Board-Appointed Physicians Do Not Control Disability Determinations Under Section 5‑156: Commentary on Moreland v. Retirement Board of the Policemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago

Board-Appointed Physicians Do Not Control Disability Determinations Under Section 5‑156: Commentary on Moreland v. Retirement Board of the Policemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago, 2025 IL 131343

Introduction

The Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Moreland v. Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago, 2025 IL 131343, addresses two recurring and practically important questions in Illinois public safety pension law:

  1. What does section 5‑156 of the Illinois Pension Code require when it says that “[p]roof of duty, occupational disease, or ordinary disability shall be furnished to the board by at least one licensed and practicing physician appointed by the board” (40 ILCS 5/5‑156)?
  2. To what extent is a police officer’s entitlement to a duty disability pension controlled by the employer’s refusal to return the officer to duty, in light of this court’s earlier “catch‑22” analysis in Kouzoukas v. Retirement Board, 234 Ill. 2d 446 (2009)?

The plaintiff, Donald B. Moreland, a Chicago police officer injured in a 2017 on‑duty traffic collision, sought duty disability benefits. His treating physicians ultimately opined that he was permanently disabled from police work, particularly due to multilevel lumbar disc pathology and associated functional limitations. A Board‑appointed orthopedic surgeon, however, concluded that Moreland had reached maximum medical improvement and could return to full, unrestricted duty.

The Retirement Board denied duty disability (and ordinary disability) benefits. The circuit court of Cook County affirmed. The Appellate Court, First District, reversed, holding that under this court’s decision in Kouzoukas, Moreland was effectively disabled because the Chicago Police Department (CPD) determined he could not return to unrestricted duty and would not offer him any position he could perform.

The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and affirmed the Board’s denial. In doing so, the court:

  • Interpreted section 5‑156 to require only that the Board obtain at least one independent medical opinion, not that a Board‑appointed physician must agree the claimant is disabled.
  • Explicitly overruled the First District’s contrary reading in Nowak v. Retirement Board of the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 315 Ill. App. 3d 403 (2000), thereby aligning disability procedures across police and firefighter funds.
  • Limited the reach of its earlier “catch‑22” analysis in Kouzoukas, holding that where the Board’s finding that an officer can perform full, unrestricted duty is not against the manifest weight of the evidence, the CPD’s refusal to reinstate does not compel an award of disability benefits.
  • Reaffirmed that it is the pension board—not any individual doctor or the employing department—that is the ultimate arbiter of disability under the Pension Code.

Summary of the Opinion

Justice Rochford, writing for a unanimous court, resolved the case in two main steps.

1. Interpretation of Section 5‑156 (¶¶ 25–33)

  • The Board argued that, under section 5‑156, a disability claim cannot succeed unless at least one Board‑appointed physician supports a finding of disability. Because Dr. Jay Levin, the Board’s only appointed physician, opined that Moreland was not disabled, the Board contended the claim necessarily failed.
  • The Appellate Court had recognized that this argument aligned with Nowak, which interpreted identical language in the firefighters’ statute (then §6‑153) as mandatory: no disability pension absent proof from a Board doctor.
  • The Supreme Court rejected that construction, invoking its earlier decision in Wade v. City of North Chicago Police Pension Board, 226 Ill. 2d 485 (2007), and held:
    • Section 5‑156 requires only that, before awarding a disability pension, the Board must receive an opinion on disability status from at least one Board‑appointed physician.
    • The Board remains the ultimate decisionmaker on disability and may credit non‑Board physicians over a Board‑appointed physician.
    • Accordingly, section 5‑156 did not compel denial of Moreland’s claim simply because Dr. Levin found him not disabled.
  • Because the firefighters’ provision (§6‑153/6‑163) is textually identical, the court held it must be interpreted the same way and therefore expressly overruled Nowak.

2. Review of the Board’s Disability Determination and Kouzoukas (¶¶ 34–50)

  • Applying manifest‑weight deference to the Board’s factual finding, the court held that:
    • The record contained conflicting medical evidence: treating surgeon Dr. Mardjetko declared Moreland permanently disabled from police work, while Board‑appointed orthopedic surgeon Dr. Levin found him fully fit for duty.
    • The Board explained why it credited Dr. Levin’s independent medical evaluation and found Moreland capable of full, unrestricted duty, including safely carrying a firearm, driving, and effectuating arrests.
    • Because Dr. Levin’s opinion provided competent support for the Board’s decision, the court could not say the opposite conclusion was “clearly evident”; thus, the denial was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
  • The court rejected the appellate court’s reliance on Kouzoukas.
    • In Kouzoukas, the Board’s finding that the officer could return to full duty was itself against the manifest weight of the evidence; the remaining issue was whether she was “disabled” given the statutory definition and the existence of possible restricted‑duty jobs that had never been offered.
    • In that context, this court held that an officer who can only work under strict limitations remains disabled where no assignment within those limitations is actually offered, to avoid a “catch‑22” (unable to work but also unable to obtain benefits).
    • In Moreland, by contrast, the predicate Board finding was that the officer could perform full, unrestricted duty, and that finding was supported by competent evidence. There was therefore no need to resort to the Kouzoukas “catch‑22” doctrine or to parse “any assigned duty.”
  • The court expressly declined to create a rule that the CPD’s refusal to reinstate an officer, standing alone, requires the Board to award disability benefits. To do so would improperly subordinate the Board’s statutory role to the employer’s internal personnel decisions.
  • Recognizing the “seeming incongruity” of an officer being judged unfit for duty by the employer but also “not disabled” by the pension board, the court cited with approval appellate decisions in Dowrick and Reed, which explain that:
    • The standards for employment fitness and for entitlement to a disability pension are distinct.
    • Different decisionmakers (employer vs. pension board) pursue different public interests (public safety vs. fund integrity).
    • As a result, inconsistent outcomes, though troubling, are a product of the statutory design and must be remedied, if at all, by the legislature—not judicial re‑drafting of the Code.

Detailed Analysis

I. Section 5‑156 and the Role of Board‑Appointed Physicians

A. Statutory Text and the Board’s Argument

Section 5‑156 provides, in relevant part (¶ 26):

“Proof of duty, occupational disease, or ordinary disability shall be furnished to the board by at least one licensed and practicing physician appointed by the board. … The board may require other evidence of disability.”

The Board read this as a substantive condition of entitlement: no disability pension may be awarded unless at least one Board‑appointed physician affirms disability. Since Dr. Levin (the only appointed doctor) found Moreland non‑disabled, the Board argued the claim necessarily failed, regardless of what treating physicians believed.

That construction tracked Nowak, which had treated the same language in the Chicago firefighters’ statute as mandatory—if a Board doctor does not certify disability, the applicant loses.

B. The Court’s Method: Statutory Construction and Harmonization

The court approached this as a pure question of statutory interpretation, reviewed de novo (¶ 27). It applied well‑established canons:

  • The “cardinal rule” is to effectuate legislative intent, primarily from the statutory language.
  • Statutes are ambiguous when reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning.
  • Related statutes should be construed in harmony, presuming a consistent legislative policy across similar provisions.
  • Courts avoid constructions that produce absurd, unjust, or wasteful results.

This analysis was anchored in the court’s prior decision in Wade, which dealt with analogous language in the downstate municipal police pension statute (§3‑115).

C. Wade and Section 3‑115: The Template (¶¶ 28–31)

Section 3‑115, governing smaller‑municipality police pensions, provides that a disability pension shall not be paid unless there are certificates of disability “by the police surgeon (if there be one) and 3 practicing physicians selected by the board” (40 ILCS 5/3‑115 (West 2002)).

Appellate districts had split on whether all three physicians had to agree on disability:

  • The First, Second, and Fourth Districts held that all three must certify disability—effectively giving any one board‑appointed physician a veto over benefits (Daily, Rizzo, Wade appellate decision).
  • The Third District in Coyne held that the statute only required three physicians to opine on disability status; the board remained free to award benefits even if one or more physicians disagreed (347 Ill. App. 3d at 729).

This court in Wade found the statute ambiguous and adopted the Coyne interpretation:

  • The phrase was reasonably read either as “certificates of disability” or as “certificates addressing the officer’s disability status” (¶ 28; Wade, 226 Ill. 2d at 511).
  • Reading the statute to require three concurring disability determinations would:
    • Make a “single physician, rather than the fund's board, the decisionmaker” (id. at 513–14).
    • Render any subsequent hearing meaningless once one dissenter appeared, because the result would be preordained regardless of the applicant’s other evidence (echoed later in Coyne, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 729).
    • Force boards to commission serial examinations until they obtained a sufficient number of favorable opinions—an unreasonable, wasteful use of public funds that the court refused to sanction (id. at 514–15).
  • The court also relied on harmonization with section 4‑112 (the firefighter analogue), which appellate courts had read as making the board, not any individual physician, the ultimate arbiter of disability.

The key holding in Wade—which the court explicitly reaffirms in Moreland—is that pension boards, not doctors, are vested with statutory authority and responsibility to determine disability. Physicians supply evidence; they do not decide entitlement.

D. Applying Wade to Section 5‑156 (¶¶ 31–32)

The court treated section 5‑156 as functionally analogous to §3‑115 and read it in light of Wade and the general public‑safety pension scheme:

  • Several statutes addressing disability pensions for emergency responders (municipal police, Chicago police, firefighters in various categories) are presumed to share “one spirit and a single policy” (¶ 31, quoting Wade).
  • It would be “inconceivable” for the legislature to deliberately subject different categories of emergency responders to substantively different disability procedures without textual indication (¶ 31, echoing Wade, 226 Ill. 2d at 513).

From that premise, the court reasoned:

  • The language “Proof … shall be furnished to the board by at least one … physician appointed by the board” is best understood as a procedural precondition:
    • Before awarding disability benefits, the board must at least obtain and consider an opinion from a Board‑appointed physician.
    • But that physician’s conclusion is not outcome‑determinative; the board can award benefits despite an adverse Board doctor’s report if the overall record supports disability.
  • This reading:
    • Preserves the board’s role as “ultimate arbiter of disability.”
    • Avoids the “summary dismissal” effect in which an adverse Board medical opinion would automatically dispose of claims, rendering hearings pointless (¶ 32, quoting Coyne’s criticism of the veto theory).
    • Prevents the wasteful scenario, condemned in Wade, where a board must keep hiring physicians until one agrees with its institutional view (§ 31–32).

The court also emphasized the Board’s own conduct in this case as revealing its practical understanding of the statute:

  • Despite Dr. Levin’s negative opinion, the Board held a full evidentiary hearing, admitted extensive records, and evaluated conflicting medical opinions (¶ 32).
  • In its written decision, the Board explicitly weighed and chose to credit Dr. Levin over treating surgeon Dr. Mardjetko, implicitly acknowledging it had discretion either way and that Dr. Levin’s view was not mechanically dispositive (¶ 32).

Had section 5‑156 operated as the Board claimed, none of that would have been necessary; the existence of any adverse Board doctor’s opinion would have ended the matter. The court regarded that result as untenable and inconsistent with legislative intent.

E. Overruling Nowak and Extending the Rule to Firefighters (¶ 33)

Nowak had interpreted the firefighters’ statute (then §6‑153, now renumbered §6‑163) to impose the very kind of doctor veto rejected in Wade and Moreland. Because §5‑156 (Chicago police) and §6‑153/6‑163 (Chicago firefighters) contain identical language on this point, the court held:

  • Both provisions must be read the same way to preserve consistency and fairness across emergency responders.
  • Nowak “employed the precise construction that we reject today,” and is therefore explicitly overruled (¶ 33).

This is a substantial doctrinal shift in the Chicago firefighters’ context and a clarifying rule for Chicago police disability claims: Board‑appointed physicians must be consulted, but they do not control the outcome.

II. Manifest Weight Review and the Board’s Factual Determination

A. The Standard of Review (¶¶ 35–36)

On administrative review, the court reviews the agency’s decision, not the circuit court’s (¶ 24, citing Marconi). Whether a claimant is disabled is a factual question, reviewed under the “manifest weight of the evidence” standard:

  • A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if “the opposite conclusion is clearly evident” (¶ 35, citing Abrahamson).
  • The agency is responsible for resolving evidentiary conflicts and evaluating witness credibility (¶ 35, citing Peterson).
  • Reviewing courts may not reweigh evidence or substitute their judgment for the agency’s; if there is some competent evidence supporting the decision, it must be upheld (¶ 35, citing Robbins).

This is a highly deferential standard. Importantly, the court reiterates that deference is “not boundless” (¶ 50, citing Wade and Kouzoukas), but still imposes a “very high burden” on challengers (¶ 50).

B. The Competing Medical Evidence

The evidence illustrated a classic conflict between treating physicians and an independent medical examiner:

  • Treating physicians:
    • Moreland suffered a significant 2017 on‑duty accident, later showing multi‑level disc herniations and disc degeneration on MRI (¶ 7).
    • He had persistent severe low back pain and spasms, and hip pathology requiring surgery (¶¶ 8–10).
    • Orthopedic surgeon Dr. Steven Mardjetko ultimately opined that Moreland was permanently disabled from police work and could not safely carry or discharge a weapon (¶ 14).
    • Other treating physicians acknowledged ongoing low back problems even as his hip improved (¶¶ 8–13).
  • Board‑appointed physician:
    • Board‑appointed orthopedic surgeon Dr. Jay Levin conducted an independent evaluation on May 10, 2022 (¶ 13).
    • He reviewed medical records and examined Moreland, concluding:
      • Moreland reached maximum medical improvement on March 7, 2022.
      • He could return to full, unrestricted duty.
      • He could maintain a stable, independent gait; safely carry and use a firearm; drive a vehicle; and effectuate an arrest of an active resister (¶ 13).

The Board credited Dr. Levin over Dr. Mardjetko, explaining that:

  • It is not required to defer to treating physicians, even though they may have “unique insight” (¶ 17).
  • It questioned whether Dr. Mardjetko knew that Moreland had successfully completed firearms qualification in March 2021 (¶ 17).

C. The Court’s Application of the Standard (¶ 36)

The Supreme Court did not say Dr. Levin’s view was more persuasive as a matter of independent judgment. Instead, applying manifest‑weight review, it asked only:

  • Is there competent evidence in the record that supports the Board’s conclusion that Moreland can perform full, unrestricted police duties?

Because Dr. Levin’s report squarely answered that question “yes,” and because the Board articulated reasons for crediting that opinion, the court held the opposite conclusion was not “clearly evident”:

  • The Board’s decision lay within its fact‑finding discretion.
  • Therefore, the denial of benefits was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

The court underscored that affirming does not mean it necessarily agreed with the Board’s weighing of the evidence; it simply means the legal threshold for reversal was not met (¶ 50).

III. Limiting the “Catch‑22” Doctrine from Kouzoukas

A. What Kouzoukas Actually Held (¶¶ 38–42)

In Kouzoukas, the court confronted a different evidentiary and procedural posture:

  • The officer suffered chronic back pain from an on‑duty injury.
  • Her treating physician said she could not perform even desk duty.
  • The Board’s doctor, Demorest, declined to give a definitive disability conclusion but thought it imprudent to return her to full unrestricted duty, although she might work under tight restrictions (e.g., frequent position changes, limited standing) (¶ 38).
  • The Board relied primarily on Dr. Spencer, whose report indicated the officer’s condition was not “incapacitating” and recommended a 20‑pound lifting limit (¶ 38).
  • The Chicago Police Department’s medical services officer testified that jobs existed that could accommodate her restrictions, but none was actually offered (¶ 38).

The court held:

  1. The Board’s finding that the officer could return to full duty “with or without restrictions” was against the manifest weight of the evidence (¶ 39).
  2. The statutory definition of “disability” in §5‑115—“a condition of physical or mental incapacity to perform any assigned duty or duties in the police service”—must be read in light of the actual positions offered to the officer:
    • If the officer can work only under specified restrictions, and positions within those restrictions are available and actually offered, then she is not disabled (and disability benefits cease).
    • But if no such position is offered, then there are no “assigned duties” she can perform, and she remains disabled within the statutory meaning.

In addressing the Board’s concern that this would make disability determinations depend on CPD’s personnel decisions, the court emphasized that, given the medical evidence and CPD’s refusal to reassign her, she had already proved disability. To deny her benefits in that posture would place her in an “untenable catch‑22”—unable to work because CPD will not assign her a suitable position, yet unable to obtain disability benefits (¶ 42).

Crucially, the “catch‑22” language came after the court had found the Board’s non‑disability finding to be factually unsustainable. The passage was directed at interpreting the term “any assigned duty” in the Code’s definition of “disability,” not at establishing a general rule that employer non‑reinstatement compels disability benefits.

B. The Appellate Court’s Misreading in Moreland (¶¶ 21, 43)

In Moreland’s case, the First District essentially treated Kouzoukas as establishing a broad rule:

  • Whenever CPD refuses to place an officer in any position because of medical limitations, the officer is in the same “catch‑22” and must be deemed disabled.
  • Therefore, even though the Board’s doctor found Moreland fully fit, CPD’s refusal to reinstate meant the Board’s denial was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

The Supreme Court found this an overreading. It held the appellate court had lifted the “catch‑22” paragraph out of the narrow statutory interpretation context in which it arose (¶ 44).

C. The Supreme Court’s Clarification (¶¶ 44–47)

The court re‑articulated the limited principle of Kouzoukas:

  • Step 1 – Factual determination of disability:
    • The pension board, as factfinder, first determines whether the officer is disabled on the evidence (subject to manifest‑weight review).
  • Step 2 – Application of statutory definition:
    • If the officer is able to work only with restrictions, the question becomes whether there are “assigned duties” the officer can perform.
    • If the employer actually offers a job within those restrictions, the officer is no longer “disabled” under the Code and benefits cease (¶ 45, summarizing Kouzoukas’s remedial directive).
    • If the employer does not offer such a job, the officer remains disabled within the statutory meaning—avoiding the catch‑22.

In Moreland, by contrast, the factual predicate is different:

  • Here, the Board found—and the court upheld—that Moreland could perform full, unrestricted duties (¶¶ 36, 46).
  • Thus, there was no need to move to step 2; there was no set of restrictions to accommodate, and no interpretive issue about “any assigned duty.”

The court explained that importing the Kouzoukas “catch‑22” reasoning into this context would effectively mean:

  • Whenever CPD declines to reinstate an officer for medical reasons, the Board would be compelled to find the officer disabled.
  • That would be true even if the Board, after considering competent medical evidence, reasonably concluded the officer could perform full duty.

Such a rule would:

  • Have “no foundation in the statute” (¶ 46).
  • Invert the statutory design by giving the employer’s personnel decision pre‑eminence over the Board’s disability determination.
  • Conflict with the principle, reaffirmed from Wade, that it is the pension board—not a single physician, and not the employer—that determines disability (¶ 46–47).

IV. Employer Fitness vs. Pension Disability: The Dowrick / Reed Line

A. The “Incongruity” Problem (¶¶ 47–49)

The court confronted head‑on the troubling practical situation presented by this and similar cases:

  • An officer can be denied reinstatement by CPD as medically unfit, yet denied a disability pension by the Board as not disabled.

At first glance, this appears internally inconsistent. However, the court adopted and endorsed appellate analysis from two firefighter cases, Dowrick and Reed.

B. Dowrick (Second District) (¶ 47)

In Dowrick, a firefighter was denied a disability pension by the pension board but then discharged by the municipal board of police and fire commissioners for being unable (or unwilling) to perform firefighting duties. He argued that the pension board’s no‑disability finding should be res judicata for his employment discharge.

The appellate court rejected that argument and noted:

  • Though “incongruous,” it is entirely possible for:
    • A firefighter to be discharged for being unfit, yet
    • Not meet the statutory threshold for a disability pension.
  • This divergence flows from the legislature’s decision to set a higher bar for pension eligibility than for employment discharge, reflecting different policy concerns:
    • Employment decisions prioritize public safety and operational readiness.
    • Pension decisions must protect the solvency and integrity of the fund and the interests of participants and beneficiaries.

C. Reed (First District) (¶ 48)

Reed involved a similar conflict:

  • The pension board determined the firefighter was not disabled and denied a duty disability pension.
  • The Chicago Fire Department, by contrast, found him unfit to perform essential duties and denied reinstatement.

The appellant argued this dual denial was unfair, but the appellate court adopted Dowrick’s reasoning. It highlighted that:

  • The municipality’s interest in ensuring fitness for duty can diverge from the pension board’s interest in safeguarding fund resources.

The Supreme Court in Moreland endorses this rationale:

  • It acknowledges the resulting hardship as “difficult and frustrating” (¶ 49).
  • But it reiterates that this is the product of the statutory framework, not judicial choice.
  • Any realignment—e.g., tying pension eligibility more tightly to employer disability determinations—must come from the legislature, not from judicial rewriting of the Pension Code (¶ 49, invoking Roselle Police Pension Board on judicial restraint in statutory revision).

V. Impact and Future Implications

A. For Pension Boards (Police and Fire)

  1. No doctor veto under §§5‑156 and 6‑163.
    • Boards cannot treat an adverse Board‑appointed physician’s opinion as automatically dispositive.
    • They must:
      • Obtain at least one independent medical opinion.
      • Hold meaningful hearings where necessary.
      • Weigh all medical and non‑medical evidence, including treating doctors’ views and employment records.
  2. Discretion to grant benefits over Board‑doctor opposition.
    • Boards now have explicit Supreme Court confirmation that they may award disability benefits even if the Board’s own physician finds no disability, provided the rest of the record compellingly supports disability.
    • This increases the importance of transparent, reasoned written decisions explaining how conflicting evidence was evaluated.
  3. Heightened responsibility and fiduciary duty.
    • The court reiterates that boards owe a fiduciary duty to participants and beneficiaries (¶ 50, citing Wade).
    • Deference is “not boundless”: manifestly unsupported non‑disability findings, as in Kouzoukas, will be reversed.
    • Boards that reflexively prefer one category of doctor (e.g., their own examiners) without explanation risk reversal when the record tilts clearly the other way.

B. For Claimants and Their Counsel

  1. Section 5‑156 is no longer a formal obstacle.
    • Claimants are not automatically disqualified merely because a Board‑appointed physician finds no disability.
    • They can win if they can persuade the Board (and, on review, the courts) that the Board doctor is less credible or less complete than treating physicians or other experts.
  2. But the standard of review remains very demanding.
    • On judicial review, counsel must show that the opposite conclusion is “clearly evident”—a high bar.
    • Therefore, strategic emphasis should be on:
      • Building a strong, well‑documented record before the Board.
      • Highlighting internal inconsistencies or omissions in Board‑appointed reports.
      • Questioning Board doctors effectively at the hearing, if possible.
  3. Employer non‑reinstatement is persuasive but not dispositive.
    • After Moreland, CPD’s refusal to reinstate—even explicitly on medical grounds—does not automatically compel a disability award.
    • Such decisions are still relevant evidence of functional limitations and risk, but they do not substitute for medical proof of disability under the Pension Code.
    • Where an officer can only work under limitations, and CPD refuses to offer an accommodating position, Kouzoukas remains powerful authority for arguing that the officer is legally disabled.

C. For Firefighters and Their Funds

By overruling Nowak, Moreland ensures that Chicago firefighters operate under the same interpretive rule as Chicago police and downstate police/firefighters:

  • Board‑appointed physicians’ opinions must be obtained but do not possess legal veto power.
  • Firefighters can challenge board decisions that treat an adverse independent medical exam as dispositive without considering the full evidentiary record.

This harmonization reduces forum‑dependent disparities and further entrenches the principle that disability is a board decision, informed—but not controlled—by physicians.

D. Potential Legislative Responses

The court takes care to signal that some perceived unfairness in the system is structural rather than doctrinal:

  • The misalignment between CPD’s fitness determinations and the Board’s disability findings is a direct consequence of:
    • Different statutory standards;
    • Different institutional missions; and
    • Different evidence and experts relied upon.
  • If the General Assembly wishes to avoid scenarios where an officer is “too disabled to work but not disabled enough for a pension,” it could:
    • More tightly link pension eligibility to employer disability findings;
    • Create intermediate benefit categories; or
    • Adjust definitions of “disability” or “assigned duty.”

However, until such reforms are enacted, courts will continue to enforce the statutes as written, with the roles and standards delineated in Moreland.

Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Manifest Weight of the Evidence”

This is a deferential standard used when reviewing factual findings of an administrative agency:

  • The question is not: “Do we, as reviewing judges, find the facts differently?”
  • The question is: “Is the decision so unsupported by the evidence that the opposite conclusion is clearly evident?”

If reasonable minds could differ and there is some competent evidence supporting the agency’s view, the decision stands—even if another view might be more persuasive to a different decisionmaker.

2. Role of Board‑Appointed Physicians

Under section 5‑156 (and analogous provisions):

  • The Board must have at least one independent physician examine the claimant and opine on disability.
  • That opinion is evidence, not a decision. The Board may:
    • Agree with the Board doctor;
    • Disagree, preferring treating physicians or other experts;
    • Or find that the totality of evidence points in a different direction.

The Supreme Court’s main point is that physicians do not possess a statutory veto: pension boards must decide.

3. “Disability” and “Any Assigned Duty”

In Article 5 (Chicago police pensions), “disability” is defined as:

“A condition of physical or mental incapacity to perform any assigned duty or duties in the police service.” (40 ILCS 5/5‑115)

After Kouzoukas and as clarified in Moreland:

  • Being unable to perform full patrol duties does not automatically constitute “disability” if there are other police duties an officer can perform.
  • But if an officer can only perform limited duties and:
    • There are positions within those limitations and CPD offers one → officer is not disabled and benefits can cease.
    • There are no such positions, or CPD does not offer them → officer is disabled; denying benefits would create the “catch‑22” recognized in Kouzoukas.

In Moreland, because the Board found the officer capable of full duties, the analysis never reached this definition‑splitting stage; the only question was whether that finding was supportable on the evidence.

4. “Catch‑22” in Pension Law

A “catch‑22” situation, as used in Kouzoukas, describes a self‑defeating loop:

  • The officer is too disabled to be given any job she can perform (so cannot work and earn wages), but
  • The pension board says she is not disabled because theoretically she could perform some job, if only such a job were offered.

Kouzoukas holds that the Pension Code should not be interpreted to produce that paradox. If no actual position is offered within an officer’s medically required restrictions, she remains “disabled” for pension purposes.

Moreland clarifies that this doctrine does not apply where the Board has supportable evidence that the officer can perform full, unrestricted duty.

Conclusion

Moreland v. Retirement Board is a significant clarification of Illinois pension law for Chicago police and, by extension through the overruling of Nowak, Chicago firefighters. The case establishes two central propositions:

  1. Section 5‑156 does not give Board‑appointed physicians a veto over disability pensions. The statute requires consultation with at least one such doctor but leaves the ultimate disability determination to the pension board, which must weigh all evidence in light of its fiduciary duties.
  2. The “catch‑22” analysis of Kouzoukas is limited to situations where an officer has already been shown, on the evidence, to be unable to perform full duty and can work only with restrictions. Employer refusal to reinstate, standing alone, does not compels a finding of disability; the Board’s factual determinations remain subject to manifest‑weight review, not to CPD’s personnel decisions.

At the same time, the court candidly acknowledges the structural tension created when one body deems an officer unfit for service and another deems the same officer not disabled for pension purposes. By insisting that any reconciliation of these outcomes must come from the legislature, not judicial rewriting, Moreland both clarifies the current law and delineates the proper institutional channels for reform.

Going forward, pension boards must exercise their fact‑finding authority with carefully reasoned decisions that reflect thoughtful engagement with both independent and treating medical opinions. Claimants must recognize that while an adverse Board medical exam is not fatal, prevailing in the face of such evidence requires a compelling record. And courts will continue to afford substantial—but not uncritical—deference to pension board determinations, intervening only where the record makes the opposite conclusion clearly evident.

Case Details

Comments