Beyond the Interstate Compact: Alaska Supreme Court Holds ICPC Inapplicable When a Child Is Properly Released to a Parent Under AS 47.14.100(p)

Beyond the Interstate Compact: Alaska Supreme Court Holds ICPC Inapplicable When a Child Is Properly Released to a Parent Under AS 47.14.100(p)

Introduction

Native Village of Saint Michael v. State of Alaska, Department of Family & Community Services, Office of Children’s Services (No. 7777, July 25 2025) is a precedential Alaska Supreme Court opinion that clarifies the interaction between two bodies of child-protection law:

  • the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children (ICPC), AS 47.70.010–.080; and
  • Alaska Statute 47.14.100(p), which allows the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) to release a child in its custody to a parent when a court finds such release to be in the child’s best interests.

The dispute arose after OCS sought to reunify two Indian children, Caleb and Milo (pseudonyms), with their father Brian K., who had completed his case plan and travelled to Alaska to take physical custody. Although the receiving state had denied an ICPC home-study request, OCS moved the superior court for an in-state release of custody under AS 47.14.100(p) while Brian was still present in Alaska. The Tribe opposed, contending that ICPC compliance and the receiving state’s approval were mandatory prerequisites. The superior court disagreed, released custody, and dismissed the Child-in-Need-of-Aid (CINA) case. The Tribe appealed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed. The Court held that when OCS properly releases custody to a parent under AS 47.14.100(p):

  1. The ICPC’s interstate approval procedures do not apply, even if the parent subsequently intends to relocate the child to another state; and
  2. Once the release occurs and the CINA case is dismissed, OCS’s jurisdiction ends; there is nothing for the ICPC to regulate.

The Court further concluded that, although the case had become moot (because the children had already been released and the CINA matter dismissed), the ICPC question satisfied the “public-interest exception” to mootness and warranted decision.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

  • Reed S. v. State (2022) and Peter A. v. State (2006) – addressed mootness in CINA appeals and framed the “public-interest exception.” These cases guided the Court’s decision to reach the ICPC question even though the underlying controversy had evaporated.
  • Clementine F. v. State (2016) – distinguished between “placing” a child (ongoing state oversight) and “releasing” a child (termination of state custody). This distinction was central to construing the term “placement” in the ICPC.
  • Ward v. State (2012) – reiterated Alaska’s plain-meaning approach to statutory interpretation, which the Court used to parse the ICPC text.
  • Out-of-state authorities – The Court surveyed decisions such as In re R.S. (Md. 2020), Leonardo (Ariz. 2001), and IDHW v. Doe (Idaho 2023) to illustrate divergent national approaches but ultimately relied on the ICPC’s plain language and Alaska statutory context.

2. Legal Reasoning

a. Statutory Construction of the ICPC

  • The ICPC’s approval mechanism applies only to children sent “for placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption.” (Art. III(a)).
  • “Placement” is further defined as an arrangement “for the care of a child in a family free or boarding home or in a child-caring agency or institution” – wording that presupposes ongoing state oversight.
  • The Compact also requires the “sending agency” to retain jurisdiction “during the period of the placement” (Art. V), a concept incompatible with a court-approved release that divests the state of custody.
  • Art. VIII(a) expressly excludes the act of a parent “sending or bringing” a child into a receiving state and keeping the child with a relative or non-agency guardian – supporting the conclusion that fully restored parents are outside the Compact’s scope.

b. Interaction with AS 47.14.100(p)

  • AS 47.14.100(p) allows OCS, with court approval and upon explicit best-interest findings, to terminate its custodial role by releasing a child under 16 to a parent.
  • Once custody is released, OCS no longer has “placement” authority; therefore, no sending agency remains to trigger the ICPC.
  • Reading ICPC approval into AS 47.14.100(p) would impermissibly add a requirement the Alaska Legislature did not include – contravening separation-of-powers principles (Yute Air Alaska v. McAlpine, 1985).

c. Public-Interest Mootness

  • The Court found the issue “capable of repetition yet evading review” because similar disputes can reoccur whenever OCS seeks to reunify children with an out-of-state parent.
  • Clear guidance benefits tribes, parents, courts, and OCS practitioners who regularly navigate interstate reunifications.

3. Impact on Future Cases and on Alaska Child-Protection Law

  • Clarified Path to Reunification. OCS can confidently seek a court-approved release under AS 47.14.100(p) without awaiting out-of-state ICPC clearance – provided it can establish current parental fitness and best interests.
  • Limits on Interstate Veto Power. Other states’ agencies cannot effectively block Alaskan courts from terminating state custody once Alaska’s statutory criteria are satisfied.
  • Practical Shift for Tribes and Guardians ad Litem. Parties opposing reunification must focus on best-interest evidence and parental fitness rather than ICPC technicalities.
  • Judicial Economy. By eliminating a potentially lengthy interstate process where unnecessary, the decision may shorten time-in-care and advance permanency – a core CINA objective.
  • Potential National Influence. Other compact states confronting similar fact patterns may look to this decision and re-evaluate their own ICPC statutes or administrative practices.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • ICPC (Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children): An agreement among all 50 states governing how child-protection agencies move children across state lines for foster care or adoption, ensuring safety and continuity of oversight.
  • AS 47.14.100(p): An Alaska statute allowing OCS to release (i.e., terminate) state custody of a child under 16, but only after (1) filing a motion explaining why release is in the child’s best interest and (2) obtaining a written best-interest finding from the superior court.
  • “Placement” vs. “Release”: A placement implies ongoing state supervision; a release ends state custody, giving the parent full legal authority.
  • Public-Interest Exception to Mootness: A doctrine allowing appellate courts to decide issues that would otherwise be moot when (i) likely to recur, (ii) likely to evade review, and (iii) important to the public.
  • CINA (Child-in-Need-of-Aid) Case: An Alaska proceeding governing children alleged to suffer parental neglect or abuse; during the case, the court oversees OCS’s efforts toward reunification or alternative permanency.
  • ICWA (Indian Child Welfare Act): A federal statute that grants tribes certain rights and imposes heightened standards in child-custody matters involving Indian children.

Conclusion

The Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in Native Village of Saint Michael v. State, DFCS, OCS decisively delineates the boundary between Alaska’s release-of-custody statute and the ICPC. When a parent has regained full parental fitness and a superior court makes the requisite best-interest findings under AS 47.14.100(p), the ICPC’s interstate approval mechanism no longer applies—even if the parent resides in, or intends to move to, another state. The ruling preserves judicial discretion, accelerates permanency for children, and prevents out-of-state agencies from vetoing Alaska courts’ best-interest determinations. Going forward, litigants must frame their arguments squarely around parental capability and the child’s welfare, not around ICPC technicalities, whenever a release of custody is contemplated.

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