a new trial only to have law enforcement obtain a warrant, collect the same DNA, and retry the case with the same evidence.
    • In her view, that outcome does not meaningfully further deterrence or judicial integrity and is at odds with the purposes of the exclusionary rule.

B. The Majority–Dissent Divide

The real disagreement is about how strictly to read Nix’s “demonstrated historical facts” requirement:

  • Majority: There must be an actual, contemporaneous lawful avenue already in motion (e.g., a search party already closing in on evidence, as in Nix). “We would have gotten a warrant” is not enough if no steps toward that warrant were taken after the illegal search.
  • Dissent: Concrete facts about the investigation (probable cause, the prior warrant, and the centrality of the evidence) can show inevitability even if a new warrant application was not begun. On these facts, the State would have sought and obtained a warrant; this is not speculative.

This split will shape how lower courts assess inevitable discovery claims going forward, particularly in cases involving bodily evidence and repeatable forensic sampling.

VIII. Doctrinal and Practical Impacts

A. For Law Enforcement and Prosecutors

  1. No more buccal swabs under Rule 9.02 alone
    • Investigatory buccal swabs to obtain DNA for evidence require a valid warrant (or a recognized exception such as exigent circumstances, consent, etc.).
    • Discovery orders under Rule 9.02, subd. 2(1)(f), cannot substitute for warrants when bodily intrusions are involved.
    • Agencies will need to review and revise standard operating procedures, forms, and training materials.
  2. Sharper line between booking DNA and evidence-gathering DNA
    • If Minnesota uses DNA as part of booking procedures, those statutes and practices must fit the King model—strictly for identification, not general crime-solving—or risk constitutional challenge.
    • Evidence-gathering DNA (to solve a specific crime) is different and now clearly within strict warrant requirements.
  3. Inevitable discovery is significantly narrowed
    • Law enforcement cannot rely on speculative “we would have gotten a warrant” arguments after an unlawful search.
    • To preserve inevitable discovery, officers must:
      • Document parallel ongoing lawful investigative efforts;
      • Show that those efforts were already underway and would have led to the evidence;
      • Demonstrate that the lawful path was not itself tainted by the illegality.
    • This may spur agencies to pursue “belt and suspenders” investigative paths more systematically.
  4. Good-faith exception remains tightly cabined
    • Officers cannot generally rely on ambiguous rules or statutes labeled “subject to constitutional limitations” as safe harbors.
    • Unless conduct is specifically and clearly authorized by binding appellate precedent, the good-faith exception is unlikely to apply.

B. For Defense Counsel

  • Suppression opportunities
    • Any case where buccal swabs or similar bodily samples were taken without a warrant (or where the “warrant” is effectively a Rule 9.02 order) is now ripe for suppression motions, at least in cases still on direct review.
    • Defense should scrutinize:
      • Whether the authorizing instrument truly meets warrant requirements (oath, probable cause to search, particularity);
      • Whether the State can credibly assert any recognized exception to the warrant requirement;
      • Whether inevitable discovery claims rest on “historical facts” or pure speculation.
  • Adjusting accomplice strategies
    • Unsworn accomplice statements (e.g., jail calls) will not trigger § 634.04 corroboration instructions, even if admitted as substantive evidence.
    • Defense will need to rely more heavily on:
      • Rule-based objections (hearsay, Rule 804(b)(3) limitations as flagged in Tovar, Williamson, Morales);
      • Confrontation Clause challenges (where applicable);
      • Requests for generic cautionary instructions about informers or accomplices, even if not compelled by statute.

C. For Trial Courts

  • Pretrial hearings
    • Greater scrutiny of bodily evidence collection, especially when authorized by court orders rather than warrants.
    • Careful factual findings on whether exceptions to the warrant requirement or exclusionary rule truly apply.
  • Jury instructions
    • § 634.04 instruction is limited to sworn accomplice testimony (trial, deposition, plea hearings, affidavits, etc.).
    • Unsworn accomplice statements do not justify that instruction under Steeprock’s interpretation.
  • Hearsay and Rule 804(b)(3)
    • The Court reiterates Tovar and Williamson: “statement against interest” must be construed narrowly—only the parts that genuinely inculpate the declarant, not broad narratives that also implicate others.
    • Courts should be particularly careful when the declarant incriminates someone else—like a co-defendant.

D. For Minnesota Constitutional Doctrine

  • Robust bodily privacy
    • The Court underscores that bodily intrusions, especially for DNA, are serious Fourth Amendment/Article I, § 10 events, even when physically minimal.
    • Retention and analytic potential of DNA heighten privacy stakes.
  • Independent state-law development
    • While tracking federal law in key respects, Minnesota continues to:
      • Maintain a narrower good-faith exception than federal law;
      • Emphasize judicial integrity and broad governmental deterrence as exclusionary-rule rationales;
      • Insist on a strict, non-speculative application of inevitable discovery aligned with Nix.

IX. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Buccal Swab vs. Saliva Sample vs. Blood Draw

  • Buccal swab: Swabbing the inside of a person’s cheek with a cotton swab to collect cells for DNA analysis; physically minor but yields extensive genetic information.
  • Saliva sample: Spitting into a container or swabbing saliva; functionally similar for DNA purposes.
  • Blood draw: Needles and vials; more invasive; often treated as a more serious intrusion, but modern doctrine recognizes that DNA from any source poses privacy concerns.

2. Probable Cause to Charge vs. Probable Cause to Search

  • Probable cause to charge: A reasonable probability that the person committed a particular crime. It justifies initiating criminal charges.
  • Probable cause to search: A fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found in a specific place or item. It justifies a search warrant.
  • They are related but not interchangeable. Charging probable cause doesn’t automatically authorize searches of the body or property outside warrant procedures.

3. Exclusionary Rule

  • Courts generally must exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment or Article I, § 10.
  • Purpose:
    • Federal: primarily to deter police misconduct.
    • Minnesota: deterrence plus judicial integrity and deterring unlawful government conduct more broadly.
  • Not automatic; exceptions include:
    • Inevitable discovery: evidence would have been discovered lawfully anyway.
    • Independent source: evidence was actually obtained via lawful independent means.
    • Good-faith (limited in Minnesota): officers reasonably relied on binding precedent specifically authorizing their conduct.

4. Inevitable Discovery vs. Independent Source

  • Inevitable discovery: The unlawful search produced the evidence, but a separate lawful process already underway would have produced it anyway. The law excuses the taint if that inevitability is proven by historical facts.
  • Independent source: The evidence was actually obtained, in fact, through a lawful independent route, even if an unlawful search also occurred.

5. Good-Faith Exception (Minnesota Version)

  • Minnesota’s good-faith exception is narrower than the federal Leon rule.
  • It applies only when:
    • Officers relied on binding appellate precedent that specifically authorizes their conduct; and
    • The precedent has not yet been overruled or undermined.
  • Reliance on a magistrate’s warrant, a statute, or a rule labeled “subject to constitutional limitations” is not enough by itself in Minnesota.

6. Harmless Error Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

  • When a constitutional error occurs at trial (e.g., admission of illegally obtained evidence), a conviction can stand only if the error is “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
  • Courts ask whether the verdict is “surely unattributable to the error” or whether there is any reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.

7. Accomplice, Testimony, and Hearsay (Rule 804(b)(3))

  • Accomplice: Someone who could be charged with the same crime as the defendant.
  • Testimony: In § 634.04, statements made under oath or affirmation (e.g., in court, deposition, plea hearing, affidavit).
  • Hearsay and Rule 804(b)(3):
    • Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered for its truth.
    • Rule 804(b)(3) allows admission of statements “against interest”—those that so clearly expose the declarant to legal jeopardy that a reasonable person would not say them unless true.
    • Courts must parse such statements narrowly, admitting only the parts that truly incriminate the speaker, not broad narratives that sweep in accusations against others.

X. Conclusion

State v. Steeprock is a significant recalibration of Minnesota criminal procedure on three fronts:

  • It fortifies constitutional protection for bodily DNA evidence, making clear that Rule 9.02 discovery orders cannot bypass the warrant requirement when the State seeks DNA as evidence of a crime.
  • It sharpens and narrows the inevitable discovery doctrine, overruling J.W.K. and curtailing speculative “we would have gotten a warrant” arguments, thereby aligning Minnesota’s application of the doctrine more strictly with Nix and Diede.
  • It interprets “testimony” in Minnesota’s accomplice‑corroboration statute as limited to sworn statements, reducing the situations where § 634.04 mandates corroboration, even as hearsay doctrines and confrontation principles continue to regulate unsworn accomplice statements.

The majority and dissent disagree not about the underlying constitutional violation, but about how far the exclusionary rule should extend and how rigorously inevitable discovery should be policed. That debate will shape investigations, suppression litigation, and jury instruction practice in Minnesota for years to come. On balance, Steeprock signals a judiciary willing to enforce strong procedural safeguards around bodily searches and to insist that exceptions to exclusionary remedies remain narrow, carefully justified, and grounded in concrete investigative realities rather than hypothetical alternatives.

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