Binding Effect of Original Criminal History Category in Supervised Release Revocations

Introduction

United States v. Roderic Bodiford, decided May 2, 2025 by the Eleventh Circuit, addresses two critical questions in supervised-release revocation: first, whether the Government met its burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Bodiford possessed cocaine with intent to distribute; second, whether a district court may recalibrate a defendant’s criminal history category based on retroactive guideline amendments when imposing a revocation sentence. The parties are the United States as Plaintiff-Appellee and Roderic Bodiford ("Rock") as Defendant-Appellant. Bodiford’s original sentence (2013) included imprisonment and five years of supervised release with a mandatory condition against committing any new crime. Following a traffic stop and on-the-run discovery of a cocaine “cookie,” the district court found a Grade A violation, revoked supervised release, and imposed a 30-month prison term using Bodiford’s original Criminal History Category III. Bodiford challenged (1) the sufficiency of the evidence on the intent-to-distribute finding and (2) the district court’s refusal to apply retroactively amended guidelines to reduce his history to Category II. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on both counts.

Summary of the Judgment

The court first held that the evidence—circumstantial proof of a freshly discarded 25-gram cocaine package along Bodiford’s flight path, possession of $1,100 cash and multiple cell phones, and professional testimony on distributable amounts—was sufficient by a preponderance to find possession with intent to distribute. Reviewing factual findings for clear error and discretionary revocation determinations for abuse of discretion, the court found no error. Second, the court concluded as a matter of guideline interpretation that U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a)(2) unambiguously requires a district court to employ the criminal history category “applicable at the time the defendant originally was sentenced to a term of supervision.” It therefore rejected Bodiford’s call to apply Amendment 821 retroactively in the revocation context and affirmed the use of Category III.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

United States v. Frazier, 26 F.3d 110 (11th Cir. 1994): Established the abuse-of-discretion standard for supervised-release revocation.
United States v. Almand, 992 F.2d 316 (11th Cir. 1993): Held that a district court’s factual findings in supervised-release hearings are binding unless clearly erroneous.
United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) & United States v. Cunningham, 800 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2015): Clarified de novo review of guideline interpretation in revocation sentences.
United States v. Poole, 878 F.2d 1389 (11th Cir. 1989): Allowed intent to distribute to be shown by circumstantial evidence.
United States v. Mercer, 541 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2008): Recognized large sums of cash as a factor indicating intent to distribute.
United States v. Steed, 548 F.3d 961 (11th Cir. 2008) & United States v. Martinez, 509 F. App’x 889 (11th Cir. 2013): Confirmed that multiple cell phones support an inference of drug-trafficking communications.
Hollis v. United States, 958 F.3d 1120 (11th Cir. 2020): Interpreted Georgia’s 28-gram threshold for cocaine trafficking.

Legal Reasoning

The court applied a two-step framework. First, it reviewed the district court’s finding of intent to distribute under the preponderance standard. Circumstantial factors—the undisturbed nature of the “cookie,” its proximity to Bodiford’s path, his attempts to evade police, possession of cash and phones, and expert opinion on distributable amounts—provided ample support. Under Almand and Frazier, these facts were neither clearly erroneous nor an abuse of discretion to warrant revocation.

Second, on the guideline question, the court interpreted U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a)(2), which specifies that at revocation the district court uses “the category applicable at the time the defendant originally was sentenced to a term of supervision.” Although Amendment 821 retroactively reduces certain history scores, the court concluded that § 7B1.4’s text and its comment n.1 unambiguously foreclose retroactive recalculation in the revocation context. Amendment 821 remains available only under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for resentence motions on the original term of imprisonment, not for altering revocation sentencing tables.

Impact

This decision solidifies circuit precedent that supervised-release revocations must rely on the defendant’s original criminal history category, insulating revocation sentencing from subsequent guideline amendments. It forecloses lower courts from applying retroactive changes when calculating revocation ranges, thereby ensuring consistency and predictability in revocation outcomes. Criminal practitioners will need to pursue any guideline-based relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) rather than during supervised-release proceedings. Future litigants will face a clear standard: challenges to history categories in revocation must be tied to the time of original sentencing.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Supervised Release Revocation: A hearing to determine if a released defendant violated release conditions; uses a lower “preponderance of the evidence” standard, not beyond a reasonable doubt.
Criminal History Category: A score (I–VI) reflecting past convictions; affects guideline sentencing ranges.
Retroactive Guideline Amendments: Changes to sentencing rules that sometimes apply retroactively to existing sentences via 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).
Grade A Violation: The most serious supervised-release breach (e.g., new felony possession), triggering higher revocation ranges.
Preponderance of the Evidence: More likely than not; the standard for proving supervised-release violations.

Conclusion

United States v. Bodiford reaffirms that (1) circumstantial evidence may suffice to establish intent to distribute at a supervised-release revocation hearing, and (2) district courts are bound to the criminal history category assessed at the time of the original sentence, regardless of later retroactive guideline amendments. This clear rule promotes uniformity in revocation sentencing and delineates the proper avenues for defendants seeking guideline relief. The Eleventh Circuit’s decision will guide practitioners and courts in handling supervised-release violations and sentencing calculations for years to come.