Bledsoe v. FCA US, LLC – Sixth Circuit Refines the Two-Step Test for Clean Air Act Conflict-Preemption and Confirms a Safe-Harbor for Fuel-Economy Misrepresentation Claims

Introduction

In James Bledsoe v. FCA US, LLC (6th Cir. Aug. 8, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit confronted a sprawling “clean-diesel” consumer-fraud class action aimed at Dodge RAM 2500/3500 trucks equipped with Cummins 6.7-liter diesel engines. The plaintiffs alleged that FCA and Cummins (1) misrepresented the trucks’ emissions and fuel-economy performance, (2) concealed defeat-device software, and (3) orchestrated a RICO enterprise to boost sales. The key battleground was federal preemption: did the Clean Air Act (CAA) bar state-law fraud and consumer-protection theories that—even if styled as fraud on consumers—would inevitably require a jury to second-guess decisions already made by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)?

Against the backdrop of a rapidly evolving line of Sixth Circuit precedents—In re Ford F-150 (2023), Fenner v. GM (2024), and Counts v. GM (2025)—the panel both affirmed and limited a district-court judgment that had wiped out the case on preemption and RICO standing grounds. The opinion, penned by Judge Chad Readler, crystallises a new, clearer framework for lower courts:

1. Two-Step Preemption Test. A state claim survives only if (i) no part of its “syllogism” challenges or implicates an EPA determination, and (ii) all supporting evidence exists independently of EPA standards.
2. Fuel-Economy Safe-Harbor. Where federal law exempts heavy-duty trucks (> 8,500 lbs.) from EPA fuel-economy labelling, manufacturers’ voluntary advertising of fuel-economy figures is not shielded by conflict-preemption.
3. RICO Indirect-Purchaser Bar Restated. Following Fenner, indirect purchasers lack RICO standing even when they seek damages other than passed-on overcharges.

Summary of the Judgment

• State-Law Emissions Theories
  • Claims pegged to alleged violations of EPA standards or certificate-of-conformity requirements preempted (affirmed).
  • Claims based on comparisons to (i) gasoline counterparts, (ii) reasonable consumer expectations, or (iii) defendants’ own advertising revived (reversed) because they can, at least plausibly, rest on non-EPA baselines.
• Fuel-Economy Misrepresentation/Omission Theories
  • Not preempted, because heavy-duty trucks are exempt from federal fuel-economy disclosure and the challenged statements were voluntary marketing, not EPA-vetted figures.
• RICO Claims
  • Summary judgment for FCA/Cummins affirmed; the indirect-purchaser rule forecloses standing.
• Disposition — Affirmed in part (RICO & certain emissions theories), reversed in part (consumer-based emissions and fuel-economy theories), and remanded for a record-specific preemption and merits review under the newly articulated framework.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. In re Ford Motor Co. F-150 & Ranger Fuel-Economy Litig., 65 F.4th 851 (6th Cir. 2023)
   First major statement that fraud-on-the-EPA theories are conflict-preempted whenever adjudication would place a jury “in the EPA’s regulatory shoes.” The Ford panel treated EPA-approved MPG estimates as sacrosanct federal determinations that state juries may not revisit.
2. Fenner v. General Motors, LLC, 113 F.4th 585 (6th Cir. 2024)
   Introduced the distinction between (a) theories dependent on EPA compliance and (b) theories rooted solely in consumer-facing conduct (ads, omissions, reasonable expectations). It let the latter survive Rule 12(b)(6), but left open record-specific challenges at later stages.
3. Counts v. General Motors, LLC, 139 F.4th 576 (6th Cir. 2025)
   Harmonised perceived tension between Ford and Fenner, establishing the “two-prong” approach (syllogism + evidence independence) now formalised in Bledsoe. It also emphasised remand for record-development rather than appellate fact-finding.

2. Legal Reasoning in Bledsoe

1. Conflict-Preemption Framework Refined

   The panel reiterates that the CAA contains no express preemption clause for state fraud claims, so only implied conflict preemption applies. Drawing heavily from Counts, it articulates a two-step test:
   • Step 1 (Syllogism Independence): The elements of the state claim must not require proving the EPA got it wrong.
   • Step 2 (Evidentiary Independence): The proofs offered must not rely on EPA standards or test results.
   If either fails, the claim “poses an impermissible legal challenge to the EPA’s determination” and is barred.

2. Emissions Theories Parsed

   The court grouped plaintiffs’ five pleaded emissions “benchmarks”:

   • (iv) & (v) — EPA max standards and certificate-of-conformity levels ➔ preempted under Ford.
   • (i)-(iii) — Gasoline counterparts, reasonable consumer, advertised claims ➔ not facially preempted; district court must now test them under the two-step framework with actual record evidence.
3. Fuel-Economy Distinction

   Heavy-duty trucks (> 8,500 lbs.) fall outside 49 U.S.C. § 32908’s EPA labelling regime. Hence, unlike the Ford F-150 case, FCA’s 30 % fuel-savings statements were not federally mandated or vetted. The court therefore refused to extend Ford’s preemption to optional marketing speech. The opinion analogises to Wyeth v. Levine, where voluntary branding choices escape preemption even in a heavily regulated space.

4. RICO Standing Applied

   Plaintiffs bought from dealers (direct purchasers), not the alleged enterprise—FCA/Cummins. Following Illinois Brick antitrust doctrine adopted into civil-RICO, Bledsoe repeats that indirect purchasers have no standing, regardless of damage theory (Fenner control).

3. Likely Impact of the Decision

• Clarifies Litigation Playbook. Plaintiffs’ counsel now know they must plead—and ultimately prove—non-EPA baselines and independent evidence (e.g., real-world testing, consumer surveys) to survive CAA conflict-preemption.
• Narrows Defendants’ Automatic-Preemption Defense. Manufacturers can no longer rely solely on the presence of an EPA certificate to knock-out all emission/fuel-economy claims at the pleading stage when dealing with heavy-duty vehicles.
• Creates Fuel-Economy Advertising Exposure. Because heavy-duty trucks are exempt from federal MPG labelling, any voluntary MPG marketing is now squarely subject to state consumer-protection law, without a preemption shield.
• Uniforms RICO Indirect-Purchaser Rule. By reaffirming Fenner, the decision cements a bright-line bar in the Sixth Circuit: buyers one step removed from the alleged racketeering enterprise lack civil-RICO standing.
• District-Court Roadmap. The remand instructions resemble a checklist, effectively standardising how trial courts within the circuit must parse future “clean diesel” and related eco-marketing cases.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Conflict Preemption

When state law would either (a) make it impossible to comply with federal law, or (b) undermine Congress’s policy goals, federal law “wins” and the state law is displaced.

Certificate of Conformity

An EPA “passport” allowing a manufacturer to sell each model year of a vehicle/engine. Without it, sales are illegal. Secured after lab tests and disclosures on design features (including AECDs).

Auxiliary Emission Control Device (AECD) & Defeat Device

An AECD manipulates emissions controls under certain conditions (e.g., cold start). If the manipulation unjustifiably reduces effectiveness in normal use, it becomes an illegal “defeat device.”

Indirect-Purchaser Rule

Only the party that buys directly from the wrong-doer may sue for price-related injuries; downstream buyers are “indirect” and lack standing in federal antitrust—and now, in the Sixth Circuit, RICO—actions.

Conclusion

does not deliver a total victory to either side. Instead, it threads a doctrinal needle, synthesising three recent precedents into a practical two-step test that respects EPA primacy while preserving state-law space for consumer-fraud redress. It also erects a clear marker: voluntary fuel-economy claims for heavy-duty trucks stand or fall purely under state law. Finally, the decision closes any loopholes in RICO standing for indirect purchasers.

For litigators, regulators, and automakers alike, the opinion offers a definitive roadmap: plead with independent baselines, prove with independent evidence, and expect courts to police the line between permissible consumer-oriented claims and impermissible EPA second-guessing. As environmental marketing and vehicle software grow ever more complex, Bledsoe v. FCA US will likely become the Sixth Circuit’s touchstone for balancing federal environmental oversight against state consumer-protection enforcement.