Beyond the Mis-Instruction: Eleventh Circuit Clarifies that Erroneous “Unlawful-Activity” Stand-Your-Ground Charge Does Not, Without More, Establish Strickland Prejudice

Introduction

Larry Felton White, Jr., a Florida inmate serving life for second-degree murder, sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. His core complaint was narrow but potent: during his 2014 retrial the jury was told—contrary to the 2006 version of Florida’s Stand-Your-Ground statute in force when the shooting occurred—that deadly force is not justified if the defendant is “engaged in an unlawful activity.” Trial counsel did not object, and appellate counsel did not raise the issue. White argued that this lapse violated the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied relief but granted a limited certificate of appealability on the trial-counsel aspect. On 13 August 2025, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that—even assuming the disputed instruction was wrong—White could not satisfy the “prejudice” prong of Strickland v. Washington.

Summary of the Judgment

1. AEDPA Deference. The panel found it unnecessary to decide whether the state courts’ rejection of White’s claim was entitled to §2254(d) deference because, even under de novo review, the claim failed.
2. No Strickland Deficiency. Trial counsel’s failure to object to a then-standard jury instruction, uninvalidated by Florida’s highest court, was not objectively unreasonable.
3. No Strickland Prejudice. Removing the offending language would not reasonably have altered the verdict. The factual record—particularly evidence that the victim retreated and White pursued him 175 feet before firing—overwhelmingly negated self-defense.
4. Scope of Appealability. Because the district court granted a certificate of appealability (COA) only on the trial-counsel issue, the appellate-counsel argument was beyond the Eleventh Circuit’s jurisdiction absent a timely motion to expand the COA, which White never filed.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Provides the two-part test (deficiency and prejudice). The centerpiece of the court’s reasoning.
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011); Shinn v. Kayer, 592 U.S. 111 (2020). Emphasize AEDPA’s demanding “fair-minded disagreement” threshold. Cited to show the uphill battle habeas petitioners face.
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111 (2009). Authorizes federal courts to bypass AEDPA deference and deny relief on de novo grounds when a claim clearly fails on the merits.
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011); Sears v. Warden, 73 F.4th 1269 (11th Cir. 2023). Supply the doctrinal scaffolding for AEDPA analysis.
Florida decisions: White v. State, 16 So. 3d 1004 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (first conviction reversed); Eady v. State, 229 So. 3d 434 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (post-2014 Stand-Your-Ground amendments not retroactive). Support White’s substantive argument that the “unlawful-activity” limitation was legally inapplicable.

Legal Reasoning Explained

No Automatic Deficiency for Accepting a Standard Instruction. The Court reaffirmed an often-overlooked premise: a lawyer is ordinarily entitled to rely on unchallenged pattern instructions. Until the Florida Supreme Court or legislature says otherwise, failing to object is rarely per se unreasonable.
Prejudice Analysis Dominates. Even conceding arguendo that counsel’s performance was sub-optimal, the dispositive issue was whether the jury would likely have acquitted had the “unlawful-activity” clause been omitted. The Court found the answer “no” because:
- Multiple eyewitnesses testified that the victim fled and was shot while scaling a fence.
- The medical examiner placed one shot squarely in the back of the victim’s head at eighteen inches.
- White’s own testimony was impeached by four significant inconsistencies, undercutting his credibility.
- Florida law (both 2006 and 2014 versions) denies immunity if the aggressor clearly withdraws and the defendant re-initiates force—exactly what the State showed.
Limited Appellate Jurisdiction. The decision also functions as a primer on COA mechanics: issues not certified and not subject to a timely motion to expand fall outside the court’s remit.

Potential Impact on Future Litigation

The decision is unpublished but still instructive. Practitioners should note:

Pattern Jury Instructions & Ineffective Assistance. Challenges to counsel’s reliance on standard charges face stiff headwinds absent controlling precedent deeming the charge erroneous.
Self-Defense Claims on Federal Habeas. Even clear trial-level errors tied to evolving self-defense statutes must still satisfy the hefty prejudice showing.
COA Strategy. Petitioners and counsel must secure a COA (or move to expand one) on every issue they wish to argue on appeal.
State Revisions to Stand-Your-Ground Laws. Retroactivity battles are likely to recur; this case demonstrates that—even if an error is conceded—relief will hinge on Strickland prejudice.

Complex Concepts Simplified

AEDPA Deference. Federal courts review state decisions through a lens that asks, “Was the state court not just wrong, but unreasonably wrong?”
Strickland Deficiency vs. Prejudice. Deficiency asks, “Was the lawyer’s conduct objectively unreasonable?” Prejudice asks, “Did that mistake probably change the outcome?” Both must be proved.
Stand-Your-Ground (2006 vs. 2014). In 2006, a Floridian could use deadly force if he reasonably feared imminent death or great bodily harm, regardless of being in the midst of minor illegality (e.g., trespass). The 2014 amendment removed immunity from people engaged in any criminal activity at the moment force was used.
Certificate of Appealability (COA). A jurisdictional gateway requiring a petitioner to show a debatable constitutional claim before the court of appeals can examine it.

Conclusion

Larry White’s habeas appeal underscores the formidable barriers erected by AEDPA and Strickland. Even where an instruction misstates state law, counsel’s failure to object will rarely merit federal relief unless the petitioner can show a reasonable probability of a different verdict. The Eleventh Circuit’s decision fortifies two practical rules: (1) reliance on standard jury instructions generally insulates defense counsel from per se ineffectiveness claims, and (2) overwhelming evidence of guilt will eclipse most allegations of prejudice stemming from trial-level errors. For litigants challenging convictions predicated on evolving self-defense statutes, the opinion is a stark reminder: establishing legal error is only half the battle—showing that the error mattered is the other, often insurmountable, half.